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S u m m a r y
Modern biotechnology has been transformed from a largely academic pursuit to a 
multi billion-dollar commercial bio-industry that is seen as one of the foundations of 
the knowledge economy. The sequencing of the human genome is seen as one of the 
great achievements of contemporary science. Though narratives of the sequencing of 
the human genome concentrate on the leading figures, the Human Genome Project 
was the achievement of big science. Big science represents the transformation of 
scientific work from a craft-based adhocracy into a form of work conducted within 
bureaucratic organisations that employ huge teams of scientists and technicians with 
a proliferation of specialised roles. This ‘industrialisation’ of science led many to 
describe the Human Genome Project as involving ‘production line’ efforts, 
‘sequencing mills’ and an ‘Industrial Revolution’ for biology.
This thesis investigates the experience of work at the Institute, a large-scale 
sequencing centre. Entering the ‘hidden abode’ of production, the study examines 
the sequence of the human genome as an achievement of labour, rather than the 
product of ‘great men’. Interviews were conducted with a range of people across the 
‘sequencing chain of production’. The study finds that work at the Institute was quite 
unlike the dehumanising, alienating work that might be expected as a result of the 
‘industrialisation’ of science. Rather, the work of sequencing genomes recruited the 
sentiments o f those working at the Institute, producing committed workers. This 
thesis examines the generation of commitment at the Institute in comparison to ‘high 
road’ models of work organisation. Given the central role of the sequence of the 
human genome in the future of biotechnology as a key sector in the knowledge 
economy, the Institute is considered with regard to debates around the future of work 
in technologically advanced economies.
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P a r t  O n e : P r i m e r s  a n d  P r e s e n t i m e n t s
Part One o f the thesis, Primers and Presentiments, provides the exploration of the 
Institute with context. What is the history of the Human Genome Project? What 
analogues for the Human Genome Project and the Institute can we can we find in 
the literature on big science? What are the effects on science and on work of 
organising in these kinds of ways?
Chapter A, Primers, provides the layer upon which the rest of the thesis is written. 
The chapter describes the mythic language, the big historical narrative, and large- 
scale economic story o f the Human Genome Project. This chapter acknowledges 
these as a foundation from which to explore what is missing from these stories; 
the everyday descriptions of work, the history of the Institute from the view of 
those who sequenced the human genome, and the economic story of labour, not 
stock markets.
Chapter B, Anatomies o f  Work in Big Science, explores the descriptions o f work 
in big science that are found in the sociological literature. The different levels of 
‘bigness’ are considered; that o f science as a whole, that of national science, that 
of a scientific discipline, and that o f a scientific institution. The Human Genome 
Project was big science in a number o f these ways, but the Institute is a big 
science institution. The possible consequences that result from organising work 
in such a way are considered in Chapter C, Pathologies o f  Work in Big Science. 
The chapter draws on sociological concepts such as rationalisation and alienation 
to suggest the ‘pathologies’ that might mark the experience of work in big science.
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[A ] P r i m e r s
Primers are the short pieces of DNA that are used as the initial building blocks for 
synthetic DNA replication. From these starting points strands of DNA are 
generated. In that sense, this chapter contains the initial building blocks upon 
which this thesis is set down. From these foundations spiral threads o f illustration 
and argument. A primer is also the initial coating that is used to prepare a surface 
for painting. Considered in this way, this chapter is a primer in that it serves as a 
layer on to which adheres the elaborations that are explored later in this thesis; the 
discussions o f big science and big work, the illustrations drawn from the 
interview evidence to account for the subjective experience of work at the 
Institute, and the examination o f the way in which these accounts fit into 
discussions o f economies.
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A1 In t r o d u c t io n
This chapter contains three distinct sections which, together, introduce a key idea 
of the thesis. Section A2, Sequences o f  Metaphors, discusses the way in which 
the Human Genome Project, and the human genome sequence itself, has been 
discussed. These discussions have been rich in metaphor and allusion, tending 
towards a poetic romanticisation of the human genome, and towards casting the 
Human Genome Project as a history o f great men. This thesis is a counterbalance 
for these kinds o f understandings of the Human Genome Project; it was an 
achievement o f the everyday labours o f hundreds upon hundreds of ‘ordinary’ 
men and women. This thesis, therefore, finds little room for an account that is 
framed in terms o f questing knights and Holy Grails, but nevertheless it is 
important to discuss these kinds o f understandings of the Human Genome Project. 
The men and women interviewed in the production of this thesis did not live 
outside these metaphors and allusions. As we see in Chapter Q  The Recruitment 
o f Sentiment, the way in which the story of sequencing the human genome was 
told as being one of great men did not leave the imaginations of the research 
participants untouched. For the men and women interviewed in this thesis, there 
really were heroes and villains.
The subject of section A3 is clear from the title; A History o f  the Human Genome 
Project. This section of the chapter draws primarily on the wide range of 
secondary sources that are available; journalistic, historical and sociological, 
coupled with accounts from some o f the leading figures, to produce a potted 
chronological narrative of the Human Genome Project. This serves the purpose 
not only of putting this thesis in the appropriate historical context, but also works 
as the basis for drawing out the interconnections between the biographical 
accounts provided by the interview evidence and the larger events o f history.
The final section of this chapter foreshadows the discussion of the concluding 
chapter of this thesis, Chapter J, The Institute and the Knowledge Economy. 
Section A4, Genomes and Economies describes the ways in which both the 
science and the knowledge o f the human genome has never been ‘pure’. Doing
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science is always an economic activity, and scientific knowledge is always an 
economic object. In this, the Human Genome Project and the sequence o f the 
human genome are not unique. A4, Genomes and Economies provides examples 
of the various ways in which the economic nature of the Human Genome Project 
has been written in to the existing accounts. But it also argues that a key part of 
the economic existence of the human genome sequence has been written out of 
these accounts. The Human Genome Project has an economic life lived through 
the preoccupations o f the business pages; speculation, share prices, and state 
funding. Through the evidence gathered during interviews with the men and 
women who worked to sequence the human genome, some parts of the essential 
aspect of economic life of the human genome sequence is revealed; the 
experience o f work itself.
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A 2  S e q u e n c e s  o f  M e t a p h o r s
Genetics, and the Human Genome Project, are metaphor rich. Genetics has 
become the culturally big science, replacing the similarly culturally big sciences 
of atomic physics and information technology. These had occupied the status of 
the big science in the culture of most of the latter half of the twentieth century. 
The science fiction cinema of the time is a testimony to the hold these sciences 
had over the imagination. Cinema, of course, is not the limit of culture, and as 
with the big sciences that had preceded it, the rise of genetics to being the image 
of science in the public mind has led to imaginative and creative ways of speaking 
and writing about this science. As the organisationally and politically big science 
manifestation of genetics, the Human Genome Project has been the focus of these 
metaphors and allusions.
The metaphors at work in genetics and genomics have been explored by others. 
Even biological scientists such as Avise (2001) have realised the power of the 
language, not only o f  DNA but about DNA. Terms such as ‘selfish’ and 
‘parasitic’ DNA, notions of genes as being ‘beads-on-a-string’, or of intergenic 
regions as ‘genomic deserts’ has shaped the imagination of scientists. But as 
interesting as these metaphors are, as much as they serve to shape scientific 
knowledges, it is the metaphors and allusions that are deployed to colour the 
narrative of doing science which are interesting for the purposes of this thesis.
Both the Human Genome Project and the human genome sequence that it 
produced find themselves spoken o f and written about in language that is rich in 
metaphor, simile and allusion. The Human Genome Project is, according to 
various accounts, a quest for the Holy Grail (Gilbert, 1992), a search for the Code 
of Codes (Kelves and Hood, 1992), the writing of the Book of Man (Bodmer and 
McKie, 1995), the drawing of the Human Blueprint (Shapiro, 1991), and a 
mission for the Knights of the Double Helix (Davies, 2001). Indeed, Shreeve 
(2004) described Celera Genomics, the home of the private project to sequence 
the human genome, as a ‘scientific Camelot’. Nelkin (1994) argues that these are 
promotional metaphors, full o f promises, but also attractive looking traps towards
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which scientists might be lured. It should be noted that Richard Lewontin (2001) 
thought it noteworthy that a community made up of largely atheist scientists, 
many of whom had some Jewish background, should choose for itself metaphors 
that referenced Medieval Christianity. The curious importation of religious 
themes into a community that often prides itself on scepticism towards the appeal 
of the spiritual can be said to have reached its peak when we find that, in the year 
that the draft o f the human genome was published, Mauron (2001) wrote an essay 
for iScience that asked if the genome was the secular soul.
As Anderson (2002) points out, not only does describing the Human Genome 
Project as a quest for the Holy Grail lend “the scientific process an air o f mystique 
and authority” (p. 329), but that metaphors such as code, book, and blueprint 
“lend support to the idea that the scientific enterprise will reveal the ultimate, 
objective ‘truth’ about the secrets of life” (p. 330). By evoking imaginings of 
science such as these, scientists are able to mobilise resources, political and 
financial, in support o f their research. The idea that any scientific endeavour 
might lead to the ultimate truth is epistemologically flawed, as Glasner and 
Rothman (2004) point out. Such an assumption is built on extreme flavours of 
reductionism and biological determinism. Glasner and Rothman argue that the 
metaphors that might be said to more accurately capture the position of the 
genome in contemporary science are not the those that allude to the revelation of 
religious secrets, those that imagine a comprehensive parts list and a definitive set 
of assembly instructions, or even those that paint the Human Genome Project as a 
‘spectacular’; biology’s ‘moon shot’ 1. More appropriate, though much more 
prosaic, are the metaphors of tool (for example, Sydney Brenner, quoted in 
Davies, 2001, or Charles Cantor, o f the DoE, quoted in Glasner and Rothman, 
2004) and infrastructure (Hood and Smith, 1987). In less excited language, the 
Human Genome Project is thus imagined as a construction project to create the 
infrastructure o f twenty-first century life science. Not a war, which is a concept 
that we consider shortly, not a quest for enlightenment, nor even heroic 
exploration, but the collaborative labour of hundreds upon hundreds o f people. If
1 Though the high-profile nature o f  the Human Genome Project as a ‘spectacular’ cannot have 
harmed the relative status o f  the life sciences in the public and, more importantly, the political 
minds.
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we must borrow any o f the existing metaphors, the metaphor of the human 
genome sequence as an infrastructure for science is the one that best complements 
the flavour of this thesis.
The feminist writers Rosner and Johnson (1995) note the centrality of ‘male’ 
heroes that the narratives and images present in these metaphors prompt; these are 
men as questing knights, as engineers working on a blueprint, or as explorers 
mapping an unexplored wilderness. And this is before we consider the ways in 
which the Human Genome Project has been described as a ‘war’; a hyper- 
masculinalist understanding of the conduct of science. The Genome War 
(Shreeve, 2004) and The Gene Wars (Cook-Deegan, 1994), are the titles of two 
relatively popular audience books on the Human Genome Project. It should be 
noted that the Cook-Deegan book was published in 1994, several years before 
Celera Genomics turned sequencing the human genome into a race for priority 
and property. War, in this case, is therefore used as a metaphor for scientific 
endeavour, which can only be amplified when the sequencing of the human 
genome became a competition with the advent of the race in 1998. With a race 
begun, the war metaphor was provided with justification for some in the scientific 
community; Wade (2001) relays the story o f a Nobel Prize winner comparing 
Celera Genomic’s privatised attempt to sequence the human genome with the 
annexation of the Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany. Casus belli. This sort o f 
language provided the backdrop for a demand that members of the public project 
to sequence the human genome should identify themselves with either 
Chamberlain or Churchill -  to appease the private project or to relentlessly 
oppose it. These metaphors of war, and the imaginings that they stimulate, stress 
the notion that science is, in its essence, combative and adversarial. These 
imaginations are stimulated and sustained in the face of the naked fact that the 
Human Genome Project was the largest collaborative project, by some margin, 
that there has ever been in the life sciences. Nevertheless, as we shall see in 
Chapter G The Recruitment o f  Big Science, the image of Celera Genomics as a 
mortal enemy, particularly as personified by its founder Craig Venter, finds 
purchase in the imaginations o f  the men and women interviewed during the 
production of this thesis.
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It was Walter Gilbert who pushed the idea that the sequence of the human 
genome was the Holy Grail of human genetics. Walter Gilbert was, together with 
Fred Sanger and Paul Berg, the winner of the 1980 Nobel Prize for Chemistry for 
work on sequencing DNA. Gilbert began his academic life as a physicist but in 
the 1960s, after contact with James Watson, he moved into the field of molecular 
biology (Gilbert, 1980). In a 1985 letter, Gilbert writes; “The total human 
sequence is the grail of human genetics -  all possible information about the 
human structure is revealed (but not understood)” (quoted in Cook-Deegan, 1994, 
p. 88). Gilbert maintained this as his metaphor of choice, even titling his 
contribution to an edited collection on the Human Genome Project^ Vision o f  the 
Grail (Gilbert, 1992). Cook-Deegan (1994) writes of the myth-making metaphor 
adopted by Gilbert; “The Grail myth conjured an apt image; each of the Knights 
of the Round Table set off in quest o f an object whose shape was indeterminate, 
whose history was obscure, and whose function was controversial -  except that it 
related somehow to restoring health and virility to the Fisher King, and hence to 
his kingdom. Each knight took a different path and found a different adventure” 
(p. 88). Cook-Deegan was suggesting parallels between the Grail mythos and the 
sequencing o f the human genome. This was before the advent of the private 
project in the form o f Celera Genomics. Then, the sequencing the human genome 
became a race with apparently much more than mere scientific priority at issue. 
Scientific priority is usually only of concern to the scientists involved and their 
associates and patrons. When sequencing the human genome became a race 
between groups representing public and private interests, the ante on the table was 
raised, with high stakes now measured in morality and politics as well as in repute. 
This only enriches the mythic tone o f the story. Craig Venter, the founder of 
Celera Genomics, a formerly publicly-funded genome scientist, can then be cast 
as a brash, impatient Gawain. Or perhaps as Lancelot; a brilliant knight whose 
story is dominated by a betrayal. He is certainly represented as having heroic 
qualities. In Chapter G The Recruitment o f  Sentiment we see how the people 
working at the Institute who were studied in the production of this thesis also 
imbued their own leader with heroic virtues. His virtues were described as 
qualities of a type diametrically opposed to those ascribed to Venter.
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Against the background of these metaphors and allusions, the story of the Human 
Genome Project is written as a story of great men. Troubadours sang tales of 
gallant knights, and the questing scientists found contemporary writers able to 
produce ballads o f heroic science. Some of the lyrics the scientists themselves 
wrote. It did not matter whether the virtues of the great men in question were 
their humility and lack of worldly ambition, as articulated in Sulstonand Ferry’s 
(2002) accounts o f the publicly-funded effort, or were the counter-virtues of 
ambition and energetic strategising on political and economic planes, as in 
Shreeve’s (2004) and Wade’s (2001) sympathetic accounts of Celera Genomics’ 
privatised approach to genome sequencing.
A central idea o f this thesis is that the accomplishment of sequencing the human 
genome was not the result of the quests of knights errant. The story written by 
this thesis is not that o f a noble Galahad and a brash but flawed Gawain 
competing in their Grail2 quests, though this is how the Human Genome Project 
might seem when written through with hyperbole, moralising, improbable 
promises and a ‘great man’ view of human achievement. This is the case no 
matter how journalistic accounts are written, no matter who we choose to cast in 
these roles or how many knights our story will set on the path to enlightenment. 
The sequencing o f the human genome was not big science because it involved a 
Round Table of knights who captured the cup of truth and the public imagination 
in the bargain. Rather, it was big science because, if we must use the metaphor of 
combat and war, it was achieved by the armies of science. And in this, the story 
of this war should not be o f great generals opposing each other across a map, with 
individual soldiers aggregated into regimental and divisional symbols to be 
pushed across that map. Rather, it is the story of those regiments and divisions, 
which are, when we get inside, characterised as much by cooperation and 
community as they are by their opposition to the enemy. The argument can be 
made that, in dealing with the infantry of an army of science, this thesis is not 
about science simply writ larger, but science that, through its bigness, was 
qualitatively different to many of the stories of individualised scientific discovery
2 The Grail metaphor found expression in a number o f  ways, even in the acronymised name given  
to the first gene-finding computer programme; GRAIL -  Gene Recognition and A ssem bly Internet 
Link -  which was developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Glasner and Rothman, 2004).
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by which it is preceded. This is certainly the case for the life sciences, but other 
branches of the natural sciences have had their big science manifestations. Some 
of these are explored in Chapter B, Anatomies o f  Big Science.
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A 3 A  H is t o r y  o f  t h e  H u m a n  G e n o m e  P roject
The Human Genome Project was the beneficiary of fortunate symbolic timing, at 
least when considered from the point o f view of a culture that sees significance in 
years grouped into decades and centuries. The ‘rediscovery’ of Mendel’s work in 
1900 provided a kick-start to twentieth century genetics. The structure of DNA, 
the molecular carrier of genetic information, was discovered and described in 
1953. The successful sequencing of the human genome was announced in 2000 
(at a press conference) in 2001 (as a draft sequence) and in 2003 (as a finished 
sequence). Some of the key moments in the history of the science of genetics 
appear to have been planned, not only to occur at half-century intervals, but at 
half-century intervals that coincide with the arbitrary, but highly symbolic, 
division of time into centuries. Keller (2000) noted this when she called the 
twentieth century the Century o f  the Gene. Indeed, Keller draws a direct 
comparison between the re-discovery o f M endel’s experimental results in three 
papers published in the Proceedings o f  the German Botanical Society in 1900, 
with the announcement of the completion o f the first draft of the sequence of the 
human genome at the White House on 26 June 2000. These very different forms 
of scientific communication are the bookends of the Century of the Gene.
However, despite a near century o f development in genetics and molecular 
biology, which can all be written into the history of genome science, the Human 
Genome Project began properly in 1990. This section provides a short history of 
the Human Genome Project, drawn largely from secondary sources such as 
Davies’ The Sequence (2001), Cook-Deegan’s The Gene Wars (1994), Shreeve’s 
The Genome War (2004); first-hand accounts such as Sulston and Ferry’s The 
Common Thread (2002); as well academic sources such as Balmer (1993), 
Glasner and Rothman (2004), Clarke and Ticehurst (2006), and Kelves and Hood 
(1992). Given the fact that the history of the Human Genome Project has enough 
pieces, each connected by several different threads, to, evidently, fill many books, 
these few thousand words are a limited account. This section divides the history 
of the project to sequence the human genome into four parts; pre-1985, which 
provides a prehistory o f projects to sequence the human genome; 1985-1990,
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which covers the time period from the Santa Cruz meeting organised by Robert 
Sinsheimer in 1985, to the establishment of the Human Genome Project in 1990; 
1990-1998, which accounts for the period during which the public project 
developed as a big science project without a competitor; and 1998-2003, which 
covers the founding of Celera Genomics and the beginning of the race, to the 
announcement o f the complete human genome sequence in 2003.
Prehistory (pre-1985)
While the Human Genome Project might have begun in 1990, it did not spring 
unbidden from the pork barrels of the US Congress, nor was it unanticipated in 
the scientific community. It was in the late 1970s when some of the principle 
scientific connections were made that created the possibility of sequencing the 
human genome. Balmer (1993) argues that key in this was the increasing cross­
over between genetic research and studies in molecular biology. “One significant 
point of contact... was the discovery in the late 1970s of... restriction fragment 
length polymorphisms (RFLPs)” (p. 6). This discovery suggested that the 
mapping -  note, not the sequencing -  of the human genome was a feasible goal. 
This potential, o f using RFLPs as an instrument to systematically map the human 
genome, was brought to the attention o f the wider scientific community in a letter 
by Solomon and Bodmer published in 1979. Walter Bodmer is a British 
geneticist who was president o f the Human Genome Organisation (HUGO) 
between 1990 and 1992. HUGO was the co-ordinating body for the international 
human genome sequencing collaboration. He also co-authored The Book o f  Man 
(Bodmer and McKie, 1995), a book about the Human Genome Project aimed at a 
popular audience. The idea of using RFLPs to map the human genome was 
reinforced when it was stressed in a paper by David Botstein in 1980 (Balmer,
1993). David Botstein was a key figure in the mapping and sequencing of the 
yeast genome and also served on the National Research Council (NRC) 
committee that recommended that the Human Genome Project be publicly funded.
A second point of contact was the development of DNA sequencing techniques in 
the mid-1970s, with Fred Sanger’s group at Cambridge (Sanger, Nicklen and 
Coulson, 1977) and Maxam and Gilbert (1977) at Harvard both publishing their 
methods in 1977. With genome mapping and DNA sequencing now a
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technological possibility, the scientific groundwork required in order to build the 
life science infrastructure that is the sequenced human genome was well along the 
process of being laid down. Other terrains, particularly those of the internal and 
external politics of science, were still to be prepared. The ability of some of the 
key scientists to step outside their sheltered laboratories and move with 
confidence through the more worldly domains of hard politics and big money was 
as important in the established of the Human Genome Project as were the 
technobgical advances.
During the 1980s these political foundations were laid. Meetings, predictions and 
propaganda transformed the scientific and political landscape, ploughing a fertile 
field in which a big science project to sequence the human genome could take 
root. Two important events took place independently in 1984 that put the idea of 
sequencing the human genome firmly into the mind of US science politics 
(Balmer, 1993). First, the University o f California Santa Cruz (UCSC) failed in 
an attempt to set up a genome sequencing institute. Robert Sinsheimer, who was 
then chancellor o f UCSC and a biologist by training, attempted to redirect a 
donation from the Hoffman Foundation into providing the capital for the first big 
science biology project. The donation was intended for a big science project, 
building an optical telescope, but the money was not needed when the telescope 
was funded in its entirety by the Keck Foundation. Sinsheimer managed to win 
support from the US National Institute o f Health i^JIH), but in the end the 
Hoffman donation was never awarded (Cook-Deegan, 1994). Sinsheimer would 
still play a key role in launching the Human Genome Project, acting as the 
catalyst to bring together many scientists who would become leading figures in 
the sequencing of the human genome.
The second event took place at the very end of 1984. A meeting, sponsored by 
the US Department o f Energy (DoE), took place in December at Alta in Utah. 
The Alta Summit placed the idea of sequencing the human genome into the 
imagination of US Federal agencies. Cook-Deegan (1989), writing at the very 
dawn o f the formal, publicly funded project to sequence the human genome, 
argues that through this meeting wind many historical threads which would be 
later woven into the fibric o f the Human Genome Project. At first glance, it
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might seem curious that the DoE would be interested in a life science project such 
as the large-scale sequencing of the human genome. The meeting, however, was 
held to discuss the detection of mutations in the DNA of the survivors of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The involvement of the DoE connects the Human 
Genome Project to a historical antecedent in the Manhattan Project. Both are 
institutionally big science projects that arise from, are sustained by, and in turn 
sustain, the culturally big sciences of their time; molecular genetics and atomic 
physics respectively. Robert Sinsheimer (1992) suggests, in interview, that the 
involvement o f the DoE was one of the factors that pushed the human genome 
project into being ‘big science’. “[T]he DOE is much more hierarchical [than the 
NIH]. Their programs are from the top down. And they’re used to running 
collaborative big science, with accelerators and nuclear reactors” (p. 69).
That the big science of biology might have become a heavily resourced project 
controlled by the physicists of the DoE led to unease among biologists. The 
molecular biologist David Botstein suggested that the plan to sequence the human 
genome was developed to provide employment for ‘unemployed bombmakers’ 
(quoted in Roberts, 2001). The potential cost of a project to sequence the human 
genome worried biologists; at $3 billion it was a vast amount of money for the life 
sciences, leading to fears that if the Human Genome Project were to go ahead, 
funds would be drained from creative small science to feed the demands of 
monotonous big science. However, as Glasner and Rothman (2004) point out, 
and as was raised by Human Genome Project advocates such as Walter Bodmer, 
$3 billion for a 15 year project that would provide the infrastructure for future life 
sciences was, if not small change, a reasonable sum when compared to the 
contemporaneous proposals for the Superconducting Supercollider, an $8 billion 
project, or the International Space Station, a $40 billion project.
A gathering momentum (1985-1990)
So, unemployed bombmakers were seeking a rescue from redundancy by 
proposing to examine the fine detail o f the damage caused by the weapons that 
they had built. But as we have seen, these were not the only people pushing for 
the establishment o f a big science project to sequence the human genome. Robert 
Sinsheimer remained an influential proponent of a big science project in biology
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to rival the big sciences of physics (Roberts, 2001). In 1985, Sinsheimer 
convened a scientific meeting at UCSC which, according to Cook-Deegan (1994), 
was “the first meeting focused specifically on sequencing the human genome” (p. 
79). Present at that meeting were a significant part of the cast list o f the drama of 
the Human Genome Project. The roll call included Bart Barrell and John Sulston 
(who later ran the only significant Human Genome Project sequencing centre 
outside the US; the Sanger Centre), Walter Gilbert (who later attempted to set up 
a private project to sequence the human genome, and became one the leading 
promoters o f large-scale sequencing), Leroy Hood (who developed automated 
DNA sequencing), David Botstein, and Robert Waterston (who ran the genome 
sequencing project at the University of Washington). This meeting is, in many 
accounts, accorded the status of the origin of the Human Genome Project, which 
was to officially begin five years later. However, the meeting concluded that 
sequencing complete genomes of organisms such as humans was not yet feasible. 
To make projects such as these possible would require significant leaps in 
technology. These leaps, in 1985, were not yet on the horizon (Cook-Deegan,
1994). Even in 1990, when the Human Genome Project began, there were years 
of technology development before the sequencing of the human genome could 
begin at any speed. The length of time required to develop the technologies 
required for genome sequencing can be seen by the progress that had been made 
in 1998, eight years after the Human Genome Project had officially begun. Over 
eight years, about $2 billion had been spent on genome sequencing and 97-98 per 
cent of the sequence o f the human genome still remained to be sequenced (Davies, 
2001). That a draft was completed in 2001 and the finished sequence was 
announced in 2003 tells us of the importance of technological development in the 
accomplishment o f sequencing of the human genome.
The idea o f a Human Genome Project was big, politically and scientifically. 
Objections were not limited to concerns over the effect that a human genome 
project would have on the funding landscape, as we have already seen. Davies 
records that Bernard D. Davis and his colleagues at Harvard Medical School 
wrote a letter o f objection, even though they saw the Human Genome Project as 
‘politically unstoppable’. They wrote; “The magnification is wrong [...] like 
viewing a painting through a microscope [...] Our fundamental goal is to
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understand the human genome and its products, and not to sequence the genome 
because it e there” (quoted in Davies, 2001, p. 30). The Human Genome Project 
would not just drain the resources of biology, but it would also be bad biology. 
We revisit and expand on some of these objections in Chapter C, Pathologies o f  
Work in Big Science.
Other objections to the Human Genome Project acknowledged the potential 
power o f genomic knowledge, but, pointing to historical precedent, questioned the 
use to which this power will be put. Among these was Salvador Luria, who was 
James Watson’s PhD supervisor. Luria suggested that a human genome project 
might be the infrastructure by which a eugenic programme of a ‘softer’ kind than 
history’s examples would be accomplished (Davies, 2001). Concerns of this kind 
are among the prompts that resulted in between three and five per cent of funds 
that were committed to the public genome project being spent on Ethical, Legal 
and Social Issues (ELSI) programmes (Watson, 2000).
1986 was an important year in the development of the HGP. In March the DoE 
held a meeting in Santa Fe. By May 1986 Charles DeLisi, who was in charge of 
Health and Environmental Research at the DoE, had submitted a request for a 
genome project, to spend up to $4.5 million, to be included in the next year’s 
budget. This request was approved. The genome project was encouraged in 
Congress as a means to reemploy laboratories in new work that was not linked to 
the Cold War. The DoE plan was to produce a physical map of the genome and 
improve the technology before sustained sequencing was to be attempted (Balmer, 
1993). This plan, o f having a first stage o f extensive technological development 
and refinement, was the essence of the plan used by the Human Genome Project.
Also in 1986, away from the unemployed bombmakers, Renato Dulbecco used an 
artic le in Science to set out the potential benefits that a human genome map could 
offer cancer research. In June, a Cold Spring Harbour symposium discussed the 
feasibility o f a Human Genome Project. In his keynote speech Walter Bodmer, 
who was then head o f the Imperial Cancer Research Fund, put forward a string 
arguments in favour o f a project (Balmer, 1993). At this meeting, Walter Gilbert 
estimated that sequencing the human genome would cost $3 billion. He is
16
reported as theatrically writing the number across the board of the lecture hall; 
$3,000,000,000 (Davies, 2001). Later that summer, in July, Bodmer chaired a 
meeting sponsored by the Howard Hughes Medical Institute at the NIH campus in 
Bethesda, Maryland. This meeting agreed that the first stage of any project to 
sequence the human genome must be one of technological development. A 
contest over scientific turf began that would not be resolved until late 1988. 
James Watson argued for an increased role for the NIH and the National 
Academy o f Sciences in a project. During November and December an NIH 
working group met to discuss the role of the NIH in a human genome project 
(Balmer, 1993).
Perhaps most importantly, 1986 was the year in which Leroy Hood and Lloyd 
Smith (Smith et al., 1986), working at Caltech, developed the first automated 
DNA sequencer. The following year, in 1987, Applied Biosystems Inc. (ABI) 
produced the first commercial DNA sequencer, based on the technology 
developed by Hood and Smith (Glasner and Rothman, 2004).
In 1987, Gilbert attempted to establish a private company to sequence the human 
genome; Genome Corp. The project never got off the ground. Not because it was 
‘obscene’, though that is how it was described in some quarters of the community 
of biological science, but because the stock market crash dried up the sources of 
investment capital that Gilbert had been chasing (Cook-Deegan, 1994; Davies, 
2001). In addition, the widely known push for a public human genome project 
made investors wary o f committing capital to a project that was in danger of 
being made redundant (Cook-Deegan, 1994). This is, ironically, a reverse of the 
position faced by the public project when Celera Genomics entered the race in 
1998. Once Celera Genomics was founded, US legislators questioned the wisdom 
of continuing funding a project that the private sector had volunteered to take on.
1987 was the first year that big funding was committed specifically to genome 
research. Early funding for genome sequencing research came from the NRC, 
who established a $200 million per year genome science programme in 1987, and 
a more modest $12 million programme established in 1988 by the unemployed 
bombmakers o f the DoE (Davies, 2001). The DoE, though, had committed itself
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to a $1 billion, seven year project to map and sequence the human genome; it was 
an attempt to establish the DoE as the leaders of human genome sequencing in the 
US (Roberts, et al., 2001). In February and March of 1987 James B. Wyngaarden, 
director of the NIH, put the proposal to fund genome research before Congress, 
winning approval to allocate $17.2 million of the 1988 budget to a new Office of 
Human Genome Research, which was established October 1988, to be headed by 
James Watson. It was in this position that Watson made the decision that three to 
five per cent of funding would be set aside for ELSI work (Roberts et al. 2001). 
October 1988 also saw the beginning o f collaboration between the DoE and the 
NIH, after pressure from members o f Congress to consolidate their efforts.
In late-1989 the National Center for Human Genome Research was founded under 
the leadership of James Watson. The Human Genome Project officially began the 
following year, with a budget of $60 million per year (Davies, 2001). A genome 
database was established at Johns Hopkins University (Ferry, 2001). The target 
was to sequence the human genome in 15 years; by 2005.
The Human Genome Project (1990-1998)
By 1991 eight countries had established national programmes (Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, USA and USSR) and seven were moving towards 
establishing such a programme (Australia, Canada, Chile, Korea, Netherlands, 
New Zealand and Sweden). The EC, UNESCO and others proposed international 
programmes (Balmer, 1993). The Human Genome Organization (HUGO), which 
had been established in 1988, attempted to manage the international effort. It 
viewed itself as organising a collaborative ‘confederacy’ of research programmes, 
with HUGO acting as the hub, rather than as an overarching, hierarchical 
centralised controller (Balmer, 1993). In total, twenty laboratories were involved 
in sequencing the human genome as part o f the International Human Genome 
Sequencing Consortium, with centres in the US, the UK, France, Germany, Japan 
and China (Newton, 2004). That, in time, the genome project became more 
centralised and hierarchical on the macro-scale is a development which is 
mirrored at the micro-level of the genome sequencing institute that is studied in 
this thesis.
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James Watson resigned as head o f the National Centre of Human Genome 
Research in 1992. In a precursor to the some of the most politicised and 
moralised disputes of human genome science, the cause for Watson’s resignation 
was a dispute over the patenting o f genes (Roberts et al. 2001); over the status o f 
scientific knowledge and the abstract human body as a commodity. Watson had 
argued that the US Government should not apply for patents on every gene the 
project discovered. However, W atson’s resignation was also prompted by 
allegations of a conflict of interest; the New York Times reported that he or his 
family held shares in companies with a stake in the future of biotechnology, 
including Amgen, Glaxo, Eli Lilly, Oncogen and Merck (Hilts, 1992). In 1993, 
Francis Collins replaced James Watson as the director of the National Centre for 
Human Genome Research. At the press conference, he explicitly compared the 
project to sequence the human genome to the Apollo missions and the Manhattan 
Project (Davies, 2001).
The Sanger Centre, the only one o f the G5 sequencing laboratories to be located 
outside the US, was founded in 1992 with support from the Wellcome Trust and 
the UK Medical Research Council (MRC). Based on former industrial land near 
Cambridge, it opened in 1993 (Wellcome Trust, 2000). It was named after, and 
ceremonially opened by, Fred Sanger, the double Nobel Prize winner. Sanger’s 
second Nobel Prize, in 1980, was for developing the techniques for sequencing 
DNA. John Sulston was the first director o f the Sanger Centre. Over the next 
few years, much of UK and European genome science was attracted to the Sanger 
Centre, including the establishment o f the European Bioinformatics Institute (EBI) 
at the site and the relocation of the MRC’s Human Genome Mapping Project 
Resource Centre from London (Wellcome Trust, 2000).
Throughout the nineties, the technologies and expertise required to sequence 
genomes was developed. In 1995, Craig Venter announced that his team at The 
Institute of Genome Research (TIGR), in collaboration with Hamilton Smith of 
Johns Hopkins University Medical School in Baltimore, had sequenced the 
genome of Hemophilus influenza (Fleischmann, et al., 1995). This was the first 
time that the whole genome o f an organism other than a virus had been sequenced. 
Wade (1995) reports that Francis Collins described the sequencing of the
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1,830,121 base pair H. influenza genome as a ‘significant milestone’ on the road 
to sequencing the human genome. The paper in Science that announced the 
sequencing of H. influenza had forty3 named authors, which pointed the way 
towards the kind of collaborative science by teamwork that was to be genome 
sequencing.
In February 1996, a meeting was held in Bermuda to establish a protocol for the 
release of genome data. The ‘Bermuda Principles’ included the idea that genome 
sequence data should be made freely available, that sequence assemblies should 
be released as soon as possible and that finished annotated sequences should be 
submitted to the database immediately, and that these principles should apply to 
all public large-scale sequencing centres. The Bermuda Principles were 
established to encourage research, to coordinate sequencing efforts and to 
maximise the benefit to society (Glasner and Rothman, 2004).
In 1996, the 12.1 million base pair sequence o f the genome of baker's yeast, 
Saccharomyces cerevisiae, was announced. This was the first genome of a 
eukaryotic organism to be sequenced. In 1998, the 97 million base pair sequence 
of the nematode worm, Caenorhabditis elegans, was completed by a 
collaboration between the Washington University sequencing centre and the 
Sanger Centre in the UK (The C. elegans Sequencing Consortium, 1998). The 
named author of the paper that announced this achievement was the collective 
collaboration; to find the names o f the scientist involved one had to go to the 
internet to web-based lists of individual authors. Nevertheless, despite this lack 
of individualised acclaim through authorship, thought to be a key component of 
the reward structure o f science, the mage of science dramatised in the questing 
knight narratives is reproduced in scientific journals. In the same issue of Science 
in which The C. elegans Sequencing Consortium announced the sequence of the 
worm, a brief article by a group o f scientists singles out the leaders of the 
Washington University group and the Sanger Centre, Waterston and Sulston, and 
describes them as ‘visionaries’ (Hodgkin, Horvitz, Jasny and Kimble, 1998). The
3 It is interesting to note that o f  the forty authors named on this paper, eighteen o f  them had female 
forenames. It is an open question whether the increasingly collaborative scientific work that 
characterises big(er) science generates greater gender parity than is achieved in the traditional, 
individualised mode o f  scientific labour.
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individualised system o f reward through esteem is reconstituted outside the 
authorship of journals. C. elegans was the first multicellular eukaryote to be 
sequenced; next step, the human genome.
It is estimated that, by 1998, $2 billion had been invested in the public Human 
Genome Project (Glasner and Rothman, 2004). Yet only two to three per cent of 
the genome had been sequenced. The costs of sequencing remained high in some 
centres, up to $10 per base (Davies, 2001). For comparison, by 2002, as the 
human genome sequence moved from draft status to finished status, the cost of 
sequencing at the Sanger Centre was 2p per base (Powell, 2006). In 1998, the 
founding of Celera Genomics, and the cost o f the public project, led some to 
believe that the public effort was devoting resources in the pursuit of winning a 
race that was not worth winning.
Finishing the race (1998-2003)
The race to sequence the human genome began in 1998. Craig Venter left TIGR, 
which at one point was the largest DNA sequencing institute in the world, to head 
a company bankrolled, with $300 million, by Perkin Elmer (Davies, 2001). 
Perkin Elmer is the parent company of Applied Biosystems (ABI), which is, in 
turn, the leading manufacturer o f automated sequencing machines. Venter was 
not a stranger to research with a commercial backing. While TIGR, established in 
1992, was a non-profit research centre, it was privately funded. A sister company, 
Human Genome Sciences (HGS) was established to exploit the sequence data and 
discoveries that would flow from the research of TIGR (Davies, 2001). TIGR 
straddled the public-private divide, or, as a commentator quoted by Fortun has it, 
“Venter had one foot in the world o f pure science and one foot in a bucket of 
money” (Fortun, 2006, p. 29).
Celera Genomics takes its name from the Latin celer, meaning swift, as found in 
words such as accelerate. At its launch in 1998 Venter boasted that Celera would 
be sequencing as many bases each month as there were currently stored in 
Genbank, the public genome database (Shreeve, 2004). According to Shreeve, 
Venter had agreed to lead this privately-funded human genome sequencing 
project with the belief that the business model would function, not on the
21
privatisation of the genome sequence itself, which would be available to all, but 
on the principle of patenting key genes for subsequent exploitation. This did not 
seem to be a recipe for financial success. “The academic were afraid Venter was 
hiding something. The market analysts were hoping he was” (p. 119).
The establishment of the race and the end of the race threatened to be the same 
moment for the public project. When placed in the political landscape of the US, 
the very presence of a private project to sequence the human genome was an 
argument to end the flow of funding to the public project. Celera Genomics 
would win the race, not by producing the genome any quicker, but by draining the 
political will of the US Congress. Countering this threat was one of the motives 
behind the push to publish a draft sequence of the human genome by 2001, with 
the gaps to be filled in later (Shreeve, 2004). Great efforts were made by Francis 
Collins and James Watson in the US, and John Sulston in the UK, to secure the 
financial future of the Human Genome Project.
As Shreeve (2004) writes; “If something wasn’t done, the human code of life 
would be subject to the control of a single corporation. God’s language, in the 
mouth of Mammon” (p. 124). O f course, the interests of capital are not 
homogenous. The conduct of a fiercely fought race could be as profitable as 
actually winning the race. As long as the race was being run, Perkin Elmer, who 
provided the capital for Celera Genomics, would find that the demand for their 
ABI sequencing machines would remain high, with their customers being the 
most creditworthy of clients; state-funded organisations with a moral mission. 
The Chicago Tribune remarked on this strategy, describing Celera Genomics as 
“a sales story for the ages” (quoted in Fortun, 2006).
The public project to sequence the human genome responded to the challenge of 
Celera Genomics. According to Fortun (2006), John Sulston, head of the Sanger 
Centre in the UK, persuaded the Wellcome Trust to ‘dramatically’ raise its 
funding for human genome sequencing to £110 million over seven years. This 
represented a doubling of the financial commitment to the Sanger Centre, and a 
doubling of the Sanger Centre’s commitment to sequencing. It would now 
sequence one-third of the human genome rather than one-sixth (Wellcome Trust,
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2000). Francis Collins, the director of the National Human Genome Research 
Institute in the US, and James Watson, the previous director, secured increased 
funding for their genome sequencing centres (Fortun, 2006). The advent of the 
race prompted the rationalisation o f the public project, with funding and 
responsibility for genome sequencing concentrated at a few large-scale 
laboratories. The task of sequencing the human genome was increasingly 
concentrated in the G5 group o f laboratories; the Washington University group 
led by Bob Waterston, the Baylor College of Medicine group led by Richard 
Gibbs, the DoE Joint Genome Institute, led by Elbert Branscombe, the Whitehead 
Institute at MIT, led by Eric Lander, and, outside the US, the Wellcome Trust 
funded Sanger Centre led by John Sulston (Glasner and Rothman, 2004). This 
was not necessarily a welcome move, even on the part o f some of those who 
benefited from this centralisation (Sulston and Ferry, 2002). The idea of 
international cooperation, of a universal community of science, were dented as the 
public project explicitly reorganised itself and concentrated its activities within 
the national borders of the two main funders, and even here the degree of 
‘internationalism’ was limited to just one o f the five sequencing centres being 
located outside the US. As we know, this was in the UK, a state that is politically 
closely aligned to, and shares a common language with, the US.
Fortun (2006) suggests that the images o f the race as “public versus private 
science, sharing versus patenting genomic data, smart science versus dumb 
technology, British noblesse oblige versus ruthless American capitalism” (p. 27) 
can be turned on their heads, particularly the final two. This was not the mighty, 
corporately-resourced Celera Genomics racing against a small, under-funded 
academic laboratory, but rather Celera Genomics was, for all its corporate might, 
racing against “the entire state-supported genomics communities of the Western 
industrialized nations” (p. 27).
The image of Celera Genomics as the plucky underdogs might seem strange to 
British imaginations, who are accustomed to state-funded pursuit o f public goods. 
Here, we are more ready to accept the image of Craig Venter as, put mildly, a 
practitioner of the enclosure of the genetic common wealth. In the US, tie 
ideological climate is more likely to see such activities as the laudable taming of
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nature; the term ‘gold rush’, for example, was often used with little regard for the 
negative connotations. This is explored in section A4, Genomes and Economies. 
As such, that it might be possible for Celera Genomics to ‘win’ the human 
genome sequencing race without actually sequencing the human genome was not 
an unimaginable possibility. With a promise to sequence the human genome for 
$300 million, and with the public project having consumed $2 billion for a return 
of just two to three per cent o f the human genome sequence, a case could be made 
that there was no further need for government funding. Glasner and Rothman 
(2004) report that the public project was being presented “as clumsy and 
bureaucratic, and no match for fleet footed, efficient, entrepreneurial private 
sector” (p. 40). If this line of thinking had won out, Celera Genomics would have 
won the race by default, though, it must be said, the sales of ABI sequencers 
would not have been so high.
But if there were differences in the public representation of the organisation of the 
public and private projects to sequence the human genome, there were also 
differences in the scientific techniques used by the two competitors. The public 
project used a technique called hierarchical shotgun sequencing, while Celera 
Genomics used a technique called whole genome shotgun sequencing. The 
Harvard Business Review published one o f the most concise, and concomitantly 
illuminating, comparisons between the different genome sequencing methods 
employed by the public project and Celera’s effort. The public project “is akin to 
having several teams laying bricks until various walls come together in a coherent 
structure.” The whole genome shotgun method of sequencing employed by 
Celera is, by comparison, “like using a computer to assemble a 70-million-piece 
3-D jigsaw puzzle” (Enriquez and Goldberg, 2000, p. 98). While organisationally 
Celera Genomics might have been the swift and efficient model of private 
enterprise, the whole genome shotgun strategy is a brute force approach. Simply 
put, whole genome shotgun sequencing involves decomposing the entire genome 
of an organism into fragments which are then sequenced and, using a 
supercomputer, the sequence o f the genome is assembled. Hierarchical shotgun 
sequencing involves breaking the genome into parts which the researchers know 
will overlap and cover the genome. These large fragments of the genome are then 
cloned; in the public project artificial bacterial chromosomes (BACs) were used.
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These relatively large parts are then broken up into smaller parts that can be 
sequenced. The sequence of each BAC is then assembled, which can then be 
combined to provide the sequence o f each human chromosome and, eventually, 
the whole genome. Immediately prior to the launch of Celera Genomics and the 
beginning of the race there was an extensive debate in the scientific press 
(Waterston, Lander and Sulston, 2002). Hierarchical shotgun sequencing requires 
a greater amount of preparatory work; preparing a library of BACs that is spread 
across each chromosome. However, while whole genome shotgun sequencing 
avoids this preparatory work, questions were asked about the ability of this 
technique to achieve coverage of the full genome and to assemble the whole 
genome correctly.
The race reached a suitably symbolic end on 26th June 2000, when Francis Collins 
of the NHGRI and Craig Venter of Celera Genomics flanked President Clinton at 
a press conference, which Prime Minister Blair joined via a videolink, to 
announce the sequencing of the human genome (Fortun, 2006). Publication, the 
customary form of scientific communication, did not occur until February 2001, 
when the public project (International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium,
2001) and the private project (Venter, et al., 2001) simultaneously published their 
reports of the draft sequence in the two leading journals, Nature and Science. 
After the publication of the draft sequences there was a debate in the scientific 
press over the merits o f the two sequences (see, for example, Waterston, Lander 
and Sulston, 2002; a reply by Myers et al., 2002; and a commentary supporting 
the Waterston paper by Green, 2002). A principle point of dispute revolved 
around the fact that the paper published by the team at Celera Genomics was able 
to incorporate the data released into the public domain by the International 
Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, as required by the Bermuda Principles. 
As the Celera Genomics sequence data was not released to the public domain 
before publication, the public project was always at a disadvantage. The more 
that they sequenced, the more sequence data Celera Genomics had to use. That 
the race finished in a draw arranged by agreement did not settle the waters of 
scientific and political acrimony.
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The finished sequence was not announced until 2003, with a publication in Nature 
timed to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the discovery of the structure of 
DNA. 99 per cent of the gene-containing areas of the genome were sequenced, 
with an accuracy of 99.99 per cent claimed. Some areas of the genome remain 
difficult to sequence, such as areas o f high repeats, such as telomeres, or areas 
that are structurally difficult to sequence, such as centromeres. The press releases 
that accompanied the announcement o f the finished sequence celebrated the fact 
that the project was finished ahead of schedule, taking thirteen rather than fifteen 
years, and within budget (National Human Genome Research Institute, 2003; 
Wellcome Trust, 2003).
This thesis, though, is not about the ‘big’ history o f the Human Genome Project. 
It is not about negotiations at which vast resources were allocated; in the US 
Congress, in corporate boardroom meetings, and at meetings of the trustees of 
charitable organisations. To some degree, those histories have already been told. 
This thesis is an attempt to do what Mills (1959 [1970]) described as the task of 
sociology. Mills argued that sociology is the means by which people are able to 
“grasp what is going on in the world, and to understand what is happening in 
themselves as minute points in the intersections of biography and history” (p. 14). 
The history provided in this section provides a primer fir this thesis, not because 
this thesis is a continuation of the discussion o f the sorts of power and politics that 
are written through existing historical accounts, but because these accounts 
provide a background against which to understand the experiences of those who 
worked to sequence the human genome.
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A 4  G e n o m e s  a n d  Ec o n o m ie s
The Human Genome Project and the sequence of the human genome were never 
objects without an economic life. Consider, first, the economic input required to 
sequence a genome -  inputs that pushed biology into the category of big science. 
Glasner and Rothman (2004) produce tables that show that the funding from the 
US government amounted to almost $3.4 billion over the period 1988-2002, while 
the second largest individual funder o f the public project, the Wellcome Trust, 
which supported the Sanger Centre in the UK, contributed just over $286 million 
dollars in the budgets of 1998, 1999 and 2000. Over the same three year period 
total global funding for public genome research was nearly $3.7 billion, though it 
is not clear what proportion of this was devoted to sequencing the human genome. 
It is clear, though, that the Human Genome Project was a significant economic 
object, and big science, by virtue o f the sheer scale of resources that it was 
allocated.
Shreeve (2004) illustrates the economic scale of the projects to sequence the 
human genome with an anecdote from a meeting to discuss Celera Genomics’ 
budget. At this meeting, it was pointed out that the cost of pipette tips alone was 
expected to be $14,000 each day. Scale such as this was one of the pushes 
towards the development of robotic systems, in this case a system that did not use 
the disposable pipette tips that are a ubiquitous feature of the contemporary life 
science laboratory. Unlike previous big science projects such as particle 
accelerators, gravity wave detectors, or missions to the moon, the bigness of 
sequencing the human genome did not manifest itself in correspondingly 
spectacular buildings or vehicles. Rather, its bigness was a result of the mundane 
expenses of life science laboratories magnified many fold.
Despite this lack of the spectacular, the economic life of the human genome is not 
lived covertly. The economic life o f the human genome is explicit. Among the 
frequently asked questions addressed by the website of the National Human 
Genome Research Institute is that o f the cost of the Project to ‘US taxpayers’. 
The hypothetical questioner is reassured; the Project came in under budget, at less
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than $3 billion, but this is not the limit of the economic life of the human genome. 
The rest o f the answer reads; ‘It is also important to consider that the Human 
Genome Project will likely pay for itself many times over on an economic basis - 
if one considers that genome-based research will play an important role in seeding 
biotechnology and drug development industries, not to mention improvements in 
human health” (National Human Genome Research Institute, 2005).
The Human Genome Project did not transform genetics from a science touched 
only lightly by economics, cloistered in ivory towers. Indeed, even studies of 
genetics that were conducted by literally cloistered scientists have had profound 
connections to economies. In their short note on the economic implications of the 
Human Genome Project, Elrod-Erickson and Ford (2000) write that the work of 
the monk-scientist Mendel “did not receive much commercial recognition” at the 
time, but that “[sjince then, its impact has spread throughout the horticultural and 
agribusiness sectors of the world economy; and virtually all major commercial 
food crops and other agricultural and forestry products have either been 
genetically modified or selected to enhance their yields, resistance to pests and 
disease, [or] consumer acceptance” (p. 57).
Elrod-Erickson and Ford (2000) and other authors predict that the Human 
Genome Project, and the studies in genetics that it inspires, will have profound 
economic effects. It will have an “ impact on the medical and pharmaceutical 
sectors, the agribusiness sector, defense industries, the insurance industry, the 
behavioural sciences, the labour force, and on the structure of public and private 
welfare and retirement provisions” (p. 60). This is not an unusual opinion (see 
the FAQ statement from the National Human Genome Research Institute above), 
and, indeed, there are many livelihoods built on predictions of this kind. The 
prediction does not need to come true, it merely needs to continue to be believed 
for these livelihoods to be secure. Others are not so sure. Hopkins et al. (2007) 
and Nightingale and Martin (2004), for example, have argued that ‘the biotech 
revolution’ is a myth.
The economic life o f genome sequencing was also one that had an effect on the 
surrounding terrain o f the economics of biology. Many scientists worried that the
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big science of genome sequencing would draw all the resources allocated to 
biology to itself, starving small science of its lifeblood. But no science is an 
island, and the economic life o f  the human genome had other dimensions.
If we return, for a moment, to the metaphors that are deployed to explain and 
dramatise genetics and the Human Genome Project, we need go no further than 
that of a biotechnology ‘gold rush’. The idea of a ‘gold rush’ is found in 
publications from Newsweek (Bryant and Beals, 2000) to Nature Neuroscience 
(Mombaerts, 1999). This imagining of the economy of genomes is one of 
masculine, pioneering spirit, of lone fortune-seekers expanding the boundaries of 
‘civilisation’ deeper into the wilderness. It is not one that accords with the reality 
of multi-national corporations, marketing departments, and multi-disciplinary 
research teams. The metaphor was used, unprompted, by the most senior scientist 
interviewed in the production of this thesis:
[...] biology has very quickly moved into a Klondike period, a
gold rush.
[Professor Ingham]
It has to be noted that Professor Ingham was aware that, as with examples from 
history, gold rushes are events that ruin as many as, or more than, they make 
wealthy, with the value of plots, mining equipment and expertise rising far above 
the returns that can be expected in all but the most fortunate of cases. The 
fortunes made in gold rushes were often not made in mining gold, but rather in 
selling the equipment and supplies for mining gold. In this, perhaps ‘gold rush’ 
can help us to understand some o f the most successful biotech companies. 
Applied Biosystems (ABI) supplied sequencing machines both to the public 
Human Genome Project and to the private project which was bankrolled by their 
parent company. The shovels and picks used when prospecting and mining for 
gold in DNA are far more sophisticated, and correspondingly more expensive.
Gold rushes also involve bubbles. The NASDAQ slump of 2000, an event 
Professor Ingham noted in the interview, demonstrated the unintended value of 
this metaphor in helping us understand biotechnology. ‘Gold rush’, then, might 
be a metaphor with some use, if we forget for a moment the image of the
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mythologised, pioneering ‘49er. Instead, we should remember the less laudable, 
but far more real, aspects o f gold rushes. Price bubbles, fortunes spent on 
worthless plots and the latest equipment, and battles for the formalisation of 
property rights, including the enclosure of property to which others have strong 
claims. This interpretation did not pass unseen, despite the efforts of the 
biotechnology boosters to write ‘gold rush’ to read ‘excitement and easy riches’. 
As Fortun (2006) noted, terms such as ‘gold rush’ and ‘land grab’ were also used 
by the scientific critics of Celera Genomics’ attempt to commodify the human 
genome sequence.
The Human Genome Project was expressly intended to provide impetus to this 
gold rush. Fortun (2006) quotes Jack McConnell of Johnson & Johnson as 
arguing that the Human Genome Project was a fundamental and necessary part of 
maintaining US dominance of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. 
It is important, perhaps, to note here that national boundaries do not lose their 
significance either in the ‘universal’ community o f science or in the world of a 
‘weightless’ knowledge economy.
Many (Bodmer and McKie, 1995; Russo, 2003) trace the advent of the 
biotechnology industry to the founding o f Genentech by the geneticist Herbert 
Boyer and the venture capitalist (with a background in biochemistry) Robert 
Swanson in 1976. Boyer, with Stanley Cohen, invented recombinant DNA 
technology. Thus, one of the men who was a key figure in the development of the 
new genetics was also, within just a few years of his groundbreaking scientific 
work, leading the industrialisation and commercialisation of the knowledge and 
technologies that he made possible. At the birth of the Human Genome Project, 
in 1990, Genentech was taken over by Hoffman-La Roche, who acquired 60 per 
cent of the company for $2.1 billion. Boyer’s initial stake was funded by a $500 
loan (Bodmer and McKie, 1995).
Richard Lewontin (2001) described contemporary molecular biology as being a 
discipline in which all the prominent scientists were invested in the success of 
biotechnology businesses. An example of this played a part in precipitating the 
controversial resignation of James Watson from the position as director of the
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National Center for Human Genome Research. His large private stock portfolio 
included investments in a variety of biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, 
creating, for some, the impression o f a conflict of interest (Davies, 2001). Walter 
Gilbert, the scientist who theatrically wrote the estimated $3 billion cost of a 
human genome project on the board during the 1986 Cold Spring Harbour 
meeting, was a founder of Biogen4 in 1978, and was appointed CEO in 1982. The 
new genetics, and the Human Genome Project, have always been economic 
entities.
The failure of Genome Corp. to achieve the necessary capitalisation over 1987- 
1988 as a consequence, in a large part, o f the stock market crash of October 1987 
(Cook-Deegan, 1994; Davies, 2001) was an early demonstration that genome 
science was not only an economic entity tied into the largely unobserved circuits 
of the academic economy, but one tied into international flows of capital. 
Genome Corp., it should be noted, was also to be an entity with avowedly 
economic consequences. Not merely in that it was to be a profit-making 
organisation, a near-ubiquitous feature of economic life in a capitalist economy, 
but in that it promised to increase the efficiency of the life sciences by introducing 
a new and superior division of labour. Walter Gilbert is quoted as arguing that a 
private genome sequencing project would be the same kind of change in the life 
sciences as the moves from scientists making their own restriction enzymes or 
blowing their own glassware to routinely buying these items from a catalogue 
(Cook-Deegan, 1994). A genome project, developed as a resource for the 
academic community would, in this way, transform the essential economics, the 
division of labour, of the life sciences. To the extent that the success of Venter 
was seen as the triumph of economics and management, and not that of science 
and discovery, we can look to Leroy Hood’s opinion; “He has never invented 
anything [...] The only thing he deserves credit for is scaling up the process” 
(quoted in Davies, 2004, p. 66).
4 Biogen was a financial failure. This may have been a factor, along with the stock market crash 
o f 1988, in Gilbert’s failure to raise venture capital for a private effort to sequence the human 
genome.
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We have seen how private capital saw possibilities for profit in genome sequences. 
This interest, of course, predates Perkin Elmer’s $300 investment in Celera 
Genomics. Craig Venter, as we have noted, was already a scientist with close ties 
to the commercial exploitation o f genome sequence, with the non-profit TIGR 
inextricably tied to a commercial sister company, HGS. To understand the scale 
of economic interest in the genome sequence, we need only point to the $125 
million that SmithKline-Beecham paid for seven per cent of HGS in 1993, less 
than a year after its establishment (Davies, 2001). That price valued HGS at just 
under $1.8 billion. At the time, scientific opinion was that we were decades from 
a complete sequence of the human genome. With this investment, SmithKline- 
Beecham was buying a share of the exploitation of the future genome sequence 
produced by TIGR. For capital, the very promise of the genome sequences as 
property far outweighed the deterrent o f a lack of existing assets, either material 
or informational.
As Fortun (2006) notes, one of the explicit rationales for establishing a public 
Human Genome Project was to create the infrastructure for the growth of the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries and, inevitably, the commodification 
of various aspects of living things. Craig Venter and Celera Genomics were 
building a biotechnology corporation that would profit from the building of this 
infrastructure. It follows, therefore, that “[i]n a very real sense... Venter’s history 
is not so much of competing with the HGP, but of extending and intensifying 
some of the original rationales of the HGP” (Fortun, 2006, p. 28). The centrality 
of the human genome to the developing ‘knowledge economies’ of the 
industrialised world can be seen by the effect of the creation of particular forms of 
property. When President Clinton announced that the human genome sequence 
could not be patented -  a move that supported the public project and, at least in 
the perceptions of investors, damaged the business model of Celera Genomics -  
the NASDAQ, on which many biotechnology shares are traded, lost 
approximately $50 billion in market capitalisation in two days. Celera Genomics 
lost nearly 20 per cent o f its value in this time (Fortun, 2006).
This was an overreaction. The patenting of the human genome might not have 
been possible, but it remained possible to transform human genes into private
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property. The Harvard Business Review reports that, by 2000, the year that 
Clinton made his announcement, Human Genome Sciences had been granted 
patents on 106 human genes, and was in the process of acquiring patents on 
thousands more (Enriquez and Goldberg, 2000).
Nonetheless, the sequence of the human genome is a commodity, even if it is not 
a commodity enclosed by property law in the service of particular owners. 
Commodities “are themselves the products of social activity, the result of 
expended human energy, materialized labour. As objectification of social labour, 
all commodities are crystallisations o f the same substance” (Marx, 1859 [1999]). 
By contrast to the scientific paper -  the output of small science -  in which the 
product of labour bares the specific social imprint o f its production, sequence data 
is universalised, standardised and abstracted.
But all this economic life is life as observed by the business pages of the major 
newspapers, by the Financial Times, characterised by stocks and shares, flows of 
state funding, mergers and acquisitions. The essence of economic life remains 
largely invisible; rather, the products of this life are represented as the entirety. 
Work and labour are invisible. This thesis considers the economic life of the 
sequence and sequencing of the human genome at its most fundamental level, at 
the level of the labour necessary to produce it. As Marx argued in A Contribution 
to the Critique o f  Political Economy (1859 [1999]), it is labour, and the social 
relations of production, that underpin everything else. This thesis addresses the 
questions; How was the industrialisation of the practice of biology experienced at 
the level of the bench? To what degree does this accord with other examples of 
big science? To what degree does this accord with other examples of 
industrialisation?
Through Chapter B, Anatomies o f  Big Science, and Chapter C, Pathologies o f  
Work in Big Science, we explore the examples offered to us by other studies of 
big science. Chapter C, Pathologies o f  Work in Big Science, necessarily touches 
on sociological concerns with industrialisation of work on general, not just the 
industrialisation o f science. Chapter F, through to Chapter I, address the bulk of 
the fieldwork evidence. While Chapter F, The Factory and the University,
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Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, and Chapter I, Interlude: Dis- 
Engagement and Dis-Integration, describe the way in which work at the Institute 
was experienced by those who produced the human genome sequence, Chapter H, 
The High Road to the Human Genome, connects these experiences to some of the 
current debates regarding work in the economies of the early twenty-first century. 
Chapter J, The Institute and the Knowledge Economy, places this fieldwork in a 
wider context, discussing the place of the Institute as a de-monstration in 
discussions about work in ‘post-industrial’ economies.
We return to questions of economy as seen by the Financial Times in Chapter J, 
The Institute and the Knowledge Economy. For now, we turn our attention to the 
question of big science itself; what are the precedents for big science such as the 
Human Genome Project, and how can these help us to understand the 
accomplishment of sequencing the human genome?
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[B] A n a t o m ie s  o f  B ig  S c ie n c e
Anatomy is the science o f the structure of living things. The word derives from 
the Ancient Greek temnein, which means to cut, or to divide. Using the analogy 
of a microscope, we consider the ‘bigness’ of science at varying degrees of 
resolution, slicing the term ‘big science’ into a collection of distinct but 
interrelated parts. Where student anatomists would have studied the illustrated 
plates of the classic texts to inform their own studies, here we take as our 
illustrations the studies o f other big sciences. As such, as a selective review of the 
literature, this chapter is also in the tradition o f anatomists; it is working with the 
bodies that have provided to us by others. Before we turn our attention to the 
body of the Institute, we anticipate the features that we might find.
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B1 In t r o d u c t io n
This chapter considers the meaning and appropriate use of the term ‘big science’. 
We visit the work of sociologists, such as Collins (2003) and philosophers, in 
particular Ravetz (1971 [1973]), and the reflective accounts produced by those 
within the scientific culture, especially Weinberg (1967) and Ziman (1984). From 
these sources, section B2, A Drama o f  Scale, describes the distinctive features of 
big science, considered at various levels of resolution. Section B3, A Case Study 
in Big Science: LIGO, makes use o f an existing qualitative case study (Collins, 
2003) to explore some of the features of big science organisations. This brings 
the narrowing of focus, begun in section B2, A Drama o f  Scale, down to the level 
of the laboratory. Adopting this level of resolution for the study of big science is 
discussed in section B4, Big Science as a Quality o f  Laboratory Life. The 
necessary contrast of big science with the concept of small science is examined in 
section B5, Small Science.
In arriving at the suitable level of resolution for an exploration of the experience 
of working at the Institute on the sequencing o f the human genome we are 
reminded that science is a form of work. Section B6, Understanding Work in Big 
Science Projects, explores the distinctive features of big science as work. This is 
necessary before we can understand the intersection of the experiences of the 
research participants with the wider features of history and economy. Big science 
is discussed with reference to the Human Genome Project and the Institute in 
section B7, Big Science and Biology. This section draws on the accounts of 
leading participants in the Human Genome Project such as John Sulston (Sulston 
and Ferry, 2002) and Francis Collins, Michael Morgan and Aristides Patrinos 
(2003). Throughout this chapter, objections to and anxieties with the 
development of big science are touched upon as they are raised by the literature. 
However, this chapter avoids detailed discussion of what we might call the 
‘pathologies’ of big science. The pathologies of work in big science that are 
particularly relevant to the level o f sociological resolution that this thesis adopts 
are discussed in greater depth in Chapter C, Pathologies o f  Work in Big Science.
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However, we should bear in mind the passage that Hevly (1992) wrote in the 
afterword to a collection of papers and essays on the subject of big science. 
“[Ejven after hundreds o f pages of text, “big science” itself remains an elusive 
term” (p. 355). Indeed, as science can be big in a number of senses; geographic, 
economic, multi-disciplinary and multinational (Galison, 1992), or; large in scale, 
broad in scope or great in significance (Capshew and Rader, 1992), these few 
thousand words can only claim to offer sociological orientation, not unambiguous 
definition. One of the principle aims o f this chapter is to disentangle the different 
aspects by which science can be described as being big, and determine which of 
these understandings best fits the example o f the Human Genome Project and thus 
suits the focus of this thesis.
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B 2 A  D r a m a  o f  S c a l e
Capshew and Rader (1992) suggest that ‘the drama of scale’ is at the heart of 
science. They quote Latour; “The small and invisible are made large, the large 
and unencompassable are made small. The fast are made slow and the slow are 
speeded up” (p. 18). They argue that, as students of science, we recreate this 
drama of scale anew in our research. The idea of the dramas of scale is one that 
we can actively engage with as we anatomise big science. We can use a scientific 
metaphor that perfectly illustrates science as the human manipulation of the scale 
of nature; the microscope, an instrument that is used in the study of anatomy. If 
we imagine that it is possible to examine big science through a microscope, one of 
our choices is the degree of magnification to select. When we study big science 
through the least powerful lens, we see can examine the features of big science 
that are those of science as a whole.
Big science as a quality o f the community o f science
Indeed, big science first enters the literature of science studies as a characteristic 
of science as a whole. The term big science was brought into the common usage 
by Price in his book Little Science, Big Science (1963). Price approached the 
concept of big science from a scientometric perspective, arguing that the scientific 
literature, the number of scientific workers and the amount of money allocated to 
science funding grew at an exponential rate. For Price, the ‘first law’ of scientific 
growth is that science has grown exponentially for the past three hundred years, 
with a doubling in size every fifteen years. Caphew and Rader (1992) write that 
for Price, “while this growth might be correlated with the appearance of bigger 
equipment and larger research groups, these were incidental rather than defining 
characteristics of Big Science” (p. 7).
For Price (1963), it is the community of science, rather than any particular science, 
project or laboratory, which is the social object that is big. We might rephrase 
this to say that the cultural form of life that is science is the entity that has been, 
and is, expanding. This is a definition of big science which has sociological 
utility, both within the culture o f science and beyond. Price suggested several
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consequences that might arise from the exponential growth of science. Given that 
Price adopted a scientometric focus, it is unsurprising that at the heart of these 
concerns are questions o f effective scientific communication. Are the methods 
and processes developed in an age of small science still effective after the total 
mass of scientific information being produced has grown to the levels seen in this 
age of big science? If the answer to this question is ‘no’, we might find in the 
development of the internet the means of scientific communication that are 
appropriate to a big science culture. The internet facilitates big science as a 
quality of the culture of science as a whole by allowing near instantaneous 
communication via e-mail, especially e-mail lists. The internet allows a scientist 
to negotiate the ever-proliferating collection of journals by providing 
sophisticated search tools and electronic versions of print publications. And the 
internet allows the sharing of raw data and unpublished studies; in genomics 
databases such as Genbank are essential parts of the structure of scientific 
communication.
Complementing the scientometric analysis o f the development of big science 
produced by Price (1963), Alvin Weinberg (1967) offered a reflective, 
philosophical account of a life in science as it grows. A leading physicist and 
director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Weinberg also considered the 
problems that resulted from the growth o f the whole community of science to the 
proportions o f big science. Perhaps naturally enough, given his position in the 
management of a large research laboratory, he also focused much of his concern 
on issues of scientific communication. Some o f these, such as the problem of 
document retrieval and the development o f indices, are problems that have been 
largely dealt with -  or at least have been transformed into unrecognisably 
different problems -  through the developments in information technology 
described above. Other problems o f communication in big science that were 
identified by Weinberg have found no such technological fix. Weinberg argues 
that as science grows it fragments into increasingly differentiated fields of 
knowledge and practice. However, these fields of knowledge still draw on, and 
even depend on, the knowledges o f ‘neighbouring’ fields. For this reason, the 
danger of a breakdown in communication between fields is a “cause of deep 
concern” (p. 43). Furthermore, as science fragments there is the danger that fields
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that do not communicate may become inconsistent with each other. Where fields 
do reintegrate, he argues, it tends to be at a higher level of abstraction. In doing 
so we lose resolution, we omit something, argues Weinberg He writes that 
“knowing in principle is not the same as knowing” (p. 44).
The value o f the reflective account of big science offered by Weinberg (1967) 
does not stop at the scale o f the community of science. His understanding of the 
practice of science within disciplines, institutions and laboratories continue to be 
of service as we further our discussion of big science. Though this chapter 
considers big science at different levels o f resolution, these different viewpoints 
are not independent of each other; the structures visible at one level of 
magnification are also visible at others, though at these other levels of 
magnification the appearance of those structures might be very different.
Big science, where the bigness is understood as a quality of the community of 
science as a whole, also has effects beyond the boundaries of science. The 
transformation of contemporary societies into ones in which questions of science 
are active in decisions that were once the preserve of politicians, is a challenge to 
the scope of democracy. The problems of decision-making and democracy in a 
society dominated by science have been discussed by writers such as Shackley, 
Wynne and Waterton (1996) and Funtowiczand Ravetz (1993). These problems 
can be understood as a consequence o f the general growth of science, both in 
terms of its power to transform the world and its cultural dominance. Of course, 
questions regarding the governance o f science and technology, and the 
incorporation into contemporary democracies of these products of human labour, 
which often seem to have an autonomous, independent existence, are questions 
that are resolved largely at national levels of resolution.
Big science as a quality o f national science
The community of science prides itself on the degree to which it, of all human 
endeavours, is international and universal. Universalism is one of Merton’s (1942 
[1973]) norms of science. But science is tied into the fabric of economics and 
politics. Never more so than in the case of big science, as we have seen in the 
case of the Human Genome Project in Chapter A, Primers. If we increase the
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level of magnification o f our social microscope, we move to a level of scale 
smaller than that o f the global community of science. We find that we are 
looking at big science as a characteristic of national science.
Sharon Traweek (1992) summarises the literature examining the development of 
national scientific communities. She argues that most analyses of big science 
ignore the necessity of a national infrastructure. This infrastructure, she writes, 
consists of: “(1) sustained funding for education and research at all levels, from 
elementary schools to national laboratories, (2) a certain proportion of the 
country’s gross national project (GNP) allocated regularly for scientific work, (3) 
a certain proportion of the country’s population engaged in scientific work, and (4) 
scientists engaging in a high level o f information exchange and documentation 
about their work” (p. 104). We might add to this list a public imagination for [big] 
science. Galison (1992) identifies the “cultural fascination of Americans in 
general for the large” and “depression-era delight in gigantism” (p. 3) as an 
important source of support for big science in the case of the United States. 
Without the national infrastructure to support it, big science is an impossibility. 
Investment in such as infrastructure can be justified on bases beyond a public 
delight in gigantism. In questions of the development of a ‘knowledge economy’, 
a concept not unconnected to the project to sequence the human genome, the 
development and expansion o f an educational and research infrastructure is seen 
as a prerequisite for economic success. The development of a knowledge 
economy, and its relationship to work at the Institute is explored in Chapter J, The 
Institute and the Knowledge Economy. The echoes of a linear model connecting 
science to national growth, as set out by Vannevar Bush (1945 [2007]) are clear to 
see. A study of big science at the national level would, therefore, focus on the 
development and maintenance, materially, socially and politically, of scientific 
infrastructure.
Big science as a quality o f a scientific discipline
At a similar level o f metaphorical magnification, but with the application of 
different interpretative filters, we find that we can look at big science as being a 
characteristic of a scientific discipline. This takes the form of a public and 
political fascination with a discipline. An example might be drawn from a short
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story by Kafka that we return to when discussing the Human Genome Project. In 
The Great Wall o f  China (1931 [2005]), Kafka writes that; “Fifty years before the 
building [of the Great Wall] was begun... architecture, and masonry in particular, 
had been declared the most important branch of knowledge, all others being 
recognized only in so far as they had some connection with it” (p. 3). In Kafka’s 
fictional account of the construction of the Great Wall of China, without the 
nurturing of the public fascination with a particular branch of knowledge, such an 
enormous technological and engineering project would have been impossible. 
And the majority of big science projects are, simultaneously, big technology and 
engineering projects. Consider the building of the Superconducting Supercollider, 
the Hubble Space Telescope or, in the example of this thesis, the necessary 
developments in sequencing automation and analysis technologies that allowed 
the Human Genome Project to be completed within a politically feasible 
timeframe.
Of course, not all examples are fictional. During the 1950s, when, in the blast 
wave o f the atom bomb, physics was the big science discipline, visions of the 
future, whether nightmare or utopia, were often atomic dreams. In our current 
age we can see a similar public and political fascination with genetics and the 
fruits of the Human Genome Project. In Chapter A, Primers, we described some 
of the economic excitement surrounding the promises of biotechnology. In the 
1950s, atomic power promised similar transformations5. Traweek (1992) argues 
that “big science requires a big audience”. “The role of this awed audience for 
science is not to judge the value o f the projects of scientists and engineers; its 
functions are to approve, fund, and to provide recruits” (p. 102). Traweek cites 
Lew Kowarski (1977), a key figure in the development of CERN6, the largest 
particle accelerator in the world, as arguing that the cultivation of these big 
publics is essential to big science. A study of big science at a disciplinary level
5 The canary in the coal mine that indicates the development o f  a culturally big science discipline 
is science Fiction, particularly pulp science fiction. In this light we should note the transformation 
o f  the Incredible Hulk from the product o f  a gamma bomb in the comic books o f  the 1960s into 
the product o f  genetic experimentation in the Ang Lee movie o f  2003.
6 CERN stands for Conseil Europeenpour la Recherche Nucleaire (European Council for Nuclear 
Research. The acronym was retained even after the name was changed to Organisation 
Europeene pour la Recherche Nucleaire (European Organisation for Nuclear Research) in 1954.
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would focus on the capture of public and political support, in terms of both 
sponsorship and recruitment, and the preservation of these resources once secured.
At the level of resolution that lets us focus on the scientific discipline as the 
aspect of science that is big, we can reintroduce the reflections of Weinberg 
(1967). As science fragments and is reunified at higher levels of abstraction, 
Weinberg suggests that these changes will be reified in a social reorganisation of 
science. He suggests that a hierarchy will develop. “At the first level are the 
bench scientists... [who] are kept under surveillance by the next group of 
scientists, the group leaders or bosses” (p. 47). The bench scientists work in 
narrow fields, communicating only with closely related bench scientists. It is the 
group leaders who communicate on a wider basis, in effect maintaining “contact 
between different groups of bench scientists” (p. 47). This hierarchy might 
extend upwards, with each superior ‘boss’ caste having knowledge of a wider area 
but at increasing levels of abstraction. If Weinberg is correct, a study of big 
science that takes the discipline as the object o f enquiry will be interested not only 
in how a discipline recruits resources to feed and maintain its growth, but how, as 
it grows, it manages the problem of scientific communication.
Big science as a quality o f a scientific institution
Increasing the level of magnification once again, we find that big science is a 
property of a scientific project, or a scientific institution. It is at this level that we 
find most contemporary accounts o f big science. Reflective accounts of a life in 
big science are produced by major scientific actors, who, from their positions as 
leaders offer an institutional perspective, however myopic, on big science. 
Examples from the Human Genome Project include books such as The Common 
Thread (Sulston and Ferry, 2002), and ranks of papers, such as the reflections of 
Collins, Morgan and Patrinos on managing big science (2003). The picture from 
big physics is similar, with accounts by scientists such as Weinberg (1967) and 
Kowarski (1977). Popular accounts o f big science by third parties are often set at 
the institutional level (the wide range o f books about the Human Genome Project, 
such as Davis, 1990; Shapiro, 1991; Davies, 2001, are an example of this), and 
are often journalistic, sometimes in the best sense, stories of management, 
competition, obstructions, politics, money and breakthroughs.
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Hevly (1992) calls for an increase in the number of studies using the ‘institution’ 
as a unit of analysis. He writes; “[b]ig science is, after all, institutionalized 
science” (p. 361). However, he argues that such studies “often fail to take the 
final step in their analyses to show how institutional context affects the 
intellectual content of science” (p. 360). One recent analysis that does make this 
leap is the Collins’ study o f the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-wave 
Observatory (LIGO) (2003), which is part of his exhaustive research on gravity 
wave science (see Collins, 2005). As such, we proceed through a summary of 
Collins’ analysis, using it as a case study in research on big science.
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B3 A C a s e  S t u d y  in  B ig  S c ie n c e :  LIGO
Collins (2003) describes LIGO as “centralized big science turning itself into 
mixed big science” (p. 262). From some perspectives, such as in comparison to 
the Human Genome Project, LIGO is a relatively small scientific undertaking, 
employing less than 50 scientists. O f course, such a team cannot be considered 
absolutely small, as if it was small science, and, with a cost of between $300-400 
million, we can place it squarely in the category of big science7. To illustrate 
what it means for gravity wave science to become big science, Collins quotes a 
representative of the National Science Foundation; “This community is making a 
transition from individual entrepreneurial science to big science... they’re giving 
up their individual control and identity... It’s just that the high cost of equipment 
forces communities to move up this learning curve” (p. 267). The shift to big 
science, he says, will be ‘wrenching’. Despite the leaders of gravity wave physics 
in the US expressing a preferences for small science, they saw a big science 
programme as an unfortunate necessity. ‘Necessity’ is a widely used justification 
for big science projects. We see this in discussions of the Human Genome Project.
As LIGO grew to become a big science project, opinion settled on the idea that a 
single authoritative director was required. Management by ‘steering group’ was 
no longer seen as an appropriate regime. This was a change in the management 
model of science and was resisted by the scientists involved. The first project 
manager is quoted as saying; “this was a different sort of activity than simply a 
continuation of past research activities... they [the scientists] were intellectually 
unprepared and emotionally... resistant” (Collins, 2003, p. 271). It took a second, 
more authoritative project manager to make this new management style a success. 
He is described as having “sliced through the indecision... cutting off options that 
otherwise would have survived as ... pet projects”. With this regime now in place, 
“the project leapt forward” (p. 274). The project manager, with no research 
experience in the core science of the project, gravity wave interferometry, “was
7 Just what is big science? H ow  big does science have to be, and in what terms, to be considered 
big? This chapter attempts to answer these questions, at least to some extent, but this leads us to 
endless agonising over categorising individual projects. For the purpose o f  progress in work, the 
boundaries must remain questions o f  judgement.
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now making the basic scientific decisions” (p. 275). His institutional role was to 
close, by bureaucratic rather than scientific means, ‘controversy’ at an early date.
The term ‘Skunk Works’ was applied retrospectively to this regime of 
institutional management. Skunk Works are characterised by a strong leader, a 
highly motivated group o f employees with a strong collective identity, a reward 
structure based on innovative talent rather than bureaucratic position or metrics of 
productivity, and an absence of outside scrutiny and accountability. Collins (2003) 
suggests that these kinds of institutional regimes can perhaps have unavoidable 
pathologies. Tremendous stress is placed on the scientists, and those who refused 
to ‘declare loyalty’ to the leader and team found themselves on the outside of the 
group. Secrecy, which is at least on the surface at odds with the ethos of science 
(Merton, 1942 [1973]), was also a problem under this regime. However, it was 
not as a result of the contradiction o f lie ethos of science, neither was it the 
significant discontent produced among the scientists by the ‘premature’ closure of 
scientific debate, that brought the fall o f this regime. Secrecy proved to be the 
weakness of the Skunk Works management as it refused to accept the kind of 
oversight and monitoring o f outputs that the National Science Foundation felt was 
commensurate with their capital investment.
As big science, LIGO is a client o f the National Science Foundation, which in 
turn is a client o f the US Congress. The NSF had traditionally been a funder of 
small science. Small science can proceed largely on the basis of self-governance. 
In big science though, “good work needs to be seen to be done” (Collins, 2003, p. 
280). It is interesting to note that the pressure for accountability came not only 
from politicians and civil servants, the interested funders of the project, but also 
from within science; from actors who might be characterised as the interested 
competitors. As with many big science projects, as we see with the Human 
Genome Project, LIGO was opposed by those who feared “that it would suck 
funds from their own enterprises” (p. 274).
The regime that replaced the Skunk Works attempted to manage the institution by 
rationalising the activities of the scientists. This type of big science management 
system is discussed in depth in the next chapter. In retrospect, even the leaders of
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the new regime admit that the system “didn’t take into account the peculiarities of 
the way physicists like to live or researchers like to think about problems” 
(Collins, 2003, p. 283). They illustrate their management philosophy, saying; 
“it’s exactly the way a construction company would go out and put together a 
complicated construction project -  somebody on top -  some people at the next 
level that report to them -  people at the next level below that report to them ... [at] 
each of those levels the people have specific tasks responsibilities, budgets, 
schedules... we pretty well shut that [flexibility] out... we just put our blinders on 
and moved ahead” (p. 283). This, though, led to scientists feeling like that they 
were being pushed down the organisational order, leading to dissatisfaction, with 
one scientist saying that there was, among the scientists; “a feeling that they’re 
cogs” (p. 285). Collins cites a scientist as being o f the opinion that “scientists can 
stand low pay and status as long as they are having fun” (p. 276-277). But, 
according to another scientist, under this regime “[t]here is no attempt to allow 
scientists to have fun” (p. 285).
This new management, it seems, as opposed to the previous regime, became 
enamoured of bureaucratic measures o f success, and importantly and distinctively, 
work. These were privileged over the assessments of scientists, the traditional 
way of judging scientific work and the products thereof. Collins (2003) reports 
that little time was set aside for serious thinking about what was being done, and 
that the management appeared to regard the deep thinkers being both the converse 
of, and less desirable than, those who were the ‘doers’. Shifts and schedules came 
to be seen as means of increasing the utilisation and efficiency of the facility. One 
of these leaders suggested that this organisational model was a ‘sandstorm’, a 
phase that scientists have to ride out until “the sun comes out and we act like 
scientists [again]” (p. 284).
The routinisation o f LIGO was bolstered intellectually by a belief in the 
reproducibility of the world that is strongly held in high-energy physics; the 
disciplinary background of the managers. A similar process can be observed in 
the Human Genome Project, and in biological sciences in general. This is a 
development that can be attributed to the migration of scientists from fields such 
as physics and computer science to the life science disciplines. Rose and Rose
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(1972) speculated that this was because physicists were repulsed by the atom 
bomb, and sought a new intellectual home in the life sciences. Whether the 
movement of individual scientists such as Francis Crick and Walter Gilbert along 
this cross-disciplinary path can be attributed to that is questionable, but it is the 
case that, just as scientists with an education in physics were instrumental in the 
development o f contemporary molecular biology, so too does the new genetics 
owe its existence to the infusion o f scientific minds educated other disciplines, 
especially computer science. However, these imported or incorporated scientists 
did not come to the Human Genome Project as managers, as was the case with 
LIGO. In Chapter H, The High Road to the Human Genome, the influence of the 
scientific background of the managers on the organisation of the Institute is 
discussed. The small science backgrounds o f the managers, especially that of the 
founding director, shape the work culture o f the organisation.
In the case of LIGO, Collins (2003) suggests that large scale interferometry was 
not mature enough to be routinised; there was too much debate as to what counts 
as good experimental design and what counts as a genuine experimental result. 
At the laboratory level, the gravitational wave scientists regretted the deliberate 
reduction in the level of artisanry involved.
In the case study that Collins (2003) presents, we see that the institutional 
structure of big science is variable. We should avoid inadvertently buying into a 
determinism of scale. Traweek (1992) presents work in comparative 
anthropology that strengthens this rejection o f simple determinism. Her 
comparative anthropology o f  high-energy physics demonstrated differences in the 
way that Japanese and American scientists organised their big physics projects. 
The American system was hierarchical, with authoritative leaders, in contrast to 
the Japanese decision-making system which was dependent on consensus. Of 
course, each group of scientists saw their own method of social organisation as 
superior, with stress placed on different features. While the ‘bigness’ of big 
science may make the adoption o f certain management structures more or less 
likely, the form implemented depends on more than simple measures of scale.
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B 4  B ig S c ie n c e  a s  a  Q u a l it y  o f  L a b o r a t o r y  L ife
The case study of LIGO (Collins, 2003) incorporates sociological detail from the 
level of the laboratory. This, apart from demonstrating the weakness of the 
microscope metaphor and the ‘bleed’ between different levels of magnification, 
allows the study to suggest ways in which the institutional model adopted for the 
management of big science can colour the character of the knowledge produced. 
The bureaucratic closure of scientific controversies by actors outside the core-set 
(Collins, 1981) provides rails along which the knowledge produced must proceed. 
Given the upset that these closures caused among the scientists, we can assume 
that it is possible that, had the controversies in question been settled by the 
community of science alone, the science might have developed quite differently 
from the path along which it was driven. When the explicitly industrial model 
was adopted, it could be argued that the attempt to routinise the science could 
have led to the science being fixed in organisational amber. We explore this 
argument in the next chapter. Thus, the production of scientific knowledge might 
be said to be a victim of the contingency of management. Or, more importantly, 
the contingency of work practices, however arrived at. It is for this reason that we 
must increase the level of magnification once more.
When we increase the magnification for a final time, we arrive at the point at 
which our gaze is able to penetrate the walls o f the institution, to see into the 
laboratory and witness science, and scientists, in action. By investigating big 
science as a process of work, our studies can begin to answer Hevly’s (1992) 
complaint that little attention is paid to the question of how the bigness of big 
science influences the character o f the knowledge produced. As Hevly warns us, 
urging that we do not become too enamoured of quantitative, scientometric 
analyses ofbig science; “Big science is not simply science carried out with big or 
expensive instruments... such instruments, despite their size, may be used in a 
manner consistent with traditional, little science” (p.356). Indeed, Hevly argues 
that big science involves more than a change in scale, but also “new forms of 
institutional, political, and social organization” and “new procedures for the 
conduct of scientific work”. “Big budgets and big instruments are only part of the
49
story; they represent indicators, which themselves should not be mistaken for the 
substantial changes they signal” (p. 356). The changes of prime importance, we 
can argue, are the changes in the nature of the work of science. While Hevly 
might write, as quoted above, that “ [b]ig science is, after all, institutionalized 
science” (p. 361), we can follow that statement with the simple truism that all 
science, big or otherwise, is the product of human labour. The question that is at 
the centre of this thesis is; how was the work of science experienced by those who 
worked to sequence the human genome, i.e. in the big science of genetics, on the 
big science programme of the Human Genome Project and at the big science 
institution of the Institute? Modifying the argument of Ravetz (1971 [1973]) 
slightly, as Ravetz was discussing the craft character of scientific practice, we can 
say that, without an understanding o f science as work we cannot begin to 
understand how “the subjective, intensely personal activity of creative science” 
results in “objective, impersonal knowledge” (p. 75), and how this work shapes 
the resultant knowledge. After all, as Galison (1992) writes; “Seen from the 
inside -  from the scientists’ perspective -  big science entails a change in the very 
nature of a life in science” (p. 1). This, therefore, is where the microscope 
reaches its optimum magnification; the lens o f choice for this thesis.
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B 5 S m a l l  S c ie n c e ?
Before we continue with this discussion o f big science, using the anatomies drawn 
from others (Ravtez, 1971 [1973]; Ziman, 1984; Yearley, 1988; Collins, 2003) 
and begin our discussion of big science in biology, we engage in the production of 
an essential contrast. A discussion o f big science must ask; big science is big in 
comparison to what? What is the small science implied in any discussion of big 
science? This section is a brief answer to this question, as much of what is small 
science is implied in our descriptions o f big science. In our understanding of 
what is small science, a notional ‘original’ state of science, we begin to 
understand what is meant when it is argued that science changes as it becomes big 
science. In doing so, we prefigure the next chapter, as the changes to the 
distinctive features of small science imply possible pathologies of science that is 
big.
The leader o f the DoE arm of the Human Genome Project, Ari Patrinos, is quoted 
describing the kind o f biology that existed before the sequencing o f the human 
genome.
A few years ago biological research was really a small science 
operation. And I don’t mean that in any derogatory way. But 
that was the approach. It was usually small labs with one or two 
principle scientists and a few post-docs and a bunch of graduate 
students and technicians and that constituted a fairly good-sized 
laboratory. Of course science flourished wonderfully that way 
because it was a different approach.
(Patrinos, quoted in Lasker Foundation, 1998)
Small science corresponds, to some degree, to the popular image of science. It is, 
we might argue, often taken to be the ideal o f scientific practice. In the popular 
imagination, scientists work in an autonomous, voluntaristic fashion. To do this 
small science generally involves a lesser degree o f capitalisation and smaller 
research teams (Yearley, 1988). These are the differences in scale that are patent 
in the straightforwardly descriptive language. Big science, with its large teams 
and expensive equipment, is additionally often ‘mission orientated’ (Galison, 
1992). In setting out the type o f science that is not big science, Collins (2003)
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argues that small science is under little pressure to succeed quickly. Small 
science “can work toward a goal of excellence, defined by... [its own 
practitioners], without interference... the creators of an idea can be left to decide 
whether it is succeeding or failing” (p. 261). This thesis stresses these 
superficially scale-independent characteristics. The work of small science, even 
that conducted within institutions o f large size, such as a university department, is 
distinguished from the work involved in a large-scale project in these important 
regards. The large-scale project is big science, organised to proceed towards a 
defined scientific goal, the pursuit o f which is supervised by actors outside the 
science. Small science, even when gathered together, is a more heterogeneous 
collection of scientists and objectives, largely organised and scrutinised from 
within.
In all this though, and throughout this thesis, we should bear in mind Merton 
(1968 [1973]), who, when discussing the apparent change in the behaviour 
patterns of scientists, cautioned that we ought not get too nostalgic and build a 
false picture of past environments and practices of science. Indeed, the birth of 
big science is constantly being revised and pushed further into the past. Capshew 
and Rader (1992), for example, categorise the large observatories of pre-Modern 
astronomers -  it would be anachronistic to call these men scientists -  as big 
science. In terms of the kinds of big science under examination in this thesis, we 
need not only to stress the ‘bigness’ o f the project in which work takes place, but 
the fact that science is, in the Modern era, a mass occupation. In this we see 
many parallels with other kinds o f work in Modem society, not least when we 
consider the Institute as a ‘factory’.
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B 6  U n d e r s t a n d in g  W o r k  in  B ig S c ie n c e  P r o jec ts
In section B7, Big Science and Big Biology, we explore the idea of the Human 
Genome Project as big science. Before we do this we summarise previous 
attempts to understand for work in big science. Not all of these use the phrase 
‘big science’, and the alternative titles carry descriptive weight and value; they 
communicate more to the reader than simply a hazy sense of scale.
Ravetz (1971 [1973]) describes a mode of social organisation in science that is 
recognisably ‘big science’ in nature, labelling it as ‘industrialised science’. 
Ravetz argues that modes of organising scientific work are increasingly drawing 
their character from industry, a process of asymmetrical interpenetration between 
science and industry. Kleinman and Valias (2001) present a picture where the 
process that Ravetz (1971 [1973]) identified is still underway. While Ravetz 
argues that the industrialisation of science is taking place across the community of 
science, it is patent that the most manifest examples of industrialised basic science 
are also big science projects. Ravetz uses the term industrialised science to mean, 
in the first place, the dominance o f capital-intensive research, and the social 
consequences of the concentration o f power in a small section of the community. 
Collins (2003) writes that the risk involved in the capital (and political) 
commitment to the scientific project is borne not only by the scientists, but by 
wider society; in particular the civil servants and politicians responsible for the 
grant of funding. The leadership o f the project also tends to move away from the 
site of science, up the chain of risk. Pressure to adhere to a timetable means that 
“ it can be more efficient to give decision-making responsibility to team leaders 
who do not have the same emotional commitments as inventors” (p. 261). Second, 
as science is penetrated by industry there is the dissolution of the boundaries that 
enabled different styles o f work, with their appropriate codes of behaviour and 
ideals, to co-exist. Finally, the industrialisation of science involves the growth of 
science, both in particular units and in the aggregate, with the consequent loss of 
networks of informal, personal contacts binding a community.
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We have seen in the example of LIGO as big science (Collins, 2003) how 
industrial models of work organisation are self-consciously adopted by the 
managers of big science projects, even in the most basic of sciences. This was to 
some degree found in the Skunk Works model borrowed from the military 
research division of Lockheed, but importantly, the subsequent regime evoked 
archetypal images of industrial labour. Collins argues that whereas previously 
‘craft work’ was the normal manner o f scientific work, as science becomes bigger 
it is often the case that industrial contractors bring to the project their expertise of 
working to “well-specified schedules and performance targets” (p. 262). The 
regimentation of scientists into shift patterns, the routinisation of the work and the 
measurement of work done were all aspects of the regime installed to fulfil the 
requirement o f accountability. As Yearley (1988) argues, bureaucratic 
supervision can lead to scientific work being performed to meet targets rather 
than to pursue any scientific end. Thus, even in basic research “scientific work 
has come to resemble industrial scientific labour” (p. 76).
The physicist John Ziman (1984) described large-scale science as being 
collectivised science. He argues that the collectivisation of science is a process 
driven by forces external to science. This takes the form of state or corporate 
control of funding. As the apparatus required to work in science becomes more 
sophisticated as science advances, this collectivisation is reinforced by a demand 
internal to science for expensive apparatus and other material facilities. It would 
be incredibly costly to provide each researcher with these instruments, so to 
satisfy this demand there is an aggregation and sharing of research facilities. At 
the same time, as the sophistication o f research apparatus increases the 
complexity can exceed the capabilities o f a single individual. The variety of 
specialised instrumentation used in a single project in advanced science also 
demands a wider range o f expertise than a single scientist can master. Research 
projects can therefore only be undertaken by the active collaboration of a number 
of researchers. Thus, a characteristic o f collectivised science facilities is not only 
that they are immensely costly, but also that they require the cooperative work of 
large numbers of fully qualified scientists. Each scientist takes on a narrowly 
specialised role within the project. The results of this project are published as a
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single primary paper with hundreds of co-authors seeking some degree of 
recognition for their contribution to knowledge.
This notion that big science inherently involves a division of labour is an 
argument that crops up throughout the literature. Weinberg (1967) writes; “A 
division of labor between those who create or discover the facts and those who 
sift, absorb, and correlate the facts seems to be inevitable” (p. 51). He argues that 
it is only by this method that the community of science can ‘systematise’ the 
process of induction and thus contend with the problems posed by the mass of 
data, information and knowledge that accompany the growth of science. Beaver 
(2001) describes this as the process o f creating ‘fractional scientists’. Galison 
(1992) sums up the change in the nature o f a life at work in science that he sees as 
resulting from big science; “Teamwork and hierarchy increasingly characterize 
daily work” (p. 1).
When discussing the notion of an increasingly acute division of labour in big 
science projects and laboratories, and specifically at the Institute, it is worth 
reflecting on the different ways in which the labour of scientific work can be 
divided. This thesis suggests that there are four kinds of division of labour, each 
of which is distinct in nature, which travel under the same name.
First, there is the multiplicative division o f labour; the combination of the 
‘identical’ efforts o f many people to accomplish a goal larger than possible by 
individual labour. This is not a separation o f skills or the subdivision of a job, 
and this is not a production line, merely the accumulation of outputs. Remove 
any worker from the combination and the task will proceed, only with a slower 
rate of accumulation.
Second, there b  the division of labour according to rank or seniority. This is the 
kind of division o f labour that occurs in workshops, or, as we are interested, 
laboratories. The highest ranking member of the workshop or laboratory 
delegates the dirty, the laborious, and the tiresome tasks -  the tasks of low esteem 
— to more junior members. This is an intimate and personalised division of labour, 
based on power and preferences rather than resulting from the imperatives derived
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from the pursuit of efficiency or the differentiation in skills. In principle, all the 
members o f the workshop are united in their craft but divided by their rank.
Third, there is the organic division o f labour. This is the division o f labour 
according to craft of profession, or, as in science, by discipline. These divisions 
between arrays of expertises and knowledges appear to exist as ‘organic’ entities; 
their boundaries are ‘natural’, at least so much as they are not the overt product of 
a bureaucratic division of labour. The organic division of labour can be seen 
when different crafts or professions combine their expertise and knowledge in 
order to accomplish a goal.
Fourth, we have the bureaucratic, or industrial, division of labour. This is where 
the tasks of the labour process have been broken down, perhaps through the 
mechanisation o f the process, perhaps through the application of Taylorist 
principles. This is done for the purposes o f efficiency of, or control over, 
production, and is the division o f labour which is characteristic of a production 
line.
All these divisions of labour can be found in the work of science. Science as a 
community, or as communities, is reliant on something like the first division of 
labour, if we consider the path o f normal science to be the accumulation of 
knowledge. In the Human Genome Project we find a more concrete expression of 
this division of labour. In order to produce the sequence of the human genome a 
great number o f people performing the same task were required. Almost all 
scientific laboratories contain the second division of labour, in the form of the 
relationship between principle investigators, post-doctoral researchers, doctoral 
researchers and research assistants. Collaborative, inter-disciplinary science, 
which is seen by some as ‘big science’, involves the division of labour of the third 
kind. As does, considering this division o f labour in a more abstract sense, the 
progress o f science as a whole. However, it is only big science with an industrial 
character which involves the fcurth kind o f division of labour. It is this which 
makes the Institute distinct from superficially similar descriptions of a division of 
labour in science.
56
Both ‘industrialised science’ and ‘collectivised science’ are more evocative terms 
than ‘big science’. Both ‘industrialised’ and ‘collectivised’ carry more 
descriptive content, informing readers o f the mode of social organisation involved, 
than the nebulous, relative term ‘big’ is able to do. But they both also have the 
potential to mislead. ‘Industrialised’ is capable of implying private ownership 
and applied, economically exploitable goals. ‘Collectivised’, on the other hand, 
suggests that work of science is the collaboration of equals. It is important that 
we keep both of these extremes open as possibilities, even as we acknowledge 
their theoretical value. ‘Big science’ carries far less political luggage, capable of 
being both basic, public science, and private, industrial research, and we can 
allow our imaginations to conceive o f big science as not only a collaboration of 
equal scientists, but also as a social system with a highly rationalised division of 
labour integrated according to a hierarchical structure.
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B 7  B ig S c ie n c e  a n d  B ig B io l o g y
The Human Genome Project is considered to be the first big science project in 
biology. As was described in Chapter A, Primers, the Human Genome Project 
cost more than $3 billion8, with 20 major research sites spread across 6 countries 
(China, France, Germany, UK and USA), though the bulk of the sequencing was 
conducted by the G5 centres: the Sanger Institute in Cambridge, UK (funded by 
the Wellcome Trust), the Joint Genome Institute in Walnut Creek in California 
(funded by the US Department o f Energy), Baylor College of Medicine in 
Houston, Texas, Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis, 
Missouri and the Whitehead Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts (the latter three 
funded by the National Institutes o f Health) (Collins, Morgan and Patrinos, 2003). 
According to Collins’ (2003) typology o f big science, which divides big science 
projects into; “centralized big science, such as the Manhattan Project and the 
Apollo Program; federal big science which collects and organizes data from 
dispersed sites; and mixed big science, which offers a big, centrally organized 
facility, for the use of dispersed teams” (p. 262), we would classify this effort as 
an example o f ‘federal big science’.
This was a multi-national, multi-disciplinary project that took over a decade from 
the official announcement of the Project to the announcement of the draft human 
genome sequence (International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, 2003 
and Venter, et a i,  2003). As Ziman (1984) expected, these kinds of large scale 
projects would produce publications with many authors. In the case of the 
publication of the draft human genome sequence, there were over 500 scientists 
listed as being responsible for the research and new knowledge contained in these 
papers. These 500-plus names are just the tip of the iceberg. One early 
interviewee from outside the Institute told the reseacher that, despite working on 
the Human Genome Project, his name had not been printed on the hard copy
8 Collins, Morgan and Patrinos (2003) point out that $3 billion is a modest amount in comparison 
to the $11 billion projected cost o f  the Superconducting Supercollider (SSC). In order to make the 
HGP seem ever better value, the authors argue that w hile the SSC will only have a lifespan o f  30 
years, the HGP w ill have a ‘perpetual’ lifespan. O f course the data, knowledge and technology 
generated by the HGP will be available in perpetuity, but this cannot be claimed for the HGP 
while being denied as a future ‘lifespan’ o f  the SSC.
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editions, but was relegated, alongside the names of more than 2000 other 
scientists, to an appendix to the electronic version. This expanded list of authors 
of the ‘knowledge’ does not include the technical, support and supervisory staff 
who play key roles in the existence o f large-scale scientific projects.
Francis Collins, Michael Morgan and Aristides Patrinos occupied key positions in 
the US National Institutes o f Health, the Wellcome Trust and the US Department 
o f Energy (DoE) respectively from the mid 1990s, a key period in the big biology 
phase of the Human Genome Project. In a retrospective paper discussing the 
lessons that could be learned from their management of the Human Genome 
Project, they argue that the management o f the Human Genome Project was 
intentionally ‘bottom-up’ (Collins, Morgan and Patrinos, 2003). Arguing that this 
was a decision taken to maintain a grounding in ‘solid scientific foundations’, this 
strategy can be seen as an attempt, by drawing input from scientists, to maintain 
the ‘democracy’ of science. In Chapter H, The High Road to the Human Genome, 
we see that while a description of the Human Genome Project as being ‘bottom 
up’ might jar with the disciplined and goal-orientated nature o f the project, in the 
case of the Institute there were important hangovers from the culture of small 
science. These made themselves felt in the experiences o f those who worked to 
sequence the human genome.
Collins, Morgan and Patrinos (2003) argue that peer-review in particular proved 
to be both a means to legitimate decisions taken in the big biology approach and 
as a management tool. The Human Genome Project was, however, an attempt to 
produce scientific knowledge on an industrial scale. In discussing the 
management of the Human Genome Project, the authors make regular 
concessions to this conception o f the sequencing effort, for example they write 
that centres that failed “to reach the most ambitious levels of production and cost 
efficiency” (p. 287) were phased out. It is important to remember that the DoE 
had experience in managing large-scale science prior to collaborating in the 
Human Genome Project, albeit not in biology.
Of course, big biology did not emerge from within an undisturbed unfolding of 
nature. Factors external to the interactions between scientists and nature, between
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scientists and the social sphere o f science, and even between scientists and the 
immediate sponsors of research are paramount in establishing any big science 
project. John Sulston (Sulston and Ferry, 2002), in his memoir of his scientific, 
management and political role in the Human Genome Project, reports that the US 
Congress was attracted to the idea o f sequencing the human genome at a very 
early stage. He suggests that this support sprang from more than a desire to 
expand the boundaries o f knowledge, citing the expected boost that a complete 
human genome sequence would provide to the US pharmaceutical industry, thus 
countering the threat presented by Japanese plans in the early 1980s to occupy 
this field o f commercial science.
Collins, Morgan and Patrinos (2003), writing after the publication of the draft 
human genome sequence, echo Hevly’s (1992) description of the ‘essential 
quality’ of big science, that it touches many areas “beyond the boundaries of 
science narrowly defined” (p. 356). They write that the future ‘Herculean 
challenges’ of big biology are “not limited to biologists”, and call on “leaders 
across science and society, across academia and industry, and across political and 
geographic boundaries” to back future big biology projects (Collins, Morgan and 
Patrinos, 2003, p. 290).
Service (2001) recounts many o f the objections o f the scientific community to the 
Human Genome Project. There were fears that the project would divert funding 
“away from investigator- initiated research, destroying the cottage industry culture 
of biology in the process” (p. 1182). Perhaps worse, it was suggested that a 
project to sequence the human genome was not science at all, but ‘h mindless 
factory project that no scientists in their right minds would join” (p. 1182). 
Taking the objection that the Human Genome Project was not hypothesis-driven 
science, proponents o f the project such as Leroy Hood described it not as a 
‘fishing expedition’ but as ‘discovery science’, providing ‘hew tools for doing 
hypothesis-driven research” (quoted in Service, 2001, p. 1182). John Sulston 
describes the approach taken by the Human Genome Project as “‘ignorance- 
driven’ or, more grandly, ‘Baconian science’” (Sulston and Ferry, 2002, p. 46).
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Service (2001) argues that the objections to the Human Genome Project that 
centred on the notion that it would be a factory project’ were allayed by the 
development of highly automated genome sequencing machines. It must be 
pointed out that the development o f scientific facilities that are filled with rank 
upon rank of machines in no way dispels analogies with factory organisation. 
However, even if a ‘worker bee’ vision of biology was avoided by technological 
developments, both philosophical and sociological problems remain in the 
concept of automating scientific practice. Proponents of a big science vision of 
the Human Genome Project claim to be justified by the way in which events, that 
could not have been foreseen, unfolded. The unexpectedly effective techno-fix 
amelioration o f the extremes o f assembly-line biology was coupled with the 
expansion of the funding pot of public support for biology. This, concedes 
Maynard Olson (quoted in Service, 2001), was a gamble.
The industrialised nature of the project recurs in accounts of the Human Genome 
Project. In 1998, as the public project to sequence the human genome was scaled 
up, the Lasker Foundation interviewed many of the key scientists. Bob Waterston 
described how the Human Genome Project was a quite different kind of activity 
to small science biology.
The other challenge... is this is not a typical biological activity.
This is different from the way most biology labs operate. 
Organizing ourselves and disciplining ourselves and ensuring 
that the quality o f the product remains high in the face of all 
these demands for productivity, these are the real challenges.
...M ost of the work is being done by machines and technicians.
So a lot o f it is trying to set up a process pipeline that can turn 
out the data day-after-day-after-day. And that is a different kind 
of management task... This is not so mich hypothesis driven.
This is data driven.... We know what w e’re after. We don’t 
know exactly how to get there. It does involve some significant 
unknowns in terms of getting all the pieces of DNA put together 
in the right order and making sure there aren’t any holes and so 
forth. But a lot o f it is process engineering and making the 
processes as effective as you can.
(Waterston, quoted in Lasker Foundation, 1998).
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The industrialised (Ravetz, 1971 [1973]) nature of the Human Genome Project 
cannot be ignored. John Sulston describes the Sanger Centre recruitment policy, 
at least for one rank of scientific labour. “We would recruit unskilled people... 
This group would have no need o f academic qualifications. We judged them on 
school achievements, interview and something by which I set great store: the 
pipetting test” (Sulston and Ferry, 2002, p. 75). This is essentially a test of 
manual dexterity, and it would not be unfair to describe the people recruited in 
this way as sharing more in common in terms of knowledges and skills with a 
machinist rather than with a scientist. The important difference is highlighted by 
Ravetz (1971 [1973]) in his discussions o f the craft nature of science; without an 
intimate craft knowledge of the materials that he or she is working with, a 
scientific worker cannot perform the kind o f expert judgements that allow them to 
assess results and produce data, information and ultimately, knowledge. These 
scientific workers may wear white coats and work in a laboratory, but their skills 
lie in the ability to perform delicate manual operations accurately and repeatedly. 
This labour can be reduced to measurements of manpower.
It is this ‘flushing out’ o f tacit knowledge (Keating, Limoges, and Cambrosio, 
1999) from the process of science that enables scientific work to be automated. 
As with the example o f LIGO provided by Collins (2003), biology, specifically 
molecular biology and the Human Genome Project, was the recipient of an influx 
of physicists and computational scientists. This might be the source of a belief 
that scientific labour can be reduced successfully to a catalogue of defined and 
repeatable actions, capable of being made mechanistic, which need not involve 
non-human machines (Collins and Kusch, 1998), and automated. Keating, 
Limoges and Cambrosio (1999) describe the rhetoric of the Human Genome 
Project with regard to this process. They quote Walter Gilbert: “the benefits of 
the Human Genome Project are the benefits o f organization and scale” (p. 125). 
“[I]f large scale sequencing is to work, it must be treated not as a science but as a 
production job,” a “pure technological problem quite apart from interpreting 
sequence” (p. 126). Likening the process to building an automobile, Gilbert is 
reported as saying that the work is to be done by “production workers... It is not 
done by research scientists” (quoted in Keating, Limoges and Cambrosio, 1999, p. 
126). Daniel Cohen o f Genethon is cited as speaking of “gene factories” and
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“robot biologists” that will render obsolete the “stage of craftsman laboratory 
work” (quoted in Keating, Limoges and Cambrosio, 1999, p. 127).
As for the supervisory aspect o f anatomies o f industrialisation, even John Sulston 
(Sulston and Ferry, 2002), who strikes a public pose as a traditional idealistic 
scientist, returns to the notion of measurable inputs and outputs. The scientific 
work of people recruited in the manner described above can be described in terms 
of productivity. Efficiency can be measured. The dollar cost per base pair of 
sequence is a calculation that recurs throughout Sulston’s autobiographic account. 
This is to be expected; the Human Genome Project is big science.
The science journalist Joel Davis (1990), writing before the Human Genome 
Project began proper, argued that “a Big Science Genome Project” might change 
"the way biology is done as a science” (p. 143). It would, he argued, change the 
scale of biological research in general and make computers a central part of 
biological practice. “In years to come, more and more biology papers will have 
as many coauthors as do physics report”. “[Bjiology and genetics will become 
small Big Science. The Genome Project is a major contributor to that change. // 
And there is nothing anyone can do about it” (p. 144). This view, or at least the 
rhetorical positioning of big science as the inevitable future of biology was also 
taken by key actors in the drama o f the Human Genome Project. Leroy Hood and 
Lloyd Smith (1987), arguing for a big science approach to sequencing the human 
genome, write, “biology has progressed to a point where many of its most 
exciting frontiers will require expensive and complex new instrumentation” (p. 
46). Big science is presented here as a necessary concomitant of scientific 
progress in biology. Indeed, looking at biology after the Human Genome Project, 
it might be argued that these commentators were right. Big biology is here to stay. 
At least, that is the vision o f major players in big biological science, such as 
Collins, Morgan and Patrinos (2003), who argue that the big science mode of 
doing science ought to now be put to use to increase our biological knowledge of 
other aspects of life.
Before we move on to the discussions o f the consequences of big science modes 
of organisation that occupy Chapter C, Pathologies o f  Work in Big Science, this
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chapter closes by quoting from the National Human Genome Research Institute 
(2005) website. In their list o f frequently asked questions, there is the question: 
“How has the human genome project affected biological research?” They answer 
by saying that the development o f interdisciplinary teams, “[t]he era of team- 
orientated research in biology”, is a break with the individualistic history of the 
discipline. The development of automated laboratory procedures has been 
coupled with the concentration o f “research in major centers to maximize 
economies of scale”.
Collins (2003) suggests that there are two kinds of science. There is ‘developing 
science’ which is best conducted as small science, and ‘mature science’ that is 
best organised as big science and routinised. Functowicz and Ravetz (1993), 
drawing on the ideas of Kuhn (1970), describe normal science as “the unexciting, 
indeed anti-intellectual routine puzzle solving by which science advances steadily 
between its conceptual revolutions” (Functowicz and Ravetz, 1993, p. 740). In 
the next chapter the Human Genome Project is described as being ‘extraordinarily 
normal science’. The question that faces this thesis, as a sociological study of 
work in science is; what does it mean to work in ‘extraordinarily normal science’, 
a process that key figures in the Human Genome Project likened to a construction 
effort rather than ‘real’ science? In the next chapter we explore the possible 
consequences for the community o f science, and for organisations such as the 
Institute, o f being organised in a big science, industrialised manner, and the way 
in which this organisation might be experienced by scientists and scientific 
workers.
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[C] P a t h o l o g ie s  o f  W o r k  in  B ig  S c ie n c e
The ‘pathologies’ o f work in big science that are considered in this chapter should 
not to be imagined only as a disease o f the ‘body social’. Across this thesis, 
pathology, despite its prior use in sociology, should first be read down to its 
etymological roots, as the study o f suffering. Only secondarily, do we consider 
the concerns with ‘disorganisation’ that are the preoccupations of most 
sociologies to which the word pathology is attached. This chapter is not about the 
normal and the abnormal. While this chapter does examine the ideas of function 
and dysfunction, as it touches upon a consideration of the sorts of social 
arrangements that might be best suited to the creation of scientific knowledge, this 
is not the focus of the thesis as a whole. Rather, as the thesis concentrates on the 
subjective experience o f work in big science, the understanding of ‘pathology’ 
that should be taken into the exploration o f the Institute should be that of the 
experiential kind. In light of the suggestion that big science represents the 
application o f the principles o f Modernity to scientific work, we should realise 
that we do not need to be a classical sociologist to see that ‘progress’ can be 
accompanied by sufferings.
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C l  In t r o d u c t io n
This chapter serves two purposes, with each purpose drawing on a different 
understanding of the word ‘pathology’. The first is a discussion of the effects, 
both potential and evident, that big science modes of organising scientific work 
have on the ability of the cognitive community of science to produce scientific 
knowledge. This is pathology considered as dysfunction. The society of science, 
in this analysis, is assigned a sense of purpose that exists outside and irrespective 
of a description of the actually existing society o f  science. This chapter discusses 
the rationalisation, routinisation and automation of scientific practices, and 
considers the effects these developments might have on first, the ethos of science, 
and second, the room for creative work within the social structures of science. 
While this discussion takes up the better part of this chapter, the empirical 
investigation is an exploration of the subjective experience of work at the Institute. 
As such, where it touches on the pathologies o f work in big science it is in the 
sense of pathology as the study of ‘suffering’. The second purpose of this chapter, 
therefore, is to foreshadow the empirical explorations of the subjective 
experiences of work in a big science organisation. Section C2, Anatomies? 
Pathologies?, further considers the biological metaphors at use in this chapter.
Building on the previous chapter, Chapter B, Anatomies o f  Big Science, this 
chapter discusses how the development o f big science can be described as a 
process of rationalising the work o f science. In section C3, Big Science 
Structures and Rationalisation, the concept o f rationality and rationalisation are 
considered, drawing on the work o f Mannheim (1940). Mannheim argued that 
there are two significantly different definitions of rationality; ‘substantial’ and 
‘functional’. The increase of functional, i.e. organisational, rationality is often 
accompanied by a decrease in substantial, i.e. individual, rationality. The increase 
in functional rationality, or rationalisation, can be thought of as a process of 
‘mechanisation’. This mechanisation need not necessarily be literal. This 
mechanisation can be metaphorical, as in the Weberian (Weber, 1922 [1948]) 
description of bureaucracy as a machine within which people perform as if they 
are cogs and gears. It can also be understood in terms of our understanding of
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human action, as when Collins and Kusch (1998) describe human actions as 
becoming machine-like. Or, o f course, it can be a process of literal, material 
mechanisation. This is a process that Keating, Limoges and Cambrosio (1999), in 
their description of the contemporary molecular genetics laboratory, describe as 
demanding the ‘flushing out’ o f tacit knowledge from the process being 
mechanised. Section C4, The Automation o f  Scientific Work, considers 
mechanisation and automation as the reification o f rationalisation and touches on 
some of the ways in which the automation o f work has been addressed. Despite 
the promise that automation will liberate workers from drudgery, this section 
points out that, very often, only certain classes of workers are liberated. Other 
kinds of work must still be done, but these workers are either displaced or their 
work is hidden in these narratives.
This chapter then considers the relationship between increasing rationalisation 
and various ‘pathologies’. Increases in functional rationality and its material 
counterpart, automation, have been widely considered to be drivers towards the 
alienation of people, leaving them Tost’ (Aron, 1965 [1968]) in their social 
systems (Seeman, 1959 [1970]; Blauner 1964 [1970]b). Reflexive scientists, such 
as Levin and Lewontin (1985) have raised their concern at the potential of 
contemporary modes of organising the work o f science to alienate scientists, and 
the dangers this poses for the maintenance o f the cognitive community o f science. 
Regardless of the functional integrity o f the society of science, alienation, 
considered broadly, is a key concept in understanding the Modernisation of work. 
One of the characteristics of big science is that it represents the application of the 
kinds of changes that characterise the Modernisation of work outside of science, 
massification, routinisation, and bureaucratisation, for example, to the work of the 
laboratory. In section C5, Meanings o f  Alienation, in order to examine the effects 
of these changes on both the society o f science and the experiences of people 
working in science, this chapter discusses the meanings o f alienation (Seeman, 
1959 [1970]; Blauner, 1964 [1970]a). It continues to consider the ways in which 
these meanings might be relevant in efforts to understand the effects, in particular 
the increase in functional rationality, o f big science modes of social organisation. 
Three particular meanings of alienation are considered; alienation from the
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products of work, alienation from the norms of the community, in this case the 
ethos of science, and alienation from the meaning of the work.
In an attempt to understand the pathologies of work in big science of the first kind, 
those of the community, section C6, The Ethos o f  Science, discusses the idealised 
ethos of science. To examine these ideals, we draw on Merton (1942 [1973]) and 
those engaged in dialogue with his description o f this ethos (Ellis, 1972; Rothman, 
1972). The ideal of the ethos of science, this chapter argues, is a part of the 
special character of scientific methods o f producing knowledge that work to 
justify the claim that scientific work produces reliable, valid and progressive 
knowledge. This can be illustrated by considering the effect of the alienation of 
scientists from the product of their labour, which, by eroding the justification for 
moral and intellectual ‘ownership’ of the knowledge produced, would leave many 
of the imperatives of the ethos of science without the force of normative weight. 
Bound up in this notion of alienation, big, rationalised science risks making the 
whole ethos of science irrelevant to contemporary scientific workers. This 
chapter argues that the individualised ethos o f science, with its claims to being 
central to the special nature of scientific knowledge production, will struggle to 
maintain a normative hold over a social environment in which work in 
increasingly subdivided and communitarian. As the empirical investigations of 
the Institute demonstrate, particularly Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, 
the moral and sentimental orientation o f the scientific workers that sequenced the 
human genome is based around the collective. Not in the generalised, abstracted 
sense, as a small science scientific worker’s commitment to the discipline or, even 
more abstractly, the community o f science, but, in the case of those working at the 
Institute, a commitment towards the local, concrete institution in which they work.
To close the discussion o f the pathologies o f the first kind, this chapter argues that 
the functional rationalisation of science, as manifested in routinisation, is only 
possible in disciplines that have moved, or are moved, into a fully mature phase 
(Collins, 2003). In section C l, The Parable o f  the Needle and the Haystack, this 
chapter suggests that the resulting science is not merely the normal science of a 
mature discipline as described by Kuhn (1970), but extra-ordinarily normal. In 
extra-ordinarily normal science, the paradigm is embodied in the largely
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inaccessible workings of automated machinery, and/or the similarly inaccessible 
workings of a functionally rationalised work procedure. This chapter argues that 
this represents a sclerotic pathobgy o f science, restricting the possibility of the 
rationalised science to develop by means of human creativity.
This chapter then turns from the examination of work in science as a special kind 
of work in a special kind of community, to an examination o f work in big science 
as being of the same kind of thing as all other kinds of work. In section C8, Work, 
Modernity, and Big Science, the chapter compares the development of big science 
organisations from small science laboratories to the development of industrialised 
forms of work more generally. This provides the thesis with a foreshadowing of 
the kinds of issues raised in the empirical exploration of the Institute, and 
suggests a humanistic grounding for the thesis, concerned as it is with the 
subjective experience of work, irrespective o f claims o f ‘progress’.
Though both this chapter and Chapter B, Anatomies o f  Big Science, are concerned 
explicitly with the development and consequences of ‘big science’, this thesis 
claims that cases such as the exploration o f the Institute have value beyond the 
intrinsic interest possessed by grotesques. While we might be unable to magnify 
the social world, except in our imaginations, we do find that in some cases the 
social world presents us with exaggerated examples of developments and 
structures that are typical of a more widely found social setting. The drivers 
towards rationalisation that are patent in big science modes of organisation are not 
absent in contemporary small(er) science. Big science modes of organisation set 
an example of a successful way to manage the search for knowledge and account 
for the funding allocated for research. As we saw in Chapter B, Anatomies o f  Big 
Science, the big science mode of organisation is presented by some as an 
inevitable model for the future of biology (Davis, 1990; Collins, Morgan, and 
Patrinos, 2003). Furthermore, outside the particular and unusual domain of 
science, technologically advanced workplaces are thought to be a key feature of 
an emerging knowledge economy. The extent to which a study of the big science 
organisation of the Institute can illuminate the social domains of science and/or 
work in a contemporary economy is considered in greater depth in Chapter D, 
Case.
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C 2 A n a t o m ie s ? P a t h o l o g ie s?
There is a danger in using organic metaphors in sociology, even, or perhaps 
particularly, in the sociology of biological science. They arrive with us having 
travelled from a historical hinterland that is stalked by conservative, even 
reactionary, politics. This thesis, particularly Chapter B, Anatomies o f  Big 
Science, and Chapter C, Pathologies o f  Work in Big Science, does not aim to find 
itself in such territory. For Durkheim, pathologies are the components and 
consequences of social organisation that do not serve a function in the stability or 
survival of the social organism. Thus, they are a statement of his functionalist 
philosophy of society and societal change (Cheal, 2005). But the organic 
metaphors used by Durkheim, outside o f their role as illustrators of the 
philosophical position taken, also serve as rhetorical devices. The metaphor of 
society as organism is used as a means o f convincing the audience of the 
importance of the moral propositions made within the sociological work (Crow, 
2005). The rhetorical value of these words is the purpose, aside from the obvious 
nods to the intellectual preoccupations o f the scientific workers under study, for 
their adoption in these chapters.
In so much that we employ the term pathology in a Durkheimian sense, the 
pathologies that are the focus of this chapter are, despite the focus arrived at when 
considering the various anatomies of big science in the previous chapter, not those 
of big science institutions. These might survive, as imagined Durkheimian social 
organisms (Durkheim, 1895 [1938]), in a perfectly healthy, stable form, with, for 
example, an alienated scientific labour force. These changes might have an effect 
on the subjective experience o f a working life lived within science, but this in 
itself would not be a pathology o f an institution imagined as an organism of itself. 
But, as Collins (1985) writes; “Science policy ought not to be about maintaining 
efficient institutions, but about maintaining the sort of cognitive community that 
will produce the desired scientific products” (Collins, 1985, p. 554). The 
Durkheimian pathologies that might arise from big science modes of social 
organisation are pathologies that affect not individual institutions but the 
cognitive community o f which they are a part. The pathologies exist as obstacles
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to the ability of this community to produce knowledge in such a way that it can 
claim to possess the virtues, such as reliability and novelty, that are characteristic 
of the special kind of knowledge that is science.
Pathology, though, primarily serves this thesis as a rhetorical tool, used to 
foreshadow the kinds of issues that are explored in the empirical investigation of 
work at the Institute. It is a device that evocatively flags the potential sufferings 
that are present in the Modern modes o f social organisation of scientific work that 
characterise big science projects. In this usage, this purpose is served regardless 
of the position taken by this thesis, or a reader, with regard to organic concepts of 
societies.
A Rejection o f Simple Determinism
This chapter ought not be taken to be an appeal to simple determinism. If for 
nothing else, for the fact that the empirical investigation of the Institute reveals 
the way in which contingencies shaped working life during and after the Human 
Genome Project. The pathologies that we describe are not the necessary result of 
either scale or technology. As Gallie (1978) shows, the social response to 
technological developments in the workplace, including automation, is dependent 
not just on the shape o f the technology, but also on the shape of the social system 
into which these technologies are introduced. Science is a social system of 
peculiar shape. In Chapter B, Anatomies o f  Big Science, we cite Traweek (1992), 
who demonstrates that the social organisation o f work within big science projects 
varies even within a single scientific discipline, that of high-energy physics, as a 
result of national cultural differences. Further, we can look at the work of 
Stinchcombe (1959 [1970]). He investigated the construction of large scale tracts 
of housing, the closest thing that exists within the construction industry to 
repeatable, standardised mass production. He argued that the social organisation 
of this work remained, contrary to the expectations of theorists of 
bureaucratisation, craft controlled. He argued that “the professionalization of the 
labour force in the construction industry serves the same functions as bureaucratic 
administration in mass production industries and is more rational than 
bureaucratic administration in the face of economic and technical constraints on 
construction projects” (1959 [1970], p. 261). Not all jobs are amenable to the
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rationality of the ‘assembly line’; the contingencies of the task at hand shape how 
the organisation of work responds to the imperatives of Modernity. While the 
experience of scientists (see, for example, Kowarski, 1977; Levin and Lewontin, 
1985; Sulston and Ferry, 2002; Collins, Morgan, and Patrinos, 2003) and students 
of science (see, for example, Ravtez, 1971 [1973]; Ziman, 1984; Yearley, 1988; 
Collins, 2003) supports the thesis o f rationalisation, routinisation, and automation 
in big science, this is not enough to argue that it is a necessary aspect of big 
science organisation. Indeed, in Chapter F, The Factory and the University, we 
see that while these scientists see a world o f work that is rationalised and 
routinised, their descriptions cannot be separated from their perspective, the 
hinterland of work from which they approach big science.
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C 3 B ig S c ie n c e  S t r u c t u r e s  a n d  R a t io n a l is a t io n
Before we discuss the connection between the theoretical consequences for the 
cognitive community of science and the structures of big science, it is appropriate 
for us to enjoy a diversion to the literary example that was cited in the Chapter B, 
Anatomies o f  Big Science. The description below is of the construction of the 
Great Wall of China, as offered by Kafka (1931 [2005]), the creator of 
bureaucratic nightmares. It evokes, at least to a gaze that shares the 
preoccupations of this thesis, the story o f the sequencing of the human genome.
The Great Wall of China has been completed at its most 
northerly point. From the south-east and the south-west it came 
up in two sections that were united here. This system of 
piecemeal construction was also followed within each of the two 
great armies of labour, the eastern army and the western army. It 
was done by forming gangs of about a score of labourers, whose 
task was to erect a section of wall about five hundred yards long, 
while the adjoining gang built a stretch o f similar length to meet 
it. But after the junction had been effected the work was not 
then continued, as one might have expected, where the thousand 
yards ended; instead the labour-gangs were sent off to continue 
their work on the wall in some quite different region. This 
meant of course that many great gaps were left, which were only 
filled in by slow and gradual stages, and some indeed not until 
after the completion of the wall had actually been announced. It 
is even said that there are gaps which have never been filled in at 
all, and according to some people they are far larger than the 
completed sections, but this assertion may admittedly be no 
more than one o f the many legends that have grown up round the 
wall, and which no single person can verify, at least not with his 
own eyes and his own judgement, owing to the great extent of 
the structure.
(Kafka, 1931 [2005], p. 1).
The story of sequencing the human genome can be, and s, told in very similar 
language. It was sequenced piecemeal, though not without design, with many 
gaps in the sequence remaining after the announcement of finished sequence. It 
was completed by the recruitment o f great teams of scientists and scientific 
workers, labouring at different sites and on the sequencing of different 
chromosomes. If we return to the summary o f the public project as described by 
The Harvard Business Review, we read it “is akin to having several teams laying
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bricks until various vsalls come together in a coherent structure” (Enriquez and 
Goldberg, 2000, p. 98). As for the suggestion that the project is so large that its 
completion cannot be verified by a person’s own judgement, the sheer size of big 
science projects leaves little possibility of independent replication or verification.
The process described by Kafka, which can be seen as a mirror of the organisation 
of the work of the Human Genome Project, is an example of where the division of 
the work of a large project involves the functional rationalisation of the 
organisation. Karl Mannheim (1940) discussed the meanings of the term 
‘rationality’ in industrial societies. He argued that there are two significantly 
different definitions of rationality; ‘substantial’ and ‘functional’. What is to be 
understood as a ‘substantially rational’ act is one that “reveals intelligent insight 
into the inter-relations of events in a given situation” (p. 53). ‘Functional 
rationality’, by contrast, does not refer to the knowledge and understanding 
expressed by an individual in his or her actions. Rather, it is used to describe 
actions that are “organized in such a way that it leads to a previously defined goal, 
every element in this series of actions receiving a functional position and role” (p. 
53). These two definitions of rationality are not, at first glance, logically 
incongruent. A thought experiment, however, can reveal that it would be 
reasonable to conclude that, in many cases, working within a functionally rational 
system reduces the capacity of an individual to act with substantial rationality. 
Mannheim asks us to consider the Army. “The common soldier... [can carry] out 
an entire series of functionally rational actions accurately without having any idea 
as to the ultimate end of his actions or the functional role of each individual act 
within the framework o f the whole” (p. 54). Weber (1922 [1948]) describes 
bureaucracy as a machine, in which people perform as if they are cogs. Perhaps, 
as our understanding of machines has changed, we could now use a new, 
electronic metaphor for the collectively orientated and meaningful component 
individual of a ‘machine’. In the light of the rhetoric of a new economy that 
generates wealth without reliance on old-fashioned notions of capital and labour, 
and their attendant visions (see Chapter J, The Institute and the Knowledge 
Economy), we should instead imagine a dematerialised update suitable for an 
‘informational age’. Rather than human beings as cogs or gears, perhaps human 
beings as coding scripts or logic gates? What we should note from the example
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offered by Mannheim (1940) is that the soldier remains, or can remain, a highly 
skilled ‘worker’, as, after all, a cog can be a piece of precision engineering. An 
increase in functional rationality does not, necessarily, result in deskilling. It does, 
it seems, lead to reductions in substantial rationality.
The definition of substantially rational actions as being those acts that involve 
“intelligent insight into the inter-relations of events in a given situation” 
(Mannheim, 1940, p. 53), sounds very similar to any non-mystical definition of 
scientific creativity. We return to the notion o f creativity at a later point in this 
chapter. Demands for creativity, and the fact that the expertise of science, with its 
emphasis on novelty and progress prevents codification of work processes, have 
shaped the organisation of work in small science. As Kinsella (1999) writes; 
“scientific work is especially characterized by conditions of high task uncertainty, 
complexity, and relatively loose coupling among researchers -  rendering overt 
and monolithic forms of control ineffective. Simultaneously, scientific cultures 
are characterized by a strong ethos o f autonomy that encourages and enables 
scientists to resist classical forms o f direct or bureaucratic control” (p. 177). The 
observation made by Stinchcombe (1959 [1970]), that certain jobs are not 
amenable to ‘bureaucratic administration’, might be at least as true in science as it 
is in construction.
While the Human Genome Project, and the Institute in particular, is the empirical 
focus of this thesis, we can return to Collins (2003) and the case study of LIGO. 
The regime at LIGO was described by its instigators as being the way that a 
“complicated construction project” would be run, a hierarchical pyramid with 
people at each of those levels having “specific tasks, responsibilities, budgets, 
schedules...” (p. 264). This is a description of functional rationalisation. Collins 
finds that scientists subject to this regime described themselves as ‘cogs’, though 
the significance of this should not be overestimated as this is, at best, insight 
through cliche. The description o f the regime offered, not only by its detractors 
but also by its champions, accords very well with the definition of mass 
production offered by Stinchcombe (1959 [1970]). He wrote that mass 
production is defined “by the criterion that both the product and the work process 
are planned in advance by persons not on the work crew” (p. 262). This quote
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does not come from the sociology of science, but from the sociology of work. It 
is untainted by an attempt to force its description of the work of mass production 
into a box containing the special field o f activity that is science, yet it appears to 
fit the organisation of LIGO, and, indeed, much of the work of the Human 
Genome Project, particularly the work o f the people at the Institute interviewed 
for the production of this thesis.
The Human Genome Project, including work at the Institute, involved the 
development of shiftwork and production targets. In moves that demonstrate a 
degree of functional rationalisation exceeding that found at LIGO, the Human 
Genome Project involved a distinct increase in the division of labour, recruiting 
accredited scientists in addition to large numbers of untrained technical labourers 
to perform the bench work of sequencing (Sulston and Ferry, 2002). In this task 
they were assisted by the development o f automated sequencing (and sequence 
assemblage) technologies (Collins, Morgan and Patrinos, 2003). This chapter 
argues that automation is the material reification o f rationalisation.
The irony of the functional rationalisation o f scientific work is that, outside of the 
community of science, the functional rationalisation of work procedures are often 
described as ‘scientific management’ (Cooley, 1981). As Ravetz (1971 [1973]) 
argues, just as science has penetrated industry, reshaping its organisation and 
social processes, so too does industry penetrate science. Kleinman and Valias 
(2001) argue that the exchange between the work world of science and the work 
world of industry is not symmetrical; that work in science is increasingly taking 
on the characteristics of work in the commercially-orientated world. As a lament 
in The Scientist, a magazine for life scientists, has it;
Newton had it easy [...] For Darwin, science was a country 
gentleman's pastime [...] The Industrial Revolution changed all 
this. For the first time in human history, it became possible to 
produce goods and services on a mass scale. Industrialization 
proved so successful that science also fell victim to it, and 
academic research now resembles a commercial operation.
(Aszodi, 2007)
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But this is not the full story. This is not simply an exchange between two social 
worlds, each passing to the other some of aspects of itself. Attitudes and 
technologies derived from science were a feature of the social changes in the 
world of work during the 20th century. The rationalisation, routinisation and 
automation of science are therefore not strictly the results of an exchange, but 
rather an example of the influence o f science coming full circle to ‘scientise’ the 
social world of science. The laboratory, the very engine of Modernity, has now 
been Modernised.
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C 4 T h e  A u t o m a t io n  o f  S c ie n t if ic  W o r k
Keating. Limoges and Cambrosio (1999) suggest that molecular biology involves 
‘green-fingered’ techniques. However, they reach what is an intuitively 
paradoxical conclusion, that “molecular biology as a whole has been singled out 
as ripe for automation partly because of the lack of routine” (p. 125). The 
automation of other areas of work has been seen not only as a means to increase 
economic efficiency, but also to move control from the shop-floor, or the 
laboratory bench, and to the management office. Watson (2003) describes how 
Noble (1984) demonstrated that computer numerically controlled (CNC) 
machines were not so much a technology shaped by the cost-conscious imperative 
o f capital, but rather CNC was a product o f the interests of the military customers 
of the Massachusetts Institute o f Technology to have technologies that took 
control of the methods of production away from the skilled shop-floor workforce 
and transferred it to management. In a knowledge economy, where ideas are 
capital, this transformation of tacit knowledge into objects that cannot walk out 
through the factory gates is a process the logic o f which is patent.
The process of automation necessarily involves “[fjlushing out tacit knowledge” 
(Keating, Limoges and Cambrosio, 1999, p. 126) from the laboratory practice 
being automated. All the knowledge and expertise must be made explicit. An 
automated process is an example of a supremely rationalised process; each part 
and practice of the procedure is defined and described, in advance, according to 
the, at least apparently, most effective pursuit o f the predetermined goals. It is 
possible to view the Human Genome Project, as the organisational embodiment of 
these programmes. As we discussed in Chapter B, Anatomies o f  Big Science, 
Keating, Limoges and Cambrosio (1999) report Walter Gilbert as being of the 
opinion that the work of sequencing the human genome is to be done by 
“production workers... It is not done by research scientists” (quoted in Keating, 
Limoges and Cambrosio, 1999, p. 126). In the same chapter, Daniel Cohen, of 
Genethon, is quoted as speaking o f ‘gene factories’ and ‘robot biologists’, 
developments that he believes will render obsolete the “stage of craftsman 
laboratory work” (quoted in Keating, Limoges and Cambrosio, 1999, p. 127).
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This discourse that speaks o f the ‘end of the craftsman’ echoes that of previous 
technological developments that affected the organisation of work.
The automation of specific laboratory protocols is just one part in the process of 
rationalising scientific practice as a whole. Keating, Limoges and Cambrosio 
(1999) write that “the 1980s saw a shift in rhetoric from automation in the 
laboratory to automation o f  the laboratory” (p. 127). We can take their analysis 
further. The ‘flushing out of tacit knowledge’ involves not just the installation of 
machines, but the mechanisation o f human action. Human action is made 
machine-like (see Collins and Kusch, 1998) when tacit knowledge is removed by 
codifying and standardising protocols o f action, in this case by routinising 
laboratory procedures. The installation o f a new machine, and the way that this 
changes the shape of the social environment, is an interesting point for 
sociological research. But we should be wary of seeing the automation of 
laboratories, or indeed other workplaces, as merely this. Rather, the installation 
of a new machine is just a materialised component of a wider programme of 
rationalisation.
Early visions of the Human Genome Project presented a landscape of dark, 
Satanic sequencing mills. Zweiger (2001) describes how, when he was a young 
scientist, plans to sequence the human genome were presented to him. He was 
faced with a vision o f technicians sequencing genomes on an ‘assembly line’. 
Their work would be assessed on the bases of cost and efficiency. He writes; “It 
was as bad as the rumours we had heard o f factory-like sequencing operations in 
Japan. It all seemed so inelegant, even mindless” (p. ix-x). However, later 
accounts of the Human Genome Project in the scientific press describe the way 
that these nightmares of a factory- like genome project never saw waking life as 
rapid improvements in automation prevented the recruitment of hundreds of 
accredited scientists into drudgery (Service, 2001).
This appears to be an example o f Blauner’s (1964) ‘inverted U curve’, the 
representation of the relationship between technology and alienation However, 
the empirical investigation of the Institute reminds us that, while there might not 
have been a demoralised army of accredited scientists working on the benches of
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the Human Genome Project, there were hundreds upon hundreds of technicians. 
Some of these, as we have read, were recruited on their performance at school and 
their manual dexterity (Sulston and Ferry, 2002). This should remind us of the 
observations made by some o f the critics of Blauner. Watson (2003) quotes 
Nichols and Beynon (1977) and their study of the chemical industry; “for every 
man who watched dials [the non-alienated process worker of Blauner (1964)] 
another maintained the plants, another was a lorry driver and another two humped 
bags or shovelled muck” (Watson, 2003, p. 182-183; quoting Nichols and Beynon, 
1977). This insight not only enlightens our understanding of the process of the 
automation of science, but also reminds us that claims that a turn to a knowledge 
economy will improve all our working lives should be read with scepticism. Not 
all the material necessities of work are transferred onto the pistons of robots or 
into the circuits of computers; some are displaced and, to some, hidden.
This process can be seen in an interview the researcher conducted, before 
beginning substantial fieldwork, with a scientist working on the automation of 
science. He was not automating processes in the laboratory, and he was not, as 
Keating, Limoges and Cambrosio (1999) write about, attempting to automate the 
laboratory itself. Rather, he was attempting to automate the discovery process of 
‘normal’ (Kuhn, 1970) molecular biology. When the scientist described his 
discovery robots, it became clear that the ideal was a lab emptied of scientists. 
This would be a progressive development, he argued, as scientists are now free 
from the manual labours of the lab, and even the routine intellectual processes of 
‘normal science’, and are able to use their creative intelligence to advance science. 
However, as the interview progressed, it became clear that these laboratories 
would not be empty of human beings; maintenance workers would need to attend 
the machine, cleaners would be required, manual labour would be needed to 
deliver and load supplies, and so on. There would be a process of upskilling and 
a decrease in alienation, so long as the majority of the people whose labours are 
necessary for the production o f scientific knowledge are written from the scene.
Rationalisation and automation are intimately connected with notions of 
alienation. It is, after all, the very definition of the instrumentalisation of the 
activity of work. Previous advances of rationality across the world o f work have
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come in such forms as scientific management, eponymised as Taylorism. Watson 
(2003) writes that Weber saw Taylorism as a ‘triumph’ of rationality fulfilling its 
dehumanising potential. Braverman (1974) described the general logic of 
industrialism as being one that routinises, mechanises and deskills; the 
transformation of labour into a homogenous commodity. Again, the contingency 
of these connections must be stressed. Rationalisation, automation and the 
instrumentalisation of work do not necessarily result in increased alienation 
(Cotgrove, 1972). Such an outcome depends on the shape of the work culture that 
is subject to these developments (Edwards, 1979; Thompson, 1989). In ssme 
cases there is a counter logic, that leads to upskilling, rather than deskilling 
(Senker, 1992), and arguments exist for the increasing automation of work as 
leading to a decrease in alienation (Blauner, 1964). This chapter argues that the 
work culture of science is an integral component of what it is that makes science a 
special way of knowing the world that provides reliable, valid, progressive 
knowledge. In the empirical investigation o f the Institute, particularly in Chapter 
H, The High Road to the Human Genome, we see the importance of the peculiar 
character of science in producing an organisation with a particular culture.
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C 5 M e a n in g s  o f  A l ie n a t io n
Before we can begin discussing the possible alienation of scientists, we must 
clarify what we mean when we use the term alienation. Watson (2003) describes 
alienation at its most simple, as separation. However, Aron (1965 [1968]) 
provides us with a succinct definition o f alienation as “a sociological process by 
means of which men or societies construct collective organizations in which they 
become lost” (p. 148). Despite the elegance o f the definition offered by Aron, we 
still need something a little more comprehensive if we are to effectively use this 
concept.
Seeman (1959 [1970]) is determined to treat alienation as a social-psychological 
experience focused on expectations, values and behaviour, rather than an 
assessment of the objective conditions. These are important in gauging the 
realism of the individual’s alienated response. However, to divorce alienation 
from the subjective experience of those described as alienated would be neither 
the means to robust argument, nor the intellectual basis for an effective strategy 
for research. This thesis proposes to use the term alienation to describe the 
subjective experience of people in relation to their work, and the products of their 
work.
There are dangers in allowing the concept of alienation to become too loosely 
used a term. Alienation is not the same as dissatisfaction, though defining it as a 
subjectively experienced phenomenon does push it close to synonymity. It is 
important to keep these two categories o f experience distinct. We could say that 
one can be satisfied with work thanks to, say, an extremely comfortable working 
environment and a generous package o f pay and benefits. But one could still be 
alienated from the work if it is undertaken solely as a means to this physical 
comfort (Mills, 1962 [1963]) and no meaning is derived from the work itself and 
the worker has no connection with the products of their work. In investigating the 
pathologies of big science modes o f social organisation, the question of the 
alienation of scientific workers requires us not to ask; ‘are scientific workers 
satisfied with their jobs?’, but to ask the subtly different question; ‘are scientific
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workers satisfied as scientific workers?’ These two questions capture the 
differences between the extrinsic satisfactions of work, in which, in extremis, 
work is a means to an end and possesses only instrumental meaning, and the 
intrinsic satisfactions of work -  whether it is enriching, challenging, fulfilling, for 
example -  which carries with it expressive meaning (Watson, 2003). This, as we 
shall see, connects the maintenance o f the cognitive community of science, which 
we discuss in this chapter, with the subjective experience of scientific workers, 
the focus of the empirical explorations o f this thesis. The maintenance of this 
community is important for the production o f scientific knowledge. As Ravetz 
(1971 [1973]) argues, the self-discipline that scientists require to produce quality 
work is dependent on “the strength, health and integrity of the community 
involved” (p. 82).
This chapter concentrates on three related meanings of the word alienation. The 
first of these is the notion of becoming alienated from the products of labour, a 
concept that traces its descent through Marx to Hegel (Jordan, 1971). It should be 
noted that, as Watson (2003) describes, this definition of alienation has been 
criticised on the basis that it connects human fulfilment entirely with work, and 
thus it shares a view of the world with those who use the term ‘work ethic’ in the 
most unreflective manner, or, more recently, those who argued for ‘self 
actualisation’ through work. Seeman (1959 [1970]) identifies five further 
meanings of alienation which relate to the subjective lives of those who are 
alienated. In so much that this chapter is concerned with the society of science, 
we concentrate on two of these, ‘meaninglessness’ and ‘normlessness’ in addition 
to the classical notion of alienation from the product of labour. These are 
summarised below. Understanding alienation as ‘powerlessness’, ‘isolation’ and 
‘self-estrangement’, which are, for Seeman, the further three meanings of 
alienation, might have little utility for understanding the pathologies of big 
science qua the society of science, but they can be of use in helping us understand 
the pathologies of working lives. Consideration of these meanings of alienation 
echoes through the discussions of the empirical investigation of the Institute.
The notion of alienation from the product o f labour can be illustrated by a literary 
example. The human genome sequence is often referred to as ‘the book of life’
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(see, for example, Pennisi, 2001). Considering the role of creativity in science, 
we can enjoy some play with this metaphor. Whether fiction or non-fiction, 
books are commonly held to involve a degree of creative and imaginative input on 
the part of the author. How can this process be rationalised, mechanised, 
automated? In Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell (1949 [1989]), provides us 
with a fictional example9. Julia works “on the novel-writing machines in the 
Fiction Department. She enjoyed her work, which consisted chiefly in running 
and serving a powerful but tricky electric motor. She was ‘not clever’, but was 
fond of using her hands and felt at home with machinery” (p. 136). Consider this 
in comparison to the description o f recruitment to the work of sequencing at the 
Sanger Centre “We would recruit unskilled people... This group would have no 
need of academic qualifications. We judged them on school achievements, 
interview and something by which I set great store: the pipetting test” (Sulston 
and Ferry, 2003, p. 75). In Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell (1949 [1989]) describes 
the relationship that Julia had with the products of her labour; “She could describe 
the whole process of composing a novel, from the general directive issued by the 
Planning Committee down to the final touches by the Rewrite Squad. But she 
was not interested in the finished product. She ‘didn’t much care for reading’, she 
said. Books were just a commodity that had to be produced like jam or 
bootlaces” (p. 136). Julia was alienated from the product of her labour; the 
process of production of the novel rendered her distant from the content of the 
novels and allowed them to become ‘mere’ commodities. In the empirical 
investigation of the Institute, particularly in Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  
Sentiment, we see that the people working at the Institute, even those recruited by 
the ‘pipetting test’, had a much greater connection with the products of their 
labour.
But perhaps we ought to offer ourselves an enlightening corrective. When using 
the metaphor of ‘the book o f life’, scientists, commentators and politicians do not 
imagine that they are talking of scientists writing the book of life. Rather, they 
are taking a view that science unveils pre-existing natural facts, and thus, that the 
act of producing the book of life is one of transcription. But here, for all its
9 The common caveat for the allegories that are drawn from fiction applies here; w hile this is a 
literary illustration, it is not intended to be taken literally.
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eminently sensible realism, we are confronted with the rationale for the conduct 
of science stripped o f creative imagination; an anti-science vision.
Returning to Seeman (1959 [1970]), the first meaning of alienation that we use in 
this thesis is ‘meaninglessness’. Seeman cites Mannheim (1940), using his 
“description o f the increase of “functional rationality” and the concomitant 
decline of “substantial rationality.” Mannheim argues that as society increasingly 
organises its members with reference to the most efficient realisation of ends (that 
is, as functional rationality increases), there is a parallel decline in the ability of 
individuals to act with intelligence in response to a given situation. Seeman 
(1959 [1970]) writes; “One might operationalize this aspect of alienation by 
focusing upon the fact that it is characterized by a low expectancy that 
satisfactory predictions about future behavior can be made” (p. 386). The second 
meaning of alienation that Seeman provides to this thesis is ‘normlessness’. He 
likens this meaning o f alienation to ‘anomie’. “[A]nomie denotes a situation in 
which the social norms regulating individual conduct are no longer effective rules 
for behavior” (p. 387). When the culturally prescribed goals are no longer 
attainable, normlessness leads to the development of ‘adaptations’ -  technically 
effective, if not culturally legitimate, procedures. “[T]he anomic situation... may 
be defined as one in which there is a high expectancy that socially unapproved 
behaviors are required to achieve given goals” (p. 389).
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C 6 T h e  E t h o s  of  S c ie n c e
One of the special characteristics o f science as both a way of working and a way 
of knowing is that Ihe community o f science can be seen as holding to a set of 
norms and values that make it distinct. The community of science is able to 
produce knowledge that is both valid and novel as a result o f “an institutional 
framework which involves a complex o f values and norms which elaborate the 
appropriate approach and methods to be employed in the quest for knowledge, 
and which also define standards for the acceptance and certification of additions 
to the body of scientific knowledge” (Rothman, 1972, p. 102). Some of these 
norms and values are technical, defining the accepted community boundaries of 
the ‘scientific method’. Rothman suggests that these include; empirical validity, 
logical clarity, logical consistency o f propositions and generality of principles. 
Adherence to technical norms is necessary for the generation of valid scientific 
knowledge by a community, but they are not sufficient. Merton (1942 [1973]) 
offered the initial formulation o f the value system of science; “The ethos of 
science is that affectively toned complex o f values and norms which is held to be 
binding on the man of science. These are prescriptions, proscriptions, preferences, 
and permissions... legitimised in institutional values” (p 268-269). This 
‘affectively toned complex’ can be understood as part of the sentimental 
orientation of a scientist. In Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, we 
consider the role of the affective in the accomplishment of sequencing the human 
genome at the Institute. Merton identifies “[f]our sets of institutional imperatives 
-  universalism, communism, disinterestedness, organized scepticism -  ... [that] 
comprise the ethos of modem science” (p. 270). Each of these imperatives is 
summarised in turn.
For Merton (1942 [1973]), universalism refers to the idea that “the acceptance or 
rejection of claims entering the lists o f science is not to depend on the personal or 
social attributes of their protagonist” (p. 270). Science is international and 
impersonal, and the career o f the ‘scientist’ is open to anyone of talent. In this, 
science can be seen as bearing one o f the hallmarks of Modernity, being without 
regard to the characteristics of the individual that are irrelevant to his or her role
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as, in this case, a scientific worker. Merton argues that this aspect of the ethos of 
science is democratic (p. 273). Communism (sometimes tamed by being re­
labelled as ‘communalism’) refers to the common ownership of goods. The 
goods in this case are the product of science; scientific knowledge. This 
knowledge is the product of social collaboration, both directly and indirectly, and 
the ownership of product is assigned to the community. Rather, then, than 
material ownership of knowledge, scientists are concerned with claims of priority. 
These are assertions of the right to the recognition and esteem that are the rewards 
of discovery. Merton argues that this drive for recognition and esteem pushes 
scientists into publishing their discoveries and thus sharing the knowledge that 
they have produced. Rose and Rose (1969) describe the cognitive community of 
science as being “maintained by a value system which emphasises universality 
and disciplinary communism and a reward system whereby the scientist, in return 
for the gift of knowledge to his readers, is accorded status and recognition” (p. 8). 
Merton describes the drive to share knowledge as operating as a ‘moral 
compulsive’. This reward system, however, is dependent on visibility and 
recognition, as can be seen by the fact that the greatest reward in science, beyond 
any prize, is being eponymised, and immortalised, in scientific fact, technique or 
law. If, in big science, scientists become ‘invisible’, as suggested by Beaver 
(2001), then an important connection with the products of their labour has been 
broken. Scientists do not own the knowledge that they create. Instead, their 
‘property’ is found in priority; being recognised, by name, as the first discoverer 
of a fact, as the first to develop a technique, as the first to devise an explanatory 
theory. This impossible for the great majority of scientists in the event that 
science becomes not only a mass profession, but further, a job conducted in 
industrial laboratories of mass employment. This alienation from the products of 
their work is a challenge to the maintenance o f the ethos of science.
Suggestions that the communism o f knowledge are being undermined are not new. 
Today they are characterised by debates over commercial research and the 
attendant secrecy, over patents and licensing, and over the ownership of journals. 
Merton (1942 [1973]) noted that advanced capitalist conceptions of knowledge as 
property were a challenge to this plank of the ethos of science. For Merton, “[t]he 
demand for disinterestedness has a firm basis in the public and testable character
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of science” (p. 276). Merton argues that the fact that the ‘public’ of science are, 
in effect, fellow scientists, is an institutional contribution to the high integrity of 
members of the community of science. Organised scepticism, the final of 
Merton’s institutional imperatives, is interrelated with the other three elements. 
Science asks questions, holding no uncritical reverence for any aspects of nature 
and society.
The behaviour of people who cannot be classed as anything other than ‘scientists’ 
has often deviated from the ideals o f the ethos. That individual members of any 
community will contradict the community norms is a fact that should be expected. 
This fact does not render these norms, and the ethos that binds them, invalid. 
How else would the rules of a society be tested, displayed, and demonstrated? It 
is the institutional chastisement of those who display this deviant behaviour that 
demonstrates the functional value of the ethos to the cognitive community of 
science10.
However, in some cases the behaviour o f the community of science, not simply 
individuals or small sub-groups of scientists, appears to violate the norms that are 
said to represent the scientific ethos. Rothman (1972) presented ‘a dissenting 
view on the scientific ethos’. He reminds us that we ought not uncritically take 
the ethos articulated by Merton (1942 [1973]) as being identical to the actually 
existing ethos and ideology of members o f the community of science. There is 
evidence that the community o f science behaves contrary to these norms. 
Particularism, to be imagined as the opposing state to universalism, is a common 
aspect of the assessment of the quality o f scientific knowledge. Traweek (1992) 
discusses the way in which science from outside the West is overlooked. 
Rothman (1972) suggests that particularistic criteria are applied within national 
science cultures, distinguishing work produced on the basis of institution, for 
instance. Rothman argues that the norm of communalism is also infringed by the 
development of ‘invisible colleges’. Weinberg (1967) suggests that these kinds of 
structures are reactions to the problem of communication arising from the growth
10 See, for example, commentary o f  the recent case o f  Dr Woo Suk Hwang, the South Korean 
cloning scientist who was exposed as a fraud. In The Guardian, Richard Horton (2006), editor o f  
The Lancet, wrote an article titled ‘The cloning fraud case is a scientific success story’.
88
of science. Further, we could suggest that a drive towards greater secrecy might 
flow from increased competition for funding, and attempts to commodify and 
profit from scientific knowledge.
Rothman (1972) argues that the forces that are reducing the strength of the hold 
that the ethos of science articulated by Merton (1942 [1973]) exerts over the 
behaviour of scientists are external. He suggests that the intrusion of 
contemporary ‘middle class culture’, with its “dominant value themes of 
materialism and success, conformity and morality” (Rothman, 1972, p. 107) is an 
expected result of the recruitment patterns o f science. But more, Rothman 
suggests that the apparent weakening o f the scientific ethos is the result of the 
growth of ‘big science’, in particular “ its resultant dependence upon external 
money” (p. 107). What effect does the development of big science projects have 
on the norms and values of scientists? What consequences do these changes have 
for the cognitive community of science? We suggest that the loss of the special 
ethos of science leaves it without both the established means to maintain 
standards of knowledge, through social and psychological checks, and the 
traditional drivers to ‘progress’, both through the sharing of knowledge and the 
promotion of novelty.
Merton (1968 [1974]) wrote o f possible changes, or adaptations, in the ethos of 
science as a result o f science becoming a mass occupation11 . He quotes 
Zuckerman; “as the social organization o f scientific work becomes more 
complex... the visibility of individual role-performance is reduced” (p. 332). As 
Beaver (2001) argues, in the ‘new paradigm’ o f teamwork in science, of which 
high-energy physics is described as the exemplar; “most participants are invisible, 
in a formal sense, to the larger research community. They are just “names” on a 
paper, “fractional” scientists, essentially anonymous” (p. 370). This chimes with 
the phrasing that Aron (1965 [1968]) uses to describe the notion of alienation, 
writing that it is a process by which people become ‘lost’ in organisations. 
Merton (1968 [1974]), however, suggests that the late 1960s belief that the ethos 
of science is in a process o f change “ is the result of parochial perception” (p. 334).
11 In the same paper, Merton (1968 [1974]) warned that w e ought not simply replace the old, 
outdated mythology o f  science with by m ythologising the modern organisation o f  science.
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Even if historical parochialism was responsible for concerns for the ethos of 
science in the 1960s, these concerns deserve E-examination in light of further 
developments in the social organisation of science. Sulston and Ferry (2002) 
write; “Insidiously, over the past few decades, the prevailing ethos of the world of 
science has shifted. What was once a collective enterprise, in which discoverers 
were acknowledged but their results freely shared, is now frequently constrained 
by the demands of commercial competition. Motivated by financial gain, 
hamstrung by sponsorship deals, or simply out o f self-defence, many researchers 
trade their discoveries with the rest of the community only under the protection of 
patent law or commercial secrecy” (p. ix). This reads as though this were a 
response to the same events that prompted Hans Gaffronto lament; “Not only has 
the ruthlessness of accomplished business techniques invaded the areas where 
industrial exploitation overlaps research, but this kind of behavior is no longer 
considered alien to science” (quoted by Merton, 1968 [1974], p. 327). Gaffron, 
though, was speaking in the 1960s, mourning the apparent passing of his 
cherished ethos of science in 1920s. Sulston and Ferry (2002) are recording the 
concerns of one of the leading figures o f early twenty-first century science as he 
looks back to the scientific ethos of the 1970s. It is in the Human Genome Project 
and the Institute that the processes o f biological science were rationalised, 
automated and bureaucratised. While Sulston’s professional biography (Sulston 
and Ferry, 2002) tells a story of a man tied to a Mertonian ideology of science, the 
organisational arrangements that were resorted to in a defence of these values 
may have played a part in laying the material foundations for the dissolution of 
the norms of the cognitive community o f science.
The bureaucratic organisation of big science is at odds with what is often 
imagined as the ideal method of organising scientific work; the adhocracy. 
Kinsella (1999) writes; “Although traditional and popular views of science 
emphasize the autonomy of scientists, the contemporary social practice known as 
big science [...] foregrounds the constraints that are also implicit in scientific work 
and its management” (p. 174). Kinsella goes on to suggest that the culture of 
science, in which an ethos of autonomy is particularly valued, bnds scientists the 
means with which to resist bureaucratic management. In the empirical
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investigation of the Institute we find narratives of autonomy, particularly as 
articulated by research participants in Chapter F, The Factory and the University. 
However, here we should note that the autonomy of technical workers is not the 
autonomy that is idealised in the ethos of science. It is not a state in which “the 
choice of subjects and the actual conduct o f research is entirely the responsibility 
of the individual scientist” (Polanyi, 1962, p. 53). Indeed, in a big science project 
such as the Human Genome Project there are no individual scientists.
We should also pay attention to the ethos that develops among scientific workers 
in settings outside academia. As my investigation of the Institute revealed, and is 
highlighted by the fieldwork anecdote described in Chapter E, Conduct, the 
Institute has absorbed industrial values beyond simply the adoption of an 
‘assembly line’. Ellis (1972) investigated scientists working in an industrial 
setting and found that in such a setting the idealised image of scientific work, and 
the accompanying ethos of science, was dissolved by exposure to a world of 
commercialised science. The scientists who participated in the research 
demonstrated little attachment to the apparent ideal and appeared to feel little 
dissatisfaction as a result of their working experience. Rather, as Ellis notes, 
these industrial scientists would often adopt an ethos developed for a 
commercially orientated social world. This suggests that an industrial setting for 
scientific work can break scientists’ adherence to an ethos that is peculiar to 
science. We might say that as a consequence of the social organisation that these 
scientists inhabit and work within they have been alienated from the scientific 
ethos. But they have not been rendered normless. The adoption of an ethos 
rooted in commercial values is an ‘adaptation’ to this situation. However, while 
scientists might adapt to the inappropriateness of the scientific ethos to their 
experience of work in industrialised science, this should not be taken as a 
replacement of equivalencies. The adapted scientists might identify with 
commercial values and priorities and draw satisfaction from the ‘applied’ nature 
of their work. But with little opportunity to work on research of their own 
choosing, and with “the increased subdivision of complex scientific tasks... [that] 
takes away from them the opportunity to understand and appreciate their work as 
a whole” (Yearley, 1988, p. 73), these scientists might have adapted in ways that 
counter the normlessness of the loss of the ethos of science, but they cannot avoid
91
alienation in the senses of powerlessness and meaninglessness, and, more 
fundamentally, from the products, in this case scientific knowledge, of their work.
The dissolution and replacement of the ethos of science may involve factors that 
we might not expect to find in big, but basic, science, for example in the Human 
Genome Project and at the Institute. Examples of these would include 
commercial pressures to arrive at profitable research findings and the imperative 
for industrial levels of secrecy. But in other aspects of its character, industrial 
science, with hierarchical control over large, multi-disciplinary research and 
development teams, can be seen as a close counterpart of big basic science. And 
if these developments lead to the loss o f the scientific ethos, then one of the 
normative bases by which science ensures that knowledge that is both novel and 
valid is lost.
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C l  T h e  P a r a b l e  o f  t h e  N e e d l e  a n d  t h e  H a y s t a c k
In a diversion from considering the experiences, and pathologies, of working lives 
in big science, let us consider the philosophy of science that underpins the 
rationalisation of science as it reaches its extreme end-point, the automation of 
discovery. Glymour (2004) discusses the various methods that might be 
employed in the search for knowledge. He offers a metaphor to illustrate his call 
for the automation of, not just laboratory procedures, but, as was the goal of the 
scientist who was discussed in section C4, The Automation o f Scientific Work, the 
very process of discovery; “When scientists seek to leam new, interesting truths, 
to find important patterns hiding in vast arrays of data, they are often trying to do 
something like searching for a needle in a really huge haystack of falsehoods, for 
a correct network among many possible networks, for a robust pattern among 
many apparent but unreal patterns” (p. 76).
First, we ought to recognise that in this introduction the scientific method is 
described without reservation as the process o f uncovering of truths already 
existent in nature. Truth, Glymour (2004) assures us, is out there, but it is hidden 
and need to be revealed. It must be uncovered, not from a mass of data, but a 
mass of ‘falsehoods’. There is no ‘construction’ at work at all, and so, despite 
Glymour referring to ‘creativity’ on the part o f scientists, we might begin to doubt 
where this particular vision of the scientific method has room for it.
Glymour (2004) asks; “So how does one find a needle in a haystack?” (p. 76). He 
offers us six options12, two of which he suggests are akin to automated discovery. 
These are; “5. Set the haystack on fire and blow away the ashes to find the 
needle”, and “6. Run a magnet through the haystack” (p. 76).
12 Option two is; “Pick something you like out o f  the haystack. Subject it to a test. If it doesn’t 
pass the test, find a weaker test (e.g . is the thing long and narrow?) that it can pass” (Glymour, 
2004, p. 76). Glymour suggests that this “is practiced and effectively advocated by many social 
scientists (you need only replace ‘som ething you like’ in 2 with ‘theory’)” (p. 76). His 
methodological digs at social science continues with remarks about the social studies o f  science 
(which he labels as ‘postmodernist’), which betray a lack o f  engagement with even intellectually 
conservative accounts o f  how science, as a social process, is actually accomplished.
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The destructive and mechanistic attitude of these last two methods ought to reveal 
to us that there is a significant weakness in this conception of the automation of 
discovery. It is bound to work entirely within the bounds of the existing ontology 
and understanding to collect new data o f the same sort. It can only do 
‘extraordinarily normal science’. It can tell you nothing more about the haystack 
except how many needles are, or were, inside it. For that, you must know that 
there are needles inside, and that these needles are the objects of prime concern. 
The answers to these questions might be interesting, but creativity does not 
merely serve as a recreational outlet that keeps scientific researchers satisfied with
I 'i
their work . It serves an important purpose in the maintenance of the cognitive 
community of science, organised, in the loosest sense, in the pursuit of both valid 
and novel knowledge. It is by this creativity and the consequent generation of 
novelty by which science develops new categories, new ways of looking at 
objects, new ontologies.
If we return to Mannheim (1940), and to the notions of substantial and functional 
modes of rationality, we can ask; rather than the Army, how could the creativity 
of scientific work be made subject to a process of functional rationalisation? We 
might suggest that the overall experiment is broken down into a series of 
procedures in a pathway. Scientists would then be trained to become experts in a 
single procedure. Feeding the results o f these procedures -  which could be data 
or material products -  through the rationalised experiment pathway this collective 
of scientists produces an experimental result. This result can then be published. 
Throughout Part Three, Illustrating and Accounting, we see discussions of such a 
‘chain of production’ in genome sequencing. In examples such as this, no single 
scientist need understand the whole experiment, nor does he or she necessarily 
understand the position of his or her results in the knowledge produced. Indeed, 
if the process of producing the published paper is standardised, or done away with 
altogether, this decrease in substantial rationality can run deep. Note that in this 
example we did not discuss the deskilling o f  scientists, though that may be an 
associated consequence of increasing functional rationality. Rather, we have
13 This, we must stress, is the reason why the alienation o f  scientific workers can be considered a 
special problem, and ought to be a concern o f  those who are nevertheless indifferent to the 
alienation o f  workers in general.
concentrated on way in which an increase in functional rationality might reduce 
the space in which individual scientists are able to respond with substantial 
rationality, with intelligence and with insight (Mannheim, 1940), in other words 
creatively, towards the work that they perform and the data they produce. 
Without the scope to work creatively, in a system in which functional 
rationalisation is maximised, scientific workers are alienated from the meaning of 
their work.
The functional rationalisation of science, manifested in routinisation, is only 
possible in disciplines that have moved, or are moved, into a fully mature phase 
(Collins, 2003). The resulting routinised science is not merely the normal science 
of a mature discipline as described by Kuhn (1970), but extra-ordinarily normal. 
This might be an apt description for what the proponents of the Human Genome 
Project have called ‘discovery science’ (Collins, Morgan and Patrinos, 2003). 
Bob Waterston described the Human Genome Project as being a ‘data driven’ 
scientific project, unlike traditional ‘hypothesis driven’ science.
...M ost of the work is being done by machines and technicians.
So a lot of it is trying to set up a process pipeline that can turn 
out the data day-after-day-after-day. And that is a different kind 
of management task... This is not so much hypothesis driven.
This b data driven.... We know what we’re after. We don’t 
know exactly how to get there. It does involve some significant 
unknowns in terms of getting all the pieces of DNA put together 
in the right order and making sure there aren’t any holes and so 
forth. But a lot of it is process engineering and making the
processes as effective as you can.
(Waterston, quoted in Lasker Foundation, 1998)
Normal science, according to Kuhn (1970), is “an attempt to force nature into the 
preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies. No part of the 
aim of normal science is to call forth new sorts of phenomena; indeed, those that 
will not fit the box are often not seen at all. Nor do scientists normally aim to
invent new theories, and they are often intolerant of those invented by others.
Instead, normafscientific research is directed to the articulation of those 
phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies” (p. 24). Extra­
ordinarily normal science involves the hardening o f tie box that bounds the 
paradigm. How could this be done? One suggestion is that it might result from
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the embodiment of the paradigm in the inaccessible workings of automated 
machinery, and/or the similarly inaccessible workings of a functionally 
rationalised work procedure. The scientific paradigm, and the knowledge that it 
represents, is black-boxed. A hardening of the boxes of this kind would be a 
sclerotic pathology of science. In normal science, the box that represents the 
boundary of the paradigm can be broken open by human insight and creativity. 
Black boxes are built to be indestructible.
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C 8 W o r k , M o d e r n it y , a n d  B ig S c ie n c e
Doing and Hilgartner (2006), in the abstract for their session at the 2006 Society 
fo r  the Social Studies o f  Science conference, state that “[t]he laboratory and the 
factory are two of the central symbols of modernity, and they stand in a dialectical 
relationship to one another in a way that broadly parallels the dialectics of 
fact/technique, designer/operator, worker/knower, and creative/routine” (p. 208). 
This thesis is, in part, the result of the realisation that the work of big science, and 
of the Institute, can be seen as embodying a combination of these contradictory 
forms of social organisation. They are laboratory and  factory, and in being so, 
big science institutions can be seen as thoroughly Modern workplaces.
Grint (1998) provides us with a ‘history helix’ to help us to understand the 
qualities of work. This charts the differences between ‘pre-industrial’, ‘industrial’ 
and ‘post-industrial’ modes of work. The changes that this text-book summation 
takes to characterise the transition from pre- industrial to industrial forms of work 
can be seen as capturing, to an informative degree, the changes that mark the 
move from small science to big science. The moves from patriarchy to hierarchy, 
from craft production to mass production, from autonomy to heteronomy; all 
these are features not only o f the industrialisation of economic activities outside 
the special society that is science, but also of the industrialisation of science. 
Taken in this way, it should be natural that a similar sort of gaze be cast on the 
Institute as has been cast on the industrial workplaces of the past.
However, as we see in Chapter J, The Institute and the Knowledge Economy, for 
some time now debates have centred on moves away from industrialised forms of 
work. This move has been labelled post-Fordism, post-industrialism, a facet of 
post-Modernism, and the turn to a knowledge economy. However, as Grint (1999) 
writes, these new ways o f working embody “shadows of the pre- industrial past” 
(p. 320). However, just as science is ‘industrialising’, so, the narrative goes, 
much of the economy is turning to knowledge work, the post-industrial character 
of which involves the adoption of characteristics of small science (Kleinman and 
Valias, 2001). In this, autonomy finds a post-industrial shadow in ‘self-
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discipline’, craft production in ‘niche production’, patriarchy in ‘trust’ (Grint, 
1999). In Chapter H, The High Road to the Human Genome, we see just how 
these apparently paradigmatic features of contemporary knowledge economy 
work can be seen, in so much that they are manifested in the Institute, as the 
hangovers of the culture of small science. It is not so much that Institute is post­
industrial, but, to take for a moment a vision of development as linear and 
progressive, that the Institute was never thoroughly industrialised. When Kinsella 
(1999) writes that “the characteristics attributed to contemporary knowledge- 
intensive organisations are exemplified, perhaps most clearly, in the work of 
organized, large scale science” (p. 177), he is suggesting that a form of work that 
proved more resistant than most to the triumphs of Modernity should be taken as 
a model of the future of work.
Indeed, big science, in the form of the Human Genome Project and the Institute, 
seems to be resistant to many of the contemporary trends that we diagnose. For 
Watson (2003), post-Modemity involves ‘the fragmentation of existing patterns’. 
Thinking in terms of work, the post-Modern condition of “heterogeneity, plurality 
and constant innovation” (Watson, 2003, p. 70; quoting Best and Kellner, 1991) 
can be seen another description of the post-Fordist model of organisation in a 
‘knowledge economy’. However, while the project to sequence the human 
genome relied on ever improving automation, this is not the ‘constant innovation’ 
of post-Modemity, but the simple, linear progress of Modernity. And far from an 
expression of homogeneity and plurality, the Human Genome Project involved 
the concentration of resources in a single, standardised task, which was itself 
increasingly geographically and organisationally rationalised. The Human 
Genome Project was a thoroughly M odern endeavour.
As much as the character of the Human Genome Project swims against the tide of 
post-Modemity, so it resists the wave o f globalisation. Even as it accommodates 
the global in so much that it is a collaborative project, and as much as it is a work 
of science, which, as we have seen, imagines itself as a field of human labour that 
effortlessly crosses borders and cultures, the Project was a triumph of state 
funding and national glorification. While Watson (2003) references Lash and 
Urry (1987) to discuss the way in which capitalism is increasingly disorganised
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by the waning powers of the nation state and organised labour, the Human 
Genome Project was the state-funded organisation of biology, bringing many 
aspects of the disorganised diversity of small science into concert. And, once the 
Project was ‘complete’, its accomplishment was appropriated by heads of 
government to bolster the narratives o f national success. There are few other 
scientific projects that find their accomplishment announced not by journal 
publication, not even by press release, but by presidents and prime ministers. The 
Human Genome Project may not have been as centralised as the Apollo Program, 
but that is not the appropriate comparison. The historical movement was not one 
of decentralisation and increasing heterogeneity, as would mark a move from the 
Apollo Program to the Human Genome Project. Rather, it is a move from 
disorganised small science biology to the big biology of the Human Genome 
Project. In this, it is the similarities with the Apollo Program, as an ideographic 
reference, and the discontinuities from small science biology, as a historical 
ancestor, that are of interest.
The Human Genome Project appears, therefore, to be an island of Modernity in a 
perceived sea of post-Fordism, post-industrialism, and post-Modemism. Perhaps 
this view is the result of an error scale in our cartographies; perhaps the sea is not 
so big as it seems, perhaps there is more land, sub-continents, continents even, of 
Fordism, industrialism and Modernity. This would certainly be the response of 
many who see the mapping of these trends as exaggerations (Callinicos, 1989). 
Or perhaps the Human Genome Project is a Surtsey in this sea, a spectacular and 
captivating eruption of Modernity, but one that results in only a small, steadily 
eroding outcrop nonetheless.
The following chapter, Chapter D, Case, considers the ways in which a case study 
such as this exploration of work at the Institute can find application and value in 
other settings. Knorr-Cetina asks us to “consider the possibility that laboratories 
exemplify features also present in organized settings such as the clinic, the factory, 
the garden, the government agency” (quoted in Kinsella, 1999, p. 174-175). And 
as Kinsella noted, work in the knowledge economy is perhaps exemplified by 
work in ‘organised, large-scale science’.
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P a r t  T w o : S t r a t e g y  a n d  M e t h o d
The second part of this thesis addresses questions of strategy and method. What 
kind of evidence is used in this thesis? What are the particulars of the case, and 
how was the research conducted? Part Two is divided into two chapters, Chapter 
D, Case and Chapter E, Conduct, and addresses both the theoretical and practical 
aspects of gathering and using evidence. Chapter D, Case discusses the strategy 
employed. The empirical exploration in this thesis is a case study. After 
addressing the particulars of the Institute, this chapter considers the ways in which 
this example can serve as a scaffold for more general understanding. Questions 
addressed include; What kind of case study is that o f the Institute? What sort of 
understanding of the social world can be gained through a case study? Can this 
case study have generalisable or transferable qualities?
Chapter E, Conduct discusses the use of interviews as a research method and the 
practice o f the research in this instance. Questions that are addressed include; 
Why use interviews to conduct social research? How were the interviews 
developed and conducted? What sort o f evidence do interviews gather, and how 
is this evidence used? Considering the fieldwork experiences, this chapter 
reflects on the effects o f location on the interview, on the method of recruitment, 
and on an uncomfortable challenge to the anonymity of the research participants.
These two chapters bridge the gap between discussions of the history of the 
Human Genome Project and the sociological literature on big work and big 
science, and the contextual, living meaning derived from the evidence gathered. 
Throughout, this section steers a path mapped so as to avoid falling into ‘methods 
talk’ (Gubrium and Holstein, 1997), concentrating on connecting the discussions 
of strategy and method to the study o f the Institute as case and in wider context, 
and the actual practice o f research.
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[D] C a s e
The word ‘case’ suggests the particular. When used in phrases such as case study, 
the word case is used to denote an instance. The connotations of this meaning of 
case suggest that we ought to be pessimistic when considering the ability of case 
studies to provide knowledge and understanding o f the world outside the 
particulars of the case in question. However, case can also be used to as a 
synonym for box or frame.
A case study that produces only a statement o f the particulars of an instance has 
only a weak claim to be sociologically interesting. But a case study can also 
produce the outline of a general social setting, providing us with an example, an 
ideal type perhaps. Seen in this way, a case study can be used to build a 
theoretical and/or archetypal frame which we can then use as a scaffold. This 
scaffold supports our attempts to build an understanding of the social world 
beyond the particulars o f the study in question. A case study that embraces this 
second meaning of the word case has the potential for transferable sociological 
value.
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D1 In t r o d u c t io n
This chapter considers what it means when we describe this study of the Institute 
as a case study. Section D2, The Institute, provides sets the scene for the case. 
This section presents some of the particulars of the setting explored in this thesis. 
We are presented with a short history of the development of the Institute and a 
description of the Institute as it exists. These descriptions provide a material 
context in which to position the accounts o f the research participants that are used 
to illustrate the empirical analysis o f Part Three. Section D3, A Typology o f  Case 
Studies, considers the ways in which case studies have been differentiated into 
categories. The section asks how the research that makes up this thesis could be 
described according to these types. Section D4, Case Studies o f  Work and 
Science, is a short tour of the way in which the case study has a rich history in 
providing insights into the worlds o f work and science. Qualitative case studies 
are the pre-eminent method for gathering rich, contextual evidence. Finally, in 
section D5, Monsters and De-Monstrations, the chapter closes by suggesting 
several ways in which this research might serve as a scaffold for wider 
understanding. This case study has the potential to illuminate settings beyond the 
instance of the Institute. Given the setting, the evidence gathered, and the focus 
of the analysis, light may be cast upon the workings of the social world of science, 
upon a subset of that social world in the form of peculiar world of big science, 
and upon the much broader social domain of work in a technologically advanced 
economy.
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D 2  T h e  In s t it u t e
The Institute was founded in the early 1990s, jointly funded by a major medical 
research charity and the Medical Research Council. When the Institute was 
founded there was just 7 staff, rising to 34 by the end of the first year. By the end 
of 1999 there were over 500 people working at the Institute. By the time the 
research fieldwork was conducted in 2006, the Institute employed over 800 
people (Powell, 2006). Purpose-built laboratories were opened in 1996, and a 
major expansion to the Institute having been built between 2001 and 2006. In 
time, the Institute was joined at its site in the English countryside by other 
molecular biology organisations to form a ‘campus’. In particular, a world- 
leading bioinformatics institute was relocated to the site from continental Europe 
over several years during the mid-1990s.
The Institute was one of the G5 laboratories, and played a leading role in the 
publicly-funded Human Genome Project. It sequenced approximately one-third 
of the human genome and, in the process, helped to develop the techniques, 
technologies and protocols for genome sequencing. Politically, the Institute was 
an important site in the Human Genome Project, not only because it 
internationalised what was otherwise an overwhelmingly an American project, 
realising at least part o f the global aspirations o f the public project, but also 
because those at the Institute, including the founding director, played a key role in 
arguing that the human genome sequence should be public property.
In 2000, the founding director handed over the leadership of the Institute to an 
American scientist from outside the Institute. As a specialist in animal models of 
genetics, not, notably, in the sequencing o f genomes, the new director was a key 
part of the re-orientation o f the Institute from genome sequencing goals towards 
an emphasis on translating sequence information into biomedical benefit. To 
fulfil this vision, the Institute recruited scientists to establish laboratories to 
conduct relatively small science projects. These laboratories benefit from tie 
genomic resources, the funding, and the prestige of the Institute. This re­
orientation can be seen in the way that the balance of employment at the Institute
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changed between 1999, the height o f the race to sequence the human genome, and 
2006, when the fieldwork visits were conducted. In 1999, over 60 per cent of 
those employed at the Institute were employed sequencing genomes. This 
workforce of over to 300 people produced approximately 25 to 30 million bases 
of sequence each day. By 2006, the same amount of sequence was being 
produced by approximately 130 people. This is fewer than half the number of 
people employed in equivalent roles in 1999, but the most important change is the 
one of balance. By 2006, well over 80 per cent of the people working at the 
Institute were working on a range o f smaller scale research, building on the 
genomic information produced over the previous decade. The sequence has 
become a platform (Powell, 2006), a piece o f the infrastructure of science. The 
major medical charity that had backed the Institute from its inception confirmed 
this re-orientation with a commitment o f several hundred million pounds of 
funding in 2001. This funding also brought with it a change in name, a symbolic 
mark to the end of a phase in the history of the Institute.
The changes in sequencing productivity over the history of the Institute are 
startling. Between 1995 and 1999, there was a six-fold increase in output, with a 
similar increase between 1999 and 2001. Since the end of the race, the increase in 
output has slowed, but not stopped; in 2005, the amount o f sequence being 
produced had increased by one-third on the figures from 2001. Similar 
development can be seen in the decreasing cost o f sequencing each base. In 1998, 
it cost around 16 pence to sequence each base. By shortly after the end of the 
race, in 2002, this had fallen to two pence. Unlike output, this development did 
not slow after the end o f the race; by 2005, the cost of sequencing a base had 
fallen to just 0.07 pence (Powell, 2006). With the end of the race there was far 
less demand to sequence a lot o f DNA, but there is always pressure to sequence 
more cheaply, especially when the goal cannot be described as a mission to 
safeguard common human heritage.
The Institute is set in the English countryside, a few miles from a historic 
university town. A security building controls access to the Institute, but there are 
no forbidding fences or conspicuous patrols. The campus bears few marks that 
provide any clue to its previous incarnation as a site for industrial research dating
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back to the 1950s. The buildings are clean and clear-lined; frontages of glass and 
light brickwork indicate that the Institute was built in the period that straddled the 
Millennium. Invention and originality in the design and layout of the buildings 
differentiates them from the office buildings that are thrown up on commercial 
estates, though they clearly belong to the same family, the architecture of the 
Institute creates a cutting-edge atmosphere. The Institute is given an open feel by 
the pedestrianisation of the areas between the buildings, with gentle slopes and 
curves characterising the space. Set away from the laboratories is a listed country 
house that provides comfortable conference facilities. Public artworks bring a 
distinctive character to the Institute. These artworks include a spiralling wooden 
sculpture representing the DNA o f the genomes that have been sequenced at the 
Institute, and, interestingly, a stained glass window using the symbols of 
contemporary genetics to ape religious iconography. The community pavilion is 
one of the more distinctive buildings; a glass-walled building with a curved shell 
of a roof, from some angles it appears as a concrete wave.
The interiors of the buildings are determined by their functions. Chce we are 
beyond the foyer, the coffee shop and snack bar, and the reception with an LCD 
display that tracks the number o f bases sequenced, the main building is a series of 
plain white-walled labs, indistinguishable from their counterparts in academia. It 
is in this building that the laboratories o f the Pre-Finishing labs are based, as are 
many of the small-science faculty14. Other buildings have a distinctly different 
feel. The building in which the Finishing teams work houses open-plan offices 
that are similar in layout and feel to the workplaces found in many contemporary 
settings. Members o f the Finishing teams work at individual workstations that 
can be observed from without, through the windowed walls, and within, from the 
offices of the team leaders that are sectioned off from the central workplace. 
Though obvious care has been taken over the styling of these interiors, this does 
not set these spaces apart from a recently built workplace of the administrative 
division of an anonymous company.
14 Before visiting the Institute the researcher would have described these as post-genomic projects. 
However, it was forcefully pointed out by one o f  the research participants that these projects were 
not post-genomic. Sequencing the human genom e, or any other genome, does not propel biology 
into an age after genom es, but an age during which genom es are a central feature o f  the work. The 
research participant insisted that these sm all-science projects were the epitome o f  biology in the 
genomic age.
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The exception to this clean contemporary architecture, a small city of science, is 
the building that was the temporary home to the Production teams; the 
Sequencing Centre. This was not a building of light brickwork and glass, but a 
one storey building of prefabricated metal walls and small windows. This 
building housed the laboratories used for preparing the DNA for sequencing, the 
offices of the team leaders and co-ordinators, and the row upon row of sequencing 
machines. One of the research participants referred to this building as ‘the 
cowshed’. This was an incongruous addition to the landscape of the Institute, 
which was, in the main, and especially the 2001-2005 expansion, designed to be 
accommodated into the landscape of the surrounding countryside. This building 
was dismantled when the Production teams were able to move back into a 
permanent home in 2007.
This, though, should not be taken as the picture o f the Institute throughout its 
history. Major changes were made to the Institute between the sequencing of the 
human genome and the fieldwork visits. The most significant changes were the 
expansion of the Institute, which was begun in 2001 and completed in 2005. 
These changes reflected the re-orientation o f the scientific mission that animated 
the Institute, with a move from large-scale genome sequencing to a diversity of 
smaller scale laboratory projects. This did not go unnoticed by the new director, 
who remarked when the Institute won a 2006 architectural award; “It’s not only 
the physical structure o f the campus that has been extended and remodeled, but 
our science also. We have added new programs that will bring biological 
discovery and medical understanding from our work on genomes” (quoted in 
Higginbotham, 2008). The end of the Human Genome Project, and the changing 
emphasis of the Institute, is therefore written in the steel and glass of the new 
developments.
As was noted in Chapter A, Primers, molecular biologists are inextricably bound 
to the business of biotechnology (Lewontin, 2001). Indeed, when the new 
director of the Institute was appointed a Fellow of the Royal Society, the press 
release boasted of his role in founding several biotech start-up companies (Powell, 
2002). But this entanglement o f the commercial and the academic is not simply
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found in the threads o f individuals, but in the spaces of science. Universities 
often have space dedicated to start-up and spin-off companies that will 
commercialise the academic work being conducted. These spaces range from a 
collection of prefabricated cabins to dedicated, permanent science parks. Despite 
the seeming transmissibility o f knowledge in an Information Age, proximity15 of 
the sites of commercialisation to the sites o f discovery and invention remains 
important. With this in mind, it should not be a surprise to find that the Institute 
has set aside land for an ‘innovation centre’ to incubate genomics-related start-up 
companies, seen as an essential part o f translating basic research into medical 
systems and products (Higginbotham, 2008).
The chain o f production
The sequencing of genomes at the Institute is conducted by in a manner that, in 
some respects, resembles a production line. Since the founding of the Institute, 
the technology o f DNA sequencing has become increasingly automated. As one 
of the major customers of DNA sequencing equipment, the Human Genome 
Project, and, as part o f that, the Institute, has not simply been a recipient of 
increasing automation, but also an instigator. Driving the development of 
automation were issues of “cost, space, flexibility and the requirement for high 
quality data” (West, Clee and Rogers, 2006, p. 169). By 1998, 250,000 reads 
were generated a month using Applied Biosystems 377 and 373 slab gel DNA 
sequencers. These sequencing machines were labour intensive, requiring 
technicians to pour and load more than 300 gels each day. By 2000, advances in 
the techniques and technologies, including the automation of pipetting through the 
use of robots, had quadrupled the number o f reads to 1,000,000 each month. By 
2006, this level of output was being achieved by just 50 people in a space half that 
of 2000; a reduction from 5,000 square metres to 2,500 square metres. 
Significant cost reductions are achiewd through the use of automation systems 
that reduce the use o f plasticware and reagents (West, Clee and Rogers, 2006). 
The ‘big’ of big science in the Human Genome Project was not produced simply
15 The Institute itself illustrates the value accorded to proximity in science. While it is found in a 
fairly rural setting, it is around 10 m iles from a major university town with a reputation and 
history in genetic science. Further, as its developm ent as a campus demonstrates, the clustering o f  
scientific work in one location is a persuasive model o f  organisation.
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by the increase in the cost o f large pieces of apparatus16, as is the model supplied 
by social studies o f big physics, but by the increase in the consumption of labour 
and materials. It is not a case o f conducting the equivalent of one enormous 
experiment, as is the case with a supercollider, but of conducting a previously 
unimaginable number of small procedures.
In the course of this research, representatives from three parts of the ‘chain of 
production’ were interviewed; Production, Pre-Finishing and Finishing. As Alice, 
a manager in the Finishing team described, within this chain of production there is 
a hierarchy.
So production is, as you say, the first step. And then finishing is 
a little bit, you have to be a little more intelligent, I guess, to do 
the finishing. Then from finishing you've got your annotation, 
which again you have to be more competent and they look for 
people that have got PhDs to do. So yes, there is that sort of 
hierarchy.
[Alice]
Brian, a manager in the Pre-Finishing team offered a critical view of the 
development of sue h a hierarchy. He made sure that the researcher was aware 
that the task of sequencing genomes has not always been divided into distinct and 
separate jobs; there is nothing ‘natural’ about the division.
As soon as that [the separation o f the production and the 
finishing o f sequence into separate teams] happened it was 
always seen that production were lower than finishers. Even if 
one couldn’t survive without the other, it was always seen that 
finishing was a higher job than production. Whereas personally I 
don’t think that it was.
[Brian]
Finishing and Production became separate teams in late 1998, though the actual 
task of producing sequence was divided into the jobs of production and finishing
16 Indeed it is debatable whether automated sequencing machines are equivalent to supercolliders 
or radio telescopes. However, when w e understand the equipment as a collective; an array o f  
automated sequencers comb ined with the required supercomputing power, w e produce a piece o f  
apparatus that is perhaps comparable with the models o f  big physics. This understanding does 
reinforce the notion that the sequencing o f  the human genom e a highly collective accomplishment; 
the combined effort o f  many nations, many centres, a great number o f  scientific and technical 
workers and an enormous (and continually updated array o f  machines).
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well before this. In an e-mail, Peter, a Finishing Manager, attributes this to the 
‘managerial challenge’ (Peter, 2006). This managerial decision physically 
separated the people producing genome sequence into separate teams. We 
discuss the development of an increasingly acute division of labour, including 
physical separation, and the attendant hierarchy, in Part Three, particularly 
Chapter F, The Factory and the University.
Subcloning Production Finishing™ **- Annotation
Pre-Finishing<
Figure D2.1 The Sequencing Chain o f Production
Production is where the sequencing is carried out. Prior to the large-scale 
introduction of capillary sequencers at the turn of the century, sequencing was 
carried out using machines that used polyacrylamide gels, or slab gels as they are 
descriptively known. The workhorse machine of this technique was the ABI 377. 
Capillary sequencers have now replaced slab gel sequencers, and the standard 
model used in sequencing the human genome was the ABI 3700.
The terms ‘slab gel’ and ‘capillary’ refer to the technique by which DNA 
fragments are sorted by size. This sorting enables the products of chain 
terminator sequencing to be ordered into sequence. Compared to slab gel 
sequencing, in which the slab gels had to be prepared manually close to the time 
when they would be needed, capillary sequencing requires much less labour input. 
The fieldwork at the Institute included interviews with people who had spent their 
early days on the Human Genome Project making slab gels. According to Julia, 
who is now a Pre-Finishing Team member, during the late 1990s, as the Institute 
was scaling up to complete the sequencing of the human genome, the pouring of 
slab gels occupied about twenty people. Between them, working shifts, they 
made gels twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, to ensure that that the 
sequencing machines never sat idle. The reduction in the amount of labour 
required to produce sequence does not stop with the elimination of the task of 
pouring slab gels. The integral sample loader and flowable gels of the ABI 3700
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automated sequencer enables the machine to run technician-free. Michael Phillips 
of ABI describes this as ‘walk-way automation’ (Hodgson, 2000).
The move to capillary machines was also an improvement in quality in a number 
of ways, not least the removal o f the ‘green-fingered’ process of producing slab 
gels. Hodgson (2000) quotes Chris Clee, o f what was then the Sanger Centre, as 
saying:
Gel quality varied from batch to batch and depended on who was 
preparing it [...] Even the time o f year made a difference. Gels 
were better during the summer because of the lab temperature, 
although sometimes that affected the water quality.
(Clee, quoted in Hodsgon, 2000, p. 40)
More than this, slab gel sequencing produced problems for the optical readers that 
transform the separation of fragments of DNA on a gel into data. With 96 lanes 
on a gel, the reader would sometimes pick up the fluorescent readings of adjacent 
lanes, which then required the finishing team to compare the reads from adjacent 
lanes (Hodgson, 2000).
Pre-Finishing involves a variety o f laboratory procedures designed to streamline 
the finishing process. The laboratory procedures are designed to improve the 
sequencing of low quality regions and fill gaps. Directed sequencing reactions are 
conducted to resolve problem areas of sequence. This process can take several 
rounds of reactions.
Finishers use computer programmes such as Phred, Phrap and Consed to 
assemble the sequences. Phred ‘calls’ the bases, on the basis of the strength and 
spacing of the fluorescence reads, Phrap is a tool that helps a Finisher make 
judgements on assembly by comparing the overlap of sequences, while Consed 
helps Finishers examine the quality of sequences from overlapping regions and 
determine what new sequencing runs are required to improve data quality in 
particular regions or to fill sequence gaps. As we see in Chapter F, The Factory 
and the University, this job is seen as requiring a greater degree of formal 
education than the other two aspects o f the chain of production considered in this 
study. Nevertheless, these tasks are also subject to automation. Hodgson claims
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that the ‘Autofinish’ module “can reduce the decision burden for the human 
finisher by 85 per cent” (2000, p. 42).
I l l
D 3 A  T y p o l o g y  o f  C a s e  S t u d ie s
Bryman (2004) distinguishes between several different kinds of case studies17. 
The ones that are relevant to a discussion of this case study are the ‘unique’ case, 
the ‘revelatory’ case, (both drawn from the classifications of Yin) and the most 
common form, the ‘exemplifying’ case. Into which of these categories does a 
qualitative investigation o f work in the Institute fit most comfortably?
Bryman (2004) describes the unique case (or the extreme case) as those instances 
where interest is granted by exceptionality. Clearly, a case study of the Institute, 
as part of the Human Genome Project, could be categorised as a unique case. The 
Institute, particularly during the sequencing o f the human genome, is unique 
historically and disciplinarily; a representative o f a particular, now completed 
project that adopted a degree o f industrialised organisation that is unlikely to be 
seen again in biological research. This is the category of case that best fits the 
view of the Institute as a ‘monster’, as considered in the next section of this 
chapter. Unique cases are not without sociological merit. Their position in the 
literature of sociology is certainly not marginal; Bryman suggests that Mead’s 
study of childhood in Samoa and Fielding’s study of the National Front are 
examples of cases that are unique. However, the derivation of transferable 
qualities is not so straightforward. A qualitative sociological investigation of the 
experience of work at the Institute has intrinsic interest on the basis of its 
existence as an extreme case, but if we can draw parallels, which begin to 
dissolve the sense o f uniqueness, then there is much more that can be gained.
Bryman (2004) describes the revelatory case as one that permits research into 
phenomena that was previously inaccessible. We can see how the Institute can be 
seen in this way if we consider the quote from Bruno Latour which we visited in 
Chapter B , Anatomies o f  Big Science: “The small and invisible are made large, the 
large and unemcompassable are made small. The fast are made slow and the slow 
are speeded up” (quoted in Capshew and Rader, 1992, p. 18). As suggested when
17 We should remember that “[c]ases are always hypotheses” (Walton, 1992, p. 122). The 
identification o f  a case as a case betrays our assumptions o f  the world; the kinds o f  social units 
that are intelligible, the borders o f  these social units, and, not least, their importance.
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we first visited this quote, which is a description of the ‘drama of scale’ at the 
heart of science, sociology, unlike the natural sciences, does not possess the 
apparatus to magnify the world to peer into the smallest spaces, or alter the scale 
of the social in any way. But these apparatus, this ability to alter the scale of the 
world, allows scientists to gain knowledge of the previously inaccessible; they are 
revelatory. If we are to seek revelation of sociological knowledge by these 
principles, we cannot hope for the development of apparatus18, but must rely on 
‘naturally’ existing alterations in the scale of things. This is one way in which the 
Institute is a ‘de-monstration’; by the rapidity of its development and its very size, 
it might allow us insights into process usually hidden by the scales of space and 
time.
Bryman (2004) describes the exemplifying case as being chosen “because they 
will provide a suitable context for certain research questions to be answered” (p. 
51). In this sense, we might examine the notion, which is drawn from existing 
social theory and set out in the Chapter C, Pathologies o f  Work in Big Science, 
that big science organisations are driven towards rationalisation, bureaucratisation, 
and with this comes the concomitant alienation o f those people whose work lives 
are conducted within these organisations. The Institute, as a particular instance of 
a big science organisation, would be an exemplifying case. However, as Bryman 
notes, “[o]ften, what a case study exemplifies will only become apparent after the 
case study has been carried out. It is only at a very late stage that the singularity 
and significance of the case becomes apparent” (p. 52). As the research 
progressed, it became apparent to the researcher that the Institute could serve as 
an exemplifying case for social processes beyond the limited domain of big 
science; it could shed light on the experience of work in contemporary science, 
and, even more generally, experiences of work in technologically advanced 
economies. Through this, a case study of the Institute might have something to 
say in debates about the ‘knowledge economy’ and the future of work. These are 
explored in Part Three, Illustrating and Accounting, and in the final chapter, 
Chapter J, The Institute and the Knowledge Economy.
18 Some, such as Savage and Burrows (2007), do argue that empirical sociology is on the verge o f  
radical transformation as a result o f  the development o f  new, largely IT-based methods. These 
arguments underplay the power o f  existing empirical methods o f  sociology.
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Hartley (1994) has written on the use of case studies in organisational research. 
Hartley identifies the strength o f case study research is the maintenance of context. 
Conclusions are reached inductively from the data collected during the detailed 
investigation of the case. Hartley argues that, as a result of the maintenance of 
context in case study research, “there will always be too many ‘variables’ for the 
number of observations made” (p. 209). This goes some way to ameliorating 
concerns that pervade this research that simple, smooth sense cannot be made of 
the Institute. Law (2004) urges that care be taken when attempting to make 
simple, smooth sense o f our research, and the world. Not only is the world 
patently not shaped or textured so smoothly, but in producing such stories we are 
in danger of simply reproducing the opportunistic (Myrdal, 1970) beliefs about 
the world held by dominant groups.
Criticisms of case study research include the argument that case studies lack 
“rigour and reliability and that they do not address issues of generalizability” 
(Hartley, 1994, p. 208). The simplistic inversion of these arguments stresses the 
power of case study research to provide ‘rich’ and ‘meaningful’ data, “shed[ding] 
light on the fine-grain detail o f social processes in their appropriate context” (p. 
208). Hartley offers a more sophisticated elaboration on the strengths of case 
study research, arguing that “case study methods [...] are more likely to be better 
able to adapt to and probe areas o f original but also emergent theory” (p. 210).
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D 4 C a s e  S t u d ie s  in  W o r k  a n d  S c ie n c e
Case studies have formed the backbone o f studies of both the workplace and the 
laboratory. Many o f these studies are ethnographies, of one kind or other. This 
thesis relied on evidence gathered through interviews. In Chapter E, Conduct, the 
choice of interviews as a research tool, and the sort of evidence that interviews 
produce, are discussed. In the studies o f science, ethnographic explorations such 
as Latour and Woolgar’s Laboratory Life (1986), a first edition of which was 
published in 1979, is the archetypical text. Latour spent time in a 
neuroendocrinology laboratory, and was granted remarkable access and his own 
office space as he engaged in an observational study of the social process by 
which scientific laboratories produce knowledge. Latour and Woolgar note that 
the laboratory is, in some ways, unlike a factory. Bench spaces and the office 
spaces combine to produce papers in a process of ‘literary inscription’. Science is 
primarily a literary activity, a process o f reading and writing. Latour and 
Woolgar note that much o f the informal communication taking place in the 
laboratory was concerned with the substance o f formal communication. This 
even applies in the laboratory itself through the use of inscription devices, ‘which 
transform pieces o f matter into written documents’ (p. 51). The Human Genome 
Project, for all its industrial trappings, was a process of mass inscription; the 
transformation of a three-dimensional molecule into a string of letters. The length 
of the inscription was such that the production o f the results on paper would be a 
pointless, wasteful exercise. When science is engaged in mass inscription, the 
devices of the ‘information age’ are required.
Studies of big science, o f the modes o f work that the Human Genome Project 
resembles to a greater degree than it does the small(er) science laboratories that 
Latour studied, have also tended to be built around the case study. Galison and 
Hevly’s (1992) Big Science, is a collection of case studies, some historical, some 
ethnographic, such as the chapter by Traweek (1992). A more recent addition to 
the literature has been Collins’ (2004) G ravity’s Shadow, which built on decades 
of observational research and interviews with researchers attempting to detect 
gravity waves. Some o f this work is incorporated into Chapter B, Anatomies o f
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Big Science, as Collin’s (2003; 2004) study of LIGO demonstrates one trajectory 
that the management and organisation of a big science institution might take.
Case studies have also been one of the standard research strategies of the 
sociology of work. Many o f these case studies concentrate on the collection and 
analysis of qualitative data. Examples include Beynon’s Working fo r  Ford (1973 
[1984]) and Burawoy’s (1979), in Manufacturing Consent, in which the 
researcher spent ten months as a machinist at a factory in Chicago. The great 
regret contained in this thesis is the fact that the evidence for this research does 
not emerge from such in-depth ethnographic observation and evidence gathering; 
compared to the studies of the sociologists of work in the examples of Beynon 
(1973 [1984]) and Burawoy (1979), and the sociologists of science in the 
examples of Latour and Woolgar (1986) and Collins (2003; 2004). Nevertheless, 
for all that this thesis is missing in comparison to these classic case studies, some 
of the strengths of those studies can be replicated. Despite the limits of interviews 
as a means of gathering sociological evidence, as discussed in Chapter E, Conduct, 
this thesis can marry the richness o f the contextual description of the setting, its 
lived experience, to the wider currents o f history and economy. As was 
highlighted in Chapter A, Primers, Mills (1959 [1970]) described the task of 
sociology as being the method by which people are given the tools to “grasp what 
is going on in the world, and to understand what is happening in themselves as 
minute points in the intersections of biography and history” (p. 14). This thesis is 
an attempt to connect the specifics o f the local, the peculiar even, to wider 
changes in the conduct of science and work in the early twenty-first century.
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D 4  M o n s t e r s  a n d  D e -M o n s t r a t io n s
Walton (1992), in his account o f conducting a case study of ‘California’s little 
civil war’, describes a process by which a case study, initially framed as the study 
of one thing, becomes, as the researcher moves back and forth between the case, 
history, and theory, a study that is appropriately framed in a different manner. 
Hartley (1994) argues that as “case studies may begin with (in some situations) 
only rudimentary theory or a primitive framework, they need to develop 
theoretical frameworks by the end which inform and enrich the data and provide 
not only a sense of the uniqueness of the case but also what is of more general 
relevance and interest” (p. 210). It is through theoretical connection of the 
instance of the case with the wider currents o f history and economy that the case 
study finds the mean to fulfil the purpose that Mills’ (1959 [1970]) assigned 
sociology. Case study research can thus marry the richness of the storytelling 
afforded by the narrative and description o f the instance with meaning over and 
above that of ‘the story’ alone. The popular accessibility of books such as 
Working fo r  Ford (Beynon, 1973 [1984]) as provides a model in which the 
poverty of meaning found in description, however richly detailed, is alleviated, 
and the work enriched through the intellectual labour of analysis and 
contextual isation.
This thesis was imagined, in the first instance, as having transferable value in a 
very limited sense, to the growing number of laboratories practising big(er) 
biology. In the fieldwork visits to the Institute, through the preliminary analyses 
of the interviews, and as a consequence o f engagement with a wider range of 
theory, this study grew into being understood as a case of an event, or perhaps a 
location, within a technology advanced society with claims to be moving towards 
a knowledge economy. This iterative process provides this thesis with claims to 
be a scaffold with a wider set o f uses than simply an aid to examination of big 
biology.
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A question that surfaced time after time in the production of this thesis was that of 
‘monsters’ and ‘de-monstrations’. Should the case study of the Institute, as part 
of the Human Genome Project, be seen as a:
[1] Monster. A product of exceptional forces, and therefore is an example only of 
a limited category of its own?
Or a:
[2] De- monstration A product o f the same currents of history and economy that 
shape other aspects of the society, whether small science, technological advanced 
work, or more general features of society, which therefore possesses value beyond 
the investigation o f this particular instance o f big science?
The degree to which a case study is de-monstration or monster is not simply an 
essential product of the features of the case at hand, but is also dependent on the 
way in which the case is considered. This is not to say that any case can be an 
exemplar of any thing, irrespective of its actual features. But it is a recognition 
that a case, in so much as it exists as a sociological object, only exists once the 
study has been written. An approach that can see the case as nothing but a 
monster, produces a monster. An approach that attempts to draw connections 
between the ‘monster’ and the wider contexts of history and economy, produces a 
de-monstration.
In which domains can this study of the Institute find use as a scaffold? The first 
domain to turn to is that o f the workplaces of science. What purpose do 
narratives of, for example, an increasing division of labour, increasing degrees of 
rationalisation, the development o f laboratory automation, and the growth of 
research teams, serve when applied beyond the Institute, beyond even the 
‘grotesques’ of other big science projects? If we revisit B*uno Latour’s elegant 
description of the conduct of science, we find in it the basis for an argument that 
the case of the Institute ought to be of interest to those concerned with the world 
of small science. It should not only be of interest to those fascinated by rare 
instances of the massive. “The small and invisible are made large, the large and
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unemcompassable are made small. The fast are made slow and the slow are 
speeded up” (Latour, quoted in Capshew and Rader, 1992, p. 18). This ‘the 
drama of scale’, which we described in Chapter B, Anatomies o f  Big Science, is at 
the heart of the claim that the case o f the Institute can enlighten understandings of 
small science. The argument runs; The physical sciences are able to use 
microscopes, mass spectrometers, indeed, even DNA sequencers, in order to 
make small objects appear to be big. The objects, enlarged, are then accessible to 
investigation and understanding. Sociology has no such apparatus to hand. If it is 
the case that big science is shaped by exceptional drivers, then it is a monster, to 
which our reaction must, at one level, be to marvel, rather than to use it as a 
measure of the social world of science. But this is not the case. Big science is 
subject to the same economic, political and social drivers that shape and reshape 
the work of small(er) science. Biological science, in general, is a world in which 
papers are ‘authored’ by an increasing number of contributors, where there is 
pressure to bring teams together in collaborations, and bring together different 
kinds o f scientists in multidisciplinary work. In this, big science offers us a de­
monstration of the possible future shape of work in science.
This was once the limit to the imagined claim for de-monstration for this thesis. 
In the production of this thesis the case has acquired its theory and context, as 
Walton (1992) described. Even if the big science of the Institute is qualitatively 
different to the science found in other settings, in academia and in industry, 
rendering the case useless as a scaffold in these domains, this does not exhaust the 
uses to which the scaffold of this thesis can be put. The features that might make 
work at the Institute distinct from the emerging modes of practice in biology, such 
as the ‘extra-ordinarily normal’ nature o f the science, the similarity of the Human 
Genome Project to a ‘construction’ or ‘process engineering’ project, and the 
overwhelming proportion o f technical and scientific workers to professional, 
career scientists, work to strengthen comparisons with other forms of work in a 
technologically advanced economy. The form of organisation of this labour, and 
the subjective experience of this labour, is a question of significance, given the 
rhetoric that suggests that the development of a knowledge economy is a 
transformation of society and economy of the same scale as the Industrial 
Revolution. In this transformation to a knowledge economy, biotechnology, of
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which the Human Genome Project is imagined a fundamental infrastructural 
element, is considered an economic sector on which we will rely for our future 
wealth.
The Institute, which played a key role in building the foundations for future 
biotechnology work and, as a consequence, the development of a knowledge 
economy, can therefore serve as a site for exploration of the organisation and 
subjective experience o f ‘knowledge work’. In addressing the framing of the case 
study in this way, this thesis engages with contemporary ideas of the organisation 
of work, particularly, in Chapter H, The High Road to the Human Genome, with 
the ‘high road’, ‘high commitment’ organisations and cultures that are often 
associated with successful technologically advanced workplaces. Chapter J, The 
Institute and the Knowledge Economy, which concludes this thesis, draws 
connections between work at the Institute, and the Human Genome Project in 
general, with ideas about knowledge economies. For all that the Institute is a 
monster of big biology, alien to the social world of small science, and even if the 
Institute is the last example of centralised big biology, this case still finds use to 
which the scaffolds built here can be transferred.
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[E] C o n d u c t
In our role as social researchers we conduct interviews. What is signified by the 
word conduct? First, the imagination is drawn to an image of a conductor leading 
an orchestra. Do we, as social researchers, orchestrate our interviews? But this is 
not the only image evoked by the word conduct. The word conduct is also used in 
the physical sciences to describe the transmission o f energy. Are social 
researchers conductors in this sense? Do we put one hand on the social world, the 
other on our word-processors and, through us, allow the truth to be transmitted? 
A naive empiricist might hope that we are the latter. If  researchers are passive 
transmitters of the facts o f the world, then we do not need to reflect on the process. 
As social scientists we realise that this is not the case. We are, inevitably, the 
orchestrators of the evidence that we collect. We shape the pace, the rhythm, and 
the tone of a focused conversation in order to produce a product. Conducting an 
interview is a deliberate act o f skill. This chapter reflects on this process.
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E l In t r o d u c t io n
Fontana and Frey (1994) argue that interviewing is interaction and sociology is 
the study of interaction. Silverman (2001) cites Denzin to describe the research 
interview as ‘focused interaction’. The interview, therefore, is both the tool and 
the object of study. This chapter discusses the use of interviews in this research. 
Interviews are considered on both an abstracted, theoretical level, and in terms of 
the conduct of the interviews in the field.
Section E2, Why Choose Interviews?, examines the choice to use interviews to 
explore the subjective experience o f work at the Institute. This section argues that 
there is a ‘narrative gap’ in the existing discussions of the Human Genome Project. 
This ‘narrative gap’ leaves the bench workers, the army of technical, scientific 
workers who did the day-to-day sequencing of the human genome, unrepresented. 
The ‘virtues’ o f interviews are considered. The strengths of interviews, such as 
flexibility and the ability to reconstruct past events, and weighed against their 
weaknesses. Interviews are identified as being a social research tool particularly 
suited to exploring the subjective experience working in large-scale genome 
sequencing.
In section E3, Structure: Form and Content, the interview itself is examined. 
Considering, first, ‘form’, arguments relating to the concept of structure in 
interviews are rehearsed. The interviews used in this research are positioned 
within the categories that are found in the literature. Turning to ‘content’, the 
themes explored in the interviews conducted at the Institute are discussed. The 
context of the interviews is reflected upon, with the questions of place and the 
identity of the interviewer considered.
This chapter covers questions o f access and sampling in section E4, Access and 
Anonymity. The process by which access to the Institute was gained, and 
maintained, is discussed, and the process of recruiting participants is considered. 
A table of interviewees is provided. A ‘tale from the field’ is recounted, in which 
the conduct o f academic research at the Institute rubbed up against the interests of
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Public Relations. As much as any evidence gathered through the use interviews, 
this event highlights ways in which the Institute is unlike an academic 
organisation, but rather shares features with bureaucratic organisations.
The question of evidence is discussed in section E5, Evidence and Illustration. 
The process o f content analysis is summarily described, before the question of 
understanding the variety o f accounts provided by research participants is 
addressed. Discussing both ideas o f a ‘Rashomon effect’ and Gilbert and 
Mulkay’s (1984) use o f the idea o f ‘linguistic repertoires’, this section suggests 
ways in which the evidence gathered in the course of the exploration of the 
Institute can be understood as sociologically valuable illustration. This discussion 
sets the ground for Chapter F, The Factory and the University, in which quite 
different ways of understanding the Institute as a workplace are analysed.
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E 2 W h y  C h o o s e  In t e r v ie w s ?
The Narrative Gap
The Human Genome Project and the new genetics are not orphan-subjects. 
Neither the Human Genome Project, nor the field in which it is historically and 
scientifically located, want for commentaries, analysis, histories, and, even, 
futurologies. Despite this, the choice to use interviews to gather the evidence 
used in this thesis is the product o f the view that, though they are ever narrowing, 
there are gaps in the literature that seeks to describe and explain the Human 
Genome Project and its position in and significance for society.
The existing accounts o f the Human Genome Project are numerous. As described 
in Chapter A, Primers, these accounts include the journalistic (Davies, 2001; 
Shreeve, 2004; Wickelgren, 2002), those that examine the sequencing of the 
human genome from ethical and sociological perspectives (Clarke and Ticehurst, 
2006; Glasner and Rothman, 2004; Kelves and Hood, 1992), and the first-hand 
accounts of powerful insiders (Bodmer and McKie, 1995; Sulston and Ferry, 2002; 
Watson, 2000). Savage and Burrows (2007) suggest that the saturation of 
narrative has made the interview an outmoded tool of social research. They write; 
“[i]t is now not very clear what the significance of the in-depth interview is in an 
age of knowing capitalism [...] the world-views o f diverse populations [are] now 
routinely presented to us in the popular and new media in such a manner that their 
summary characterization by sociologists is no longer as necessary (or as 
interesting) as it once was” (p. 894). Setting aside the questions of the role of the 
sociologist as analyst rather than simple re-presenter o f narratives, the ‘popular 
and new media’ has left the story of the Human Genome Project with 
unrepresented world-views. There has not been a ‘saturation’. The gap which 
remains, when these existing accounts o f the Human Genome Project are 
collected, is that o f the bench workers who, day by day, sequenced the human 
genome. Not the Lancelots and Gawains that drew to themselves the glories of 
the quest for the human genome, but massed ranks of unnamed foot-soldiers. As 
Edwards (1979) argues, quoting Marx, the social world of production is a ‘hidden 
abode’.
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This is not just a question of the identity of the narrator, but of the content of 
these accounts. As Atkinson and Delamont (2006) argue; “While the ‘voices’ of 
otherwise muted groups may be charged with political significance, we cannot 
proceed as if they were guaranteed authenticity simply by virtue of narrators’ 
social positions” (p. 170). This thesis does not seek to collect the perspectives of 
those who worked on the day-to-day sequencing of genomes, merely as a 
consequence of their previously unheard voices. Absent from the existing 
accounts are narratives that provide us with the means to grasp what it was to 
have worked on this big science project; as a technical worker on one of the great 
foundations of the knowledge economy; on a project with claims to historical 
significance.
Given the historical significance o f the sequencing of the human genome, the 
absence of these accounts is no surprise. Journalists, sociologists and prominent 
scientists are keen to address the big impacts of big science, and the specific 
impacts of the knowledge at that; what does sequencing the human genome mean 
for health care, for equality, for the surveillance of populations? As described in 
Chapter A, Primers, Mills (1970 [1959]) argued that sociology is the means by 
which people are to be able to “grasp what is going on in the world, and to 
understand what is happening in themselves as minute points in the intersections 
of biography and history” (p. 14). This thesis considers the apparently big stories 
of big science to be well rehearsed. These stories leave standing the question; 
what was it to have one o f the hundreds of scientific workers who accomplished 
the sequencing of the human genome? And what do their stories have to tell us 
about work in science and in technologically advanced economies in general?
Interviews and their Virtues
The interview, in all its variation, is a standard component of the toolkit of social 
researchers (Fielding, 1993; Bryman, 2001). The interview can, though, range 
from pre-scripted and therefore highly structured questionnaires, to open-ended, 
explorative unstructured ‘guided conversations’ (Lofland and Lofland, 1984). 
The interviews to gather evidence for this thesis fall toward the unstructured end 
of any continuum of structure; the questions were open-ended, the order of the
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questions rearranged according to the shape that a particular interview was taking, 
though each interview was conducted with a strong thematic focus and with the 
benefit of a detailed question guide. Fielding (1993) reminds us that qualitative 
research involves strategies o f discovery, and, in pursuit of discovery, interviews 
have versatility as one o f their strengths. Through the adaptability of interviews, 
and the flexibility of face-to-face interaction, the researcher is able to respond in 
ways that allow us to get some hold o f the concepts and phraseology of the 
interviewees. ‘Focused interaction’ is an apt term (Denzin, cited in Silverman, 
2001). A discussion of the structure o f the interviews used in the exploration of 
the Institute is provided in the next section, E3 Structure: Form and Content.
O’Brien (1993), re-introducing the reader to sociology, offers various 
characterisations of the boundaries the discipline. Echoing the debates in the 
sociology of science (cf. Gieym, 1999), O ’Brien offers brief portraits of parallel 
sociobgies, with one having its boundaries delineated by the limits of the 
professional sociological hierarchy, another is bounded by its theoretical positions, 
a third is defined in terms the ‘social problems’ that it concerns itself with. 
Pertinent here, in this discussion o f the methods used in order to understand the 
social world, is his description o f a sociology defined by the “methods for 
studying empirical questions.” O ’Brien describes the breadth of the methods that 
mark sociology. “These methods... range from the observational (watching what 
happens), through the interactional (asking about what happens), to the 
mathematical (predicting and modeling what happens)” (p. 3). Interviews fall 
into the category o f interactional methods. In discussing the choice to use 
interviews, we should reflect on the relative strengths of the interview as a means 
to access the social. Why not use observational or mathematical methods to 
explore the social world o f the Institute? What are the features of the interview 
that makes it an appropriate tool to help us to understand what it was to have 
worked, ignored by the gaze o f journalism, and when it condenses and congeals, 
pop-history, as one of the scientific workers who accomplished the sequencing of 
the human genome?
Patently, a ‘mathematical’ approach, as O ’Brien (1993) labels it, will not help us 
to capture a subjective, qualitative understanding of what it was to work in the big
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science of the Human Genome Project. It can provide us with plenty of 
information, a wealth o f apparently unproblematic data. Section E5, Evidence 
and Illustration, discusses some o f the ways in which the evidence produced by 
interviews can be problematic. Sociological research that requires the researcher 
to interact with inhabitants of the social world in question produces empirical 
material that is far more rich and vivid than the thin, though plentiful, data 
provided by questionnaires and surveys (Gillham, 2000).
So, if ‘mathematical’ methods would have collected evidence that would not have 
helped us to explore the subjective experience of work at the Institute, perhaps 
more relevant is the question; why not use observational methods? Observational 
techniques have a distinct and distinguished history in social studies of science. 
As described in Chapter D, Case, Latour and Woolgar (1986) provided the 
pioneering text for studies investigating life inside a laboratory. The decision to 
employ observational methods to study science was an attempt by Latour to 
“become part of a laboratory, to follow closely the intimate processes of scientific 
work, while at the same time to remain an ‘inside’ outside observer, a kind of 
anthropological probe to study a scientific ‘culture’ - to follow in every detail 
what the scientists do and how and what they think” (Latour and Woolgar, 1986, 
p. 12). Chapter D, Case, also provided examples of well-regarded studies of the 
workplace. These kinds o f observational studies also involved interaction, a 
necessary product of the researcher’s presence. Given such eminent antecedents, 
what argument could there be in opting not to use interviews in an exploration of 
the experience of work in the Human Genome Project?
As Bryman (2001) points out, interviews allow the reconstruction of events, 
something that few other tools o f accessing the social world can achieve. The 
Human Genome Project was ‘completed’ in draft form in 2001, and in ‘finished’ 
form in 2003. The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted during 2006. As 
O’Brien (1993) tells us, interviews are interactional methods, and interactional 
methods involve asking about what happens. This includes the capability to ask 
about what has happened. Time can be explored subjectively. An observational 
study would not have been able to capture the story of the development, growth, 
and, once the human genome sequence was complete, re-orientation and
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diversification of the Institute. An observational study, even when we consider 
the interaction that is a necessary product of the researcher’s presence, would 
focus on the Institute as it is at the moment of research. Conducted in 2006, this 
would produce a study of the workplace that is described in Chapter I, Interlude: 
Dis-Engagement and Dis-Integration. Such a study would have failed to capture 
the experience of working to sequence the human genome, and would have lacked 
the subjective sense o f history, w ith which we are able to understand the negative 
aspects of accomplishment.
There is also a far more pragmatic reason for choosing interviews over 
observational methods. Interviews are less intrusive. The disruption caused by 
the researcher visiting the site to conduct interviews pales when compared to the 
accommodation that would be required in order to allow the researcher to have 
extended access to laboratories and offices, and to the activities that are conducted 
in these workspaces. This is a particularly important factor when negotiating 
access to many organisational settings (Bryman, 2001). This research did not 
have the luxury of many possible research sites. As the discussion of ‘monsters’ 
and ‘de-monstrations’ that closes Chapter D, Case, suggests, as the research 
developed, the wider historical and social context became apparent, and the 
significance of the exploration o f the case of the Institute changed from the 
intrinsic interest of the big science grotesque, to a more generalised interest in 
work in an emerging ‘knowledge economy’. On entering the Institute, it appeared 
that much of its interest lay in its unique qualities. With this \iew, fieldwork 
access had to be gained to this site, or to no site at all. A conservative approach to 
research, with as little disruption caused to, or accommodation required on the 
part of, the research participants and the organisation that employs them was, 
therefore, a suitably pragmatic choice.
A further advantage to conducting research using interviews lies in the interview 
as an event. Gillham (2000) notes that the ‘special occasion’ of the interview 
often elicits rich evidence. The interviewee works hard to make the interview 
work. This “reflects the fact that people are often not listened to; that their views 
are not treated as being o f any account” (p. 7-8). Though we should be wary of 
the way in which this phenomenon might be a product of the ‘interview society’
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(Atkinson and Silverman, 1997; Atkinson and Delamont, 2006), the exploration 
of the Institute could have benefited from this dynamic. Not only because the 
majority of the people that were interviewed were technical workers, distant from 
the public glories of the Human Genome Project. But also because, as we see in 
Chapter I, Interlude: Dis-Engagement and Dis-Integration, the Institute has been 
re-orientated, from a focus on genome sequencing, in which the people working 
in Production, Pre-Finishing and Finishing, however junior, were the point and 
purpose of the Institute, to, after the accomplishment of the sequencing of the 
human genome, a diversification o f goals, with the growing faculty of small(er) 
science ‘post-genomic’ research taking centre stage.
The undisputed ‘artificiality’ o f the interview should not be read as an unalloyed 
negative. Formal interviews, even those which are conducted in the place of work, 
as was the case in the exploration o f the Institute, place research participants in a 
situation that is outside that o f their day-to-day setting. The fact that the 
interviews conducted during this research took place inside the Institute during 
working hours is deceptive; a pre-arranged interview, in which an outsider takes 
interviewees aside for one hour long structured discussion, all of which is 
recorded using a digital sound recorder, is indisputably artificial. The first 
response of a qualitative social researcher might be to see such artificiality as a 
factor that works to inhibit the ability o f the researcher to grasp the social world in 
question. A different perspective can be taken, one from which the artificiality of 
the interview is lit by a more constructive light. For a student of biology, analogy 
can be drawn with the virtues o f in vitro, as opposed to in vivo, research. The 
generation of a small degree o f isolation of the research participants from their 
context allows for in-depth probing o f their views, attitudes and experiences 
(Fielding, 1993).
Artificiality, though, is not the only drawback to the interview as a tool of social 
research. As Gillham (2000) reminds us, the ‘organised interview’ has a formal 
quality that, no matter how loosely structured, associates them with a variety of 
undesirable interactions with power. The interview is something that most 
people encounter only when applying for a job, when being assessed at work, 
when applying for welfare benefits, or, perhaps, when interacting with the police.
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For all our efforts, the association between the interview as a form of interaction 
and existing relations o f power cannot be broken19. Calling the interview a ‘chat’ 
for example, has the potential to present as an even more sinister experience. One 
does not need to be particularly cynical to know that when a person of power 
invites someone for a ‘chat’, the term is, at best, simply a euphemism for an 
interview, but, at worst, represents the transformation of informal space and time 
into an event controlled and put to the use o f the powerful. In the explorations of 
the Institute the researcher was an outsider, and the appearance of the researcher, 
as a young, informally dressed sociologist, should have suggested that he was not 
an agent of supervision and evaluation. Nevertheless, the fact that the researcher 
had arranged interviews through gatekeepers who occupied management 
positions was not unproblematic. Section E4, Access and Anonymity, discusses 
the recruitment of research participants.
19 Perhaps this association does not exist in the case o f ‘elite’ interviewing, in which the power 
dynamic is so obviously reversed. Elites, however, have their own negative associations with 
interviews, in, for example, the form o f  critical journalism.
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E3 T h e  In t e r v ie w : F o r m  A n d  C o n t e n t
Structure?
As touched upon in the discussion of the ‘virtues’ of interviews, ‘the interview’ 
can mean any one of a set o f quite different social research methods. The 
customary continuum, upon which these different methods are differentiated as if 
they were DNA fragments being sorted by electrophoresis, is that of structure 
(Fielding 1993). This continuum runs from highly structured questionnaires in 
which almost every utterance o f the researcher, or perhaps, given the degree of 
standardisation, an agent o f the researcher, is scripted, through to unstructured 
‘guided conversations’ (Lofland and Lofland, 1984). A discussion of the degree 
of structure present in an interview should not obscure the fact that all these 
approaches to gathering evidence are organised approaches. The use of 
interviews as a method of social research involves a process of theorising about 
the social world, forethought and planning, and the component that is hidden, as it 
is inadequately translated from action to written account; skill.
As suggested by section E2, Why Choose Interviews?, the interviews that were 
used to explore the subjective experience o f work at the Institute were of the sort 
to be found towards the unstructured end of the spectrum imagined above. 
Gaining an understanding o f the subjective experience of work at the Institute was 
a process of discovery, despite the prior insights of sociological theory, so the 
adoption of an interview style that asked open-ended questions in a flexible 
environment was appropriate. This flexibility enabled the interaction of the 
interview to respond to the circumstances within each instance of the interview, to 
the differences between interviews, and to the developing understanding of the 
researcher. By eschewing too much structure, we also provide the flexibility to 
“allow respondents to use their own particular way of defining the world” 
(Fielding, 1993, p. 151). The nomenclature present in the social research 
literature provides us with many labels to attach to this approach. Are these 
events non-standardised interviews, unstructured interviews, or focused 
interviews? For Fielding (1993), these are interchangeable terms for the ‘guided 
conversations’ (Lofland and Lofland, 1984) that make up much qualitative social
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research. But terminology is important; the impressionistic implications of 
‘unstructured’ are quite different to those evoked by ‘focused’. The choice of 
label reveals the virtues of the technique that the researcher wishes to stress, and, 
indeed, the weaknesses that the researcher seeks to minimise.
To some audiences, the term ‘non-standardised’ could suggest that the interview 
is nothing more than a conversation. An audience approaching the term with such 
a perspective is unlikely to take the opinion that ‘naturally’ occurring 
conversations are appropriate tools of organised research. In such a reading of 
‘non-standardised’, these conversations might be the inadvertent, ad-hoc flints 
that provide sparks o f social knowledge, but they are not tools purposefully 
fashioned for the generation of empirical knowledge that help us to describe and 
understand social worlds. Non-standardised interviews are not, of course, nothing 
more than conversations. With a change in terminology, but with no change in 
practice, we can describe the interviews that were performed in order to gather 
empirical material for this research as ‘focused’. This re-labelling can work to 
radically re-orientate perceptions of the semi-structured interview as a tool. Now 
it evokes deliberate shaping, organising and skill. To an audience with an 
education and training in the natural sciences and without a background in 
sociology, ‘focused’ stresses what these kinds of interviews are rather than what 
they are not20. Sensitive to the reading that might be brought to this thesis by the 
research participants, ‘focused’ stresses the deliberate fashioning and use of 
interviews as a tool o f research. The question of the particular points of focus is 
considered in the second part o f this section.
Questions and Schedules
The ability to conduct effective research is not straightforwardly associated with 
the ability to handle theory and concepts. One need only examine the attempt 
made by Marx (1880 [1961]), in his Enquete Ouvriere, to conduct a piece of 
original empirical research. The questionnaire Marx designed ran to 101
20 To a different audience, these terminological associations can be stood on their heads. ‘Non- 
standardised’ can be taken to stress the freedom for both the interviewer and interviewee to 
interact, allowing for an understanding o f  the social world o f  the interviewee to be communicated 
in rich, contextual detail. ‘F ocused’, by contrast, would evoke rigidity and restriction, o f  the 
closing down avenues o f  interaction and communication.
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‘questions’ and involved asking late-nineteenth century British workers to write 
their answers to questions such as; “ 15. State the number of workshops in which 
the different branches o f the industry are carried on. Describe the special branch 
in which you are employed, giving information not only about the technical 
aspects, but also about the muscular and nervous strain involved, and the general 
effects of the work on the health o f the workers” (p. 212). Not all of the 101 
‘questions’ are as demanding as this, but it is not unrepresentative. The weakness 
of the self-complete questionnaire to capture the evidence that Marx sought to 
collect is another example o f the virtues of the face-to-face qualitative interview; 
its ability to work as a tool o f discovery, to uncover the phraseology and world­
view of the interviewees, ensures that, even if the researcher enters the field with 
questions to which the researcher participants cannot relate, the question schedule 
is quickly re-designed and re-ordered.
The development of a question schedule was, therefore, an iterative process. By 
responding to the interviews as they were conducted, and to insight gained from a 
preliminary analysis o f transcripts, the interview was improved as a research tool. 
As described above, the choice was made to opt for a style of interview that 
allowed for conversation rather than one that demanded rigid structure. The 
question schedule had key questions and prompts to ensure all the ground of 
interest was covered, and so that an interview might be completed if the research 
participant was unusually uncommunicative and the conversation was in danger 
of stalling. However, the schedule is not a map of the structure of any particular 
interview. Each interview was different. This was in line with the researcher’s 
prior knowledge of the interviewee, in response to the experience of previous 
interviews and the success or failure o f certain lines of conversation, and in 
response to the changing themes and research questions of the overall project. 
Nevertheless, for every interview the following key conversation areas were 
worked into a series o f appropriate questions.
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Degree of Resolution Principle Areas of In terest
Individual
The nature and development of the job
Training and education
Career
Identity
Team
Supervision
Reward and recognition
Institute
Growth and development
Interaction with other teams
Culture and character
Community of Science
The race to sequence the human genome
Engagement with science
Table E3.1 Interview Themes
The interview, in sociological research is an im/personal tool. For the researcher, 
a qualitative interview may be one of many very similar interviews, with 
individual participants becoming, in time, anonymised voices, and even, 
collectively, archetypes. For the participant, the content of an interview is not a 
set of descriptions of generalisable or translatable social events, but the details of 
an individualised, personal life. This distinction holds true even if the 
communication between the researcher and the participant has achieved a one-to- 
one level of correspondence between their respective aims and understandings 
held in regard to the research project.
The degree to which interviews are acutely personal events reminds us of the 
statement made by a documentary director. He found that his subjects became 
suspicious, then hostile, and then withdrew their co-operation entirely. He wrote, 
“[f]or its subjects, at least, the camera is a surgical instrument rather than an 
artistic one” (Cumming, 2007). For the sociologist, an interview might be a 
means of collecting depersonalised evidence. For the subjects of the sociologist’s 
research, the interview may well feel like an interrogative and invasive tool. It is 
here that the confidence developed during the face-to-face interview process is 
vital, as is the process o f being vouched for by a colleague of the interviewee, 
both of which generate trust. The process of recruitment is discussed in the next 
section, E4, Access and Anonymity.
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E 4 A c c e s s  a n d  A n o n y m it y
The interviews were conducted over a series of three visits to the Institute 
between spring and late autumn 2006. A table of interviewees is provided below.
Interviewee Pseudonym Role at the Institute
Professor Ingham Senior Genome Scientist
Nick Research Scientist
Susan Senior Sequencing Manager
Neneh Administrator
Mark Senior Production Manager
Megan Production Manager
Pat Production
Abi Production
Sophie Production
Louise Production
Brian Pre-Finishing Manager
Nicole Pre-Finishing
Anna Pre-Finishing
Julia Pre-Finishing
Maggie Pre-Finishing
Colin Pre-Finishing
Claudia Pre-Finishing
Peter Senior Finishing Manager
Jill Finishing Manager
Judith Finishing Manager
Catherine Finishing
Elizabeth Finishing
Alice Finishing
Helen Finishing
Victoria Finishing
Joe Research Engineer
Alex Research Engineer
Table E4.1 Interviewees at the Institute
During the period o f funding for this thesis, but prior to negotiating access to the 
Institute, six other interviews were conducted. These were with; a laboratory 
technician would had briefly worked in a laboratory connected with the Human
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Genome Project; a computational biologist who had worked on the Human 
Genome Project, a scientist working in the field of proteomics, and three 
members of a research group developing methods for automating scientific 
discovery.
Research participants at the Institute were recruited using a purposive ‘snowball’ 
method. Contact was made with several of the team managers, and, by e-mail and 
telephone, the purpose and nature o f the research was described. Here, the 
personal biography of the researcher was invaluable in developing trust. With a 
BSc and an MSc in the life sciences, research participants had their suspicions of 
the sociology of science disarm ed21. These managers acted as gatekeepers, 
inviting the researcher to visit the Institute and interview members of their teams, 
recommending other potential research participants, and vouching for the research 
that was being conducted. These new contacts then put the researcher in touch 
with other members of their, or other, research teams. A major limitation of this 
method is that it is not well suited to recruiting research participants who no 
longer work in the organisation under study. This process continued until, after 
three visits to the Institute, the twenty-seven people listed in table E4.1 had been 
interviewed.
Any suggestion of neutral interconnectivity between a flat network of potential 
participants in this ‘snowball’ method of recruiting interviewees is misleading. 
Research participants included some of the most senior members of the 
management of the Institute. Indeed, the very quality that marked a member of 
the Institute as a potential gatekeeper to access was their seniority. Team 
managers not only have the ability to grant access to the laboratories and teams 
under their supervision, but, pragmatically, they are also contactable, with 
publications, press releases, and web profiles. This raises questions as to the 
degree of voluntarism and anonymity involved in the participation of workers 
recruited in such a way. We can also ask questions of the image that the 
researcher presented when conducting interviews. Was it the image of the 
disinterested, and perhaps uninteresting, academic researcher asking obscure and
21 This background in the life sciences did lead to some interviewees making the assumption that 
the researcher possessed a far higher degree o f  knowledge than he could claim.
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irrelevant questions? Or was it, perhaps, the image of an informant to and ally of 
management? This, o f course, does not exhaust all the possible roles into which 
the researcher might be imagined by the research participants, but it does run 
from pole-to-pole of an important spectrum to be considered when intruding into 
a place of work. Though the appearance of the researche r, who looked anything 
but the image of a professional assessor or consultant, should have placed fears of 
the researcher being an informant to management to rest, the fact remains that the 
interviews were conducted in the workplace itself.
That the interviews were conducted in the place of work of the research 
participant means different things for different participants. For some, such as 
managers and administrators, this means that they were interviewed in their own 
offices. In the case of one manager, a large part o f the interview was conducted 
as he led the researcher on a guided tour of the laboratories over which he had 
responsibility. For the scientific workers who volunteered to take part in this 
research, working at a laboratory bench in the case of production and pre­
finishing workers, or at a computer in an open-plan office, as in the case of 
finishing workers, there was no private or personal space in which interviews 
could be conducted. In these cases, the interviews took place in vacant offices, or, 
in the case of one day o f interviewing, in a scarcely-used staff-room.
The location of the interviews should be considered. Gillham (2000) writes that 
“there is a common assumption that people talk more freely ‘on their own 
ground’” (p. 8). But he cautions us; “Sometimes that is certainly true, but those 
familiar contexts can also be inhibiting” (p. 8). However, interviewing research 
participants at the Institute was the only sensible option. Pragmatism acts as the 
final arbiter of methodological choices. The difficulty of arranging interviews at 
a time and location that is outside of work would be compounded by the fact that 
conducting research in such a manner, when access to the Institute as a site has 
been granted, would suggest the research has some unsavoury, underhand 
qualities. Not only might this deter all but those most motivated to provide an 
outsider with their narratives, but it would have been a crippling mis-step, lending 
credence to the suspicions of Kurt, the representative of the Press and Public 
Relations office, who seemed to view the research as an undercover,
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conspiratorial attempt at expose. This encounter is described in the second part of 
this section.
Anonymity Challenged
This research faces several problems when it comes to anonymising the identities 
of the research participants. One of these, clearly, comes from the unique 
qualities of the Institute. The very qualities of the Institute that lend it intrinsic 
interest are those that render it identifiable. Providing the research site with a 
generic name does not make it anonymous. However, perhaps more serious, if 
we take the principle of anonymity to be to prevent harm to research participants, 
as human beings, rather than institutions, is the method o f recruitment. Managers 
know who in their team has been interviewed, and which of their colleagues has 
granted access to the researcher. This cannot be avoided, but the use of 
pseudonyms, and the provision of little personal detail, except in so much as it 
directly relates to, rather than merely decorates, the discussion at hand, is a means 
to limit the identifiability of participants. When the use of pseudonyms was 
explained to the research participants, many of the more senior members of the 
Institute regarded the process as unnecessary. The argument ran that they would 
not say in interview anything that they would not say in public. Nevertheless, 
despite their suggestions, all the interview extracts used in this thesis are 
identified only by the pseudonyms listed in table E4.1, Interviewees at the 
Institute.
However, the value o f protecting the anonymity became clear in an incident that 
occurred shortly after completing the third visit to the Institute. This visit was 
three days of interviews with people working at the Institute, ranging from the 
most senior managers to technical workers, and included meeting prior 
interviewees for lunches and coffees. Not long after this visit, Kurt, a 
representative of the Press and Public Relations Office, contacted the researcher.
As described, the research approached accessing the Institute as if it was the same 
kind of organisation as, for example, a university. That the researcher had spent 
some time considering the potential anatomies and pathologies of big science 
organisation, which raised questions of bureaucratisation and industrialisation,
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ought to have served as forewarning that the Institute would be a place in which 
organisational procedures really do matter. The Institute is not a university.
The researcher had, during the summer of 2006, contacted Kurt to ask for details 
of the history of the Institute. Kurt supplied as much detail as was to hand, and 
offered to facilitate access to the Institute. The researcher replied, by e-mail, 
making it clear that he had already conducted laboratory visits, but that he would 
be in touch if assistance was needed. This e-mail was misread, it seems. As the 
purposive snowball recruitment process gathered new interviewees, some 
recommended research participants declined to take part. As the researcher tried 
to expand the research further along the sequencing chain of production a 
potential research participant, recommended to me by one of my senior 
management gatekeepers, did not reply but forwarded the initial contact e-mail to 
Kurt.
During the telephone conversations that followed, it became clear that Kurt had 
misread the e-mail that had made plain that research was being conducted. This 
left Kurt with the impression that the researcher had been conducting some kind 
of clandestine investigation. This left him ‘disappointed’ and called him to 
question the ‘bona /ides' o f the researcher. When the researcher suggested that he 
had been clear in his earlier e-mail, Kurt threatened that he would find the e-mail 
and read it back over the telephone. The e-mail had presented the research as had 
been suggested.
Nonetheless, this did not disarm Kurt. The research was still an underhand, 
secretive pursuit. He asked for the names of the research participants. When 
Kurt was told that this could not be done, his tone grew even more suspicious. 
The irony is that, had the researcher been able to draw on the identities of his 
research participants, the degree to which access to the Institute was approved by 
the highest levels of scientific management would have been evident. This irony 
is compounded by the fact that it was the researcher’s refusal to compromise the 
anonymity of the research participants that strengthened Kurt’s claim that the 
work was lacking in scruples. Kurt, of course, is a pseudonym.
139
Kurt informed the researcher that he would discover the identities of the research 
participants regardless. He would also, he said, contact the supervisor of this 
research. The researcher contacted key gatekeepers who informed the researcher 
they would be able to ‘smooth over’ any problems, and reminded the researcher 
that the research had been ‘sanctioned’ by senior managers, though perhaps not 
through ‘official channels’. It does not seem that Kurt got his fist of names, and 
he did not contact the supervisor o f this research. Kurt did send a long e-mail that 
presented a narrative o f the events quite unlike those understood by the researcher 
to have occurred. In particular the omail exchange of summer 2006, the 
misreading of which Kurt had based much of his ‘disappointment’ with the 
conduct of the researcher, was omitted. Presumably as, given that the researcher 
had approached Kurt to discuss the study of the Institute without guile or 
deception, this no bnger suited the story that he wished to tell. This e-mail was 
copied to several key figures in the Institute, including some of the research 
participants. This potentially positioned the researcher as presented by Kurt; 
devious, underhand, and now publicly chastised. Despite the desire to correct this 
account, the researcher settled on assuming a contrite position. At this stage, the 
researcher had collected interviews with members of the Finishing team, the Pre- 
Finishing team and the Production team. No further interviews were sought, 
though e-mail contact was maintained with several key gatekeepers.
The purpose o f this story is not simply to ensure that the researcher’s version of 
this story is on paper, though that desire is present. Nor is it to warn other 
researchers that a press and public relations expert possesses the skills and 
knowledge required to win battles o f presentation, though that advice might be 
useful. More, it is an illustration, uncomfortable as it is for the researcher, that 
even though senior members o f the scientific management of the Institute 
behaved, it seems, as if they had the autonomy of action and communication that 
is afforded to academics, this autonomy led to a collision with the bureaucratic 
structures of big science. In the next chapter, F, The Factory and the University, 
we consider the research participants’ own categorisation of the workplace of the 
Institute.
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E5 E v id e n c e  a n d  Il l u s t r a t io n
All the interviews conducted at the Institute were transcribed in full. 
Transcription was conducted partly by the researcher, and partly by a professional 
transcription service. The use o f the professional transcribers was problematic. 
In addition to a presumably standard error rate in transcription, technical terms 
were frequently mis-transcribed. The mis-transcription of one word transforms 
the sentence, acting as a mutatagen by encouraging the transcriber to mis­
transcribe neighbouring words in order for the sentence to make sense. 
Transcription may appear to be the mere reproduction of an audio record in 
written form, but as this process involves translation it is, necessarily, 
interpretative (Poland, 1995). The interview transcripts were then subject to 
content analysis, a process that developed as the analysis of the evidence 
progressed.
While the researcher arrived at the interview transcripts with concepts such as 
‘alienation’, ‘engagement’, ‘automation’ and ‘division of labour’, ready to begin 
the preliminary content coding o f the evidence, as the process of analysis 
progressed, the evidence presented new points of exploration. Aspects of the 
transcripts that highlight the way in which the interviewees categorise the Institute 
as a workplace were coded, the results of which is explored in Chapter F, The 
Factory and the University. The transcripts were interrogated for descriptions of 
the way in which the interviewees subjectively engage with their work, which is 
explored in Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment. This engagement leads to 
questions of commitment, which connects with contemporary ideas about the 
organisation of work in a knowledge economy, discussed in Chapter H, The High 
Road to the Human Genome. Finally, we close the empirical exploration of the 
subjective experience o f work in Chapter I, Interlude: Dis-Engagement and Dis­
integration, with a discussion o f the ways in which these accounts of sentimental 
engagement and commitment are not universal. Some of the research 
participants’ accounts describe a resistance to the recruitment of their sentiments, 
while all note that the changes that have occurred after the accomplishment of 
sequencing the human genome have led to distinct changes.
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What are we to make o f the evidence provided by interviews? Sociologists of 
scientific social life who employ qualitative research methods are faced by the 
scepticism of the enumerating scientific imagination. The plural of anecdote is 
not data, we are reminded by our research participants. If social researchers are to 
call evidence that is collected during interviews data, then should we treat such 
evidence as data with all the demands and binds that this places on us? Poland 
(1995) argues that it may be more valuable to think of the transcript of an 
interview as a telling rather than a finding. Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) remind us 
that “participants’ use o f language can never be taken as literally descriptive” (p. 
15), and Fielding (1993) argues that we cannot take language as a simple 
indicator of thought and action. As he writes, “expressed attitude is a problematic 
indicator of what people have done, or will do” (p. 148). However, in this study, 
we are concerned with experience and attitudes, not in predicting action, to which 
interviews are well suited.
However, Wooffitt (1993) cites Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) to argue that “social 
events are the ‘repositories’ of multiple meanings, by which they [Gilbert and 
Mulkay] mean that the ‘same’ circumstances can be described in a variety of 
ways to emphasise different features” (p. 303). In Chapter F, The Factory and the 
University, we see this process in action, as work at the Institute is described by 
research participants using diametrically opposed analogies. The question is then 
asked; how do we make sense of this variety of accounts?
One way of understanding the how a social researcher might handle the 
differences between the accounts o f a social world provided by different 
participants draws on a much referenced fictional example. The ‘Rashomon 
Effect’ is named after Akira Kurosawa’s 1950 film in which the ‘same’ story is 
told, quite differently, from the perspectives of four different people, a bandit, his 
two victims, one of whom provides his account from beyond the grave, and a 
passing woodcutter. A true version of the event is not portrayed, reminding us of 
Wooffitt (1993) when he writes “there is no privilege for the analysts’ decision as 
to what constitutes an ‘objective’ or ‘accurate’ version of the world” (p. 304).
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The concept of the Rashomon Effect has been used in discussions of qualitative 
social research. Most prominently, it was invoked by Heider (1988) in an attempt 
to provide some resolution to the fierce dispute over the authenticity of Mead’s 
Coming o f  Age in Samoa (1943)22. However, as Rhoades (1989) argues in a short 
reply to the Heider (1988) article, the film Rashomon may not be the greatest 
assistance in helping us deal with disagreement between social researchers, which 
is what the Mead-Freeman debate was. It may, though, be a good method of 
accounting for the role o f social researcher. Rhoades suggests that, in the film, 
the passer-by, a woodcutter, occupies an analogous position to the social 
researcher.
The accounts provided by both the social researcher and the woodcutter are to 
some extent ‘self-serving’ 23. Nevertheless, Rhoades (1989) argues that “he 
nonetheless does a reasonably good job of describing and explaining what he, as 
an observer sees the participants doing even though they are incapable of 
providing such an account” (p. 171). In other words, writes Rhoades, an 
invocation of ‘The Rashomon Effect’ ought to be a defence of the possibility of 
“an ethnographic “truth” achieved in the face of informants’ variait testimony” (p. 
171).
But this does not help the social researcher who relies on interviews, who does 
not see the research participants do anything other than present their variant 
accounts. While ‘Rashomon’ is commonly used shorthand for a story in which 
there are variant accounts, it is too tied into the concept of ‘witnessing’ the event 
to be of use in a study in which variant accounts are the evidence. Here, perhaps, 
it is appropriate to turn to a study of discourse, rather than contested accounts of 
action.
Wooffitt (1993) describes how Gilbert and Mulkay’s (1984) Opening Pandora’s 
Box uses of the concept o f linguistic repertoires. Woofitt (1993) describes a 
linguistic repertoire as “a set o f descriptive and referential terms which portray
22An attempt that was dism issively rejected by Freeman (1989) as ‘constructivist’ and ‘quaint’.
23The woodcutter in Rashomon is also a coward. One imagines that their might be a productive 
discussion to be had on the virtue o f  cowardice when a social researcher is ‘in the field’.
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beliefs, actions and events in a specific way” (p. 292). Quoting from Potter and 
Wetherell (1987), Wooffitt (1993) reports that “a repertoire will be organised 
around specific metaphors and figures of speech” (p. 292). However, for this 
thesis, we should note that Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) were arguing that a 
scientist had the use o f two repertoires; the empirical and the contingent. Chapter 
F, The Factory and the University, argues that the use of ‘specific metaphors and 
figures of speech’ that enable interviewees to describe the Institute as being like a 
factory or like a university are dependent on the ‘hinterland of work’ from which 
a person arrives at the workplace in question. In other words, we find that the 
linguistic repertoires used to categorise the Institute as a workplace that we 
present in Chapter F, The Factory and the University, are the products of 
backgrounds of the research participants. This, as we see throughout Part 3, 
Illustrating and Accounting, is not a statement that is wholly relativistic. 
Silverman (2001) asks, “[m]ust we choose between seeing interviews as either 
‘true’ reports or situated narratives?” (p. 113). While the meaning of a workplace 
might be relative to the perspective o f the viewer, this does not mean that the 
features that are being seen are not real and material.
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P a r t  T h r e e : I l l u s t r a t i n g  a n d  A c c o u n t i n g
Part Three, Illustrating and Accounting, is the exploration of the empirical 
evidence gathered during the study of the Institute. Chapter F, The Factory and 
the University, explores the ways in which those working at the Institute 
categorise the workplace. The chapter demonstrates that the Institute is seen as 
embodying the two symbols o f Modem work, the ‘factory’ and the ‘university’.
Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, is an examination of the most 
subjective of experiences o f work. The chapter describes the ways in which the 
sentiments, as well as the hands and minds, o f those working at the Institute were 
recruited. Some of this recruitment was the product of the exceptionalism of the 
workplace of the Institute; work in science, work on ‘the human’, and the moral 
dimension to the race, for example. Some, though, was the product of features of 
the Institute that could exist in any workplace; the charisma of the leader, the 
‘flat’ workplace culture, the celebration of accomplishments, for example.
Chapter H, The High Road to the Human Genome, is a comparison of the Institute 
to the descriptions o f the new forms of organising work that are described as 
characteristic of post-industrialist, post-Fordist, knowledge economies. As the 
recruitment of sentiment generates high commitment, the Institute appears to bear 
many of the hallmarks of the high road, high commitment, high performance 
models of workplace organisation, but this chapter argues that they owe more to 
PhD than MBA; to the small science hinterland of the founders of the Institute 
than the conscious management practice.
Chapter I, Interlude: Dis-Engagement and Dis-Integration, arranges and re­
presents the accounts o f  the research participants that describe processes that run 
counter the recruitment o f sentiment and the generation of commitment. These 
disengaging and dis-integrating trends are the product of growth, a change in 
leader, and ‘triumph o f accomplishment’. Completing the sequencing of the 
human genome has left many of the research participants without the feature of 
work that was central to the recruitment and animation of their sentiments.
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[F ]  T h e  F a c t o r y  a n d  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y
The ‘factory’ and the ‘university’ represent, in many ways, polar opposites in the 
organisation o f work. Yet, as Doing and Hilgartner (2006) argue, these two kinds 
of workplaces, imagined as unlike, are among the ‘central symbols’ o f Modernity. 
As Weber saw it, the Taylorist factory represents the ‘triumph’ of rationalisation. 
Control, acute divisions o f labour, meaninglessness, alienation. The university, 
by contrast, is the site where reason triumphs. Autonomy, creativity, engagement. 
This chapter explores the ways in which these archetypes are used in narratives of 
work at the Institute. In demonstrating that both of these archetypes are drawn on 
by research participants, and in suggesting an explanation for this variety of 
accounts, this chapter presents a more complex picture of the workplace than the 
simple visions of ‘sequencing mills’ that fill the popular and scientific accounts of 
the Human Genome Project.
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F I In t r o d u c t io n
Becker (1992) asks us to consider what is “the underlying imagery with which we 
approach the phenomenon we study. What do we think we are looking at? What 
is its character? Most importantly, given what we think it is, is the way we study 
it and report our findings congruent with that character?” (p. 210). We arrive at 
the Institute, and the Human Genome Project, with a particular set of imagery. 
The language of production lines, construction projects, process engineering, 
automation, mindless, inelegant, and repetitive work, comes to us from the 
accounts of scientists. Together with our understandings of this kind of work 
drawn from sociological theory, we produce a particular image of the Institute, of 
work in the Human Genome Project. O f dark, satanic sequencing mills.
Becker (1992) writes that we construct our initial imagery of a case 
“imaginatively (or stereotypically) from a few facts” (p. 211). These images 
contain details that we ‘know’ about a social domain, in Becker’s example of the 
style of decor and tone o f discussion in a particular Chicago neighbourhood. But, 
though “[ijmaginative, well-read social scientists can go a long way with a little 
fact[, sjince, however, we claim to be social scientists, we don’t stop with 
imagination and extrapolation, as a novelist or filmmaker might. We do checking 
to see if we’re right. Research. We gather data” (p. 211).
This is the first chapter o f Part Three, Illustrating and Accounting, which handles 
and analyzes the evidence drawn from the interviews at the Institute. The first 
task of the chapter, therefore, is to account for the highest level of category used 
by research participants when describing the Institute as a workplace. In ‘account 
for’ we find the second task of this chapter. The chapter ‘accounts for’ the ways 
that the research participants describe their workplace both by sorting and re­
presenting these descriptions, but also by attempting to understand the ways by 
which these categories are arrived.
Section F2, From the University to the Factory, describes the images that these 
workplaces evoke. These workplaces are placed at the opposite ends of many of
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the oppositional relationships that are used to differentiate the varieties of 
contemporary work. As the extracts from the interview evidence demonstrate, the 
Institute is described using repertoires that draw on elements of these polar 
opposites.
Section F3, The Institute as Factory, opens with a recapitulation of the ‘industrial’ 
descriptions that marked the accounts o f the Human Genome Project of leading 
scientists and journalists. These kind o f descriptions are also found in the 
interview evidence, proving to be a popular image of work at the Institute not 
only with those observing from outside, or from above, but also from those at the 
level of bench-work.
The Institute as routinised and factory-like was not the only image of the 
workplace presented in the accounts o f  the research participants. Section F4, The 
Institute as University, collects and re-presents the ways in which people working 
at the Institute also draw on comparisons with the archetype of the university. 
Given the public presentation o f work in the Human Genome Project, and at the 
Institute, these descriptions present a vision o f the work of large-scale genome 
sequencing that is at odds with common understanding.
Section F5, Hinterlands o f  Work, is an attempt to explain the use of these two 
archetypal workplaces in the description o f a single workplace. The section 
argues that the use o f quite different descriptive repertoires to present an image of 
the workplace o f the Institute is a product, not so much o f the position of the 
worker within the Institute, but ‘where’ the worker has come from before they 
arrived at the Institute. The use o f references to the similarity o f the Institute with 
a factory does not appear to map on to the experience of routinisation and 
automation within the Institute. Members o f the more heavily ‘industrialised’ 
Production team commonly use comparisons to archetypal features of the 
university in order to describe the Institute, while those working in Finishing, 
which involves comparatively more problem-solving and variety, are apt to use 
references to the factory like features o f work at the Institute. If the choice of 
descriptive comparison was determined by the objective reality of work at the 
Institute, we would expect to see the opposite set o f associations. But the choice
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of descriptive repertoire is a product not only of current work, but o f the 
‘hinterland o f work’ from which the worker emerges. This hinterland is not just 
experience, but also the expectations produced, and examples set, by, for example, 
educational background.
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F 2  F r o m  t h e  U n iv e r s it y  t o  t h e  F a c t o r y
The archetypes o f the ‘university’ and the ‘factory’ are workplaces that share little 
in common except their Modernity. Between them they demonstrate the 
contradictions within Modernity. Consider, apposite to the discussion at hand, the 
relationships that the university and the factory have with science. Universities 
are the workplaces within which the work of science is conducted; they are home 
to the expansion o f knowledge and reason. Factories are the scientific workplace, 
the home to Taylorism and calculative, rational management practices, 
mechanisation and automation. The factory is the site of the application of reason 
and knowledge.
000D □ □ □ □ □  Q0D0 I Mental
DODO □  □  □  □  □  DODD I Creative ~ 1
DDOD □  □  □  □  □  DODD I Autonomous ~
DODD D  D  E H  D  D  DDDD I Engaged
OOflD □  □  □  □  □  DODD I Career ~ ~
Figure F2.1 The Dichotomies o f  Work
These two archetypal workplaces occupy the opposite ends of many of the 
apparent dichotomies by which workplaces can be described. In the university, 
labour is conducted by the intellect. The factory is the home of manual labour.
The university is a workplace o f professionals. Work in the factory is a job.
Work in the university is imagined as creative, se lf  directed and fulfilling. Work 
in the factory is routine, supervised and subjectively meaningless. Using 
‘laboratory’, corresponding to where this chapter uses ‘university’, Doing and 
Hilgartner (2006), in the abstract for their session at the 2006 Society fo r  the 
Social Studies o f  Science conference, state that “[t]he laboratory and the factory 
are two o f the central symbols o f modernity, and they stand in a dialectical 
relationship to one another in a way that broadly parallels the dialectics of 
fact/technique, designer/operator, worker/knower, and creative/routine” (p. 208).
Manual
Routine
Supervised
Alienated
Job
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As Kleinman and Valias (2001) report, the rise of knowledge economies is 
marked by organisations that incorporate elements of these two archetypes.
It is in the literature on technical work that we find most starkly the play of these 
oppositional relationships. Discussing technical work, Nelsen (1997) argues that 
the work settings can be ordered either vertically or horizontally. A horizontally 
ordered work setting is, she argues, best characterised by that found in the crafts 
and the professions. Roles within these “work settings are neither sharply 
differentiated nor hierarchically structured” (p. 155). Each person in the work 
setting is a member o f a ‘community o f practice’. We could suggest that the 
archetypal horizontally ordered work setting is that o f academic science. Nelsen 
describes these settings as being ones in which each “full member is, in principle 
at least, just as qualified to wield authority as any other full member. As a result, 
actors enjoy a measure o f technical and moral equality which renders 
coordination by command inappropriate” (p. 155-156). Rather, there is 
coordination by collegiality and persuasion. A vertically ordered work setting, on 
the other hand, is one o f command, supervision, and hierarchy. Superiors have 
greater technical and moral authority, and as such are granted the right to 
command, which subordinates have a duty to obey. The archetype here is the 
Modem bureaucracy, or the factory. Both forms o f work ordering encourage a 
form of social cohesion; the egalitarian collegiality o f the horizontal ordering, and 
the subordination o f the vertical ordering. In Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  
Sentiment, we explore the character o f social cohesion in the Institute, and 
examine the ways in which this cohesion is challenged in Chapter I, Interlude: 
Dis-Engagement and Dis-lntegration.
There is a moral dimension to these oppositional relationships. Considering the 
two forms o f social cohesion, Nelsen (1997) writes; “There is an obvious tension 
between these ideals; each reviles what the other demands. Yet, both moral 
visions are juxtaposed in the context o f technical work” (p. 156). As we explore 
the way in which the research participants categorise the Institute in this chapter, 
we see the juxtaposition o f  horizontal ordering, i.e. the university, and vertical 
ordering, i.e. the factory. Further, we see in the accounts of the research
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participants laments for lost forms o f work; this is not the exchange of neutral 
alternatives.
Throughout Chapter B, Anatomies o f  Big Science, and Chapter C, Pathologies o f  
Work in Big Science, we see that big science appears to involve a move from one 
pole o f these apparent dichotomies to the other. However, the movement away 
from the archetype o f the university, towards the factory-like nature of big science, 
is movement along continuums, not a leap from pole to pole.
This study began with the suggestion that work at the Institute was like that of a 
factory, a state apparently antithetical to the ideals of the workplaces of science. 
Once the researcher visited the Institute, and interviewed those who worked there, 
it became apparent that the workplace o f the Institute did not simply stand, as a 
factory, in opposition to the ideals o f work in science. Rather, in the accounts of 
those working at the Institute, the work o f sequencing genomes embodies 
elements o f both o f the contradictory forms o f social organisation that are the 
university and the factory. Both o f these workplaces are the products of a Modem, 
scientistic attitude, and in this the work o f the Human Genome Project was the 
epitome o f Modernity. This chapter demonstrates that the accounts of the 
Institute as a workplace presented by the research participants make use of both of 
these archetypes. In doing so, we must ask; how do we get from the university to 
the factory in a single workplace? Section F5, Hinterlands o f  Work, suggests that 
these variant accounts are not the product o f a different experience of the Institute 
itself, but o f a different engagement with the possibilities o f Modem work.
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F 3 T h e  In s t it u t e  a s  a  F a c t o r y
Even before the Human Genome Project was properly begun, the workplaces of 
genome sequencing were imagined as factory-like industrialised laboratories. As 
presented in Chapter B, Anatomies o f  Big Science, Walter Gilbert has been quoted 
as arguing that “the benefits o f the Human Genome Project are the benefits of 
organization and scale” Quoted in Keating, Limoges and Cambrosio, 1999, p.
125). “ [I]f large scale sequencing is to work, it must be treated not as a science 
but as a production job,” as a “pure technological problem quite apart from 
interpreting sequence.” Large-scale genome sequencing is like the task of 
producing cars; the work is to be done by “production workers... It is not done by 
research scientists” (Gilbert, quoted in Keating, Limoges and Cambrosio, 1999, p.
126).
Hood and Smith (1987) were quick to see the negative aspects of organising 
science in this way. “Sequencing currently requires the skill and judgement of 
professional scientists to be carried out effectively. Yet it is also repetitive, 
boring and labor-intensive. It would be a waste o f intellectual talent to have many 
young scientists engaged in this task now” (p. 38-39). As with Gilbert, Hood and 
Smith argued that the answer to this problem lay in automation and the 
development o f efficient “ industrial laboratories” . “Obtaining the complete 
sequence is a production-line effort” (p. 38)24.
Hilgartner (1995) notes that objections to the Human Genome Project within 
science included a constriction o f the pool o f training opportunities available for 
young scientists and the degree o f laboratory drudgery that would be involved. 
To return to Gary Zweiger’s account, we read his distaste in his account o f first 
exposure to the plans for ‘industrial laboratories’. “[Maynard] Olsen used our
24 Hood and Smith (1987) explicitly  made the case that sequencing the human genom e was not 
science but an “essentially nonresearch production task” ( p. 46). They argue that, as sequencing 
would neither ask questions nor (therefore) form ulate and conduct experim ents that it would not 
be science. The authors draw parallels betw een the genom e sequence and particle accelerators. 
“[D ]eveloping the technologies requires science and engineering. Obtaining the complete 
sequence is a production-line effort, and using the resultant data is science” (p. 38). If this 
argument is correct, then the correct com parison cases for socio log ists to draw on might not be the 
socio log ies o f  big physics laboratories, but rather the socio log ies o f  the construction o f  big physics 
apparatus.
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attention-filled hour to drone on about a scheme to determine the nucleotide 
sequence o f enormous segments o f DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). The speech 
was a bore because it had to do with various laboratory devices, automation, and 
costs. He described technicians (>r even graduate students) working on what 
amounted to an assembly line. He analyzed the costs per technician, as well as 
costs per base pair o f DNA. It was as bad as the rumours we had heard of 
factory-like sequencing operations in Japan. It all seemed so inelegant, even 
mindless’' (p. ix-x).
This vision o f a resource-appropriating sequencing mill, in which talented 
graduate students are subjected to daily drudgery, was one o f the objections to the 
Project when it was proposed. Accounts of the Project in the scientific press 
describe how visions o f a factory-like genome project were allayed by the rapid 
improvement in automation (Service, 2001), as well as the increasing 
routinisation o f  laboratory protocols. These developments removed the need for 
highly-skilled ‘green-fingered’ workers. But this “ [flushing out [of] tacit 
knowledge” (Keating, Limoges and Cambrosio, 1999, p. 126) is a key component 
o f the rationalisation o f work. These technological and organisational 
developments might have ‘rescued’ several hundred graduate life-scientists from 
decades o f uncreative but highly-skilled routine. Even this was imagined in 
‘industrial term s’; Cook-Deegan (1994) quotes Gilbert as writing that “[m]any of 
those who complain about the genome project are really manifesting fears of 
technological unemployment” (p. 91).
The development o f routinised protocols and laboratory automation, which 
relieve the drudgery o f work for accredited scientists, do not, in themselves, undo 
the development o f factory-like organisations in the pursuit o f the human genome 
sequence. As we were reminded by Nichols and Beynon in Chapter C, 
Pathologies o f  Big Science, “for every man who watched dials another maintained 
the plants, another was a lorry driver and another two humped bags or shovelled 
muck” (Watson, 2003, p. 182-183; quoting Nichols and Beynon, 1977). As 
Claudia said when I asked her about the development of automation in Pre- 
Finishing, the machines cannot do everything.
154
Ah well, funny you should say that. Our boss has actually got a 
robot that hides away in a room somewhere and think only he 
knows how to work it. [...] But I think there is one- I think 
there’s a few things which this machine can’t do, which is why 
you need people in. [...] Because I reckon if it could, I don’t 
think you’d have been interviewing us six either! [...] It’d just 
be this machine to talk to!
[Claudia]
Through these developments, molecular biology moves from an era of craft work 
to a way o f working that demonstrates characteristics o f both the ‘Machine Age’ 
and the ‘Information Age’. As Hodgson’s (2000) article in the journal of the 
Institute o f Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) had it, sequencing the 
human genome involved ‘gene sequencing’s Industrial Revolution’.
As we have descrbed, commentators taking a retrospective view of the Human 
Genome Project often stress that improvements in the automation of sequencing 
ameliorated the industrial qualities o f work in organisations such as the Institute 
(see Service, 2001; Collins, Morgan and Patrinos, 2003). But some accounts, 
perhaps inadvertently, remind us o f the counsel that Nichols and Beynon offered 
to their contemporaries who saw technology as having the potential to be, 
independently, the route to fulfilling and engaging work for all. As quoted in 
Chapter A, Anatomies o f  Big Science, one o f the leaders of the Human Genome 
Project described a recruitment process that was resolutely factory-like. “We 
would recruit unskilled people... This group would have no need of academic 
qualifications. We judged them on school achievements, interview and 
something by which I set great store: the pipetting test” (Sulston and Ferry, 2002, 
p. 75). In Chapter A , Anatomies o f  Big Science, this is described as being akin to 
the recruitment o f a machinist. The skill o f a worker recruited in this way lies in 
the ability to repeatedly and accurately perform delicate manual operations. It is 
labour o f this kind that can be unproblematically25 reduced to measurements of 
manpower. Indeed, the ‘output’ o f these workers can be described in terms of 
productivity; by the production o f bases o f genome sequence. In Sulston and 
Ferry (2002), as in many histories o f the project, one o f the key themes is the 
continual reduction in the economic cost o f each base pair o f sequence.
25 By those with the world-view' o f  managem ent and consultancy, at least.
155
To what degree do accounts o f working lives within the Institute reproduce these 
descriptions o f genome sequencing as factory work, as production lines, as, even, 
drudgery? The second part o f this section collects and discusses accounts of work 
at the Institute that explicitly stress the ‘industrial’ nature of the Institute. These 
are the ways in which research participants use the archetype of the factory to 
describe work at the Institute; this is the Institute as factory.
The recruitment o f  untrained, or, as Sulston and Ferry (2002) put it, unskilled 
workers to work in genome sequencing means that many of the research 
participants had prior working lives outside of the peculiar environment of 
scientific laboratories. Several o f the interviewees, therefore, were in a position 
to invoke the archetype o f the factory informed by personal experience. Those 
that do have a background in unambiguously industrial work make comparative 
statements that do not so much play down the industrial nature of the Institute, but 
rather, that stress that the Institute is a ‘good’ example o f such a workplace. 
Claudia, a member o f the Pre-Finishing team, who had worked in manufacturing, 
describes the Institute in terms o f a comparison to her previous place o f work.
It’s like a glorified factory; a lot cleaner and a lot more perks
than where I used to work.
[Claudia]
As described in Chapter D, Case, there are differences between the sections 
involved in the ‘sequencing chain o f production’. Considering the features of 
most relevance to this discussion, Production is the most automated section and 
involves the closest degree o f supervision, the work in Pre-Finishing consists of 
varied but routinised laboratory work, while Finishing involves comparatively 
skilled computer work. The sequencing chain o f production, therefore, embodies 
an acknowledged hierarchy that separates the different sections in terms o f the 
perceived degree o f skill required and ‘industrialisation’ involved. Elizabeth is a 
member o f a Finishing team who joined the Institute from school and has since 
gained a degree. She describes why she left her previous role in Production, 
invoking the undesirability o f work in factory-like settings.
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[Bjecause Sequencing, it is kind of almost like being in a factory. 
[Elizabeth]
Colin, who works in Pre-Finishing, also looks down the sequencing chain of 
production to describe Production as being factory-like. For Colin, it is the 
routinisation o f work in Production that makes it factory-like. The variety of 
work in Pre-Finishing is presented as part of what makes Pre-Finishing unlike 
working in a factory.
I think that’s a bit more sort o f like working in a factory because 
they’ve just got the bog standard job that they probably do en 
masse, whereas ours is smaller and more varied.
[Colin]
In accounts such as these, the factory-like nature o f Production is contrasted to the 
work of Pre-Finishing and Finishing. Along the sequencing chain of production, 
a gradient o f increasing likeness to the factory can be seen as we move from 
Finishing to Production. This is present in the accounts of the research 
participants, as we would expect from our knowledge o f the kind of work 
performed by each team. However, this does not mean that the work of the Pre- 
Finishing and Finishing teams is not described by some interviewees as being 
factory-like. Alice, a Finisher who has achieved a degree of seniority in her time 
at the Institute, contrasts the difficult problem-solving work that she is involved in 
with the majority o f work conducted by the Finishing team. The rest of Finishing 
is:
[...] more o f a factory production line I would say, in a way.
[Alice]
Again, this is a downwards view, diagnosing undesirable ‘industrialisation’ from 
above. For Alice, her description o f the work o f Finishing, with involves skilled 
IT work, as being a ‘factory production line’ is justified on the basis that, from her 
perspective, the work o f Finishing appears routine. The question o f perspective is 
explored in section F5, Hinterlands o f  Work.
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Many accounts offered by the research participants stress that the workplace of 
the Institute is a developing environment. Since its inception, through the race to 
sequence the human genome, and after the accomplishment of that goal, work at 
the Institute has not been a static arrangement of practices and technologies. 
Time, therefore, should be expected to be a factor in the way in which the 
Institute is described as a workplace.
The development o f the Institute reminds us o f Edwards (1979) description o f the 
change in the organisation o f the Modem firm. Edwards takes the reader from the 
late nineteenth-century, when “[T]he ownership and management [...] reflected a 
small-business character” (p. 25). From his description of the way in which both 
the rewards, in terms o f profits, and the responsibility, in terms of management, 
were concentrated with the founding entrepreneurs and their families, we can 
draw parallels with the reward and control system of small science. These small 
firms were organised in ways in which “ [t]he entire firm was, in a way, the 
capitalist’s own workshop” (p. 25). They were “small enough for all, or nearly all, 
the workers to have some personal relationship with the capitalist” (p. 26). This 
form o f organisation echoes through the organisation o f the laboratories of small 
science. The degree to which the personal relationships that those working at the 
Institute enjoyed with the founding director are important in accounts of work in 
genome sequencing are explored in Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment.
As Edwards (1979) continues his discussion o f  the development of the Modem 
firm, we find a useful scaffold to help us to describe the development o f a big 
science organisation such as the Institute. “A s... firms outgrew their 
entrepreneurial origins, direct personal control by the capitalist became 
increasingly difficult. [...] More and more managers had to be employed, but 
soon not even all the managers could be supervised directly” (p. 28). Edwards 
describes a process in which, accompanying the growth o f the firm and an 
increasing division o f labour, ‘head workmen’ became managers. We hear 
echoes o f this kind o f development in the organisation of production, which took 
place in many industries around the turn o f the twentieth century, in accounts of 
work at the Institute at the turn o f the tw enty  first century. In the decade and a 
half that the Institute has existed it has grown from a group o f green-fingered craft
158
laboratories, into an increasingly capitalised, automated, and hierarchical 
organisation.
One o f the changes that has accompanied this development is the introduction of 
new technologies. Tremendous improvements in the automation of genome 
sequencing have been complemented by, for example, the development o f new 
Finishing tools. Helen, who works in a Finishing team, describes the impact of 
the improvement in the computer tools used to assemble genome sequence.
[l]t is nice in a way. You feel like you’re getting more done, but
it does feel now like a ... kind o f a factory kind of thing.
[Helen]
In her account, Helen acknowledges the improved productivity that this new 
technology enabled. It is important to note that she does not, however, see this 
improvement in productivity in unproblematic terms. Unlike Mark, who, while 
he showed me round the laboratories that he was responsible for, spent a good 
deal of time describing his achievement in transforming Production into a 
workplace with an increasingly industrial character, Helen’s likening of Finishing 
to a ‘factory kind o f thing’ is a lament.
Helen implicitly recognises that technologies change the social situation into 
which they are embedded. Returning to Gallie (1978), we are reminded that the 
social response to technological developments in the workplace is dependent not 
just on the shape o f the technology, but also on the shape o f the social system into 
which these technologies are embedded. Helen accounts for this change in 
character by reference to organisational changes in addition to technological 
development. She argues that the increased factory like character o f the Institute 
is a product o f the ‘streamlining o f jo b s’. This ‘streamlining’ consists of a 
progressively more acute division o f labour and the introduction o f increasingly 
visible production targets.
Brian, a Pre-Finishing team leader, describes the way in which his experience of 
the Institute has changed over time. For Brian, it is the increasingly acute
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division o f labour that marks the development of the Institute into something that 
is like a factory.
It changed I guess when the teams started to get split up into 
more specialist groups because obviously the work was more 
defined. People started to feel like they were more in a factory 
and it was kind o f then. You know when you didn’t have that 
identity with that piece o f work any more. It wasn’t a personal 
thing any more. It was more o f a, “Oh, I need to get this done” .
[Brian]
This extract from the interview with Brian is interesting because he does not limit 
his likening o f the Institute to a factory to a story of the increasing division of 
labour. Brian also describes the development of a sense of alienation, a 
detachment from the products o f his labour, as the division o f labour grows more 
acute, as the Institute acquires the characteristics of a factory. This separation 
from the meaning and identity o f the work is a classic form of alienation, as 
discussed in Chapter C, Pathologies o f  Big Science.
Brian, while he has no degree, joined the Institute in order to work in science. 
This makes him unlike many o f the members o f the Production and Pre-Finishing 
teams interviewed by the researcher. Characteristically, these do not have 
backgrounds in science, in terms o f either work or education, and did not join the 
Institute in order to work in science. This interest in science, and the deliberate 
seeking o f a scientific career, makes his account read similarly to that o f those 
participants who arrived at the Institute possessing a scientific background. 
Brian’s background in science is part o f his ‘hinterland o f work’, the concept of 
which is discussed in section F5 o f this chapter.
Victoria, a member o f the Finishing team, has a postgraduate-level scientific 
education. Like many o f the research participants who have a background in 
science, she joined the Institute in its early years with little prior work experience. 
In the interview, she was asked how work at the Institute had changed since she 
had joined. She summed the changes up by describing a move towards a more 
industrial form o f work.
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I think... more, more industrial, more industry-based I guess 
with the targets and [inaudible] and yeah...
[Victoria]
Victoria sees the growing visibility of supervision, expressed here in the 
rationalising quality o f performance targets, to be a key aspect o f the 
industrialisation o f the workplace. Rationalisation is used here in the strictest 
sense, that o f the development of ratios. The rationalisation of the workplace 
requires the enumeration, or pseudo-enumeration, of all aspects of the work. The 
development o f  the Institute after the accomplishment of sequencing the human 
genome, which research participants identify as being the start of particular 
instances o f rationalisation that have had the most deleterious effect on their 
experience o f work, is discussed in Chapter I, Interlude: Dis-Engagement and 
Dis-Integration.
In contrast to Victoria, Joe, who worked as an engineer at the Institute, had 
enjoyed a varied work history. Despite this experience of work settings outside 
the limited world o f  genome sequencing, Joe describes a change in the way that 
the Institute can be described as a workplace. Rather than the opposition o f the 
factory and the university, Joe uses a different formulation that captures some of 
the same relationships listed in Figure F2.1, The Dichotomies o f  Work', opposing 
the world o f  sdence to that o f business. He describes a workplace that is 
increasingly organised according to the principles o f business. In the interview, 
Joe was asked to describe the way in which the Institute had become more 
business-like.
It’s just that everything is more structured. And there are all 
limits on everything and there is a budget for this and you've got 
to make sure you're within that and you have to do it within that 
time. And there is more o f that now I think, I feel.
[Joe]
Once again, we see a description o f increasing rationalisation featuring in an 
account o f the changing workplace o f the Institute. And, once again, this s a 
lament. Only Mark, a manager in Production, the most ‘industrialised’ section of 
the sequencing chain o f production lauded the making factory-like o f the Institute
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in unambiguous terms. These descriptions o f rationalisation through enumeration 
are used to illustrate the development of the Institute from something with 
similarities to a iniversity to something akin to a factory. Or, in the terminology 
used by Joe, the Institute has changed from something that operates on the rules 
of science, to something governed by the principles of business. Interestingly, Joe 
suggests a path o f causation that explains these developments. He positions the 
origin o f this increasing rationalisation in the person of the new director of the 
Institute. Joe describes the new director as being ‘more work orientated’. 
According to Joe, the new director carries with him the values and principles of 
business.
[...] more an actual businessman than an actual -  I mean, I know
he's a scientist but I think he's got more of a bus iness side behind
him.
[Joe]
For Joe, then, the character o f the new director explains why the Institute has 
become ‘more regim ented’. In Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, we 
explore the way in which the person o f the founding director is taken as a 
keystone around which the sentimental commitment to the Institute of many 
research participants is built. This is labelled ‘contingent charisma’, and a similar 
process is at work here. This is not to deny the differences in character and 
outlook o f the founding director and the new director, but is to suggest that other 
changes, beyond and greater than the personality o f one man, are necessary to 
produce such a changed experience o f work within an organisation of the size of 
the Institute. In Chapter I, Interlude: Dis-Engagement and Dis-Integration, the 
subjective effects o f the development o f the Institute after the accomplishment of 
the sequencing o f the human genome are discussed in greater depth.
Jill, a manager o f a Finishing team, provided another account of the increasingly 
industrial nature o f the Institute. Jill has a degree in the sciences and, prior to 
joining the Institute, she had worked for a year doing routine laboratory work. 
She joined the Institute when it was still very small, when there were very few 
members o f staff. In her account, Jill contrasts the contemporary atmosphere of 
the Institute with that o f  the ‘academic way o f working4. She characterises
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academic work as taking place in a sociable environment and involving a 
voluntaristic long-hours ethos. As the Institute has grown, things have changed.
It’s very much nine-to-five. You very much do the hours that
you’re paid for and no more. In a way I see that as a more sort
o f normal job than academic way o f working.
[Jill]
The academic workplace, or, in other words, the university archetype, is 
characterised, for Jill at least, by commitment and engagement. And it is these
qualities that have been lost as tie Institute has grown and developed into a
sequencing factory capable o f helping to win a race to keep the human genome 
sequence in public ownership. Jill has an explanation for this development. 
Unlike Joe, who suggested that these changes were the result of a radical change 
at the top, Jill explains the change in the character of the Institute terms of the 
organic maturation from below.
We were all single, we were all just out of, more or less, straight 
out o f university, we socialised a lot together, we went to the pub 
every weekend [...] as lives change and as we settle down and 
we have children, priorities change in terms o f what we want to 
do with our spare time and our work time.
[Jill]
The character o f the Institute is merely the character of its staff, written 
organisationally. Where it once was young, eagpr, committed and single-minded, 
it has now grown older, developed a more sensible outlook, and has developed 
other interests.
Explanations o f organisational change such at those offered by Joe and Jill should 
not simply be dismissed. They provide insight into the way that research 
participants see the changes that are occurring, how they put these changes into 
context and how they draw together the different strands of their working lives. 
These accounts also remind us o f  the problem of variant accounts discussed in 
Chapter E, Conduct. Both Joe and Jill describe a workplace that has become 
more industrial and less academic, having acquired characteristics of that are 
imagined as typifying business and having lost those that distinguish science.
163
Despite this, they each build narratives of causation that are quite different, 
locating the prime mover in these changes in the character of the Institute in quite 
different material changes.
Not all the descriptions o f  the industrial nature o f the Institute rely on changes 
over time to give the characterisation context. As this chapter has shown, in some 
cases it is parts o f the Institute that are factory-like, when compared to other 
sections o f the sequencing chain o f production. In other accounts, the industrial 
nature o f the Institute was apparent at the first point of contact, before 
experiencing variation over time or within the Institute. Abi, who works in 
Production, describes the way in which she came to work at the Institute.
[Tjhe advert for the production side o f it was quite strange really.
It said you work on your own. If you’ve got production skills -  
which is what I thought well, I’ve worked in a factory, I’ve got 
that. Production skills, work on your own.
[Abi]
Abi arrived at the Institute with experience o f workplaces that can be 
unambiguously and unproblematically described as factories. The production 
skills that Abi describes herself as having were developed during this previous 
employment. This background, indeed, this ‘hinterland of work’, gives Abi an 
interesting perspective on the industrial nature o f the Institute, which are explored 
in the section F4, The Institute as University.
As the Institute has ‘industrialised’, the educational background of the kinds of 
people recruited to the Institute has changed. Megan, manager of a Production 
team, describes the reason why the profile o f a new member of the Production 
teams has changed.
It’s also unlikely for us to take graduates on in the production 
area, because it’s quite routine, especially now, because a lot of 
it is robotic. Whereas when I was doing it it was all by hand.
[Megan]
This reminds us the study o f a pharmaceutical firm by Keefe and Potosky (1997). 
They found that the recruitment o f higher degree holders in Quality Control, the
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most factory-like o f the sections, was ‘disastrous’. The more highly qualified of 
the recruits “found their work boring, routine, and even demeaning” (p. 65). The 
firm therefore made it a policy not to recruit those with higher degrees to 
technical positions. However, the structure o f the pharmaceutical firm was one in 
which those recruited to management positions were required to have a full 
degree. This meant that promotion was always from without. In the case of the 
Institute, while Production is no longer seen as a suitable job for graduates, this is 
in contrast to the recruitment practices o f the Finishing teams, who almost 
exclusively recruit graduates. This differentiation of recruitment profiles has not 
always been so pronounced. New workers were expected to work on the 
sequencing machines, before graduating to finishing, learning the sequence chain 
of production as they went. Some of the current finishers passed along this route 
o f progression, despite their lack o f degrees. In Megan’s account, it is 
technological developments that are responsible for the changing profile of the 
Production vorker. When Megan began work at the Institute, the tasks now 
performed in Productbn were ‘green-fingered’. Such highly-skilled laboratory 
work was suitable work for graduates, though degrees were not a necessary 
requirement. This produced, Megan suggests, a future-orientated recruitment 
strategy in the early days o f the Institute.
And I think the people that started then, the idea was these
people would move up. And most of us have moved up, people
who are now managers o f teams.
[Megan]
Megan’s account presents a history o f work in genome sequencing that is 
characterised by increasing automation and routinisation. The work has been de­
skilled (Braverman, 1974). As the work o f Production has been de-skilled, the 
possibilities have shrunk for someone entering the Institute as Production worker 
to make a career, rather than a jo b , at tie Institute. Again, tie impact of 
improving technologies upon the social system o f fie Institute has not simply 
been the increase in efficiency or productivity.
This section presents a range o f narratives o f ‘industrialisation’, o f the Institute 
becoming more factory like. The degree to which research participants describe
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the Institute as being like a factory differs between sections of the sequencing 
chain o f production. According to the accounts o f participants, Production is 
more factory-like than Pre-Finishing, which, in turn, is more factory-like than 
Finishing. All sections, however, are described by at least some participants as 
being in some way factory-like. The Institute has also become more 
industrialised over time. For the research participants, ‘industrialisation’ is the 
product o f increasing automation, an increasing division o f labour, and a growth 
in bureaucratic oversight. Causal narratives include the maturation of the 
workforce and the individual qualities o f the new director. Subjectively, 
participants describe a reduction in the degree o f engagement, in other words 
increasing alienation, as the workplace has become more factory-like. These 
ideas are explored in Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, and Chapter I, 
Counter Narratives and Dis-Integration. The next section of this chapter 
discusses the ways in which research participants draw on the archetype of the 
university to describe the Institute as a workplace.
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F 4  T h e  In s t it u t e  a s  a  U n iv e r s it y
The university is the model o f the workplace in which science is conducted. 
Public descriptions o f the Human Genome Project tended to stress the way in 
which the workplaces o f genome sequencing, such as Ihe Institute, were quite 
unlike universities. Universities are the homes of small science. The Human 
Genome Project, accomplished by workplaces such as the Institute, was big 
science. Or, as Hood and Smith (1987) argue, not science at all. Section F3, The 
Institute as a Factory , shows how the archetype o f the factory finds expression in 
the accounts o f the research participants. However, as suggested by the re­
presenting o f interviewee accounts in that section, in the way that different 
sections o f the sequencing chain o f production were more or less industrial than 
others, and in the way that the Institute has grown more factory-like over time, 
there is another side to these descriptions. The accounts of working at the 
Institute provided by the research participants often use the archetype of the 
university as a way o f illustrating aspects o f  the workplace that contrast with the 
industrialising narrative. This section sorts and re-presents accounts that 
explicitly stress the way in which the Institute is university-like.
Accounts o f the Institute as being university-like draw on a range o f aspects of the 
workplace. Some o f these are the seemingly superficial, such as in this extract 
from the interview with Brian, a manager o f a Pre-Finishing team, in which he 
discusses the aesthetics o f the Institute.
I mean even the way buildings have been made and the artwork
created and put in place has all added to that ethos o f a
university.
[Brian]
The Institute, as described in Chapter D, Case , certainly could be a recently built 
extension to an existing university, all glass, metal and light brickwork. The 
imagination o f the architecture sets it apart from the business parks, and it does 
little to evoke the images o f industrialism. Other accounts o f work at the Institute, 
though, draw on more substantial archetypal characteristics o f the university. If
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we return to Joe, for example, we find a stress on self-direction and the absence of 
supervision.
[I]t was like a university in a way. It was quite free and easy.
There was no -  really no pressure. And it was just get on with it 
kind o f like. And when you’ve done it come and see me kind of 
thing.
[Joe]
In a similar way, Helen describes the Institute as “quite a non-pressured 
environment” . O f course, a lack o f pressure from supervisors is not unique to 
universities, and neither is it a necessary feature of actually existing universities. 
However, as displayed in Figure F2.1, The Dichotomies o f  Work, in our 
comparison o f archetypal Modern workplaces, the university placed in opposition 
to the factory on the continuum o f autonomy to control. The autonomy of 
academia contrasted with the supervision o f Taylorism.
Brian describes the way in the subjective experience of work was vastly different 
at a time when the Institute felt more like a university. In section F3, The Institute 
as a Factory, we see how he feels that the increasing division of labour has 
alienated people from the products o f their work. Referring back to his 
experience o f the Institute during its early years, Brian describes a degree of 
engagement with work that is not present in the later incarnation of the Institute as 
it develops into an industrial workplace.
[E]veryone was there because they liked science, they wanted to 
do a good job and see w hat’s possible and get on with it. And 
everyone, not so much liked working with each other, but 
respected each other’s work ethos in that everyone would work 
for as long as it took that day to get the job done. Whether that 
be working from 6 o ’clock in the morning to midnight, 2 o ’clock 
in the morning. Or if there was no work to get done the entire 
place would go down the pub for lunch.
[Brian]
Not all the descriptions o f the Institute as like a university are laments for times 
past. Abi adopts a more ambivalent view. If we return to her account, we see 
another description o f the way that the Institute shares features with the archetype
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of the university. Again, this categorisation hinges on the lack of a visibly strong 
system o f supervision.
[B]ut it is like a university, that -  that’s what it seems like here 
to me. [ ...] You know, yeah. They wander in and then they have 
coffee and then they go and do a bit and then they have a bit 
more coffee! And I’m like -  how can you do a day like that?
That’s just so unstructured. [...] But to them, I suppose it’s 
structured to them because that’s -  you know, their wandering is 
structure for them, so!
[Abi]
We should note that, in A bi’s account, the Institute remains university-like. Given 
that Abi has, as noted in section F3, The Institute as a Factory, a background in 
factory work, the researcher prompted her to consider the comparisons that have 
been made between working in large-scale genome sequencing and work in a 
factory. Her immediate response to this suggestion is fairly unequivocal.
Yeah. But it’s not, ha!
[Abi]
An attempt to phrase the question in a different way was cut off. Nonetheless, the 
attempt at rephrasing served as an effective prompt. Here, Abi reflects on the
ways in which the workplace o f the Institute could be considered factory-like, or
university-like.
No, it’s nothing, I mean -  no. [...] No. If it was -  it -  what I do, 
yeah. In the tiny bit o f like putting things on the machine and
having those bits, yes. They’re very -  but I mean I suppose,
yeah. Over there, there’s a lot more use o f automation now than 
there was. And yeah. You have got to get a product out at the 
end o f the day and -  but I think because it was -  because the 
product we were -  my dad always used to say, because the 
products you’re producing is free, like for one you know, you’re 
not having to do deadlines and you know. [...] Oh well, this has 
got to be on the Net by ten o ’clock tomorrow morning, or this 
has got to be at the customer for so and so. You haven’t got that 
pressure; you’re not producing a physical thing that somebody’s 
then got to do something else with. And I don’t -  I think 
because they’re all -  a lot o f them are academics, they just move 
in here as if they’ve moved out o f the university and moved in 
here, and -  you know, it’s a campus.
[Abi]
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In this interview extract, Abi identifies automation as being the aspect of the work 
of genome sequencing that provides the material backdrop against which 
descriptions o f the Institute as factory-like are made. Abi considers this to be a 
superficial similarity. The lack o f economic pressures, which is the product of 
working in a non-commercial setting, outweighs the industrialising nature o f 
automation. In addition, as is the case with Brian’s comments on the aesthetics of 
the Institute, she comments on the place that is the Institute. The physical 
organisation o f the Institute as a campus is important in her characterisation of the 
workplace as being quite unlike a factory.
The features o f workplace that are highlighted in explicit descriptions of the 
Institute as being like a university are the absence o f heavy-touch supervision and 
control, and the absence o f a restrictive structure. These are placed at odds with 
the features highlighted in section F3, The Institute as a Factory,; the 
industrialising nature o f automation, an increasingly acute division of labour, and 
lately, increasing rationalisation. We should not imagine, though, that the kind of 
‘autonomy’ described by the research participants is the kind of autonomy 
idealised by science. It is not professional autonomy (Varma, 1999). The 
autonomy o f the technical workers is not the autonomy o f science. It is not a state 
in which individual scientists choose their own research subjects and determine 
the actual conduct o f research (Polanyi, 1962). Indeed, at the Institute, in the 
Human Genome Project, there is no individual scientist. As Kleinman and Valias 
(2001) warn, while knowledge economies might be marked by organisations that 
bear the hallmarks o f both the factory and the university, o f the values of industry 
and of academia, this ‘convergence’ is not symmetrical. It is the norms of 
industry that hold the upper hand.
Watson (2003) describes how the label that might more properly characterise 
work in a post-industrial economy is Drucker’s (1992) concept o f a ‘post-Modem 
factory’. This incorporates elements o f the archetype of the Fordist factory with 
the more flexible forms o f organisation that Kleinman and Valias (2001) argue 
are being co-opted into commercial settings from academia. Drucker uses a naval 
analogy to explain the difference between the ‘Modem’ factory and the ‘post-
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Modem factory’. While the Modem factory is like a battleship, the post-Modem 
factory could be better imagined as a flotilla; “a set of modules centred around 
stages in the production process or a set o f cbsely related operations” (Watson, 
2003, p. 128; quoting Drucker, 1992). But the Institute, when it was sequencing 
the human genome, was no flotilla. It was a battleship of a scientific workplace, 
with a single goal, a line o f production and a large collectivised crew. In so much 
that it was part o f  a fleet, it was part o f a fleet of battleships, the G5 laboratories, 
with a great number o f smaller ships providing auxiliary support. As we see in 
Chapter I: Interlude: Dis-Engagement and Dis-Integration, since the
accomplishment o f sequencing o f the human genome, the subsequent 
diversification o f the pursuits o f the Institute renders the analogy of a flotilla more 
suitable. As the image o f a flotilla might fit the kind of work conducted in a 
university26. If we expand the picture a little, the sequencing arm of the Institute 
is no longer a battleship, but something more akin to a supply ship or tanker; large, 
and necessary for the other ships to travel their routes, but subordinate to the goals 
of pursued by other ships.
To some extent, the way that the research participants draw on radically different 
workplace archetypes is the product o f time, as the Institute appears to develop 
along the lines of the Modem firm described by Edwards (1979), only in a 
radically condensed time frame, a century after most industries went through 
these changes. In other cases, the characterisation o f sections o f the sequencing 
chain o f production as being factory-like is the product o f perspective within the 
Institute; it is a feature o f  looking down the hierarchy. The changes of time and 
perspective within the Institute explain the presence o f the use of a both the 
descriptive repertoires that accompany the university and the factory within the 
accounts o f research participants. In section F5, Hinterlands o f  Work, this chapter 
argues that, in some o f these cases, different people are looking at the same 
workplace, with the account o f one drawing on the archetype of factory, and the 
account o f the other drawing on the archetype o f the university. This is a product
26 In fact, for any university department that takes the ideal o f  the autonomous direction o f  
intellectual labour as a goal, flotilla  w ould be too organised an analogy. Lots o f  tiny craft ships 
travelling their ow n routes, exchanging maps, som etim es sailing together, som etim es in opposite 
directions would be a more appropriate, i f  a lot less concise, analogy.
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of the different ‘hinterlands of work’ from which these workers arrive at 
Institute.
F 5  H i n t e r l a n d s  o f  W o r k
This chapter opens with a quote from Becker (1992), who urges us to consider 
“the underlying imagery with which we approach the phenomenon we study” (p. 
210). The social researcher, though, is not the only person who approaches the 
Institute with a set o f images that shapes his perceptions of the kind of workplace 
that is the Institute. Each person recruited to work at the Institute arrives there 
from a ‘hinterland o f w ork’.
It would be gratifyingly simple if the accounts o f the Institute that describe it as 
being like a factory, and those that describe it as being like a university, could be 
accounted by straightforward reference to the division of labour. Production is 
the most routinised and industrialised o f  the sections of the sequencing chain of 
production. We might expect those working in Production to have a greater sense 
of the Institute as being a like a factory. Finishing, by contrast, is the most skilled 
o f the sections, recruiting graduates for problem-solving IT work. We might 
expect those working in Finishing to have a greater sense of the Institute being 
like a university. This would provide us with a situation where the imaginations 
of work in the Institute were determined by the immediate material conditions of 
the research participants. This, unfortunately for the agreeably neat explanation, 
does not match the interview evidence gathered. Indeed, as we see in section F4, 
The Institute as a University, as exemplified in the case of Abi, some of the 
accounts that most explicitly reject the description o f the Institute as being 
factory-like are provided by those working in Production.
The realisation though, that workers in a routinised, automated laboratory reject 
the factory as a descriptive label for work at the Institute, should not lead us to 
reject a material explanation for the variation between the accounts o f research 
participants. We can still claim that the immediate conditions o f work are 
straightforwardly responsible for the use o f radically different archetypes within 
accounts. Whether looking down the sequencing chain o f production, or 
reflecting on the changes in work at the Institute over time, reference to the 
division o f labour, and to the degree o f bureaucratisation, routinsation, and
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automation found at the Institute can be called upon to explain the internal 
variation o f accounts27. The use, by people working in these sections, of the 
archetype o f the university to describe Production, and the use of archetype of the 
factory to describe Finishing, requires reference to the wider experiences o f work 
of the research participants. The ‘hinterland of work’.
As Colin, a member o f the Pre-Finishing team points out, the prior experience of 
workplaces presents the individual with examples for comparison. Or, perhaps, in 
some cases, a lack o f experience leaves individuals with a poverty of reference 
points.
Well I think a lot o f people up here have come straight from 
university and never worked anywhere else so they probably, 
you know, they probably think this is just what a normal job is 
like possibly.
[Colin]
The extract from the interview with Colin helps us to articulate the point that it is 
not only where a person is now, in terms of immediate working environment, 
which establishes their view o f what sort o f workplace is the Institute. But that 
we must also take into account where a person has come from; their hinterland of 
work. This hinterland should be understood as including both direct work 
experience and socialised expectations o f a working environment. Considered 
this way, and condensing the archetype o f the fectory to routinisation, we might 
expect those research participants working in the most routinised sections to see 
the Institute as less factory-like than those in the least routinised roles. This is no 
longer a counter-intuitive suggestion. The research participants working in the 
most routinised sections tend to not have a degree, and to have employment 
histories outside science. In some cases this includes having worked in factories, 
in manufacturing. The socialised expectation o f routinisation in work will 
therefore be relatively high. On the other hand, research participants working in 
the least routinised sections tend to have degrees in science and, where they did 
not enter the Institute immediately after leaving education, have experience of
27 There are, o f  course, real differences between the different sections. The accounts o f  those, 
such as Elizabeth, w ho have worked in more than one section testify to this; she stresses the 
factory-like qualities o f  Production.
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work in science. The socialised expectation of routinisation held by research 
participants whose hinterland of work is dominated by an education for a career in 
science will likely be very low.
This idea can be illustrated in following series of diagrams. Figure F5.1, A 
Continuum o f  Forms o f  Work, suggests that the Institute is neither factory nor 
university, but something in between, of the kind of organisation that writers such 
as Kleinman and Valias (2001) suggest will be the form of workplace that is 
emerging as knowledge economies develop.
Figure F5.1 A Continuum o f Forms o f  Work
On this continuum we can place all the apparent dichotomies of work described in 
section F2, From the University to the Factory. Wooffitt (1993) cites Gilbert and 
Mulkay (1984) to argue that “social events are the ‘repositories’ of multiple 
meanings, by which they [Gilbert and Mulkay] mean that the ‘same’ 
circumstances can be described in a variety of ways to emphasise different 
features” (p. 303). The diagrams below represent the ‘view’ of the Institute as it 
is approached from hinterlands o f work dominated by the factory and by the 
university. The distance o f the Institute from the hinterland is exaggerated, and 
the distance of the Institute from the oppositional archetype of that hinterland is 
minimised.
1
University Institute Factory
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Figure F5.2 Views from  the Hinterlands o f the University and the Factory
Kleinman and Valias (2001) suggest that this effect of perspective colours the 
academic literature o f the knowledge economy. They write that “analysts of
academic research commonly idealize the past, [while] students of industrial
scientists and engineers tend to idealize present trends” (p. 452). Students of
industrial scientists and engineers, steeped in forms of work organisation
governed by the principles o f manufacturing and commerce, celebrate the 
increased autonomy o f new forms of work, of which the Institute might be an 
example. Researchers that have spent their careers examining academic work, 
much more strongly, see the erosion of autonomy in these new forms of work that 
are closer to industrial norms than is the academic ideal.
Wooffitt (1993) describes Gilbert and Mulkay’s (1984) use of the concept of 
linguistic repertoires. He describes a linguistic repertoire as “a set of descriptive 
and referential terms which portray beliefs, actions and events in a specific way” 
(p. 292). Wooffitt reports that repertoires are organised around the use of specific 
metaphors and descriptive devices. We should note that Gilbert and Mulkay are 
arguing that a scientist has the use of two repertoires; the empirical and the 
contingent. And, indeed, we see that research participants working at the Institute 
are capable of drawing on two very different descriptive repertoires to describe 
work at the Institute. But more than that, the interview evidence suggests that the 
choice of descriptive repertoire is not determined by the immediate experience of 
work, but that metaphors and descriptive devices that are used are dependent on 
the ‘hinterland of work’ from which a person arrives at the workplace.
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This conclusion finds a mirror in previous studies of scientists in non-academic 
settings. Abrahamson (1964) reports that “the more thorough the academic 
socialization o f the scientist, the more difficult the industrial adjustment” (p. 208). 
In a similar vein, Miller (1967) argues that, as the level of education increases, so 
too does the degree o f alienation o f professionals in a bureaucracy. In both cases, 
the greater the degree that the hinterland of work is dominated by imagery o f the 
university, the greater the mis-match with work in industrial science. Technical 
work occupies a curious middle ground, much like the Institute itself. Nelsen 
(1997) argues that technical workers are prone to suffering from a contradiction 
between their self-conception, in so much that they imagine that that they ought 
be part of a horizontally ordered work setting, and the ways in which they are 
perceived and treated, in that they are actually part of a vertically ordered work 
setting. Keefe and Potosky (1997) argue that for technical workers, “professional 
career expectations formed in educational programs have rarely conformed to 
their job experiences” (p. 55). For technicians with expectations of being 
accorded professional status, though, this mis-match leads to status incongruity, 
role ambiguity and feelings o f deprivation. Keefe and Potosky write; 
“Technicians invidious comparisons with professionals [...] and high levels of 
status inconsistency were correlated with expressed dissatisfaction, increased 
levels of interest in unionization, heightened interest in occupational certification, 
and reduced occupational and organizational commitment” (p. 55). In the terms 
used by Flecker and Hofbauer (1998), the socialising process of an education in 
science “generates ‘superfluous’ subjectivity, that is, aspirations, desires for self- 
actualisation and so on, which exceed what is required” (p. 121). In Chapter G, 
The Recruitment o f  Sentim ent, we see how, despite the kind of predictions that 
can be drawn from the work o f Keefe and Potosky, at the Institute the sentiments 
of technicians was recruited into the task o f sequencing genomes as much as was 
their mental and manual labour.
In Chapter J, The Institute and the Knowledge Economy, we explore the ways the 
Institute can be seen in the context o f the development o f knowledge economies. 
One aspect of the Institute that connects with debates about work in knowledge 
economies is the way that it was organised. Barton and Delbridge (2004) argue 
that the growth o f ‘progressive’ human resource management (HRM) practices,
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such as those discussed in Chapter H, The High Road to the Human Genome, is 
driven, at least in part, by the desire for innovation to meet competitive demands. 
This is the ‘new manufacturing’, the ‘learning factory’. “The emphasis on 
innovation in manufacturing has called into question the traditional division of 
labour under Taylorist approaches to the management of the labour process. [...] 
the need for workers who think as well as do requires a ‘post-Fordist’ 
management system [...] the reintegration of production and innovation and of 
intellectual and physical labour” (p. 333). The trend, Barton and Delbridge argue, 
is towards the ‘upskilling’ o f manufacturing workers into ‘knowledge workers’, 
with responsibilities beyond physical work. A second way in which the 
exploration o f the Institute can have value in discussions regarding the knowledge 
economy is as an exploration o f the subjective experience of technical workers.
Keefe and Potosky (1997) write that “science technicians, as a distinct 
occupational group, appeared at the historical moment when science was 
bureaucratized and relocated into large public and corporate bodies” (p. 54). In 
this sense, technicians are substitutes for scientists, allowing them to dispense 
with the routine tasks and pursue research unencumbered by the repeated and 
repeatable processes that characterise science as a service. In the case of the 
Institute, scientists were able, through routinisation and automation, to ‘hive o ff  
the ‘mindless’ and ‘robotic’ work o f genome sequencing and pursue the work that 
better suits their education, training and skills; scientific research. Here, 
‘scientific research’ is imagined as opposed to the knowledge creating enterprise 
of genome sequencing.
As well as being skilled, working with complex technologies or technical 
processes, and manipulating symbols, technical “occupations are also 
characterized by the acquisition o f a craft version o f professional knowledge” 
(Keefe and Potosky, 1997, p. 53). So the workers at the Institute are different 
from other skilled workers, in that the knowledges that they use are derivative to a 
system of formalised knowledge, in this case that of molecular biology. In this 
sense, the construction o f the occupation o f technicians is ‘passive’. Whereas the 
professions and the crafts are ‘active’ with regard to the boundaries o f their 
occupations, set through struggles to control the system o f knowledge, the
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processes o f training and recruitment and so on, the occupation of technicians is 
shaped by powerful actors from outside. “The new occupation is assembled from 
tasks discarded by professionals through the “hiving o f f ’ process” (p. 54). 
Therefore, “most technicians work in complex organizations where they neither 
set the entry and performance standards o f their occupation, nor control the 
educational process through which new recruits are trained. Most cannot 
formally self-regulate or self-govern their work practices. Most important, 
technicians often operate within an established profession’s field of knowledge 
and competence” (p. 54). This results in a blurred identity, they are highly skilled 
but they are also within the orbit o f the dominant parent profession. This sets 
claims that technical workers will be a new class, reshaping the social, in a rather 
more pessimistic light.
The idea that approaching the Institute from a particular hinterland of work 
provides speakers with a preference in the use o f descriptive repertoires also helps 
to explain the fact that, even when genome sequencing was more a green-fingered 
craft, well before the Institute became as factory-like as it became, according to 
the accounts of the research participants, the archetype o f the fictory was the 
descriptive repertoire o f choice for scientists and scientific commentators when 
writing about work in the Human Genome Project. But it is not so much a 
question of what work at the Institute actually is, but how it compares to where 
our commentators have come fom. In this example, we have people whose 
hinterland of work consists overwhelmingly o f universities and small-science 
laboratories. From the perspective o f a background in workplaces such as those, 
the Institute would look like nothing but a factory.
We should be careful. Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) write that “participants’ use of 
language can never be taken as literally descriptive” (p. 15), and this is true in this 
case. The mistake o f taking the accounts o f research participants to be ‘literally 
descriptive’ is a two-part mistake. It does not refer simply to the mistake of 
taking the accounts o f research participants as being in correspondence to the 
features o f the external world. It can also refer to the mistake of taking the 
accounts o f the research participants solely as attempts at correspondence with the 
features o f the external world. As described in section F3, The Institute as a
179
Factory, when Hood and Smith (1987) described a future large-scale project to 
sequence the human genome, they were practising large-scale politics. Presenting 
genome sequencing as industrial presented genome sequencing as eminently 
doable, as a practical investment of the resources of the state. This suggests that 
we should be aware o f the small-scale politics that make the accounts of our 
research participants something more than solely attempts at description.
As Wooffitt (1993) reminds us, “descriptions are designed not merely to 
represent the world, but to do specific tasks in the world” (p. 297). In this, the 
description o f the Institute as being like a university serves to highlight the way in 
which the workplace o f the Institute is unlike industrial and commercial settings. 
The comparison is used, with few exceptions, to stress the subjectively positive 
features o f work at the Institute. Vice versa, the description of the Institute as a 
factory serves to stress the features o f work at the Institute that make it unlike 
work in a university or research laboratory. The comparison is used to stress the 
negative features o f work at the Institute.
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[G] T h e  R e c r u i t m e n t  o f  S e n t i m e n t
Work is imagined as existing somewhere on the spectrum from manual, in which 
case the workers are hands, to intellectual, in which case the workers are minds. 
Work, though, can also draw on the heart; or the sentiment. In some cases this is 
overt, as in the case o f  emotional labour (Hochschild, 1983). In other cases 
sentiment is recruited into manual and mental labour. This recruitment of 
sentiment is experienced as engagement, as intrinsic satisfaction. Work, through 
the recruitment o f sentiment, itself has a value. But just as in the term 
‘recruitment o f  sentiment’ we avoid using the word sentiment in the sense of 
mawkishness, we should avoid that kind o f sweet sentimentalism in our 
exploration o f  the Institute. Sentiments do work other than to warm the 
subjective experience o f  work; the recruitment o f sentiment involves the 
internalisation o f the values o f the organisation, it eases the extraction of 
discretionary effort, and it hides the nature o f the relationship between employer 
and employee. Sentiments have value.
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G1 In t r o d u c t i o n
In the title o f their own contribution to their edited collection Workplaces o f  the 
Future (Thompson and Warhurst, 1998), Warhurst and Thompson (1998) identify 
three aspects o f the worker; hands, hearts, and minds. They write that “[t]he 
popular view is that organisations are opting, by choice or necessity, to engage 
with hearts and minds” (p. 1) in the face of changes that have, apparently, 
rendered the notion o f workers as ‘hands’ obsolete. Hearts and minds, this 
thinking goes, are the parts o f the worker from which value will be extracted in 
knowledge economies. For Warhurst and Thompson, this is a suggestion that 
‘sits oddly’ with their view o f the nature o f contemporary workplace. As with 
much rhetoric o f the development o f knowledge economies, there is little 
attention paid to the continuities o f work, or to the way in which these 
developments affect people whose work is outside the relatively privileged band 
of well credentialed workers that are unambiguously defined as ‘knowledge 
workers’ (Kleinman and Valias, 2001). In Chapter J, The Institute and the 
Knowledge Economy, we explore the ways in which this study o f large-scale 
genome sequencing can be used to illuminate aspects of the development of 
knowledge economies.
This chapter explores the ways in which work at the Institute, despite its label as a 
factory o f genome sequencing, involves the recruitment o f more than just ‘hands’. 
Those employed at the Institute find that it is not merely the efforts o f their bodies 
that are recruited into work. Workers find recruitment to the project is not, even, 
limited to their talents, skills, and knowledges. Rather, it is the case that, 
explicitly, implicitly, and/or contingently, the sentiments o f those working at the 
Institute are recruited into the projects o f sequencing genomes. With hearts so 
recruited, alongside hands and minds, those working at the Institute are engaged 
in their work. This recruitment o f sentiment is a process that ameliorates the 
subjectively alienating tendencies o f  industrialised, factory-like work that are 
described in Chapter C, Pathologies o f  Work in Big Science. This chapter draws 
illustrations from the accounts o f work at the Institute, categorising and re­
presenting evidence extracted from interviews with research participants.
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The accounts o f the work at the Institute provide illustrations of several different 
ways in which their sentiment was recruited and their feelings were engaged. 
This chapter makes an attempt to tease these apart, to separate the strands and 
threads o f the recruitment o f sentiment present in the accounts of the research 
participants.
The chapter opens, in section G2, Exceptionalism, with a discussion of the ways 
in which work at the Institute was considered ‘special’. This section discusses, in 
turn, the way in which the notion that science is a special form of work, that the 
human genome was a special project, and that the Institute itself is a special place 
of work. The idea that work at the Institute is different from other kinds of work 
shape the accounts o f research participants.
In section G3, The Spark o f  Competition , this chapter discusses an aspect of work 
at the Institute that is particular to the case at hand; the race to sequence the 
human genome. To some extent this way in which the sentiments of research 
participants was recruited into the Institute can be understood as the negative 
counter- image o f the exceptionalism o f the human genome itself. Negative, due 
to the fact that sentiment was recruited as a consequence of the existence of a 
‘villainous’ other. Mordred, perhaps?
The recruitment o f sentiment discussed in sections G2, Exceptionalism , and G3, 
The Spark o f  Competition, can be considered particular to this case and a small 
number o f other situations. Not all work can drape itself in the exceptionalism of 
science, or motivate through a moral narrative o f competition. In sections G4, 
Celebrating Work and G5, The Work is F lat, the focus o f the chapter shifts from 
the special to ways o f recruiting sentiment that are more general. In section G4, 
Celebrating Work, this chapter explores the ways in which the accounts of 
research participants contain fond memories o f events and parties at which being 
a part o f the Institute was celebrated. Section G5, The Work is Flat, deals with 
the more day-to-day ways in which work at the Institute was experienced as being 
part o f a collective, through the absence o f overt symbolic markings of hierarchy. 
This aspect o f work at the Institute is also discussed in Chapter H, The High Road
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to the Human Genome, in which the experience of work described by the research 
participants is connected to contemporary discussions on the way work is 
organised.
The final section that teases apart the different strands of the recruitment of 
sentiment is G6, Personalising the Workplace. This section discusses the ways in 
sentiment was recruited to the Institute through the proxy o f the founding director. 
The person o f the founding director is associated with the structure and 
organisation o f the Institute, and the successes of the Project. In this, the 
founding director is described being ‘contingently charismatic’. The theme of the 
personalisation o f the subjective experience of work is returned to in Chapter I, 
Interlude: Dis-Integration, in which the character of the new director is 
understood as being responsible for the dis-integration of the collective 
community o f the Institute.
This chapter concludes, in section G7, Collectivism or Communalism, with a 
discussion o f a key difference between the orientation of the sentiments recruited 
in the case o f the Institute, and those recruited in what we have considered to be 
the model of the engaging  workplace, the university. The sentiments recruited in 
the archetypal o f the university are, in the first instance, orientated around the 
individual or the small group; the scientist and the laboratory. This is exemplified 
in the pursuit o f the individualised reward structure o f science, built around names 
on papers. In the second instance we have the Mertonian notion that the 
sentiments o f science are orientated towards the communality of the discipline, or 
o f science in general. These are the questing knights and their squires of science, 
and their communality is not Medieval Christendom but the new genetics. But, as 
we noted in Chapter A, Primers, the human genome was not sequenced by a 
Gawain or a Lancelot, but by the regimented armies o f Modem science. And, in 
line with this metaphor, the sentiments recruited to these armies are those 
orientated towards the concrete collective, rather than an abstract communal. In 
this case, towards the Institute, and the Project.
We describe how engagement can be considered the opposite o f alienation, in 
terms o f the subjective experience o f work. However, this does not mean that the
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recruitment o f sentiments at work is something that should be read as an 
unproblematic positive. While such recruitment of sentiment may engage, which 
ameliorates a subjective sense o f alienation, it might also serve to co-opt workers 
in their own exploitation. Successful recruitment o f sentiments into the service of 
a workplace can obscure the exploitative relationship between employer and 
employee. The idea that commitment is merely a new form of control, suitable 
for the new organisational forms o f the knowledge economy is discussed in 
Chapter H, The High Road to the Human Genome. The recruitment o f sentiment 
is not new. Though the management trends that produce the Taylorisation of 
work involved the construction o f the “wilMess and opinionless ‘mar>as- 
machine’” as the ‘model w orker’ (Flecker and Hofbauer, 1998, p. 105), this 
extreme, this ‘triumph’ o f rationality, does not describe work in general. Rather, 
work at a specific moment in history, when the factory most resembled the 
archetypal image. At other points, the recruitment o f sentiment has been 
important in the organisation o f work, whether it was the master-apprentice 
relationship or the ‘civilising’ efforts o f Christian industrialists. Describing 
manufacturing in pre-Fordist environments, Edwards (1979) discusses how, in the 
entrepreneurial manufacturing firm, it was the ‘personal touch’ o f the owner that 
provided the sentimental glue that bound the workplace and eased the extraction 
of labour. “Loyalty had a direct and personal meaning”, he wrote, but warned 
that the romaticisation o f this era involved ignoring what this recruitment of 
sentiment actually does. “The personal ties [...] tended to obscure the real class 
differences” (p. 27).
At the Institute, the recruitment o f  sentiment did produce real effects in the way 
that research participants worked. A particularly marked effect is the role of 
sentiment in eliciting ‘discretionary effort’. Jill, a manager of a Finishing team, 
recalls the early years o f the Institute. At this time the Institute was still small, 
and there was close personal contact between the laboratory bench workers and 
the most senior o f scientists. The hierarchy, symbolically, at least, was at its 
flattest, and the celebrations held to acknowledge achievement were the least 
contrived. Jill describes the working patterns o f the time.
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And a lot o f us were prepared to stay till seven, eight. I’m never 
talking ten and eleven at night. But yeah, I did work longer 
hours back in those days.
[Jill]
Was that because- 
[Researcher]
Because I wanted to. I don’t think there was even a general 
expectation that people would do that, I think it was just a 
personal choice.
[Jill]
The history o f the Institute, though, is just that; history. The narrative of this 
history involves growth, change, accomplishment and end-points, and, lately, 
diversification. In Chapter I, Interlude: Dis-Engagement and Dis-Integration, we 
explore the role these developments play in the research participants’ descriptions 
of the way in which their sentiments are no longer recruited into work at the 
Institute with the same intensity. Jill illustrates the way in which this change in 
subjective experience o f work has effects beyond the imaginations of each worker. 
To revisit an extract from the interview with Jill that illustrates discussions of the 
factory-like nature o f the Institute in Chapter F, The Factory and The University,
•> Q
we see one o f the effects o f the decrease in the recruitment.
It’s very much nine-to-five. You very much do the hours that 
you’re paid for and no more.
[Jill]
Ideas o f the discretionary effort are discussed, among other things, in Chapter H, 
The High Road to the Human Genome, in which the Institute is considered from 
the perspective o f the contemporary categorisations of work. This chapter 
concentrates on the different ways in which the research participants account for 
the recruitment o f their sentiment.
28 O f course, it could very w ell be the case that a change to nine-to-five timekeeping would itself 
produce a decrease in the recruitment o f  sentiment. This, though, is not the way that these 
changes were experienced by the research participants.
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G 2  E x c e p t i o n a l i s m
This section exam ines the ways in which research participants understand their 
work as being in some way ‘unique’. This ‘exceptionalism’ produces a 
sentimental attachment; there is something special about working at the Institute. 
The exceptionalism o f working at the Institute comes in three forms. The first of 
these is the idea that science is a special kind o f work, the second that there is 
something special about working on the human  genome, and the third is that the 
Institute is an intrinsically special workplace.
It is the case that some o f the research participants described that they applied to 
work at the Institute because they were motivated by an ambition to work ‘in 
science'. Most o f the research participants had very little concept o f the Human 
Genome Project when they arrived at the Institute. Julia and Maggie are an 
extreme case, but they illustrate the fact that, for all the cultural power of the 
Human Genome Project, the notion that is was something that a previously 
untrained worker could be a part o f was far from the imagination. Julia and 
Maggie were asked if, when beginning work at the Institute, they knew anything 
about the Human Genome Project.
No, and considering we both live about two miles away from it.
[Julia]
Yes, so-
[Maggie]
I think you live two miles one way, I live two miles the other
way. And no-
[Julia]
No, didn’t know anything.
[Maggie]
Despite the presence o f one o f the large-scale sequencing centres within a short 
drive o f their homes, the notion o f the Human Genome Project as an 
accomplishment o f work was hidden from Julia and Maggie.
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While the Human Genome Project was quite often absent from the imaginations 
o f the research participants when arriving at the Institute, it many cases it soon 
became part o f what made their work distinctive. There are exceptions. In the 
cases o f FJizabeth and Neneh, whose accounts we visit in greater depth during 
this section o f  the chapter, the attraction o f the Human Genome Project was the 
main reason they came to work at the Institute.
The combination o f the notion that science is a special form of work, and that the 
human genome is itself a special object, produces a vision o f a special workplace. 
It is a workplace that conducts special work and, since the accomplishment of the 
sequencing o f the human genome, has achieved special things. However, the 
Institute is itself exceptionalised in the imaginations o f some research participants, 
becoming a special workplace in its own right, without overt and explicit 
reference to the exceptionalism o f the scientific work being conducted.
Science is special
There are arguments for objectively considering science to be a special form of 
work. These arguments might rely on the idea that science is special as a 
consequence o f it being a creative pursuit o f the unknown, or the notion that 
science is an activity conducted for the benefit o f all humankind. If arguments of 
these kinds are to be a factor h  the subjective experience o f work at the Institute, 
in the recruitment o f sentiment, research participants would have to understand 
the work that they do as being part o f science.
The image o f  science as an engine that benefits all humankind is an idea that 
engaged several o f  the research participants. Claudia, a member o f the Pre- 
Finishing team, had worked in a factory before she arrived at the Institute. She 
was asked to describe the difference between her previous work and work at the 
Institute.
Oh, fantastic. When I first got here it was really good. I felt like 
I was doing something worthwhile.
[Claudia]
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Because I always wanted to do something good but I never quite 
knew what I wanted to do [...] It’s nice to do something that you 
feel benefiting.
[Claudia]
Elizabeth a member o f a Finishing team, claimed that she was not particularly 
interested in the biological significance o f the stretches o f sequence on which she 
had worked. However, the more general idea, that she was a part o f a scientific 
project that would help us to understand human biology did recruit her sentiments.
I was always quite proud o f being in the- doing the job anyway, 
because even though what you were doing didn’t look much, 
you knew that it went o ff and then somebody found genes and 
cures for things and whatever.
[Elizabeth]
Despite describing herself as being disengaged from the details o f the scientific 
knowledge that her work produces, Elizabeth was nevertheless engaged by the 
idea o f working in science, in which science is understood as a motor of progress. 
The fact that, in the interview extract used to illustrate this point, Elizabeth speaks 
o f her pride in the job  in the past tense is a result of the double-edged nature of 
the ‘triumph o f accom plishm ent’, which is explored in Chapter I, Interlude: Dis- 
Engagement and Dis-Integration.
Several o f the research participants do recall being engaged with the knowledge 
that was produced by the Institute. Catherine, a member o f a Finishing team, 
recalls the way in which this engagement was not the result o f ‘curiosity’ as a 
feature o f the abstracted worker, but o f Institute policy.
At one stage in the human they would -  well, through the human 
in fact -  annotators would tell you if there were genes and stuff 
found within your clones and what the genes were. After the 
human that kind o f stopped. They did revive it for a while 
during the zebra fish, I don’t know if it’s still going ahead. But 
that’s quite cool to know. That whatever you finished contained 
X and Y.
[Catherine]
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This policy, o f feeding back to members o f the Finishing team the biological 
significance o f the sequences o f letters that they arranged as part of their day-to- 
day work, injected ‘science’ into the working life o f Finishers. Several o f the 
research participants describe how this kept them engaged, even after the sense of 
‘doing something worthwhile’ had shrunk in the face of the mundanity of day-to- 
day work. Neneh, a scientific administrator who had worked in Finishing, 
describes how this feedback kept her connected with the product o f her work.
But to start with it was really interesting because then you felt 
like you were doing something a bit more worthwhile. Because 
in some respects finishing is just- Because you spend so much 
time in front o f  a computer, you feel a bit like you’re in your 
own little world and you’re not really aware of the sort o f effects 
that it has. But when you get that back saying that this is for 
such and such a gene and you can see that someone, somewhere, 
is going to use that you feel a bit more, ‘Oh, that’s good, I’m 
quite impressed about that.’ Yeah.
[Neneh]
Catherine sums these attitudes up in a single sentence.
It certainly makes it a bit more scientific than just looking at a 
bunch o f letters.
[Catherine]
Not all sections o f the sequencing chain o f production received this kind of 
feedback. Claudia, who had worked in Production at the height of the Human 
Genome Project, did not receive the kind o f feedback described by Catherine and 
Neneh. The attractiveness o f the idea o f receiving some kind o f feedback as to 
the meaning o f the work being conducted was evident from Claudia’s response 
when she was asked about the feedback that had been received by Finishers. 
Claudia described how  this kind o f feedback would change the connection that 
she had with her work.
No, and I wish we did. I’d love that feedback. It’d be great.
The other day, was it- we have to say what we’ve been 
sequencing and someone came out with some posh word. And 
it's like, well, w hat’s that? And they went, ‘it’s a pea’. It’s like, 
well, why are we sequencing peas? You know, it just- it would 
be interesting.
[Claudia]
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The desire to be engaged in the products o f work, to understand the meaning of 
the day-to-day labours, is evident in the extract from the interview with Claudia. 
Julia, like Claudia, a member o f the Pre-Finishing team, also says that she would 
like to know more about the scientific significance of the laboratory procedures 
that she carries out. Julia suggests that the reason that she is not engaged is a 
product o f her unusual working hours, which puts her outside the same circuits in 
which she imagines that the rest o f those working in Pre-Finishing are involved. 
However, the feedback, which is identified by Finishers as being their main route 
to any engagement in the meaning o f their work, was not a feature of work in 
Production or Pre-Finishing. So, while members of Production teams and the 
Pre-Finishing team are separated, even alienated (Seeman, 1959 [1970]), from the 
meaning o f their work, for a time at least, members o f the Finishing teams were 
subjectively engaged in their work.
Helen, a member o f a Finishing team, describes how she feels that the process of 
engaging workers in the meaning o f their work, by providing feedback on the 
biological significance o f the sequence that they finish, does more than provide 
people working in Finishing with satisfaction.
Because otherwise you just... it’d just a whole bunch o f letters 
that you put together and it just means nothing. So it was really 
nice to know, and then it reminds you that it’s important that you 
get it right.
[Helen]
Helen suggests that engagement with the meaning of work is an important means 
of maintaining high standards o f  quality. This argument, given Helen’s 
description o f finishing as being ‘just a whole bunch o f letters you put together’, 
applies even when conducting tasks that might be considered routine compared to 
the working lives o f research scientists who have the room to act independently 
and creatively. If H elen’s observation is correct, this supports the arguments 
found in Chapter C, Pathologies o f  Work in Big Science. One o f the ‘pathologies’ 
o f big science is not simply the subjective alienation o f scientific workers, but that, 
in being alienated from the products o f their work, scientific workers can be
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separated from the moral imperatives that commit those working in science to 
produce reliable knowledge.
Helen expands on her description o f the effects o f separation from the meaning of 
work. While, subjectively, engagement in the meaning o f work is a rescue from 
routine, it also produces objective effects.
And maybe that's one o f the problems, maybe if they still e- 
mailed that around then the finisher might be thinking, well 
maybe I should make sure, doubly make sure, this is right.
[Helen]
It is not just through engagement in the meaning of work that one has a sense of 
‘working in science'. The special nature o f science is able to recruit sentiment 
into the workplace through other means. Elizabeth, who described her awareness 
that the day-to-day details o f her job  were part o f the production o f progress, 
described how she was also linked into the unique reward and recognition 
structure o f science. Even though this connection is largely passive, being 
accorded the authorship o f a scientific paper is symbolic marker o f being part of 
the special community o f science. Elizabeth describes how she discovered that 
she was a co-author on a scientific paper.
I tell you what was quite nice, that I found out completely by 
accident. I was bored one day and I Googled myself.
[Elizabeth]
AB: Right.
And I found out I am a co-writer on a paper about genes.
[Elizabeth]
Elizabeth describes how this process did not produce engagement with the 
meaning o f  her work.
[laughing] And I was none the wiser about this entirely. I 
remember the project because it was a complete and utter pain in 
the arse, which often the ones with gene-heavy areas are 
[laughing], but I haven’t got round to reading the paper yet.
[Elizabeth]
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This formal recognition o f their labour as scientific work is a symbolic marker 
that they belong to the special community of science. This does not, in itself, 
produce engagement. It does not, as we can see from the experience o f Elizabeth, 
necessitate a connection with the meaning of work. But being part of the reward 
and recognition system o f science does allow some o f the research participants, 
particularly those working in Finishing, to think of themselves as not only 
working in science, but as scientists.
For some though, this sense o f being involved in science is ebbing. This is part of 
the changing experiences o f work that are explored in Chapter L, Interlude: Dis­
engagem ent and Dis-Integration.
To the outside world I’m a scientist. To any other public or
private institute, yeah, w e're scientists. It is science -  there was
science in there somewhere once.
[Catherine]
[.. .]
I mean, it's the whole finishing, sequencing -  it’s more 
production that true science.
[Catherine]
As is discussed in Chapter F, The Factory and The University, there is a sense that
the Institute is becoming more factory-like. This factory cannot recruit the
sentiments to the same degree as the scientific, university like workplace that the 
Institute was. For some, o f course, there is little sense in which they consider 
themselves scientists, even if they do work in science. When Julia was asked if 
she thought o f herself as a scientist, she replied; “Only when we’re using dry ice”.
The human is special
The idea that it was not just science, but the project to sequence o f the human 
genome that was ‘special’, is a feature o f accounts of engagement with work at 
the Institute. Again, there are arguments that make the case that the human 
genome is objectively a special object, but this is a discussion o f the subjective 
experience o f work at the Institute. The Human Genome Project b  special, in
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both the public imagination29, and in the understandings of those working on the 
production o f genome sequence. In the accounts o f research participants, the 
special nature o f the human genome is twofold. First, the research participants 
present a sense o f working towards the achievement of a goal o f historical 
importance. Second, the research participants display a sense of working on a 
project that possesses a degree of fame and celebrity, even if the majority of those 
working to achieve it do not. Even so, more than one o f the research participants 
was invited to discuss the Human Genome Project in the popular media, and these 
invitations were not limited to platforms that had any claim to being educational 
or otherwise ‘h igh-brow \
Neneh, who arrived at the Institute with a postgraduate degree in the biological 
sciences, describes the way in which the human genome became a part of her 
immediate connection with her work at the Institute.
When I first applied for it the advert did say ‘finisher’ and I had 
no idea what a finisher was. So it was kind o f a blind interview.
But then I found out what it was going to be, and mainly then it 
was sort o f the human genome. I thought that was pretty 
exciting and it was new and it was- you know, it was something 
at that point, well, still is really, that nobody else in Britain was 
doing. So I thought that was pretty cool.
[Neneh]
It was the idea o f sequencing the human genome that recruited Neneh’s 
sentiments into her work.
[ ...]  I did get quite excited and quite proud o f what we did really.
[Neneh]
Elizabeth, who was engaged by the idea o f working in science, came to work at 
the Institute in order to take part in the Human Genome Project. The public 
profile o f the Human Genome Project ensured that it stood out from the rest o f the 
world o f science.
As noted in Chapter l i  Anatom ies o f  Big Science , genetics is not just big science in som e 
specific cases by virtue o f  organisational s ize , it is generically big science. It was, through the 
1990s and into the tw enty-first century, the scien tific  genre o f  choice for pop-science and science  
fiction.
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Oh yeah. I mean, that was the main reason I came here actually.
It was something I was quite excited about. I got very into 
genetics when I was doing my A-Levels, and I had read a lot 
about it in papers and news and whatever so, yeah. I know not 
everybody did.
[Elizabeth]
The exceptional ism o f the Human Genome Project, in Elizabeth’s account, is not 
an essential feature o f the scientific object, but a product o f the cultural position 
o f the Human Genome Project at the end o f the twentieth century. The human 
genome is not inherently special, nor is it necessarily special when considered by 
reference to the internal society of science. But the human genome is certainly a 
special idea in the public, political and journalistic imaginations.
Brian, the manager o f the Pre-Finishing team, recalls the motivation that the 
sequencing the human genome lent those working at the Institute. The extract 
from the interview used to illustrate the recruitment o f sentiment that was 
achieved by the exceptionalism o f the Human Genome Project also contains its 
counterpoint; the dis-engagem ent that comes from the ‘triumph’ of 
accomplishment. Ideas such as this are explored in Chapter I: Interlude: Dis- 
Engagement and Dis-Integration.
Yeah, I remember the motivation o f doing the Human Genome 
Project. I think that’s one thing that's changed as well for the 
kind o f  detriment o f the institute is that when doing the Human 
Genome Project it was all, ‘Yes, come on we’ve got a real good 
goal, it doesn’t matter how much money we spend. We just 
need to get it done. This is fentastic, think of the future. We’re 
all going to make a huge difference’.
[Brian]
Brian binds the recruitment o f sentiment that results from the exceptionalism of 
the human genome to other features o f work at the Institute. Engagement and dis­
engagement, integration and dis-integration; these processes involve a complex 
tangle o f factors. The special nature o f the human genome is a factor that is 
external to, though influenced by, the Institute. Nevertheless, the experience of
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the exceptionalism  o f the human genome is not immune to the organisational 
forms adopted.
And now that's kind o f been lost in the way the institute’s now 
run because there isn’t that kind o f morale boosting talk going 
on any more. And people can’t see the bigger picture because 
we have been split up into these little teams.
[Brian]
The extract from the interview with Brian suggests that the increasingly acute, 
and material, division o f labour at the Institute has had an alienating effect. 
Experiencing working on the human gpnome as work o f an exceptional nature is 
therefore, according to Brian, inextricably tied to the organisational choices made 
at the Institute, and the culture that these choices creates.
Part of the culture o f work at the Institute during the sequencing of the human 
genome was regular celebrations. These are discussed in more detail section G4, 
Celebrating W ork , but the following extract from the interview with Elizabeth 
illustrates the difficultly involved in pulling apart the different threads by with the 
sentiment o f  workers was recruited into the task o f  sequencing genomes at the 
Institute.
I mean the Human Genome Project, I think because it was, I 
suppose, it was human, there was definitely, especially when 
[the race began and the Institute] had a big pulling together and 
everybody felt a really big part o f it. And you felt very proud to 
be in that, and I think that the idea o f  all working together was 
very good. And we also had, you know, parties. The parties are 
definitely an important thing. Whereas I don’t think there is the 
same feeling about it with the mouse and the zebra fish. It’s not 
got that, partly, I suppose, because it’s not us. It hasn’t got that 
kind o f  I used, you know, to say with pride I was working on 
the Human Genome Project. Working with zebra fish or the 
mouse project doesn 't really engender the same thing 
[Elizabeth]
The extract begins and ends with the assertion that the human genome is special, 
exceptional when compared to the genomes o f the zebra fish or the mouse. In 
working on a project which has an exceptional object as its focus, there is a 
resulting sense o f  pride; Elizabeth finds that her sentiments are recruited into her
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work. However, this extract also suggests that the race to sequence the human 
genom e, which is discussed in section G3, The Spark o f  Competition, and the 
regular celebrations, were important in recruiting sentiments into the work at hand. 
Elizabeth cannot separate the special nature o f the human genome from the race 
to keep the genome sequence public property, or from the celebrations held to 
reward and recognise the accomplishment o f milestones in the sequencing o f the 
human genome. For many o f those working on genome sequencing at the 
Institute, though the human genome has an inherently exceptional status as a 
scientific object, the experience o f this cannot be separated from the contingent 
features o f work at the Institute and the politics o f the commercialisation o f 
science. In their combination, these features o f the experience o f work at the 
Institute recruit sentiment, build a sense o f collectivity, and make the working on 
‘the human' special.
The Institute is special
Both the exceptional nature o f science and the special character o f the human 
genome are features o f  work that are resident in the Institute as a workplace. This 
makes the Institute itself a special place to work. For research participants this is 
not limited to an account o f how the Institute is simply a good place to work, but 
that it is a workplace with unique qualities that work to recruit their sentiments.
Julia describes her pride in working for the Institute. Flowever, given that when 
she arrived to work at the Institute she had very little idea o f its existence, Julia 
tempers her description o f the pride o f working at the Institute. She remarks that 
working at the Institute, naturally enough, only impresses those who have some 
idea what has been achieved at the Institute.
I mean it's- you feel sort o f proud when you say, you know, ‘I 
work for [the Institute]’. But the majority o f people who are 
normal, everyday people w on’t know what that is or what it’s to 
do with. I mean when you perhaps are somewhere like at the 
doctor’s, for example, and they might say, ‘What do you do?’
Then they know, and they say, ‘Oh wow, you know, that’s a cool 
place to work. [ ...]  I mean I live [nearby] and the majority o f 
people there don’t even know, apart from seeing it on signposts.
[...] But if people do know, you’re sort of, ‘Oh yeah, that’s me.
I’m part o f that’.
[Julia]
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Julia identifies herself as part o f the Institute, part o f the workplace as a collective. 
For Julia, there is a pride not only in the particulars o f her job, or in the work that 
she did that contributed to the Human Genome Project, or in the details of the 
work that she does now, but in the membership o f Institute. Her pride in her work, 
the recruitment o f her sentiment, is orientated around a sense o f collective identity.
Jill describes the features o f work at the Institute that make it a good place to 
work. But her description is not limited to the features o f the workplace that 
could be built into unexceptional workplaces.
The benefits o f  working here are enormous. In terms o f sporting 
activities, there 's a gym, the hours are flexible, there are free 
buses to work from [town], there’s a fantastic green transport 
policy. I think, on the whole, if you asked people, it’s a really 
good place to work. And I think because o f what has been 
achieved by [the Institute] I think there is a certain pride in 
belonging to that.
[jiii]
Free buses, gym membership, flexible hours; all these are features of work at the 
Institute that work to recruit sentiment, but they are not what makes the Institute 
itself an exceptional workplace. The exceptionalism o f the Institute is found in its 
history, in its accomplishments. Jill describes pride in being a member of the 
Institute as a result o f its history. It is the membership o f a collective with an 
identity that marks it quite different from other workplaces, as being exceptional 
rather than mundane, which recruits the sentiments o f the research participants.
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G 3  T h e  S p a r k  o f  C o m p e t i t i o n
As described in Chapter A, Primers, in 1998 Celera, led by Craig Venter, 
announced that they would sequence the human genome quicker and for less 
expense than the existing publicly-funded Human Genome Project. Sequencing 
the human genome became a race. Competition for priority is part of the history 
in science (see, for example, Merton’s classic discussion, 1957 [1973]). This race, 
though, was different in two ways. First, the race was publicly declared and had a 
celebrity life. The race for priority was a subject for polarised reporting in the 
popular media. Second, this public life was a result of the fact that the outcome 
of the race was understood as having consequences far beyond the boundaries of 
science. It was not just that the sequencing o f the human genome would change 
the world, but that the question o f who sequenced it would determine the 
character of these changes. The race was characterised as being between the 
public good and private enclosure. Or, conversely and less commonly, between 
free enterprise and socialistic communalism. The experience of being part of a 
race brought its own effects to the way in which sentiment was recruited into 
work at the Institute.
One of the research participants had been involved in a race for priority before. 
He likened the experience o f racing against the privately-funded project to his 
experience o f the search for a gene involved in breast cancer.
But I mean previously there was another race I don’t know if 
you know about. It was for the breast cancer gene which was 
back in ’96 in the old building. [...] But we were specifically 
racing against time to find the breast cancer gene against the 
Americans. And that really, really inspired people back then.
[Brian]
Speaking o f the race to sequence the human genome, Brian says that the spark of 
competition reinvigorated people.
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Yes it did. Although that [the race] was coming more towards 
the end o f the Human Genome Project so there was less of that 
sort o f enthusiasm. That did kind o f spark it up again.
[Brian]
In this account, the race to sequence the human genome is placed firmly in the 
tradition o f priority races in science. The advent of the race was a spark that 
rekindled the fire o f engagement in work at the Institute, which had been fading 
as the Human Genome Project moved past the excitement of beginnings. But 
while the outcome of the search for breast cancer genes has the potential to have a 
tremendous impact on the world outside o f science, the race itself is not 
conducted in the full view o f the public. The race between the public project and 
Celera held public and political interest that is usually absent from these 
competitive expressions o f scientific creativity.
The public and political interest in the outcome o f the race to sequence the human 
genome was an indication that this race for priority did not motivate and engage 
solely through competition. The race to sequence the human genome contained a 
moral and political dimension. To those who worked to sequence the human 
genome at the Institute, it mattered who won, not for the sake of pride, but 
because they were the ‘good guys’. Helen describes this moral vision of work.
In the past I really enjoyed being part o f the Human Genome 
Project. I liked the idea that the sequence that we were putting 
out, it was going- I liked the whole race thing, that we were the 
good guys trying to put it out there for free, and it was going to 
be used to help researchers, with disease and stuff.
[Helen]
So, the race was not just between ‘us’ and ‘them’, between one academic 
laboratory and another. In the emergence o f a rival that was not just a scientific 
competitor but that was also a political antithesis of the scientific values of the 
Institute, the work acquired a moral weight. As Professor Ingham explains, this 
was a win or lose situation for more than just the laboratories concerned. The 
identity of the victor would have consequences beyond the distribution of the 
rewards o f science, beyond even the award o f prizes, or the little immortality that 
accompanies the naming o f memorial chairs o f genetics.
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[It was a w]in or lose situation. As I say, in terms of ownership, 
not in terms of the quality of the science or the way it was done.
All of that was very irrelevant, but it was definitely the question 
o f public ownership or private ownership.
[Professor Ingham]
Contrary to the intuitive expectations, the advent of the race is not remembered as 
manifesting itself materially in the form of an intensification of work. We might 
expect a win or lose race with moral and political implications to lead to increased 
pressures to meet targets, to cut costs, to improve efficiencies. But this was not 
the experience at the level o f the laboratory bench. When asked if there was any 
pressure to be ‘economical’ during the race to sequence the human genome, Brian, 
who, during that time, was then working as a sequencer, explained how the 
experience of the race was quite different to what might be expected.
Certainly not, certainly not. It was more like an open cheque 
book. We could hire as many people as needed, we could throw 
basically everything chemical-wise at the projects that we could 
and no-one really batted an eyelid.
[Brian]
It was not merely, then, that the race brought a sense of moral purpose to those 
working at the Institute. It was also that, in this case, the sense of the race being 
an all or nothing struggle appropriated the resources that were needed to ensure 
victory. This provided the Institute with the means that were required to liberate 
itself from the constraints o f efficiencies and the binds of tight structures.
In this race between scientific organisations with ideologically antithetical 
understandings o f the ownership o f knowledge, the idea o f being a ‘good guy’ 
and that the opponents are the ‘bad guys’ found expression right through the 
Institute. Most o f the research participants were fer removed from the politics of 
international science funding and intellectual property. Nonetheless, those 
working at the day-to-day production o f sequence found their sentiments were 
recruited and organised against the enemy. Elizabeth describes the reaction of 
those working in Production to the advent of the race.
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[W]e weren’t going to let him [Venter] get away with that 
[laughing], you know? So lots of pictures of him appeared with 
devil horns and things around the place [laughing].
[Elizabeth]
When the researcher expressed surprise that someone working in sequencing 
would be aware of the race in this fashion, Elizabeth expanded on her description.
Oh yeah. Oh yeah, definitely. Everybody knew about it. It was 
kind o f a personal challenge. Everybody, it really did. I don’t 
know whether that would work now, but it really was kind of, 
we weren’t, after all that, we weren’t going to let him go 
patenting all our genes and all that. [...] [T]here was definitely a 
feeling that this was a challenge for everybody.
[Elizabeth]
Claudia also worked in Production at the advent of the race. Describing how it 
felt to do something worthwhile, she asked the researcher if he had heard of Craig 
Venter, and then explained the level o f antipathy.
Well, he was trying to get out exactly the same [sequence], but 
he was going to try and privatise it. [ ...] Whereas we were doing 
it for the public, and so that made it even more like, ‘Oh my God, 
yeah! We must beat him because we don’t want him, like, 
playing God with everybody’s lives. And you know, I was 
really up for it coming into the public [domain], so yeah. It was 
really great. Great atmosphere. Everyone seemed challenged [...] 
[Claudia]
The race was not a common, garden-variety race for priority of the kind that is 
found throughout the history o f science. Rather, it was understood by those 
working at the Institute as a contest between public good and private selfishness. 
The challenge of the race recruited the sentiment of those working at the Institute 
not only through adding a sense o f challenge, but through injecting a moral 
dimension to their labours. This moral dimension required the presence o f a 
villain, Craig Venter, who was both cartooned into the role o f minor devil and 
feared as scientist who wanted to play at being God. While the recruitment of 
sentiment produced by the exceptionalism of science, of the human genome, and 
of the Institute are the result o f positive associations, for the race to be a moral 
mission required a negative against which the Institute could be contrasted. And
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it was the Institute that was contrasted, as this moral dimension was not 
understood as question o f private virtue o f those working on the public project. 
Rather, being the ‘good guy’ was the collective virtue of the Institute. The 
sentiments were organised around the collectivity. In so much as they extended 
beyond the concrete and the local, the interests that those working at the Institute 
imagined themselves to be defending through their labours were those of all 
humanity.
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G 4  C e l e b r a t in g  w o r k
Accounts o f working at the Institute are marked by reference to regular, collective, 
on-site parties. As Elizabeth noted in the extract used to illustrate G2, 
Exceptionalism, these were im portant in creating a sense o f ‘all working together’. 
Elizabeth describes the way in w hich collective celebrations were made part of 
work life at the Institute.
I know it sounds sort o f w eird because it’s, you know, but [the 
founding director], they w ould always find some excuse for a 
big party in about June/July tim e. It wouldn’t matter what the 
excuse was. It would be- they would find a landmark that had 
been passed and you would have a 10 mega base party or a 100 
mega base party or 200 m ega base or whatever or finish of the 
Human Genome Project. T h ey  would find one. There was 
normally a landmark that could be found around July time and 
they would have a party. We d o n ’t seem to do that now.
[Elizabeth]
We should note that Elizabeth m akes reference to the founding director when 
accounting for the regular celebrations. The personalisation o f the engagement in 
work at the Institute is discussed in section G6, Personalising the Workplace. 
Elizabeth displays noticeable cynicism  with regard to whether these celebrations 
were a response to the achievem ents o f  any ‘real’ landmarks. They would always 
find some excuse, she says. H ow ever, this cynicism, unlike that the kind which is 
discussed in Chapter I: Interlude: Dis-Engagement and Dis-Integration, is 
coloured by an appreciation o f  the benefits that these collective social events 
bring. Again, this account o f engagem ent is marked by a regret that these events 
are no longer a feature o f working a t the Institute.
The lament that these celebrations a re  no longer a central part of a working life at 
the Institute is a feature o f the accounts o f  many of the research participants. 
Neneh, who has moved into w orking  in administration as the Institute has 
developed, placed her description o f  the celebrations in the context of an 
understanding o f the economic p ressures that led to the end o f regular 
celebrations.
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And then when we did achieve things we had those big 
celebrations which was great, we were lucky to have them. [...]
And it’s the one thing now that people who have been here a 
long time always say that they miss. Because it was nice, and 
we would get- you know, they would write off an afternoon 
basically and say, ‘Well done, go and have a party’. So we’d all 
just go and sit outside, which was nice.
[Neneh]
The role that the laments o f the ending o f regular celebrations play in the accounts 
o f the present is discussed in Chapter I, Interlude: Dis-Engagement and Dis­
integration.
Celebrations order the recruitment o f sentiments around the sense of belonging to 
the Institute. For Durkheim, the maintenance of collective sentiments requires 
symbols. Symbols of the collective ideals can take many forms (Lukes, 1973). 
The symbol can be a place, such as a site o f pilgrimage30. Symbols can be human 
beings; we find them in the images o f the great men of science conjured by their 
hagiographers. In emblems; at the Institute we find the symbolic use of the 
double helix o f DNA in both sculpture and stained glass. And, not least, in events, 
in celebrations. The role o f collective events in maintaining the orientation of 
sentiments around the collective, the Institute, can be seen not only in the positive 
accounts, but also in the laments. And, interestingly, in the example of resistance 
to the recruitment of sentiment that we examine in Chapter I, Interlude: Dis- 
Engagement and Dis-Integration. The celebrations, never mind the bouncy castle 
and the free alcohol, might not carry the research participants to the heights of 
religious ecstasy. Nevertheless, they serve to create periods of creation and 
renewal” when “men are brought into more intimate relations with one another, 
when meetings and assemblies are more frequent, relationships more solid and the 
exchange o f ideas more active” . They bring “men together and [make] them 
communicate in the same intellectual and moral life’ (Lukes, 1973, p. 422, 
quoting Durkheim).
30 The Large Hadron C ollider, a big science apparatus cum institution, has been described, with 
irony but not without meaning, as a cathedral o f  science.
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The parties and celebrations that mark accounts of working at the Institute helped 
to produce sense of collective identity. They ensured that the achievements o f the 
Institute were felt to be the achievements o f all the people working there. But 
they also were an attempt to ensure that the achievements of the people working 
there were felt as the achievements o f the Institute. The celebrations, as the most 
visible sign o f reward and recognition, involved senior scientists, team managers, 
and workers from right down the length o f the sequencing chain o f production, to 
those who spent their shifts pouring the gels for the automated sequencers, 
drinking and bouncing on inflatable castles side by side.
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G 5 T h e  W o r k  is F l a t
Many o f the research participants’ accounts o f the experience of work at the 
Institute describe very little overt hierarchy. This is not just in ‘social’ areas such 
as the cafe, in which participants describe no distinction between the members of 
the board o f management, senior scientists, and those working at the day-to-day 
task o f  genome sequencing. More than that, research participants recall that there 
were deliberate attempts to avoid any sense o f overbearing hierarchy; in work 
spaces as well as spaces that might be designated ‘social’. ‘Flat’ organisational 
structure is something that has swung into fashion in the management literature, 
as we explore in Chapter H, The High Road to the Human Genome. In the case of 
the Institute, the impetus for adopting this model can be traced back not to MBA, 
but to PhD.
Professor Ingham, a senior genome scientist, describes some of the motivation to 
build into the organisation o f the Institute as flat a hierarchy as possible.
[We were] keen and I think we were somewhat successful in 
running as flat a structure as possible. In other words, it wasn’t 
tremendously hierarchical. In fact we interestingly, in a way 
driven by the staff, and with a tiny bit o f management training, 
we were forced to make some structures, more than I would have 
liked. People like it, otherwise things get unfair. If you have a 
totally flat structure there are people who feel they aren’t being 
treated right, they’re not getting exactly the same treatment as 
someone else. So that means you have to make some sort of 
grades, promotion structure, and all the rest of it, and then 
everybody settles down. But I think in terms of the sense of 
teamwork I really wanted to have it as nearly as possible like [a 
small science, university-based laboratory].
[Professor Ingham]
In this interview extract, Professor Ingham is explicit that the organisational 
character that senior scientific figures sought to create at the Institute was that of 
the small science model. The cfesire for a flat organisational structure did not 
come from management training, which, indeed, was a non-existent expertise 
until after the Institute was established. Rather, it emerges from the cultural 
origins, from the hinterland o f work, o f those with responsibility for creating the
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Institute and leading the Human Genome Project; the world of work o f small 
science.
The extract from the interview with Professor Ingham describes the way in which, 
as the Institute developed, the peculiarities o f the organisational model of small 
science became apparent. These peculiarities rubbed against the nature o f a 
workplace that did not adopt the scientific reward system of publication, esteem 
and autonomy. To resolve this, a greater degree o f formal structure was required, 
but the cultural origins, indeed, the hinterland o f work, from which those creating 
the Institute emerged, produced the argument that the model for successful 
scientific work was as flat a structure as possible. Susan, a member of the board 
o f management, recalls the way that the work of sequencing genomes was 
originally imagined.
And the way the original proposal was set out was that basically 
we would have seventeen teams o f ten people doing the same 
thing in parallel. [...] And that team of ten was based on the lab 
structure that [the founding director] had built up at the [small 
science laboratory] to do the first worm sequence -  cosmid 
sequencing. So we were just going to multiply it umpteen times.
[Susan]
The original vision was for the Institute to be, in effect, a series of small science 
laboratories. This did not happen, as the difficulties of performing “sub-cloning, 
picking, sequencing, and then the finishing, all done within that little 
environment” [Susan] were evident before the Institute was established. 
Problems o f expertise and technique were later coupled with the pressures o f the 
race. As described in section G2, Exceptionalism, this race was understood as a 
‘win or lose situation’. Professor Ingham describes the ‘irrationality’ of the 
rationalisation that the race demanded o f  the Institute.
So at that point it was beyond science, now we were talking 
politics and economics, [laughs] To simply keep the thing in the 
public domain. That’s a whole different kind o f pressure.
There’s absolutely no reason to do genome sequencing as fast as 
it was done. It would not have been much slower anyway to be 
honest. Saving a few months became very important at that 
point for very irrational reasons.
[Professor Ingham]
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The race was understood as one of the factors that denied the Institute the ‘flat’ 
organisational and cultural model chosen for it by senior scientists. This entailed 
the loss of the small science-style recruitment of sentiment, organised around a 
laboratory, around individual reward and recognition by scientific peers, and 
abstractly, around sets o f ideas. However, this was off-set by the fact that the race 
itself worked to recruit sentiment, as described is section G3, The Spark o f  
Competition. By producing a world in which there were ‘good guys’ and ‘bad 
guys’, the race to sequence the human genome engendered a different sort of 
recruitment o f sentiment. This was organised around the larger collectives of the 
Institute and the Human Genome Project.
Despite the way in which the values produced by a hinterland of work in small 
science were forced to adapt to the demands of large-scale sequencing, the 
attempt to produce a flat culture was felt by the research participants. ‘Flatness’ 
was felt in the informality of the relationships of the research participants with 
their superiors. This is seen in both accounts o f work, and accounts o f the way in 
which members of the institute socialised together. Again, we find that the 
descriptions o f the past arrangements o f work at the Institute are contrasted with 
an undesirable present. Claudia, who had worked in a factory prior to joining the 
Institute, described the increasing formality of work at the Institute. This 
formality makes the structure and hierarchy o f work plain.
Yes, definitely. Whereas before I’d just go in the office and go,
‘Oi! You’, just face-to-face, talk to someone. But it it’s like,
well, ‘mail the boss’.
[Claudia]
This does not so much describe a change in the hierarchy of the Institute, but a 
change in the way the hierarchy o f the Institute is experienced in day-to-day work. 
The effects o f the increasing visibility of the hierarchical structure o f the Institute 
on the experience o f work are discussed in Chapter I, Interlude: Dis-Engagement 
and Dis-Integration.
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Hierarchical relationships are not limited to differentiation by reference to formal 
rank. There are also hierarchies o f esteem. A steep hierarchy of esteem would 
impress itself upon social relationships between people even if their formal ranks 
are relatively undifferentiated. This is the kind of hierarchical relationship that 
we see in academia, often despite the lack of great differences in formal rank and 
bureaucratic power. In the case o f the Institute, the hierarchies of esteem were 
not experienced by the research participants as being particularly steep. Julia and 
Maggie, in the context o f describing the way in which they could find out about 
the biological significance o f their work, such as through the seminars that are 
available, describe the degree o f social differentiation in the canteen.
Oh yes, there’s some very clever people.
[Julia]
Yes, very.
[Maggie]
Because you wouldn’t know it really. You know, you wouldn’t 
know it from sitting down in the canteen with them 1.
[Julia]
No.
[Maggie]
Or, whatever, you know.
[Julia]
So very open?
[Researcher]
Yes. You know it’s- there’s no sort o f top people sitting down at 
one end and the other- you know, you wouldn’t know whether 
you were talking to the cleaner or the- 
[ Julia]
No.
[Maggie]
The person in charge.
[Julia]
31 This might be a subtle reference to a lack o f  social skills among those people classed as ‘very 
clever’.
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This is almost certainly an idealised vision of the way in which the canteen 
operates as a social space. Nevertheless, this ideal is believed to be true. Section 
G4, Celebrating Work, describes how the ‘social’ aspects of work at the Institute 
are not limited to the canteen, the coffee shop and the laboratory. There are also 
celebrations. These celebrations break down the experience of a hierarchy o f rank 
and esteem  With celebrations such a central aspect of work at the Institute 
during the Human Genome Project, a key aspect of the experience of work are 
occasions that demand that people behave as equals. Indeed, as people who are 
sometimes embarrassingly equal, as Claudia remembers the founding director at 
one of the celebrations.
Running down the corridor at a party, booze, girl in arms, having 
a laugh [...]
[Claudia]
This diminution o f the experience o f hierarchy recruits the sentiments of those 
working at the Institute. The director, the members of the board of management, 
the senior scientists, the team managers, all are ‘equal’ to the bench worker, all 
are members of the Institute, and, as so, share the same interests. Elizabeth 
describes how her friend recalls a particularly informal interaction with the 
founding director.
Elizabeth: [...] I mean, a friend o f mine is quite proud of the fact 
that he went to [the founding director’s] leaving party and gave 
him the bumps [laughing].
[Elizabeth]
These celebrations, as we discuss in section G4, Celebrating Work, not only 
rewarded people collectively and tied the sentiments of those working at the 
Institute with the successes and achievements of everyone working there, but they 
also demanded that people working at the Institute experience interaction with 
each other as equals. They worked to ‘flatten’ the experience of hierarchy o f the 
Institute. That the Institute felt like a socially flat place of work was the product 
of the values derived from the small science hinterland of work of its leaders, and 
the deliberate fostering o f a sense o f collectivity.
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G 6  P e r s o n a l is in g  t h e  W o r k p l a c e
Sentiments might be collective, as Durkheim argued, but they are experienced as 
being acutely personal. Therefore, it is not surprising that the personalisation of 
the workplace is one o f the most common ways in which the research participants 
illustrate the way in which their sentiment was recruited. In working at the 
Institute, their sentiment has been orientated towards the founding director, who is 
a contingently charismatic leader. As the founding director is a symbol of the 
values o f the Institute, the sentiments are recruited into the service of the 
collective. The personalisation o f the workplace mirrors Edwards (1979) 
description o f entrepreneurial firm. But the power of contingently charismatic 
leadership also has its limits. “Naturally, control exercised personally by the 
capitalist could be no more effective than the force of the individual capitalist’s 
personality” (p. 26-27).
Claudia describes how the founding director transformed the most individual of 
events into a collective accomplishment that would recruit sentiment to the 
collective. The founding director was awarded the prize in question for work that 
he had conducted before founding the Institute.
I mean even when [the founding director] picked up the award, 
he was so humble about it. He was- you know, it’s just like, you 
felt proud working for him because he was so nice and, like, ‘I 
take this on behalf o f everyone, not just rry se lf. [...] Even back 
to the people in the lab and that, you just think, ‘Yeah! That’s 
great, you know, he didn’t forget anybody’. And then obviously 
we’ve got a new person in now who maybe ain’t the same. You 
know, he’s not the same.
[Claudia]
This extract from the interview with Claudia demonstrates two aspects of the 
personalisation o f the workplace. First, it describes one of the more overt ways 
that the charisma o f the founding director recruited sentiment from those working 
from him. Second, it illustrates the way that research participants bcate many of 
the changes that have taken place at their workplace in the personalities of the 
directors. The recruitment o f  sentiment was not just organised around the
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founding director, but also around the Institute. By thanking ‘the people in the 
lab’ the founding director made a successful show of humility with regard to the 
individualised rewards and recognition that he was receiving, and included all the 
people of the Institute in the highest reaches of the reward system of science. 
They were included as members o f a collective, rather than as individuals.
Catherine, a specialist member o f the Finishing team, personalises the changes 
that have occurred in the organisation o f work at the Institute. Catherine feels that 
the main change in the way that work at the Institute is arranged is in the 
increasing sense o f structure. She explains the comparatively unstructured past of 
the Institute through reference to the personality of the founding director.
I suppose it's the changeover from [the founding director] 
stepping down when the human was kind of finally complete to 
[the new director] taking over. I suppose [the founding director] 
essentially an old school scientist and a hippy. So everything 
was very laid back and it was kind of like, it's science it'll 
happen in its own time.
[Catherine]
For Catherine, as for others working at the Institute, the personality of the 
founding director enjoyed a degree o f correspondence with the arrangement of 
work. Under the leadership of the new director, Catherine describes the 
organisation o f work and the definition of roles at the Institute as becoming 
increasingly defined.
So [the new director] kind o f coming in it's less laid back, it's a 
lot more work centric, a lot more- I think there's a lot more 
structure as to what's expected o f you.
[Catherine]
Catherine’s experience o f being engaged with the Institute and the Project is 
inextricably connected to her experience of the founding director as a person. 
This provides people working at the Institute with a way of personalising the end 
of the Human Genome Project and the post-human genome diversification of the 
Institute. The structure o f work, and through this, the character of the Institute, is 
understood by reference to the personalities o f the directors. Understood in this
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way, the celebrations, the sense o f flatness, indeed, all the aspects o f work at the 
Institute that were engaging and integrating, were the products of the personality 
of the founding director.
At the very end of her interview, Helen suggested that one aspect o f a working 
life at the Institute that had been missed in the conduct of the interview was the 
importance o f the person o f the director.
I think a big change was with the change of director. That... I 
think that made a big difference because they had different 
priorities; they came from different points of view. [...] But 
because [the founding director] had been there from the 
beginning and he always came across as being this really easy­
going nice guy, but then [the new director] came over from 
America, and he was much more American in, like, I don’t know, 
his style of going about things.
[Helen]
This ‘American’ style is experienced as an increase in the visibility of 
management practices, o f pushes for efficiency, o f targets and monitoring. The 
ways that these changes in the subjective experience of work are accounted for by 
the research participants is discussed in Chapter I, Interlude: Dis-Engagement and 
Dis-In tegration.
The person o f the founding director is the object upon which many research 
participants locate their engagement and integration with the Institute. The way 
in which the person of the founding director recruited the sentiments of those 
working at the institute was by making them feel a part of the Institute. Even 
when personalised in this fashion, the sentiments that are recruited are organised 
around the collective. Julia suggests that making people feel part o f the Institute 
was a distinctive feature o f the founding director.
Julia: And like [the founding director], I mean he was always for 
that, wasn’t he, when he was here?
[Julia]
It is possible to understand the founding director’s personality, in terms of his 
attitudes towards work, as the product o f enculturation in small science; his
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arrival at the Institute from a hinterland of work in academia. Indeed, in Chapter 
H, The High Road to the Human Genome, we suggest that the similarity o f some 
features of the Institute to the kinds of practices that are advocated for managing 
knowledge work are a feature o f convergent evolution rather than common 
descent. From PhD, not MBA. But the new director is also a scientist. 
Reflecting on Helen’s observation on the origin of the directors, it certainly might 
be possible to say something about the academic cultures of Britain and of the US 
that produced the founding director and the new director respectively. The new 
director certainly was a far better fit for Lewontin’s (2001) characterisation of 
academic molecular biologists as being thoroughly entangled in commercial 
biotechnology; the new director certainly had experience of the commercialisation 
of science. But it is not simply a question of the personality of a leader producing 
corresponding structures in the workplace. Even powerful characters, even the 
most charismatic, must bow to the fact that “[m]en make their own history, but 
they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances 
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and 
transmitted from the past” (Marx, 1852 [2006]). As much as the accounts 
describe the shaping o f the Institute according to the character of the directors, 
these accounts also personalise and individualise the organisational structures and 
changes that are the products o f circumstances beyond even the will of 
accomplished scientists.
True, the founding director was charismatic; it was common for research 
participants to describe his easy-going, laid back, yst motivational nature. But he 
was contingently charismatic; the historically important project, the vast resources 
that accompany such a project, and the fact that the Institute began under his 
guidance as a handful o f people all allow the demonstration o f  charisma. 
Conversely, the new director is, as a consequence of the accomplishments of the 
Institute, the leader o f a workplace that is without a moral mission such as the 
Human Genome Project, that, in order to survive, needs to diversify, ending the 
position of large-scale sequencing as the purpose of the Institute, and which, in 
the face of funding agencies whose pockets no longer seem bottomless, needs to 
economise. These circumstances are not the product of the character of the
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directors, but the experience o f their character is a consequence of these 
circumstances.
Mommsen (1989) describes W eber’s definition of the charisma of a person as 
being “the strength of the belief o f the masses in their capacity for leadership” (p. 
13). In the circumstances o f the Institute during the Human Genome Project, the 
research participants held full belief in the capacity of the founding director to 
lead. Charismatic leadership “motivates the leader’s followers from the inside out. 
They are supposed not only to lend full support but also to rationalize their own 
conduct in accordance with the ideals spelt out by the leader” (p. 116). The 
contingent charisma o f the founding director recruited the sentiments of the 
research participants into the Institute, into the ideals of a collective workplace 
with a mission to secure the sequence o f the human genome as a public good.
We should reflect that in so much as charismatic leadership contains the potential 
to be creative and innovative, for Weber this can serve as a counter-balance to the 
sclerosis of bureaucratisation as described in Chapter C, Pathologies o f  Work in 
Big Science. As Mommsen (1989) describes the problems of rationalised, 
bureaucratic rule; “the impersonal nature o f legal rule, associated with the 
progressive elimination o f all forms o f individual activity, creates conditions 
which will eventually precipitate its failure, or more often its petrification” (p.
116). Incentives for innovation are lost, as is the ability to react flexibly to meet 
challenges from within and without. Is the solution to the problems of the 
Modernisation o f science a combination o f charismatic rule and bureaucratic 
governance? Brown and Hesketh (2004) identify a change from bureaucratic 
management to charismatic leadership as being one of the images of the transition 
to a post- industrial future.
But charisma is not some essential feature o f a human being. Not only is it social 
being that determines consciousness (Marx, 1859 [1999]), seen in this example in 
the way that fie founding director’s arrival at the Institute from hinterland of 
work in small science can be seen as shaping his ideal of the workplace, but that 
the contingent circumstances determine the range of charismatic leadership that 
can be displayed. If we are to avoid the pessimism of big science, we might then
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suggest that, in order to retain the dynamism and creativity of science in the face 
o f scientific organisations that are Modernised, rationalised and bureaucratised, 
we cannot rely on the emergence o f ‘great men’, but rather we need to defend, or 
create, systems that produce contingent charisma.
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G 7  C o l l e c t iv it y  a n d  C o m m u n it y
This chapter demonstrates that is difficult to tease apart the separate threads by 
which sentiment has been recruited to work at the Institute. The exceptionalism 
of work in science, of the human genome, of the Institute itself, coupled with the 
race to sequence the human genome, the celebrations to reward and recognise the 
achievements o f the Institute, the culture that eschews overt hierarchy, and the 
charisma of the founding director; all are intertwined in the recruitment of 
sentiment. In this chapter, we comb out some o f the tangles that are present in the 
accounts o f the research participants. Nevertheless, while ideal types might have 
sharply defined edges, there is a reason why these only serve as scaffolds are not 
a descriptions of the real thing; messy interweaving is the description of the social 
shape o f work at the Institute, not a failure o f description.
The sentiments recruited from those working at the Institute are organised around 
the larger collective, the Institute itself. At Chapter I, Interlude: Dis-Engagement 
and Dis-Integration shows, some o f this collectivity was a product o f the small 
size o f the workforce. This size was amenable to close social relationships 
between people working at the Institute, between people of different rank in the 
hierarchy. Size does its own work in generating a feeling that there was a ‘flat’ 
structure. Elizabeth describes the feeling o f the Institute during the early years.
Especially when I first started it was almost a sort o f  there were
so few people and your team was like a family and it was really
close.
[Elizabeth]
As the Institute grew, the degree to which the Institute could be experienced as a 
‘family’, and could therefore lay claim to the sentiments of the research 
participants, was diminished. This, as we see in this chapter, was ameliorated by 
the conscious creation o f a feeling of collectivity through events such as 
celebrations, as well as through the personality of the founding director. 
Circumstances allowed the founding director to write a laid-back feel through the 
structures o f work at the Institute. The ‘specialness’ of various aspects of 
working at the Institute also engaged research participants, as did the firing of the
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competitive sparks as the race ignited. These worked not only to recruit the 
sentiments of those working at the Institute into their own work, but also into the 
Institute and the Human Genome Project.
The recruitment of sentiment is the product o f a workplace in which there are 
intrinsic satisfactions. Watson (2003) cites Parker (1983) to list some features of 
work itself that are indicators o f increased satisfaction and dissatisfaction. The 
experiences o f creating something, o f  using skill, or working wholeheartedly and 
working with other competent people, all build satisfaction. The experiences of 
doing repetitive work, o f only making a small part o f something, of doing useless 
work, o f being insecure, o f close supervision, all generate dissatisfaction. Watson 
(2003) describes how work can have intrinsic satisfactions, if it is enriching, 
challenging and fulfilling, for example. These provide work with expressive 
meaning. Work, of course, can also provide extrinsic satisfaction, in which work 
is a means to an end. In these cases work has instrumental meaning. As we see 
in the case o f Abi, described in Chapter I, Dis-Engagement and Dis-Integration, 
there are some at the Institute who resist the recruitment of sentiment and yet are 
not dissatisfied. Rather, they find their work extrinsically satisfying.
Watson (2003) cites Blauner (1960) to discuss satisfaction. Blauner suggested 
four main areas that govern the degree o f satisfaction experienced. First, the 
relative prestige o f the job. Second, the degree o f independence and control that 
the worker has with regard to their working conditions. Third, the degree of 
social satisfactions enjoyed from working in a group. Fourth, the degree that the 
worker is involved in non-work socialisation with colleagues. Examining this list, 
we can see these fit onto the people working at the Institute, helping us to 
understand the recruitment o f sentiment and the degree of commitment that they 
display. The work that they do was prestigious, in that it was part of the Human 
Genome Project, and it remains prestigious, though not to the same degree, as it is 
work in science. The work is not directed on a minute-by-minute basis, with 
responsibility devolved. Though this could be seen as an internalisation of 
supervision, it is experienced as some degree o f autonomy. The work might not 
be obviously social, but it is not isolated either. This is most clearly demonstrated 
by the stories o f tie parties and celebrations enjoyed by those working at the
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Institute. The Institute clearly was, though less so now, an occupational 
community.
Occupational communities can be the product of spatial or temporal isolation. 
However, Watson (2003) describes how other groups o f workers, for example, the 
professions, can constitute occupational communities. In this vein, scientists, 
perhaps subdivided into particular fields, can be said to constitute an occupational 
community. The occupational group acts as their key reference point, in a similar 
way, though not geographically bound, to the role it plays in communities of, say, 
industrial workers. Watson cites Salaman (1974), who observed that there are 
occupational communities based on shared geography, but there are also 
occupational communities based on the occupation as a whole. Salaman 
described the similarities between architects as a profession, and a geographically 
delineated occupational community o f railway workers. Work at the Institute 
falls into the middle ground. Just as in Chapter F, The Factory and the University, 
in which we described how technical work requires the acquisition of knowledges 
that are derivative to a system o f formalised knowledge, the sense of community 
at the Institute is derivative o f the occupational community of geneticists. But, 
given the industrialised nature o f the Institute, the occupational community is also 
localised, on the workplace. The recruitment o f sentiment to the work at the 
Institute is orientated around this localised community; the recruitment of 
sentiment at the Institute is orientated towards the collective.
The collectivisation o f the recruitment o f sentiment is one of the ways in which 
this ‘big science’ is discontinuous from the laboratories o f ‘small science’. It was 
envisioned that the Project could be completed by a series of small science 
laboratories working in parallel, a product o f the small science hinterland of work 
from which the instigators o f the project emerged. But for technical and political 
reasons a collectivisation o f effort was required, with an increasingly acute and 
concrete division o f labour. As the Institute is not a series o f small science 
laboratories, it was not surprising that the sentiments recruited into the work were 
not organised around the same principles as those o f the academic scientist. They 
were not individualised, but collectivised.
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As described in section G1 o f this chapter, Introduction, the recruitment of 
sentiment, though engaging, is not an unproblematic positive. It hides differences 
in interest between employee and employer, and facilitates greater exploitation. 
In the context of a post-Fordist economy the recruitment of sentiment presents 
further problems. Watson (2003) cites Gorz (2002) as arguing that post-Fordist 
employment produces pressures on the worker to commit their ‘whole se lf to the 
organisation. In an archetypical Fordist system, labour is understood by 
employers as a mere commodity, and thus work is conceived of the selling of 
labour-power. In a post-Fordist environment, argues Gorz, employers demand a 
higher level o f commitment, to the degree that the autonomy, and autonomous 
identity, of the worker is threatened. In Chapter H, The High Road to the Human 
Genome, we explore one of the ways in which the response of work organisations 
to the challenge o f post-Fordism, post-industrialism and the emergence of 
‘knowledge economies’ finds analogy in the arrangement of work at the Institute.
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[H] T h e  H ig h  R o a d  t o  t h e  H u m a n  G e n o m e
The term ‘high road’ carries moral cargo along its route. The Institute can be said 
to have taken the high road to the human genome in three ways. First, politically. 
The Institute was part o f the public Human Genome Project, and sought to keep 
the human genome sequence as a public good rather than allow it to be enclosed 
as private property. Second, epistemologically. The public Human Genome 
Project adopted a method o f sequencing the human genome that ensured the 
quality o f  sequence and coverage o f the genome. This is unlike the private 
project, which, in addition to relying on brute computer power, relied on the 
public data in order to complete its draft o f the human genome sequence. Third, 
organisationally, which is the ‘high road’ o f interest in this chapter. Considering 
the ways in which the Institute differs from the archetype o f the factory, and the 
way in which sentiment was recruited into work, it could be argued that it bears 
many features in common with the high-performance, high-commitment models 
that are described as being ‘high road’.
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H I In t r o d u c t io n
Throughout Part Three, Illustrating and Accounting, we see the ways in which the 
Institute appears to incorporate features o f the both the archetypes of the ‘factory’ 
and the ‘university’. We know that when the Human Genome Project was 
proposed it was imagined as being quite unlike the work o f science, instead being 
akin to the kind o f work conducted in industrial settings. The Human Genome 
Project would require factory-like models o f work organisation, with an industrial, 
production-line approach to the generation o f sequence data. This claim was 
often coupled to, and in some cases the argument for a large-scale project to 
sequence the human genome was countered by, images of alienating, laborious 
and monotonous work. Some o f those images are present in the accounts of those 
who work at the Institute, as illustrated in Chapter F, The Factory and the 
University, and Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment. Nevertheless, in these 
accounts there also exists a second set o f images; those suggesting that the 
Institute is university-like, something un-factory-like that carries with it 
characteristics o f the academy. We find accounts of engagement and autonomy 
rather than alienation and control. Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment 
closes with a reflection that the orientation o f sentiments was quite unlike the 
individualised sentimental commitments elicited in a ‘university’ setting. Rather, 
sentiments were organised around the collective; the Institute. In this, we can say 
that those working at the Institute are committed to the organisation.
To move the exploration o f the experience o f work at the Institute from Chapter G, 
The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, we can refer to Etzioni (1961). Etzioni argued that 
moral involvement in the organisation was synonymous with high commitment. 
Using Etzioni’s terminology, from the evidence o f Chapter F, The Factory and 
the University, and Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, it appears that 
rather than the Institute possessing the coercive-alienative model of compliance 
relations, the type associated with the most negative visions of industrial work, or 
the remunerative-calculative model associated with instrumentalised visions of 
work, it instead demonstrates a normative-moral model of compliance relations. 
The question o f sentiment is rephrased as a question of control.
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Commitment, and organisational commitment, is not a new idea in sociology. 
Becker (1960) produced an early anatomy of the concept of commitment as used 
in sociology. In thinking about the meaning o f commitment, we are reminded 
that it carries the meaning o f  being set on a course, o f being bound by the 
decisions that we have made. If we are committed to an organisation, have we 
made a decision to join it on its route, to intertwine our interests with those of the 
organisation? Swailes (2002) reviewed the concept of organisational commitment. 
In this chapter we are concerned with attitudinal or affective commitment and 
normative commitment. The concept o f behavioural commitment is beyond the 
scope o f exploration by use o f  the kind o f interview evidence that was gathered. 
Commitment considered attitudinal, affective or normative is considered by some 
to be ‘real’ commitment. Consider for example, ‘loyalty’ to an organisation, as 
measured by turnover rates. Loyalty resulting from an instrumental pursuit of the 
benefits of organisational membership, for example, a desire to retain a particular 
level salary or benefit, produces the same behavioural outcomes as loyalty 
resulting from “a strong belief in, and acceptance of, the organisation’s goals and 
values, a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organisation, 
and a strong desire to retain membership in the organisation” (Swailes, 2002, p. 
159). This kind o f ‘real’ commitment demands the recruitment of sentiment.
This chapter examines some o f the recent literature on the subject o f high road, 
high commitment, high performance workplaces, and considers tie degree to 
which the Institute can be considered as an example of this category of workplace. 
Section H2, The High Commitment Workplace explores the category of the ‘high 
commitment’ workplace, the criticisms, and the ways in which these ways of 
organising work are seen to ‘pay o f f .  In section H3, High Commitment at the 
Institute, the descriptions o f  high commitment workplaces are compared to the 
experiences o f working in the Institute. Section H4, Convergent Evolution, 
Common Descent?, places the experience o f work at the Institute in the contexts 
of both its origins in small science and its position as a fundamental part of a 
knowledge economy.
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There a variety o f terms that have been used to describe some or all of the 
practices associated with high road management strategies. A recent paper 
identified the wide range o f labels that have been used to identify all or some of 
the features that, in this chapter, are categorised as features o f ‘high-commitment 
workplaces’. This list, which while recent is more than likely to be some way 
from being exhaustive, includes, ‘transformed work organisations’, 
‘flexible/alternative workplace practices’, ‘functional flexibility systems’, 
‘employee involvement systems’, ‘flexible production systems’, ‘progressive 
human resource management practices’, ‘high-performance work practices’, 
‘high-involvement management’ and the straightforward ‘new work practices’ 
(Kalleberg,e/tf/., 2006).
In this chapter, the terms ‘high-commitment workplace’ and ‘high-commitment 
workplace practices’ are used. These labels cany greater descriptive weight than 
‘transformed work organisation’ or ‘new work practices’. Other labels that are 
used to describe all or some o f the features contained within ‘high-commitment 
workplace’ and ‘high-commitment workplace practices’ have a similar degree of 
descriptive content, for example ‘high-performance organisation’ and ‘high- 
performance workplace practices’. For the purposes o f this chapter, commitment 
is used rather than performance due to the nature o f the questions asked and the 
evidence gathered. Interviews provide insight into attitudinal, affective and 
normative commitment, but are poor evidence on which to base statements 
regarding performance. The terms chosen also use ‘workplace’ where others 
might use ‘management’. This is a consequence o f the fact that, in line with small 
science being described as an adhocracy, the development o f the organisation of 
the Institute was an ad  hoc process o f adaptation and adjustment. It certainly was 
not the imposition o f the latest trends in management theory. To the degree that 
the Institute is a high commitment workplace, this is a quality o f the workplace, 
rather than a conscious quality o f management style.
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H 2 T h e  H ig h  C o m m i t m e n t  W o r k p l a c e
Watson (2003) discusses the origins o f ‘high commitment’ models of work 
organisation. He locates the advent o f a discourse o f high commitment in early 
1980s exhortations to copy the Japanese model o f industrial organisation. The 
aim was to emulate, in the industrial sectors of the US and the UK, the 
comparative success o f Japanese industry. The popularisation of the idea that 
there was a new way o f organising work that was being increasingly adopted is 
often traced to a 1985 article in H arvard Business Review (Walton, 1985). This 
new way of organising work was particularly suited to the rapidly changing high- 
technology late-20th century workplace. That Harvard Business Review is a 
magazine published for an audience o f senior managers should not be ignored. 
Walton (1985) was not simply reporting, but he was also stimulating the adoption 
of at least the rhetoric o f ‘com mitment’ in management o f the workplace.
Godard and Delaney (2000) describe high commitment workplace practices, 
though they use the term ‘high performance’, as involving “flexible work 
assignments, cross-training and team work, sustained by some form of 
performance-based pay, formal employee participation, and supportive H[uman] 
R[esource] M anagem ent] policies (for example, job security)” (p. 483) 32 . 
Additional features o f  high-commitment workplace practices include “minimal 
status differentials” (W ood and de Menezes, 1998, p. 486).
Watson quotes Storey (2001) as arguing that the ‘Human Resources Management 
phenomenon’ is “an amalgam o f description, prescription, and logical deduction”, 
built on the assumption that “ it is human capability and commitment which in the 
final analysis distinguishes successful organisations from the rest”. From this 
assumption follows the conclusion that “the human resource ought to be nurtured 
as a valued asset” (W atson, 2003, p. 109; quoting Storey, 2001). There is nothing
32 A study into the adoption o f  high-com m itm ent workplace practices in for-profit, public and non­
profit places o f  em ploym ent suggests that w hile public and non-profit workplaces might employ 
some practices that can be described as ‘high-com m itm ent’, it is unsurprisingly rare to find 
performance-based pay (e .g . profit-sharing or bonuses) in these sectors (Kalleberg et al., 2006). 
As The Institute is a non-profit scien tific  establishment, w e should not expect to find performance- 
based pay, regardless o f  the adoption o f  other high-commitment workplaces practices.
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necessary about the assumption, and so the deduction is contingent upon the 
degree to which this assumption is true. Furthermore, if we imagine ‘human 
capability’ as something broader than professional/technical/creative skills, and 
imagine an economy in which the market in ‘human capability’ is not a sellers’ 
market, we should not find it difficult to imagine a situation in which an 
organisation reliant on ‘human capabilities’ is able to be successful with a 
strategy o f treating ‘the human resource’ as a mere commodity. Treating labour 
as a mere commodity would be a Tow road’ strategy.
Watson (2003) writes that in the case of an organisation that requires a highly- 
skilled workforce, perhaps in situations that involve working with complex 
technology, the choice might be taken to adopt a high commitment model in order 
to ensure the retention o f these difficult to replace staff. At first glance, this 
would be an explanation for the choice of the ‘flat’ hierarchical structure of the 
Institute. However, the passage from Sulston and Ferry (2003), which we revisit 
several times in this thesis, demonstrates that in large-scale sequencing a 
significant number o f jobs have low formal entry requirements.
We would recruit unskilled people... This group would have no 
need o f academic qualifications. We judged them on school 
achievements, interview and something by which I set great 
store: the pipetting test.
(Sulston and Ferry, 2003, p. 75)
At the point o f recruitment to the task of sequencing a new employee of the 
Institute carried with them only the general skills of a school leaver and the 
requisite level o f manual dexterity. Further, in the interviews with the managers 
and supervisory staff there was no explicit discussion of the adoption of 
management practices derived from elsewhere, at least not until the appointment 
of the new director. Rather, at least in the understanding of the research 
participants, the management structure o f the Institute grew ‘organically’ from the 
seeds planted at its foundation.
It would appear, then, that rather than drawing inspiration from Japanese 
corporations or the H arvard Business Review, the structure of the Institute, and its
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recruitment o f sentiment and commitment, is a product of its origins. It might be 
big science, but it emerges from the laboratories of biological small science; 
workplaces with relatively ‘flat’ hierarchies, with close, hformal, interpersonal 
contact, with autonomy and self-direction, workplaces where engagement with 
and commitment to the goals o f the work are taken as a given. The laboratories of 
small science can be seen as the models of the high commitment workplace, just 
as the university and the campus are proving to be the workplaces that some high- 
tech and creative firms seek to emulate in order to produce an environment 
suitable for intellectual labour (Kleinman and Valias, 2001).
Watson (2003), citing Sisson (1993), describes the aims of a high commitment 
strategy as being:
• the ‘development o f a highly committed and adaptable workforce willing 
and able to learn new skills and take on new tasks’;
• the elevation o f ‘the management o f people’ to a strategic level of 
organisational decision-making;
• an emphasis on trust rather than rules and procedures;
• the encouragement o f managers to become leaders and facilitators of
cultural change by ‘harnessing the co-operation and commitment of others’;
• the move away from hierarchical organisations with a number of tiers of 
management, separate functions and tightly defined job descriptions to much 
‘flatter’ and more ‘federal’ organisations;
• an emphasis on the flexibility o f function, task, time and reward and on
teamworking and ‘single status’ terms and conditions of employment.”
(Watson, 2003, p. 109)
The standard argument in favour of adopting high commitment work practices is 
that such practices produce an increase in the amount of discretionary effort on 
the part o f the workers. An Australian study (Weakliem and Frenkel, 2006) found 
that productivity does rise in a linear fashion, in line with increases in morale. 
This accords with the beliefs and attitudes of many managers, and with the 
assumptions o f the ‘high road’ model of contemporary management “whose
228
features include “employment security, teamwork, employee participation in 
decision making, and a relatively egalitarian status system”” (p. 336). Morale, 
though, is difficult to operationalise and measure, and so such causal and 
scientistic claims contain within them scope for dispute.
Manufacturing Advantage  (Appelbaum et al., 2000) is one of the definitive 
empirical studies o f the high commitment workplace. Appelbaum et al. 
conducted an exhaustive study o f the effects o f ‘high performance’ work practices 
across three quite different industries. Their conclusion was that high- 
performance work practices increased productivity. Barton and Delbridge (2004) 
write; “There is a considerable body o f research [...] that has reported a positive 
association between firm-level measures of HRM and organizational 
performance” (p. 332). The literature is described as ‘optimistic’, is so much that 
it is taken as a fact that progressive Human Resource Management can enhance 
the performance o f organisations and employees. In answering the question of 
why organisations using progressive Human Resource Management succeed, they 
write; “[FJirms achieve their objectives by using the innovative abilities of 
individuals more effectively” (p. 332). These workplaces are ‘adaptive’. 
Considering the subjective experience o f work, Appelbaum et al. argue that there 
are also benefits for those working in companies that adopted high performance 
work practices. These are characterised by an increase in the intrinsic rewards of 
work; increased job  satisfaction coupled with an increase in organisational 
commitment. As a result, Appelbaum et al. describe high performance work 
practices as ‘win-win’.
When addressing the benefits o f high commitment workplace practices peculiar to 
the contemporary economy, the argument runs that high commitment workplaces 
are “better able to cope with rapid technological change and able to offer high- 
quality work to a labour force that has grown in educational sophistication” 
(Kalleberg et al., 2006, p. 272). Appelbaum et al. (2000) suggest this is a product 
of the increasing opportunities that high-commitment work practices present for 
the ‘shop-floor’ learning o f new skills, techniques, and processes. Considering 
that the Institute is a relatively high-technology employer, we can see how these 
organisational advantages might well apply. The technology used to sequence
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genomes changed immensely over the short organisational history of the Institute. 
Coupled with, though not determined by, these technological changes, the work 
of sequencing genomes at the Institute has been reorganised and increasingly 
divided, coming to resemble a production line. If  the argument for the advantages 
enjoyed by high commitment workplaces in a technologically changeable 
environment holds, and if the Institute is high commitment workplace, this may 
account for some o f the success o f the Institute in sequencing the human, and 
other, genomes. This would be seen especially in the maintenance of employee 
satisfaction in the face o f work environments that are marked by rapid 
technological change, such as increasing automation.
Theorists who have argued that the high commitment workplace will be a 
dominant form o f employment in the future have been criticised, as have those 
who laud the development o f these work practices. Ramsey et al. (2000) 
suggested that, rather than an uncritical ‘win-win’ diagnosis of the effects of high 
commitment practices, the performance gains attributed to high commitment 
attitudes of workers might be better described in terms of task intensification. 
Victor and Stephens (1994) argued that the rise of what is characterised of the 
‘bureaucratic form’ was met with intense moral discussion33. By contrast, the 
discussions o f new organisational forms, such as high-commitment workplaces, 
have been dominated by the testing the economic claims, while little attention was 
being paid to the moral consequences these new ways of organising work. Victor 
and Stephens (1994) suggest that we should be engaged in just these kinds of 
discussions. The deskilling that is characteristic of the ‘bureaucratic form’ “is 
replaced with an incessant demand for innovation and adaptation”. This demands 
that workers become “self-motivated, continuous leamer[s]”, or face “rapid 
obsolescence” (p. 481). The defined job is replaced by a system of flexibility in 
which “[t]ime, space, and shifting group membership and becoming the primary 
definers o f responsibility and accountability” (p. 480). Furthermore, “[a]t just the 
time that organizational commitment to the employee has been thoroughly 
violated, the employee is expected to exhibit feverishly enhanced commitment to 
the organization” (p. 481). Relationships with fellow workers also take on a new
33 The discussions in Chapter C, The Pathologies o f Work in Big Science, ow e much to these 
moral explorations.
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character. “Flat organizations force interpersonal relations in more demanding 
and intrusive modes than ever before. [...] Teams and networks call for new 
levels and kinds o f cooperation. No one can expect to escape the demand to 
interact and be interactive” (p. 481). These new relationships with fellow 
workers can also act as an invidious extension of management control, as Finlay 
(2001) suggested in his review o f Appelbaum et al. (2000), in so much as they 
transform workers into the supervisors o f each other.
Furthermore, as Weakliem and Frenkel (2006) describe, there are those who argue 
that many jobs contain within them no room for high performance. In these views, 
the majority o f jobs do not contain within them the latitude, for example, in which 
to apply discretionary effort, rather requiring only a basic minimum of 
performance. This kind o f performance can be obtained by ‘low road’ strategies, 
through existing systems o f reward and punishments. They argue that in low- 
level jobs, particularly in times o f unemployment, the fear of job insecurity can be 
used as an effective whip. In these circumstances, negative sentiment on the part 
of the workers has little effect on performance. Unless the knowledge economy is 
a booming economy, and unless the knowledge economy is dominated, rather 
than merely characterised by, knowledge workers in jobs that are designed so that 
contained within them is the room for the application of choice, the ‘low road’ 
will be a part o f  the future organisation o f work in technologically advanced 
economies.
Some see the echoes o f previous ‘revolutions’ in the organisation of the world of 
work. Godard and Delaney (2000) identify high-commitment management 
practices as a renaissance o f the post-war ‘human relations’ US tradition of 
industrial relations. This tradition sought to displace the participation of unions in 
the organisation o f work. Indeed, when research participants were asked whether 
they were members o f a union the response was one of bafflement. Why join a 
union when you are on such informal terms with your managers? Godard and 
Delaney argue that, despite their emphasis on communication and participation, 
the rhetoric o f high-commitment management “views management as the primary 
actor in the employment relationship” (p. 485). Furthermore, there is always the 
argument that labels such as ‘high-commitment’ and ‘high-performance’ are
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illusions. Rather than representing the adoption of distinctively new workplace 
practices, whether top-down or otherwise, these labels are instead the symbols of 
changes in the language and presentation of management.
It can be argued that ideal type of ‘small science’ is a paradigmatic, but 
unacknowledged, example o f the high-commitment workplace. The popular 
image o f scientists at work often that o f people engaged in autonomous, largely 
voluntaristic labour (Yearley, 1988). This work is constantly changing as the 
cutting edge o f science changes, and collaborations are formed and broken 
depending on the task at hand. In other words, high technology, flexible work 
involving a high degree o f discretionary labour. However, as we reflected upon at 
the end o f Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, the orientation of the 
commitment differs at the Institute from that of small science. In the case of the 
Institute, the commitment is orientated towards the large, concrete collective of 
the Institute, in some cases through the symbolic embodiment of the Institute in 
the person o f the founding director. In the case o f the ideal type of small science, 
the commitment is, as a consequence o f the system of reward and recognition, 
towards often changing aggregations o f people that are much smaller that the 
Institute; the individual scientists, the collaboration, or the laboratory. In so much 
as the commitment is to something larger, it is to an abstract collective; the 
scientific discipline or to science itself.
While science is work, science is a very special kind of work. Unlike the 
commercial settings that are the empirical ground in which much work on high 
commitment practices are planted, science is often insulated from the interference 
of external direction or economic pressures for product. Collins (2003) argues 
that small science is under little pressure to succeed quickly. Small science “can 
work toward a goal o f excellence, defined by... [its own practitioners], without 
interference... the creators of an idea can be left to decide whether it is 
succeeding or failing” (p. 261). This, as Collins notes and as we reflect upon in 
Chapter B, Anatomies o f  Big Science, does not hold in the case of big science. 
Internal pressures to succeed quickly are also found across science, in the cases of 
races for priority. The story o f the Institute involves both the external pressures
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of capitalised, politicised and public big science and a highly moralised race for 
priority.
The claim that the Institute resembles a high commitment workplace is not a 
claim made by the managers at the Institute. The language and rhetoric of ‘high 
commitment’ and ‘high performance’ did not emerge during the interviews 
conducted with managers at the Institute. Certainly, these interviews do contain 
descriptions o f management and workplace practices that in some ways resemble 
the ‘high commitment’ ideal type. However, the attribution of the label ‘high 
commitment’ to these practices is that o f the researcher, not a product of self­
description on the part o f the research participants.
The Institute is not a factory, despite the increasingly acute division of labour and 
the increasing automation o f sequencing. It is not a university, despite its central 
focus on the production o f knowledge and the degree of engagement engendered. 
These are broad, crude categories. The high commitmert workplace, grounded in 
the sociology o f work, is a category that might give us more purchase in our 
attempts to understand work at the Institute. Of course, it will not do to replace 
one unrepresentative but clean-lined picture of work in the big science of the 
Institute for another. The story o f work at the Institute is not without evidence of 
dissatisfying, even alienating, rationalisation and bureaucratisation. These are 
illustrated in Chapter I, Interlude: Dis-Engagement and Dis-Integration. Looking 
at the experience o f large-scale genome sequencing through the lens offered by 
the idea of the high commitment workplace is one that offers transferable value; 
lending insight to other studies o f work, studies of science, and studies of work in 
science.
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H 3 H ig h  C o m m it m e n t  a t  t h e  In s t it u t e
If small science can be considered a paradigmatic, if unacknowledged, example of 
the high commitment workplace, then we can hear the echoes of the hinterland of 
work o f the founding director sounding through the organisation of work at the 
Institute. The structure o f work at the Institute as originally envisioned reveals 
the evolutionary origins o f the resemblance o f the Institute to a high commitment 
workplace. This is an example o f convergent evolution, not common descent.
Professor Ingham describes his ambivalence towards the centralised, big science 
of which he was a prime instigator; i n  principle I would love to have everything 
totally dispersed and everybody do their bit.” Unfortunately, although “we’d 
started that way [...] as the pressure grew to get it done in a reasonable time then 
we found ourselves condensing into fewer larger labs [...] there is an efficiency to 
be gained by doing some centralisation.” To continue the evolutionary metaphor, 
it is common selection pressures, not common origins, which make the Institute 
appear akin to other models o f organising work in a knowledge economy.
Susan, a member o f the management board who has been at the Institute since its 
inception, recalled the intended organisation for work in the Institute:
[...] the way the original proposal was set out was that basically 
we would have seventeen teams o f ten people doing the same 
thing in parallel. And that team of ten was based on the lab 
structure that [Professor Ingham] had built up at the [small 
science laboratory] [...] So we were just going to multiply it 
umpteen times.
[Susan]
Susan described how the original vision o f work at the Institute was of a series of 
laboratories, each based on the successful model of work that Professor Ingham 
had enjoyed as a small science university researcher.
Running in tandem, with each of the components run in each 
laboratory. So the sub-cloning, [...] picking, sequencing, and 
then the finishing, all done within that little environment.
[Susan]
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This vision is not one o f a factory, as was suggested ought to be the structure of 
laboratories involved in the Human Genome Project. The Institute was not 
imagined by those actually creating it as the ideal of the Modem work 
organisation, involving an increasingly acute division, both in terms of 
individuals and space, o f labour. Rather, it was imagined that the reproduction of 
an absolutely non-factory model o f work organisation would generate the 
increased productivity required to sequence the human genome. Rather than a 
new model o f work, what was needed was the existing form of scientific work, 
multiplied.
This could not be maintained as a practical organisational ethos. In part, as 
described by Professor Ingham, this was the result o f an internal reaction against 
an organisational structure that was too flat. According to Professor Ingham, 
some members o f staff at the Institute demanded the differentiation in status that a 
steeper hierarchical structure provides. And some is ascribed to the technical 
features o f the science o f  genome sequencing. Susan was asked how long the 
originally envisioned structure had lasted.
It didn’t even make it out o f the [small science laboratory where 
it was conceived] actually, because the sub-cloning fell down.
And people -  sub-cloning is a . .. molecular biology, and you 
need, I mean, we call it green fingers to do that. So it was clear 
from, you know, very, very early on that we needed a specialist 
group to look after that area. The other, the team of ten beyond 
that, with half shotgun, half finishing work, that made it 
through... quite a while actually, way into this building. So this 
building went up in ’96, and we moved in, so through to the, 
almost to the beginning o f the scale-up for the human genome.
When we got to that we just needed to change the structure 
completely.
[Susan]
Professor Ingham, though, as with Susan, makes it clear that much of the eventual 
industrial character o f the Institute was the result of external pressures to 
sequence the human genome more and more quickly. For Professor Ingham, this 
reorganisation o f the Institute in the face of external challenges was a source of 
regret. He describes the mixed success of attempts to organise the Institute along
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the lines of a small science laboratory, and the development of an ‘industrial’ 
division o f labour.
But I think in terms o f the sense of teamwork I really wanted to 
have it as nearly as possible like the [successful small science 
laboratory]. And o f course it wasn’t, because, as I say, people 
were doing different kinds of jobs and the levels of qualification 
and indeed ability were different. I think the sense of working as 
an individual and yet having a common purpose, we retained.
But certainly, obviously, the individual jobs had to be organised 
in a factory-like way, so that each person did what they could do 
best.
[Professor Ingham]
These interview extracts demonstrate the debt that the work practices of the 
Institute have to small science, even if, more than a decade later, the origins are 
hidden by the subsequent adaptations. As was argued in Chapter F, The Factory 
and the University, the resemblances between the Institute and other forms of 
work are matters o f perspective; they depend on the hinterland of work fom 
which the Institute is approached. The descent from small science identified here 
should remind us that the homologies that we find between work at the Institute 
ideas of high commitment work are not the result o f the deliberate adoption of en 
vogue management practices.
This section o f the chapter discusses these homologues, taking a selection of 
indicators of high commitment work and illustrating the degree of correspondence 
found at the Institute using interview evidence. These illustrations help us to 
explore the value to be found in describing the Institute as a high commitment 
workplace.
Low Status Differentials
Low status differentials between workers, and between workers and management, 
are a key feature o f many descriptions of what makes a workplace high 
commitment. Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, discusses the ways in 
which the hierarchy o f the Institute is made to appear as flat as possible. By 
means of informality between workers and management, both in social and in 
work settings, the appearance to the research participants is o f a workplace where
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status differentials do not weigh too heavily on the conduct of day-to-day work. 
Professor Ingham, in his description o f the philosophy behind his vision, 
independently captures the ideas o f the high commitment workplace in near text­
book terminology.
For myself, I was keen and I think we were somewhat successful 
in running as flat a structure as possible. I other words, it wasn’t 
tremendously hierarchical.
[Professor Ingham]
Low status differentials are often seen as being a feature of an inclusive, 
egalitarian workplace. Cast in this light, we might expect this to be an unalloyed 
positive for the ordinary worker, if  not for the management. However, Professor 
Ingham suggested that there was resistance to this feature of the organisation of 
the early Institute.
In fact we interestingly, in a way driven by the staff, and with a 
tiny bit o f management training, we were forced to make some 
structures, more than I would have liked. People like it, 
otherwise things get unfair. If  you have a totally flat structure 
there are people who feel they aren’t being treated right, they’re 
not getting exactly the same treatment as someone else. So that 
means you have to make some sort o f grades, promotion 
structure, and all the rest o f it, and then everybody settles down.
[Professor Ingham]
This is a view tow ards which scepticism would be a natural reaction, when voiced 
by management, especially when, as an apparent aside management training is 
invoked. However, this view was supported by the concerns of some o f the 
research participants. The research participants who seemed to be the most 
concerned that the hierarchy formalises and hardens were not the team leaders 
and other members o f manag2ment, but the technical workers, the bench workers. 
Cautious optimism was expressed for the increasing bureaucratisation of the 
promotion and grading structure o f the Institute, a process that makes status 
differentials between technical workers, and between technical workers and 
management, more patent and unambiguous.
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This can be understood in several ways, but it is not the rejection of an egalitarian 
workplace. Management, and, at the upper echelons, the scientific leaders of the 
project, may envisage work at the Institute as being part of their vocation. They 
have been socialised into the values o f hinterland of work in small science. 
Scientific work brings intellectual rewards, some which carry with them grants of 
status, others o f which are less tangible. This attitude towards work can be seen 
when Professor Ingham describes how his experiences of work have shaped the 
sort of ethos he wanted to instil in The Institute.
I mean I personally have always, I was going to say tried, but 
that’s not quite right, I seem to have fallen into a pattern of 
living to work, rather than working to live, because I have 
always done things which I feel are enjoyable and or important, 
to varying amounts at different times.
[Professor Ingham]
Expecting everyone else to live by the same ethos, particularly when these other 
people are doing a very different kind of work, one that is not rewarded with 
recognition or intellectual satisfaction, and who arrive at the Institute from a very 
different hinterland o f work, seems hopelessly romantic. For the scientist, 
differential reward can be achieved by ‘soft’ means; publication, citation, peer 
esteem, awards and prizes. For the technical workers there are no such sources of 
differential reward. Differential reward here cannot be left unstated, but must be 
made cold and patent. The ‘hard’ differentials of remuneration and rank.
It is also the case that members o f the management of the science of large-scale 
sequencing, even if unable to participate in the traditional reward structures of 
science as a result o f their administrative role, are part of a hierarchy of power. 
They occupy a supervisory role. While they might be happy for there to be an 
appearance o f flat organisational structure under their supervision, the realities of 
control remain. For technical workers with no claim on the gross distinctions of 
rank and reward that come with management and supervision, more subtle 
differentiation is required. Further, some research participants suggest that in a 
structure marked by informality as part o f an attempt to be ‘flat’ there is 
ambiguity in the criteria for promotion and reward, leading to suspicions of 
favouritism.
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However, it is clear from Chapter F, The Factory and the University, and Chapter 
G, The Recruitment o f  Sentim ent, that Professor Ingham is more or less correct 
when he says that the management o f the Institute was successful in their attempts 
to keep status differentials at a minimum. Status within an organisation is not 
solely a product o f rank and payment, certainly not within an organisation within 
the domain o f science. The accounts o f a tremendous degree of social ‘flatness’, 
to be found in descriptions o f the canteen, the celebrations, and also the 
informality o f  worker-management relations, attest to the degree to which the 
Institute was able to adhere to the ethos that Professor Ingham brought with him 
from his hinterland o f  work in small science.
Flexibility
‘Flexibility’ is often seen as a key feature of a high commitment workplace. Not 
so much because, as is the case with flat organisational structures, flexibility 
generates high commitment. But because flexibility grants the space in which 
high commitment can be exploited. A flexible work environment in which people 
possessed a wide range o f skills is a clear feature o f  accounts o f work during the 
early years o f the Institute. People who were employed as finishers performed 
their own pre-finishing laboratory reactions, and also performed the tasks of 
production when needed.
The flexibility, expected and allowed, created an environment in which there was 
the ability to move between different jobs. Joe presents an unusually extreme 
example o f the flexible potential o f  the work at the Institute. Joe, who has been at 
the Institute since the mid-1990s, has had a wide range of jobs in his career here. 
Working in the Institute was his first scientific job of any kind and he arrived at 
the Institute after being made redundant. He was first employed as a ‘prepper’, 
which Joe describes as the ‘lowest’ role in genome sequencing. He describes his 
career within the Institute.
Then I went onto sequencing. Then from that, I mean, you did 
that for a little while. Then from sequencing I was a finisher's 
assistant kind o f  thing. So I vsas doing all the reactions for the 
finishers. Then after doing that for a little while I then became a
239
finisher. Did that for a little while. Didn't like it as much 
because I ju st couldn't -  I didn't like the just sitting at a desk and 
stuff — what I didn't like was I couldn’t see anything completed.
[...] So I gave that up and then I moved into the QC team. [...] 
and then we've moved on to doing what we're doing now.
[Joe]
When Joe was interviewed he was involved in the development of new laboratory 
robotics. Joe’s path through the different work tasks of the Institute is extreme, 
but illustrative. Many o f the research participants have been employed within the 
Institute in more than one job. The change in job does not always involve 
promotion to supervisory rank, but can involve a move along the sequencing 
chain o f production. This is normally up the informal hierarchy, though there are 
movements down the chain when those moves are coupled with promotions to 
supervisory roles. There are also moves from large-scale genome sequencing to 
the small science research laboratories, and back again.
These accounts place flexibility as a quality of the workplace, of the Institute. 
Indeed, taking this benign reading o f flexibility at face value is something that 
Victor and Stephens (1994) warned us against. Flexibility is not just, or even 
mainly, a quality o f the workplace. Flexibility is also demanded as a quality of 
those conducting the work, transforming high commitment into high performance. 
The idea o f broadly skilled workers, to be found in the early days of the Institute 
as a consequence o f  the ethos o f Professor Ingham, has largely been replaced by 
increasingly specialised work roles.
As the Institute, after the accomplishment of the Human Genome Project, 
reorientates itself towards ‘post-genomic’ small science research, there is an 
example of one group o f workers for whom ‘flexibility’ is an employment 
imperative. The degree o f utilisation of members of the Pre-Finishing team has 
fallen. An effort is being made to broaden the skills of people working in pre­
finishing in order for them to be temporarily deployed to other teams and 
laboratories when necessary. One might read this as an application of a post­
industrial version o f the Taylorist principles o f ‘scientific management’, rational 
calculative maximisation o f human resources. And, through this, an
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intensification o f work. Colin, a member of the Pre-Finishing team, describes 
how this is experienced.
[W ]e’re being farmed out a little bit now and again when other 
areas in a sense, and they just say — we’ve all been learning some 
new things which is great, so. [...] W e’re quite flexible, we’re 
going to be really flexible — but you know, we’re quite flexible 
now. We can just go o ff and help other teams, and everyone 
does things differently and everyone uses different equipment, 
so it’s quite handy really.
[Colin]
From outside work at the Institute we might take a cynical view of the attempts to 
maximise the utilisation o f laboratory workers. But this is not the way in which 
these moves are experienced at the bench. The recruitment of sentiment, the 
generation o f high affective and normative commitment, hides the differences in 
the interests o f employers and employees. Colin does not feel that these changes 
are attempts to intensify the exploitation of his labour. The pre-finishing team 
regard these moves with little negativity or cynicism. These developments are 
seen as an increase in their opportunities, not an increase in exploitation. The 
expansion o f these opportunities not only increases their employment prospects, 
more than that, these opportunities, through increasing the variety of work, 
improve the quality o f their working lives.
In a different workplace or at a different time, changes such as those being 
experienced by the Pre-F inishing team would not have been experienced in this 
way. We could suggest that that the experience of the members of the Pre- 
Finishing team, who do not have a criticism of their transformation into a 
continually re-deployable reserve, is a product of the diminution of class politics 
in a post-industrial economy and culture. However, there is something more 
specific to the arrangement o f work at the Institute occurring. We recall the 
comments o f  Victor and Stephens (1994) on the ‘dark side’ of the new 
organisational forms o f work; the demands that workers become “self-motivated, 
continuous learner[s]” or face “rapid obsolescence”, that “[a]t just the time that 
organizational commitment to the employee has been thoroughly violated, the 
employee is expected to exhibit feverishly enhanced commitment to the
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organization” (p. 481). Those working at the Institute have had their sentiments 
recruited into the idea o f the Institute. Therefore, these were not disaffected 
workers being asked to, in effect, intensify their labours. These were not, for the 
most part, workers entangled in coercive-alienative or remunerative-calculative 
models o f compliance (Etzioni, 1961). Rather, the recruitment of their sentiments, 
orientated towards the collective o f the Institute, draws these workers into a 
normative-moral model o f compliance. These workers are high commitment, but 
this should not be seen as unproblematically ‘win-win’.
Supportive Human Resources Policies
Most organisations that arrange their work according to the principles of the high 
commitment workplace do not have a grand historical project through which to 
integrate and motivate their workers. In this, the Institute is an unusual example. 
Most high commitment workplaces cannot draw on the exceptional moral claims 
of science, that the advance o f knowledge is for the good of all humankind, in 
order to recruit the sentiments o f their workforce. Supportive human resources 
policies, though, are a possibility open to any workplace.
There exists within the Institute the potential to move jobs. In the case of Joe, this 
is explicitly in the pursuit o f increased job satisfaction. Ebspite climbing the 
sequencing chain o f production, he found the work of Finishing uninteresting and 
unengaging. He was able to move to a different job in search of engagement. 
Elizabeth too moved roles in order to seek job satisfaction. She moved from 
Production, which she likened to a factory, to work in one of the small science 
laboratories at the Institute. She was surprised to find the work in the small 
science laboratory that she joined was not much more interesting. Nevertheless, 
what this story illustrates is not that the work of technicians in small science 
laboratories is over romanticised, but that the Institute was accommodating to the 
ambitions o f its staff. Elizabeth was able to move to a different job within the 
Institute, taking a route that was neither a promotion nor part o f an expected climb 
up the sequence chain o f production
Supportive human resources policies are not only, or even mainly, about putting 
in place structures in order to allow workers to seek to maximise the ir job
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satisfaction. In a high technology, rapidly developing workplace such as the 
Institute, it should be expected that technology overtakes the necessity for some 
jobs. This was the case for Julia and Maggie. Julia and Maggie began work at 
the Institute pouring slab gels for the sequencing machines. A key development 
in the development o f automated sequencing technologies was the introduction of 
capillary sequencing. This made the gel sequencing machines obsolescent, and 
with it the requirement for a team of gel pourers working shifts around the clock. 
While the technology that they worked with might have become redundant, Julia 
and Maggie were not. Through a series of jobs in other teams, they found 
permanent roles in the Pre-F inishing team. Julia and Maggie suggest that this 
kind o f accommodation was made £>r all those who wanted to remain part of the 
Institute.
While there was little overt discussion o f work practices that are ‘family friendly’, 
several research participants cited flexible working hours as playing an important 
role in the combination o f work at the Institute and childcare. Sophie, a member 
of a Production team, described this as a key reason for taking a job at the 
Institute.
More stabilised hours because I used to do a lot [...] when 
you’ve got younger children I supposed that used to fit, it fitted 
in then. [...] but then as they got older and sort of grew up you 
wanted something like say seven to three or something like that.
Seven to half three, so you can go out at weekends. That is why I 
changed probably.
[Sophie]
The Institute is also a place o f  education; the science of the jobs does not 
necessarily remain a black box to those working on large-scale genome 
sequencing. Susan, a member o f the board of management, speaks with pride of 
the way in which the Institute is a place where people leam.
The other thing we have run are sort of more educational 
seminars to, and a series o f lectures, to try and introduce people 
who’ve got, you know, no scientific background to some of the 
science behind what they do.
[Susan]
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Do people enjoy that, then?
[Researcher]
Yes they do. Yes they do. And it’s actually been very 
rewarding, throughout the whole project, the number of people 
who have gone back to, sort o f night school, or do degrees. 
[Susan]
Professor Ingham expands on this theme.
We did gradually put in more effort to [engaging employees with 
the scientific aspects o f their work], and courses were put in to 
teach people. Because people come and ask me; “How does this 
work? Why are we doing this?” And I would explain, and we 
realised people wanted to know. And we found, as a further 
illustration, what was going on is that we found that we would 
take people w ho’d maybe dropped out o f university or maybe 
just had A-Levels and they would become, having not been very 
enchanted with academic learning, and some of them became 
very enthused again and started to go on day-release courses to 
get their degrees and so forth. And so I had the very interesting 
feeling that we were running, not for all, but for a proportion of 
the people, a sort o f apprenticeship system, where you come in 
through that way. And the thing is I ’m totally sympathetic to 
that, because I know that I didn’t like doing my degree at all, and 
I think that working with one’s hands, actually doing things as 
you go along, as you learn. It’s not the only way to do it, but it’s 
a very satisfying way to do it. So people I think are, on the 
whole and increasingly so interestingly as the things settles 
down, have found themselves in a very benign environment I 
think in that way. They were free to grow, either doing the jobs 
that they did best, because there is a lot o f quite intellectual sort 
of puzzle-solving work in sequencing and the finishing process.
And people get very good at that and really enjoy it. And I do 
m yself actually, it is the sort o f thing I rather like doing. It’s 
mindless in the sense that it’s repetitive, but as [Nobel Prize 
Winner] and [Senior Genome Scientist] used to say, “no two 
pieces o f DNA are alike” [laughs].
[Professor Ingham]
The Institute is self-consciously understood by its managers as a workplace that 
offered intellectual as well as financial opportunities. However, while the lectures 
remain, some respondents complain that the support from within the Institute for 
members o f staff to take degrees has fallen away. This can be understood in light 
of the end o f the rapid growth o f the Institute, the increasingly acute division of 
labour that accompanies improved laboratory protocols and automation, and the
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end o f the seemingly endless supply o f money which was allocated to the defence 
of the human genome from appropriation by privateers.
The theme o f staff development is taken further by Susan.
[TJhere was potential to grow and do everything. So [Professor 
Ingham’s] idea was that people needed i d  training whatsoever, 
and, you know, some o f the criteria that we used for selecting 
people were basically that they were bright, that they had manual 
dexterity, there seemed to be some sort of positive correlation 
with whether they’d worked in a bar, pretty much [laughs]. But 
basically they, you know, they needed no scientific background.
[Susan]
We can read the positive interpretation o f statements such as this, that the Institute 
is an organisation that develops people into workers well suited to a knowledge 
economy. However, we can read the flip side o f these recruitment principles; that 
through this the scientific workforce is de-professionalised, even proletarianised. 
Rather than read this de-professionalisation as the passive result of advances n 
the automation o f the laboratory, it can be seen as a managerial process that walks 
in lock-step with these technological developments. Automation and de- 
professionalisation are part o f the same process o f reducing the demand for 
skilled labour in big biological science.
The negative interpretation o f the recruitment ethos of the Institute might win 
adherents from those who emerge from a hinterland of work in small science, 
particularly small science circa 1990. However, as we have established, the view 
from small science is a restricted view from a peculiar and unusual workplace. 
The leading figures at the Institute are not unaware of this perspective, or the truth 
that this view might contain. It was when discussing the decreasing proportion of 
people in the workplace with PhDs as science gets bigger that Professor Ingham 
found himself stressing his ambition to run the Institute with as flat an 
organisational structure as possible. It is by moving further down the hierarchy, 
to examine the Institute through the perspectives of those who emerge from 
hinterlands o f  work outside the world o f small science, that we can understand the 
way in which this ethos shaped the experience of work.
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Team Work
One o f the roles o f  team work in high commitment workplaces is to generate a 
sense o f collectivity, to intertwine the interests of individual workers with their 
colleagues and with their employers. While work at the Institute is organised into 
teams, many accounts present a narrative of ‘autonomous’, individualised work. 
Pat, who works as a ‘prepper’ in a Production team, interrupted the researcher 
when discussing the necessity o f working at part of an interacting team.
So you could arrive there and leave there without -  
[Researcher]
Without seeing anybody yeah, can do.
[Pat]
Pat was asked to describe the qualities that a person would require in order to 
work in Production.
I suppose you have to be able to work by yourself.
[Pat]
Self-direction is perhaps even more the case in Finishing, where the work is 
carried out on computers, which enables the atomisation of the working 
environment. O ne o f the team leaders suggested to me that there is no reason 
why the work o f Finishing could not be conducted at remote locations. For those 
working in a laboratory, in, for example, the Pre-Finishing team, at least some 
kind of co-ordination is required. But this co-ordination takes the form of the 
arrangement o f work practices around  the other people working in the same lab, 
not the arrangement o f  work practices with  these other people.
As we see in Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, work at the Institute 
produces a strong idea o f  being a member o f a collective. This collective, though, 
is the Institute, not the team. On a day-to-day basis, self-organisation is a 
principle feature o f  work at the Institute, not co-operative teamwork. This is 
despite the fact that the work o f each o f these individuals only makes sense in the 
context o f a vast co-ordinated effort. At the level of actual work practices, rather 
than in terms o f the community within which people work, the predominant
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experience is that o f ‘independence’ at work. This self-direction is to a degree far 
greater than one might imagine is experienced by technical workers of similar 
rank and qualification in a small science laboratory. Despite the image of small 
science as autonomous, for technical workers such an environment demands a 
much greater degree o f integration into the rhythms and habits of the team. And 
these would be defined by the idiosyncratic autonomous self-direction of the 
scientific leaders o f these small science laboratories.
Self-direction is not the same as autonomy. For management, the question of 
commitment is a question o f control. Through the recruitment of sentiment, 
which generates high affective and normative commitment, those working at the 
Institute can be relied on to supervise themselves. In so much as the role of team 
work in a high commitment workplace is to build into work demands for 
interpersonal relations that will hide the nature of the relationship between 
employer and employee, and to transform workers into the supervisors of each 
other (Finlay, 2001), the thoroughgoing engagement of those working at the 
Institute, as described in Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, supervises 
them from the inside out.
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H 4 C o n v e r g e n t  E v o l u t io n , C o m m o n  D e s c e n t ?
Work at the institute is high commitment, yes. That much is evident from 
Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment. But in important ways the Institute 
differs from the models o f the ‘high commitment workplace’ found in the 
literature o f the sociologies o f work and management. There are some similarities, 
some correspondences between the experience o f work at the Institute and the 
models o f high commitment wo rk. These are the product of convergent evolution. 
Kleinman and Valias (2001) have shown us that there is a general trend for 
convergence in the forms o f work in the academy and in knowledge-based 
industry. Faced with similar ‘selection’ pressures as knowledge-based industries, 
particularly dealing with new technology, retaining skilled workers, and 
motivating workers to exert discretionary effort, features o f the Institute come to 
resemble those o f the ‘high road’ models of workplace organisation. These 
originate not from industry, but are the product o f the descent of the Institute from 
small science, drawing from this hinterland a whole set of ideas about what work 
should be. In the case o f team work, as the Institute has diverged from the model 
of w)rk in small science, so it has diverged from the model of high commitment 
work.
The Institute has low differentials in status. This is to be remarked on, especially 
when we consider the differences in formal accreditation between the most 
qualified members o f  the workforce, who possess PhDs, and the least qualified, 
who have arrived at the Institute with a handful o f GCSE-level qualifications. 
Through this chapter and Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, we see the 
way that this works to produce workers who are bound into the values and goals 
of the Institute. The management o f the Institute has made deliberate efforts to 
develop their workers, both in terms of redeployment when the racing of 
technology reduces the necessity for some jobs, which develops a sense of loyalty, 
and in a far less obviously instrumental way, through a variety of educational 
opportunities, which engage the workers and make the Institute something more 
than a mere place o f work.
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The absence o f substantive teamwork at the Institute appears to be a key 
divergence from the high commitment models. However, this ‘independent’, self- 
direction is possible as a result of high levels of affective and normative 
commitment; real commitment. The absence of heavy-touch supervision, in line 
with the relatively flat culture within the Institute, is part of a process of recruiting 
the sentiments o f those working at the Institute that produces workers as the 
supervisors o f themselves. The lack o f teamwork prevents the commitment being 
orientated towards the immediate work group. But this absence leaves those 
working at the Institute as committed to the goals and values of the larger 
collective, the Institute.
In many ways, the experience o f working at the Institute is exceptional. Taking 
part in a grand historical project, working in science, taking the noble side in a 
race for priority, and working in an organisation that is, or has done, all of these 
things are all aspects o f this exceptionalism. These cannot be replicated in other 
workplaces o f technologically advanced economies. But, regardless of the origins 
of the w)rk practices o f the Institute or the particular modes by which sentiment 
was recruited, the development o f a highly committed work force has allowed the 
Institute to cope with the rapid changes, both in technology and in mission, that 
are understood as characterising work in post- industrial economies. Commitment 
was integral to the early success o f the Institute. Then, a small science ethos 
created an environment in which workers developed a wide range of skills and 
worked long hours to ensure the success of the Institute. Commitment continues 
to matter as the Institute has grown and changed, to ensure that the Institute is 
able to meet the challenges that are posed by the scientific landscape after the 
Human Genome Project. Some o f the ways in which the commitment of the 
workers to the Institute is being threatened by the changes that follow the 
accomplishment o f the sequencing o f the human genome are discussed in Chapter 
I, Interlude: Dis-Engagement and Dis-Integration.
For all the engagement, we should remember to bear in mind the warnings of 
Victor and Stephens (1994) that these changes are not, by some magic, a means 
by which the different interests o f employer and employee are reconciled. As 
Edwards (1979) reminds us, the notion o f loyalty and commitment are not new.
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In the case o f the entrepreneurial firm, personal loyalties hide the nature of the 
economic relationships in the workplace. Nelsen (1997) reminds us that, for all 
the experiments in improving the quality of working life, whether it is by the 
development o f small work groups, through increases in ‘autonomy’, or by means 
of participatory modes o f management, the fact remains that it is the superiors 
who ultimately retain the right to introduce, and revoke, new work practices. This 
should leave us with no illusion that the power and command that is vested in 
hierarchies at work remain.
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[i] I n t e r l u d e : D i s - e n g a g e m e n t  a n d  D i s - i n t e g r a t i o n
As an interlude, this chapter is a separate movement, a change in direction. The 
explorations o f the empirical evidence in Chapter F, The Factory and the 
University, Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, and Chapter H, The High 
Road to the H uman Genome, describe engagement and commitment, movements 
away from the image o f 4worker-as-machine’ of the rationalised factory. In those 
explorations, we have seen the glimpses o f counter-narratives. This chapter joins 
the currents o f these counter-narratives, changing direction while remaining a part 
of the body o f  the thesis. From engagement, we move to discussions of 
disengagement, from integration into the collective o f the Institute, this chapter 
turns our attention to the dis- integrating aspects o f the workplace.
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II In t r o d u c t io n
Many research participants temper their accounts of engagement, of the 
recruitment o f their sentiments, with a description of the way that things have 
changed. Throughout Chapter F, The Factory and the University, Chapter G, The 
Recruitment o f  Sentiment, and Chapter H, The High Road to the Human Genome, 
we see how these descriptions o f change are woven into the accounts of the 
research participants with the changes that produce the present workplace serving 
as a contrast by which to measure the past. These changes have a common theme; 
‘dis-engagement’ and ‘dis-integration’.
In section 12, The Triumph o f  Accomplishment?, we examine the disengagement 
that accompanied the loss o f the unifying moral mission to sequence the human 
genome. For those working on the day-to-day tasks of large-scale genome 
sequencing, the triumph o f accomplishment was momentary, with the effect of 
accomplishment on their experience o f work leaving their sentiments unengaged.
In section 13, Growing Apart, we explore the way in which the growth of the 
Institute has produced its own dis-integrating effects. As the Institute grew, it lost 
the capacity to recruit sentiments by its similarities with a family. More than that, 
as the Institute grew, the division o f labour not only grew more acute, it was 
written into the geography o f the Institute. People became physically separated. 
The Institute found new direction after the accomplishment of the Human 
Genome Project in a diversified faculty o f smaller science research. This dis­
integrated the Institute, no longer were all those working at the Institute bound 
together.
In section 14, Living to Work, or Working to Live?, we ask what this interlude has 
demonstrated. Throughout this chapter, we should be aware of the tendency to 
romanticise the past, to indulge in ‘Golden Ageism’. We should be careful to 
wear lenses that correct for the attribution o f such a colour to the past 
arrangements o f work at the Institute as we read the re-presented accounts of the 
research participants that make up this chapter. Even if we dismiss the accounts
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of the past as reconstructions rather than accounts of what was, this does not itself 
diminish the accounts o f the present, of work at the Institute now being 
disengaging and dis-integrating.
Section 15, Postscript: Resisting Recruitment, provides us with further contrast, as 
we examine the account o f Abi. Abi resisted the recruitment of her sentiment, 
resisting taking the goals and interests of the Institute as if they were her own. 
Her lack o f engagement does not mean that she is dissatisfied at work. Mills 
(1962 [1963]) reminds us that dissatisfaction and alienation are not synonymous, 
and in A bi’s case her evident satisfaction with work at the Institute is of the 
extrinsic kind rather than the intrinsic satisfactions described throughout Chapter 
G, The Recruitment o f  Sentim ent.
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12 T h e  T r iu m p h  o f  A c c o m p l is h m e n t ?
The Institute was the site at which one of the most important pieces of late 
twentieth century scientific work was conducted. The sequencing of the human 
genome was not just a triumph over the mysteries and complexities of nature, but 
a victory over the interests o f those who would privatise knowledge. As noted in 
Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, the exceptionalism of this mission and 
the moral dimension o f the race recruited sentiment into work at the Institute. 
Victory in the race, and the accomplishment o f the sequencing of the human 
genome left a sense o f pride, but diminished the active role playsd by these 
exceptional forces in recruiting sentiment.
The research participants locate some o f the disengaging and dis-integrating 
trends o f the Institute in the end o f the Human Genome Project. As Chapter G, 
The Recruitment o f  Sentim ent, demonstrates, the human genome is special, 
engaging scientific object. Research participants are far less engaged by the 
process o f sequencing other genomes, such as that of the zebra fish.
Elizabeth, who works in Finishing, describes the merits of the Human Genome 
Project as compared to the subsequent work performed by those employed in 
large-scale genome sequencing.
[I]f s just less inspiring to be honest, dead fish. [Laughing] they 
don’t inspire any kind o f pride. I always [say], you remember the 
Human Genom e Project? I did some of that. I don’t say I work 
on zebra fish.
[Elizabeth]
Neneh, who worked in Finishing during the Human Genome Project suggests that 
there is some excitement in sequencing the zebra fish, but then admits to herself 
that it is not as exciting as the ‘big one’; the human.
And again, zebra fish is still quite exciting because it’s a modem 
organism. But then the human genome was the sort of big one
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and it was the first o n e34 and it was sort of a little bit more 
exciting I guess than the ones w e’re doing now.
[Neneh]
However, though Claudia describes the sense of feeling that her work is 
worthwhile has been slipping away, she suggests that there is nothing inherently 
dis-engaging in working to sequence the genome of the zebra fish. Claudia, a 
member o f the Pre-Finishing team, suggests that the exceptionalism of the human 
genome is not due to anthropocentrism, but due to a sense of the sequencing 
project having scientific worth. In this, Claudia is not representative.
I was feeling ©ally, you know, like I say, really flat the other 
day. And the one thing our big boss did actually say was we’re 
the only company in the world sequencing zebra fish. [...] I 
didn’t know that. And he was saying how important it was, and 
it was like, ‘Oh w ow!’ You know, make- like I say, I reckon that 
would help, if they could keep us informed of how we benefit 
people still.
[Claudia]
Claudia sees that the specialness experienced while working to sequence the 
human genome is not something that rests entirely, if at all, with the intrinsic 
properties o f the human genetic sequence. Rather, at least some of this sense of 
performing special work is a result o f the way in which work is organised, 
recognised and rewarded. Scientific work might be worthwhile, but when the 
work o f science is divided and routinised, the sense that the work is worthwhile 
can only be experienced if  the organisation o f work communicates this.
Considering the accomplishment o f the sequencing of the human genome, Helen, 
a member of a Finishing team, describes how this moment in the history of the 
Institute was experienced once the celebrations had ended.
Yeah, I think people... people weren’t into it as much as they had 
been, and people were first starting to think, well, maybe it’s 
time to move on now the human’s finished. Yes. My team 
started to split up and move in different directions. Yes.
[Helen]
34 The human gen om e w as not the first genom e sequenced at the Institute. In developing the 
techniques and tech n o log ies that w ould be required to sequence the human genom e, the smaller 
genom e o f  a m odel organism  w as sequenced.
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As the team that Helen worked in disintegrated, so those at the Institute 
experienced dis-integration. With the sequencing of the human genome came the 
end o f one o f the features o f work at the Institute that had recruited the sentiments 
of those who worked. No mission was articulated that could take its place as a 
goal that bound those working there to the Institute, to keep them committed. 
The end o f the Human Genome Project was also the end of the race. Elizabeth 
commented on the effects o f  victory in her account when talking about the zebra 
fish and the mouse sequencing projects.
I mean it’s not that you don’t feel proud of your work, but it’s 
not got the same kind o f feeling, your camaraderie and 
everybody, especially when there was the race. Everybody likes 
a competition [laughing].
[Elizabeth]
As we argue in Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, the feeling of working 
on something special when sequencing the human genome cannot be separated 
from the celebrations o f work at the Institute. Or, indeed, from the feeling of 
being an important part o f the Institute, or from the feeling of being part of a 
community o f equals. As this chapter moves beyond the exceptionalism of the 
human genome and the race, we explore the ways in which research participants 
identify changes in these features o f the Institute to account for their experiences 
of disengagement and dis-integration.
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13 G r o w in g  A p a r t
In the majority o f accounts, research participants locate disengagement and dis­
integration as a product o f the growth of the Institute. Alice’s account intertwines 
a description o f a loss o f community atmosphere as a product of the growth of the 
Institute with descriptions o f changes in the organisation o f the Institute that are 
seemingly independent o f growth.
I’d say that it was a lot more o f a community when we were a lot 
smaller. I can’t remember how many staff there were when I 
first started, but you pretty much could recognise everyone by 
sight and you knew most people. And we’d regularly, pretty 
much celebrate in little milestones, I don’t know, a party every 
one or two months. So there was quite a lot of socialising. Now 
we don’t really have that and as you get bigger yes, you don’t. I 
don’t know most o f the people here now.
[Alice]
The end o f the social events that bound together the people who worked at the 
Institute is part o f the triumph o f accomplishment; completing the Human 
Genome Project took away a uniting mission that gave the punctuation of work by 
collective celebrations meaning. The growth in size of the Institute makes these 
celebrations less practicable and less likely to work to recruit sentiment and instil 
commitment. Alice says that, contrary to her earlier experiences o f the Institute 
over the past decade, she now does not know most of the people working at the 
Institute.
There are still some parties, o f course. Whether involved in historically important 
scientific projects or not, most workplaces in the UK have a Christmas party. But 
Claudia describes how the character o f these events is very different to the 
celebrations that marked the pursuit o f the sequence of the human genome.
When I got here everyone used to go to all the balls and the 
functions and it used to be really good, and everyone used to 
really look forward to it. And now it’s like, ‘Are you going to 
the Christmas ball?’ And it’s like, ‘Piss off, not going there’.
It’s like, ‘Oh, right. Okay’. ‘Why would I want to go there?’
But when I first started everyone was really into bonding and
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enjoying each other. I mean, you still get the sports and that, but 
not everyone does that. I don’t, yeah. I don’t know, it just 
seems weird. It’s, like, gone all flat really. Something that was 
bubbly when I got here has just gone.
[Claudia]
Alice suggests that once the Human Genome Project was complete there was less 
o f an organisational impetus to develop and maintain a collective ethos. For 
Alice this is reflected in her description o f the feel that large-scale sequencing at 
the Institute has, since the triumph o f accomplishment, developed into a 
workplace with higher staff turnover.
Yes, and it’s something that [, through organisational change,] 
they want to encourage. I get the impression that they probably 
don’t want anyone to see people who have been here for eight 
years. They want to see a much higher throughput of staff really.
[...] Yes, I think now they want to really just encourage more 
graduates and they don’t really want to see you staying in the job 
for a long time. They expect you to move on really and they’ve 
done this by [organisational changes that mean] you’re not going 
to be able to achieve a higher pay any more. It used to be quite a 
wide pay band and now they’ve really narrowed it so that the 
only way to earn more money would be to be promoted and to 
keep moving on.
[Alice]
Promotion is an altogether more difficult prospect than movement within a pay 
band. The opportunities for promotion are limited by the available vacancies and 
restricted by competition. Movement within a pay band relies on the 
demonstration o f  competency and experience in the conduct of the job that a 
worker is already performing. For Alice, as a member of the Finishing team, 
career advancement within the Institute means taking one of two paths. The first 
is a move up within the organisational hierarchy of the Finishing team, into 
management. The second is a move up the intellectual/scientific hierarchy35 of 
the chain o f sequence production, from Finishing and into Annotation.
You either take a team leader role and do the management side 
or my path here would be Annotation I guess, yes. [...] I don’t
35 A s w e see in Chapter D , Case, the sense o f  the Institute as containing hierarchies which not only 
differentiate w ithin team s but betw een teams in the sequencing chain o f  production is felt by 
research participants.
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know really. I think probably I would like to work in 
management but there's fewer opportunities. It’s probably a case 
o f someone has to leave because there's only so many people 
with, so many teams, and it takes a team leader to leave.
Whereas there are probably vacancies that come up in 
Annotation really.
[Alice]
Brian, a manager o f the Pre-Finishing team, describes the effect of growth on the 
integration o f those working at the Institute. In this case, through the way that 
everyday social activity is arranged.
I think it was a great thing that we had to do back then was pass 
everyone. Everyone said “Hi”. Everybody went for a coffee 
together, we used go down the pub for lunch on Friday.
Whereas things like that just don’t tend to happen any more or if 
they do they happen on a micro scale.
[Brian]
In Brian’s account, when the Institute was smaller it was possible to have a 
personal, social relationship with almost everybody who worked there. As the 
Institute grew, it dis-integrated. People can only have those kinds of personalised 
relationships with a limited number o f people. Later in that interview, Brian says 
that there used to be a degree o f  physical face-to-face contact between people that 
has now been lost.
Well, it used to be in the first building that we worked in that 
you had to walk through the lab to go for a coffee. So 
everybody knew everybody, no matter what teams we were in or 
what you were actually doing. Everybody knew everybody and 
that was a really good atmosphere then. Whereas now you can 
walk down the corridor and not see anyone. And a lot o f people 
now don’t recognise 90 per cent of the people here.
[Brian]
Elizabeth describes the same developments.
So it is quite weird, in a way, having gone from- it was quite a 
small community that everybody- I mean it was also a complete 
gossip, you know, a grapevine, because if somebody did 
something the entire place knew, and they all knew who you 
were talking about. Which was fun occasionally, unless it was
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you they were talking about [laughing]. But it has changed, 
because there is just a lot more people doing things that you have 
no idea about [...] [W]hen it was all Sequencing and Finishing 
you interacted with somebody in every department very much.
Because if you needed something doing, you knew the person to 
go talk to. W hereas there are whole sections in the building, 
whole groups o f people that I never, ever have to have anything 
to do with.
[Elizabeth]
Joe found an interesting analogy to explain what had happened as the Institute 
grew in size.
I think it has changed the atmosphere, yeah. It seems less 
friendly. Less, yeah. Just like any other job, in a way. You 
could be working for, like, a London bus company, and you 
wouldn’t know half the drivers, you know, at all the depots.
You’d only know your depot, and I think that it’s becoming like 
that.
[Joe]
Rather than being integrated into the Institute as a whole, the social and 
sentimental connections o f people working at the Institute are increasingly limited 
to their immediate work colleagues.
Brian argues that it is not the growth of the Institute that has led to this dis­
integration. He suggests that the cause can be found in the fact that people have 
been moved around and physically divided, in ‘separating teams out’ and in 
‘building design’. Regardless of whether Brian is correct in his suggestion that 
the integration o f the Institute could have been maintained as the Institute 
expanded, his account o f dis-integration is not untypical. The process might not 
have created atomised individuals, but it did shift the sense of the collective, the 
‘we’, from the Institute to that o f immediate work and social groupings. This was 
supported by N eneh’s reply to the question of whether there was a ‘community’ at 
the Institute.
[T]hese days there’s probably distinct communities, I would say 
that.
[Neneh]
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Elizabeth describes how the change in the size of the Institute has changed her 
experience o f work.
It’s changed, the size o f it and the fact that because of the size of 
it it’s had to become a lot more like a company and there is a lot 
more officialism and red tape and you don’t know everybody.
[Elizabeth]
Elizabeth was asked if she could provide examples of these changes. Her 
response began by discussing the change from a ‘laid back’ atmosphere to one 
where there are defined targets. However, the concrete example that Elizabeth 
provides, with more than a hint o f nostalgia, is one of dis- integration.
I think ju st the sheer size o f it has meant that there is a 
disconnection between the higher levels. [...] I mean I still say 
hello to everybody. I have not stopped saying hello to [the head 
o f sequencing] or [the founding director] if I see them but I don’t 
think there is that- you know you don’t seem to- its got so big 
that you don’t know people in every department.
[Elizabeth]
Joe also described the change from the ‘laid-back’ atmosphere.
It was a nicer atmosphere, yes. But it was easy-going. I mean, 
the work got done, but nobody was there, like cracking a whip 
over you to get it done. Whereas now it’s- I wouldn’t say it’s 
cracking a whip but there is more pressure to get the work done 
on time.
[Joe]
This is made manifest in the increasing visibility o f targets.
It’s more target orientated. There are product- you know there’s 
schedules for all different clones and different organisms to be 
done by and within budgets as well, o f course.
[Joe]
The development o f the Institute repeatedly reminds us o f the development of the 
firm, from craft workshop, to entrepreneurial firm, to Fordist production, and 
latterly, to diversified post-Industrial organisation. Edwards’ (1979) account of 
the expansion o f entrepreneurial firms describes the demand that this expansion
261
places on the forms o f control. “ [T]he expansion of formerly entrepreneurial 
firms undermines the personal sway that an individual capitalist could hold over 
his workers. The method o f control came into conflict with the requirements of 
production. Pressure built up for more regularized and structured management 
practices, for methods that did not depend on the extensive personal intervention 
of the capitalist” (p. 30). In the analogous development of the Institute, this 
means pressure, targets and budgets, and decreased reliance on the recruitment of 
sentiment.
Helen connects the dis-integration o f the Institute to the increasingly acute 
division o f labour, as teams become more specialised and contained. But she 
identifies this division as having effects beyond any increased efficiency in the 
performance o f immediate work tasks.
So when I started they were just breaking up the team [...] And 
so they would socialise with them all, even though they were 
splitting them up when I started. So we knew all the people that 
were providing us with the work, and so if we had a problem 
then we just like... you could mention it at tea, you know, went 
for a break or something.
[Helen]
That idea that the division o f  the work o f sequencing genomes into increasingly 
discrete jobs has had an effect on the integration of those working at the Institute 
is a common theme in the accounts o f the research participants. Many o f these 
locate this dis-integration around changes in the everyday, mundane social 
activities that bind the workplace together, such as those that take place over a 
cup of coffee or tea, rather than around the exceptional socialising o f celebrations.
The collectivity o f the Institute has also been disrupted by the developments after 
the end o f the Human Genome Project. The Institute has ceased to be a dedicated 
sequencing centre and has diversified into ‘post-genomic’ smaller science 
research built on the resources and infrastructure that the Human Genome Project 
put in place. This diversification has transformed those involved in sequencing 
from being those whose work was the essence of the Institute, to being those 
whose work is a sideline, a service even, to the main work of the Institute. The
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transformation o f  genomic resources, such as the sequence of the human genome, 
into scientific knowledge, is the new purpose of the Institute. Joe describes the 
change.
[T]he m ajor projects aren’t there. So it’s more research. Which, 
to bring people in to the research I think they had to make it into 
an [research] institute to get more of the actual research fellows 
to come in here.
[Joe]
The Institute acquiring a new reason for existence has shifted the focus away from 
genome sequencing. This shifting focus has left those working on the sequencing 
of genomes feeling side-lined. Helen describes the way the feeling of integration 
into the Institute has changed.
So, whereas we were the main thing to begin with, what we were 
famous for, now it’s getting less and less. It’s kind of more 
pushed to the side I think. [...] We don’t feel as important to the 
whole thing any more.
[Helen]
Neneh articulates similar feelings o f marginalisation.
I mean, we were the core at that point, that was basically what 
we were here for, to start for, was to sequence the human 
genome. And then when that was completed and then out of that 
obviously came the biology, and the focus did change, then we 
didn’t- I was going to say we didn’t feel quite as valued, but it 
was just the way it was. But it was difficult to take. Because 
you did feel that kind o f like you were something special and 
then you were kind of, sort of, side-lined.
[Neneh]
This ‘side-lining’ o f the sequencing work o f the Institute has, necessarily, gone 
hand-in-hand with the shifting focus to smaller science research. This has 
required the recruitment o f a ‘university’-style faculty. Or, as Julia puts it, an 
increasing number o f ‘bigwigs’. Julia and Maggie suggest that there was a much 
more ‘flat’ hierarchy o f esteem when the Institute was concentrating on
sequencing.
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But I mean when we first started it was a lot smaller and it was 
more- there w eren’t so many really bigwigs and all that. You 
know, it was more your basic researchers, a lot of, you know, not 
scientists and whatever. Or the ratio was a lot lower. Yes.
[Julia]
A lot o f lab assistants, weren’t there?
[Maggie]
With the diversification o f the Institute into ‘post-genomic’ research, those who 
worked in sequencing feel that they have been side- lined, that they no longer have 
personal, social connections with many people beyond their own teams, and that 
the hierarchy o f esteem has been made much more steep with the recruitment of a 
post-genomic research faculty. With these changes, considered in light of the 
conclusions o f Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, it should be no surprise 
that the experience o f work at the Institute is increasingly disengaging and dis­
integrating.
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14 L iv in g  t o  W o r k , o r  W o r k in g  t o  L iv e ?
Does dis-engagement and dis-integration matter? Chapter H, The High Road to 
the Human Genome, suggests that it matters more than merely colouring the 
subjective experience o f work. Work into which sentimerts are wholeheartedly 
given is experienced as engaging rather than alienating. Engagement reaches its 
apotheosis in the description that Professor Ingham gave of his connection with 
his work as an academic scientist.
I seem to have fallen into a pattern of living to work, rather than
working to live.
[Professor Ingham]
Steeped in the culture o f his hinterland o f work, dominated by the image of the 
university, Professor Ingham speaks positively about being engaged in work. But 
the world o f  small science work is highly peculiar, which necessitates a highly 
personal connection with the products of work.
As we see in Chapter H, The High Road to the Human Genome, the idea of 
alienation finds its way into contemporary management debates, even if the 
language o f alienation does not. Commitment produces functional effects. In 
Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, Helen suggests that when those 
sequencing genomes are alienated from the products of their work they would 
have less interest in producing quality work. This is supported by the arguments 
in Chapter C, Pathologies o f  Work in Big Science. If this is the case, then the 
disengagement and the dis-integration experienced by those working at the 
Institute might act as accelerants, as reinforcing feedback, to these processes. If 
workers are not, through the recruitment of sentiment, supervised from the inside 
out, then the organisational response will be the increasing visibility of targets and 
other means o f  overt control.
It is in the extraction o f  discretionary effort that disengagement and dis­
integration find their most important objective effects. As Jill describes, once 
people would work long hours because they wanted to, because they identified
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their interests and values with those of the Institute. Work at the Institute is now a 
nine-to-five’ job. Brian describes the same change.
No, there was no expectation o f anyone doing long hours or 
anything. It was just the ethos was to stay and get the job done.
That s what everyone was there for. Whereas now it’s like, do 
your hours and go. A lot o f the staff seem to be like that anyway.
And again now some o f the managers are as well.
[Brian]
Even people who have been here since that sort of time?
[Researcher]
Yes
[Brian]
So it’s not just the community that’s changing because the 
people have changed?
[Researcher]
No. It’s not, unfortunately.
[Brian]
As we read, Brian’s account o f the change in the discretionary efforts of those 
working at the Institute contains an additional lament. That lament is that 
changes cannot be located in a changing makeup o f the workforce but must be 
seen as changes in the Institute itself; what it does and how it organises this36. It 
is not just that there are new workers who arrive disengaged and dis-integrated, 
but that the Institute is now, relatively to the experience o f work over the past 
decade, a disengaging and dis-integrated workplace.
We must bear in mind the warning sounded at the start of this chapter. We should 
avoid falling into ‘Golden Ageism’. Nevertheless, even if we were cynical 
readers o f interview transcripts, and concluded that the engaging, integrated 
workplace that the participants describe when referring to the past is a romantic
36 A counter argument is put by Jill; “But it was a different era for all o f  those o f  us who had just 
started. W e w ere all single, w e w ere all just out of, more or less, straight out o f  university, we 
socialised a lot together, w e w ent to the pub every weekend, and as lives change and w e settle 
down and w e have children, priorities change in terms o f  what w e want to do with our spare time 
and our work tim e.” Jill suggests that as the Institute has developed, so its workforce has matured 
and it is this maturation that, relatively speaking, has produced a dis-engaging workplace. From a 
workplace that itse lf feels like a family, to a workplace dis-engaged as a result o f  family?
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fiction, this does not change our reading of disengagement and dis-integration in 
the accounts o f  the subjective experience of work in the present. Regardless of 
whether there was a contrasting past, the accounts of the present describe a 
workplace in which research participants do not feel part of the larger collectivity, 
in which their sentiments are not recruited.
If we do take the accounts o f the past as, more or less, accounts of the subjective 
experience o f work as it was, then we can begin to make claims about the process 
of change as well as the nature o f the present. These accounts describe a change 
in the experience o f  work at the Institute, the overall trend of which can be 
summarised as being from one in which there was a sense of collectivity and into 
one characterised by a sense o f comparative fragmentation. As we see in Chapter 
G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, this collectivity was supported by the 
personality o f the founding director, the special nature of the Human Genome 
Project, integration through celebrations and the deliberate attempt to maintain a 
‘flat’ organisational structure. The sense that there were few social barriers 
between the most senior figures in the Institute and the most junior was a sign of 
this collectivity in action. This aspect o f working at the Institute is diminished by 
challenges to all these supporting factors; there is a new director, the Human 
Genome Project is complete, the celebrations have run dry and the organisational 
structure as experienced by the research participants is increasingly 
hierarchialised and structured.
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15 P o s t s c r i p t : r e s is t in g  r e c r u it m e n t
Not all the research participants found their sentiments recruited in the first place. 
For Abi, a member o f  the Production team, the triumph of accomplishment did 
not produce the nostalgic responses that characterised the majority of the accounts 
o f the research participants. Abi presents a particularly unengaged account of the 
‘team building’ approaches to developing a campus-like community ethos at the 
Institute.
She begins by describing how the lightly structured working environment was not 
felt as an equally positive arrangement by all the people working at the Institute.
You know, you’re under no pressure. There’s nobody on your 
back going, ‘But where were you? I was looking for you at 
eleven o ’clock, where were you?’ But it works to a 
disadvantage to us, the people that do the normal thing, because 
it was like they get paid shed loads more money because they’ve 
been at university. [...] they sit in font of a computer all day 
and then they’ll have like six or seven coffees. They’ll go off, 
do this and then -  ooh! I must do this football for two hours.
Which you don’t have to payback because that’s ‘team building’.
[...] Or badminton or Frisbee or cricket or you know, things like 
that.
[Abi]
As Abi illustrates, and as Nichob and Beynon (1977) pointed out to us in their 
critique o f Blauner’s (1964) argument that increasing technology would liberate 
workers, the laudatory accounts o f new working practices often write large 
numbers o f workers out o f the picture. In this case, the freedom and autonomy of 
the more senior members o f the Institute is a freedom that must be accommodated 
by ‘the people that do the normal thing’. Abi was asked if she got opportunities 
to take part in these team building exercises.
Oh, you get -  yeah. Oh god, yeah. You can -  you can do what 
-  you know, I mean w e’ve got football teams and everything 
else like that. But that was always looked on -  like our boss, 
because she was -  our boss, she was the head of the sports and 
social club. So she was either reffing or she was doing this, that 
and the other. And you’d say, ‘Well, hang on’. You know,
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they’d moan about the fag breaks and stuff but they’d go, ‘Well,
[X has] been on for two hours doing thingy and then he’s come 
back and got his lunch and gone.’
[Abi]
Abi argues that it appears that some leisure and social activities are placed in the 
privileged position o f ‘team building’. Some non-productive activities are 
virtuous, others are wasteful. And virtue appears, in this account, to correspond 
with the interests o f those who occupy positions of power within the Institute. 
Abi’s dissatisfaction with attempts to create a collectivity with a university-like 
feel go further. While for some, these team building activities might be perks of 
working in such a campus-like environment as the Institute, for Abi, these feel 
like undignified impositions.
But that’s team building. You know, that’s for the good of the 
[Institute]. But because you don’t play football or you don’t do 
badminton or you don’t do this, that and the other, I mean like 
the stupid parties they have for -  you know, three million mega 
bases or whatever it is. [...] A huge cake, bouncy castles, free 
booze. Put a tenner in our pockets37, you know, don’t bother 
about that because I’m not -  I ain’t got the time to do that. And 
it is, but that’s the bit that’s like a campus. [...] You know, oh -  
w e’ll have a party. You know, we can have free booze, we can 
have a barbecue, we can do all that. And the bosses look down 
on you more for not going to these things and not being involved 
in these things than anything else really. And it’s like well, I 
come in to work [early] in the morning. I want to go home [early 
in the afternoon]. I’m not bothered about going to a party and 
bouncing the castle; I ’m [40] years old, for crying out loud, ha!
[Abi]
For Abi, these team building activities become duties rather than rewards. Abi 
imagines her work as an exchange o f time for money rather than a participation in 
a community o f scientific work. A ‘tenner in her pocket’ is a more suitable 
reward than a free party for the achievement o f a project goal.
37 To illustrate the d ifference betw een the engaged and the unengaged, w e can refer to the 
interview with Claudia. Claudia says almost the exact opposite to Abi. It s like, I don t want 
extra w ages. C om e and pat m e on the back and make me feel good about what I do, because I do 
work hard, and som etim es you just feel, ‘W ell, why should I if  it goes unnoticed?’ Why don’t I 
just sit back and think, ‘A h, sod it’.
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From Abi s account, it seems that the path to success at the Institute is to play 
football and to attend parties. Since the completion of the Human Genome 
Project this culture o f reward through social gathering has diminished.
Yeah. I mean it’s not so much now; I mean that was when we 
were -  that was also on human genome and that lot. But yeah.
But that was it, you know, oh — having a party. All stop work.
But this time — which is time if you come in at eleven o’clock in 
the morning. It’s like hang on a bit, I ’ve got to go. Another two 
hours, got to go to a party? And -  but yeah. That was what I 
could never — that was more of — I could never get my head 
round that bit. Yeah. [...] As long as -  you know, you have to 
get involved in the football, you have this, that and the other.
And nine times out o f ten the — you know, the team leaders are, I 
mean you know, and they can off to the gym for a couple of 
hours and come back but you disappear and some -  oh, where 
were you then? Not now it isn’t but [...] there you are.
[Abi]
We find that Abi uses her background, her hinterland of work, as a way of 
providing some mitigation for what she feels was a too negative tenor to her 
interview. Her hinterland o f work shaped her expectations o f  the experience of 
work at the Institute. Work is an exchange of time and effort for money; it is not 
meant to be a place o f parties, sports and autonomy. Abi’s account of work does 
not consider the possibility o f intrinsic satisfaction through work. Considered in 
bare economic terms, from the perspective o f the material interests of the worker, 
the most efficient worker is the one who receives the greatest monetary reward for 
the least input o f time and labour. And at the Institute, for Abi, this is a rewarding 
calculation.
Well, it’s still the best job I’ve ever had and I wouldn’t want to 
leave. [ ...] I want to be here until I retire! But, yes. Definitely. I 
mean like I said I’ve done hairdressing, I’ve worked in a factory,
I’ve done this, that and the other and worked with kids. You 
know, which you do -  I mean you do everything when you’ve 
got kids o f your own. You’ve got to do it. But this is definitely, 
you know, the most money for the least work. [...] And I still 
find things to moan about!
[Abi]
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Though Abi resists the recruitment of her sentiment, she presents an image of 
extrinsic satisfaction. She is committed to the Institute; she wants to be there until 
she retires. But her commitment is not ‘real’ commitment, of the affective or 
normative sort, but, comparatively, rational and calculative. Working at the 
Institute is the best job  that she has ever had. It is ‘the most money for the least 
work’. Work at the Institute is a job, and a job is an exchange of time and labour 
for money. For Abi, the recruitment o f sentiment does not hide this relationship. 
More, efforts to recruit sentiment from the staff, to instil commitment, are 
regarded with suspicion, particularly as it appears to Abi that those who benefit 
most from these activities are those already well placed in the hierarchy of the 
Institute.
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P a r t  F o u r : C o n t e x t  a n d  C o n c l u s i o n
Through this thesis we are engaged in the pulling apart of threads. In Chapter A, 
Primers, we tease from the literature the important strands of history, pulling 
away the mythic language and an economic vision that goes no further than the 
stock market. In Chapter B, Anatomies o f  Big Science, the various aspects in 
which science could be big are pulled apart. The meanings of alienation are 
differentiated in Chapter C, Pathologies o f  Big Science. Through Part Two: 
Strategy and Method, in Chapter D, Case, and Chapter E, Conduct, the mess of 
real qualitative social research is combed into something neat enough to be 
described. Part Three: Illustrating and Accounting, contains the most complex 
task, the analysis and re-presentation of the accounts of research participants into 
forms that provide us with insight into the sociology of work in big science.
Part Four: Context and Conclusion, pulls the threads of the thesis together. 
Through Chapter J, The Institute and the Knowledge Economy, the experiences of 
those working at the Institute are connected to debates regarding the future of 
work and economies. In drawing together these treads and addressing the future, 
questions o f optimism and pessimism are asked as the Institute is offered as a de­
monstration.
272
[J ] T h e  I n s t i t u t e  a n d  t h e  K n o w l e d g e  E c o n o m y
“The knowledge economy conjures a world o f smart people, in smart jobs, doing 
smart things, in smart ways, for smart money, increasingly open to all rather than 
a few” (Brown and Hesketh, 2004, p .l). The phrase ‘knowledge economy’ 
suggests the end o f  proletariat, those who contribute to the wealth of the economy 
through the application o f their bodies. The economy will be transformed from 
one that necessitates the manipulation o f the material world into one that is 
dependent o f the manipulation o f the symbolic. Optimistic visions of the future 
such as this might command space in political discourse, but views of a more 
pessimist nature also find expression. This chapter places the study of the 
Institute in the context o f such visions o f the future o f work.
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J1 In t r o d u c t io n
Biotechnology is seen as one o f  the key sectors in knowledge economies, 
particularly that o f the UK. The Human Genome Project is understood as 
producing a key infrastructural resources on which the future successes of 
biotechnology, indeed, biocapitalism, will be built. The knowledge economy, 
with its stress on knowledge and ideas over the material, is seen as a 
manifestation o f  post-industrialism. This chapter examines the position of the 
Institute within the knowledge economy, drawing from this the ways in which the 
Institute can serve as a ‘de-monstration’.
Daniel Bell (1974) was one o f  the first writers, outside of science fiction, to 
suggest the coming o f  a post-industrial society. Bell suggested that we would see 
the rise o f new technical elites; professional, scientific and technical labour 
becomes increasingly important. Watson (2003) argues that the “central 
weakness in Bell’s thesis, however, lies in his assumption that there is anything 
novel about the centrality o f knowledge to economic and working life” (p. 65). 
Watson points out the very existence o f industrial society itself was the result of 
the application o f scientific, technical and rational-calculative modes of thought to 
economic life. Bell’s ideas, argues Watson, can be seen as a late twentieth 
century continuation o f  W eber’s rationalisation thesis; decisions are increasingly 
taken by credentialed experts on the basis o f technical rationalities.
This sense o f continuity and connection, as compared with revolution and 
discontinuity, is one that runs through this chapter. Despite the role of the 
Institute in laying the foundations for a successful knowledge economy, in key 
respects the way in which the work was conducted was resolutely Modem. As a 
result, this chapter questions the assumption that a knowledge economy will be 
dominated by new forms o f post-industrial knowledge work.
Knowledge economies are often understood by their move from a reliance on the 
material and the physical, to the creation of wealth by use of the mental and the 
symbolic. According to Watson (2003), Castells (1996) makes a distinction
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between an information society, which is not new, and an informational society, 
in which the engines o f productivity and power are not plant, labour and capital, 
but “the generating, processing and transmitting of knowledge-based information” 
(p. 65). Societies o f this kind, it is suggested, would involve a change in the 
nature o f class society. The diminishing working class would no longer pose a 
threat to capitalism, rather, the challenge to capitalism would come from new 
social movements built around identity, the symbolic, rather than class-based 
material interests.
If, as Castells (1996) and others argue, there has been a change in the way that 
society generates wealth, we can also expect changes in the organisation of work. 
Brown and Hesketh (2004) describe the standard vision of the knowledge 
economy. “The competitive advantage o f  leading-edge companies in the 
knowledge-based economy (KBE) no longer depends on mass production of 
standardized goods and services that are made, monitored, distributed, and sold 
by vast armies o f blue-collar and white-collar employees, but on technological 
innovation, applied knowledge and the intellectual capital of a highly skilled 
workforce” (p. 16). These changes in the organisation of work open up the space 
in which workers can use initiative, display creativity, and apply contextual 
knowledge. Efence, commitment is important, as we see in Chapter H, The High 
Road to the Human Genome, and the adoption of high commitment, high 
performance management strategies can be understood as adaptations to the 
demands o f the knowledge economy.
In section J2, From Lisbon to Erewhon, we explore the more radical claims for 
the knowledge economy; that the advent of knowledge economies is a change of 
the scale o f the Industrial Revolution. This rhetoric does political work. The 
suggestion that there has been a move from the material to a world o f ideas is one 
that prescribes certain policy decisions. Section J3, Knowledge Economies and 
Knowledge Workers, examines some of the literature that has explored the 
meaning o f the knowledge economy and the term ‘knowledge worker’. The 
question o f who is a knowledge worker, and who is not, appears to depend on the 
degree o f optimism in the potential o f knowledge economies. This section argues
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that we see a persistence o f old forms of work, and non-knowledge work; that the 
contemporary economy is marked by continuity with the past, not discontinuity.
Section J4, The D e-M onstration o f  the Institute, concludes this thesis. This 
section examines the position o f this study of the Institute in debates around the 
future o f work. The question of optimism and pessimism is raised. Are we to be 
optimistic with regard to the potential of the knowledge economy, of big, 
industrialised science, o f new forms of work? Or do we see these things as the 
carriers o f problems and patholo gies?
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J2 F r o m  L is b o n  t o  E r e w h o n
The pursuit o f the Knowledge Economy became the policy of the EU at the 
Lisbon meeting o f the European Council in March 2000. The aim was to provide 
a new impetus to economic growth in the EU, and in the process “making the 
European Union (EU) the most competitive economy in the world and achieving 
full employment by 2010” (Europa, 2008). The EU expert group, which included 
several sociologists o f science, wrote that since 2000, the pursuit of the 
knowledge econom y ‘has been a continual preoccupation of EC and member- 
state policy actors” (Felt, et al. 2007, p. 14).
The EU expert group summarise the political agenda as demanding an increased 
use of science to drive economic growth.
The term, “knowledge-based economy” prioritises the 
instrumental use o f  scientific knowledge for competitive 
economic advantage. Science is seen as both the key factor of 
new production and as traded commodity-product in itself. UK 
Prime M inister Tony Blair explained in November 2006 that a 
knowledge economy is “an economy where we do not compete 
on wages -  how can we when China’s wage costs are 5 per cent 
o f ours? -  but on intelligence, on innovation, on creativity”.
(Felt, et al. 2007, p. 14)
The EU expert group suggest that these priorities demand a change in society.
The shaping o f society is further visible in the idea of the 
knowledge economy as articulated in the Lisbon Agenda, and 
underpinned by the linear model. This then leads to implicit or 
explicit assertions that “Science is the solution, society the 
problem”. Society has to become more entrepreneurial, become 
more accepting of, or even keen on, new technology. The 21st 
century version o f  the Chicago World Exhibition: “society has to 
conform”.
(Felt, et al. 2007, p. 22)
The strategy for achieving a knowledge economy, for making society conform, 
rests on three ‘pillars’.
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An economic pillar preparing the ground for the transition to a 
competitive, dynamic, knowledge-based economy. Emphasis is 
placed on the need to adapt constantly to changes in the 
information society and to boost research and development.
A social pillar designed to modernise the European social model 
by investing in human resources and combating social exclusion.
The M ember States are expected to invest in education and 
training, and to conduct an active policy for employment, 
making it easier to move to a knowledge economy.
An environmental pillar, which was added at the Goteborg 
European Council meeting in June 2001, draws attention to the 
fact that economic growth must be decoupled from the use of 
natural resources.
(Europa, 2008)
The political pursuit o f the knowledge economy does not just demand that 
governments act through altering the budgets they set for funding councils and 
higher education. Rather, the transition to the knowledge economy is seen as all 
encompassing, as revolutionising. For some, the knowledge economy is being 
heralded as a change as profound as that which accompanied the Industrial 
Revolution. Consider the speech given by David Potter, the founder of the 
computing company Psion. He talks o f the way in which ‘the chip’ facilitates 
software, information, and knowledge, likening it to the invention of the 
‘Gothenburg’ (sic) printing press.
And software isn’t just software - software is the virtual machine.
It is weightless, infinitely variable; it can drive automation and 
robots; it can facilitate remote communications at the other end 
o f the world; and replace mechanical systems; it can investigate 
and query and deal with the abstract.
(Potter, 1999 [2003])
This speech is not simply a speculative after dinner speech to a business round 
table. It is hosted on the website o f the Prime Minister. The most important 
phrases in this extract are ‘weightless’, ‘infinitely variable’, and ‘replace 
mechanical system s’. As with the extract from the summary of the Lisbon 
strategy above, with its talk of decoupling economic growth from the use of 
natural resources, there appears to be a belief that economies can exist apart from 
the material. The notion that wealth can be created without the material
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transformation o f  the world is, literally, a form of magical thinking. The 
transformation of, for example, Nike, into a branding corporation rather than a 
manufacturing corporation does not mean that their products are no longer 
manufactured. The outsourcing o f manufacture does not signal a move away 
from manufacturing except for the particular companies that do the outsourcing. 
But in the less restrained imaginations of the knowledge economy, ‘wealth 
creation’ can be shorn o f its dirt, its labour, its muck and brass.
Potter continues in this theme when setting out his four propositions38:
First, Value and Wealth derive from The Process of Creating, 
not Making things.
Second, Information is replacing Capital. Third, the Process of 
Making Things is increasingly automated.
Fourth, Digital Communications are transcending distance.
Fifth, Today, Bits o f  information are replacing material Atoms.
(Potter, 1999 [2003])
The message is that the material is irrelevant. All we need in order to generate 
wealth is our imagination and the manipulation o f symbols. In a more restrained 
continuation o f this logic Powell and Snellman (2004) use the car, the model 
object of Fordist production, to illustrate the changes involved in the development 
of the knowledge economy. “A new car today is less and less the product of 
metal fabrication and more a smart machine that uses computer technology to 
integrate safety, emissions, entertainment, and performance” (p. 201). But for all 
this, it is still a manufactured physical object. People do not drive ideas.
Burton-Jones (1999) describes the development of a knowledge economy as 
being a “transformation o f a world largely dominated by physical resources, to a 
world dominated by knowledge” and suggests that this “implies a shift in the 
locus o f economic power as profound as that which occurred at the time of the 
Industrial Revolution” (p. 3). If Burton-Jones is right, then sociologists of the 
early twenty-first century should find themselves in a situation analogous to that 
occupied by the founders o f sociology. Perhaps we should hope so. We might, 
then, either be due a new age o f sociology, with the transformation o f the social
38 The transcript o f  the speech at N um berl0.gov.uk contains the curious capitalisation seen here.
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arrangements and institutions o f this new knowledge economy the sites of prime 
sociological interest, or even the birth of a new discipline to cope with the 
changed world. Indeed, Savage and Burrows (2007) argue that in order to cope 
with a world o f  ‘knowing capitalism’ the empirical techniques of sociology will 
need to be radically innovated.
Rather than the Industrial Revolution, arriving amid the trappings of Modernity, 
such as mass employment, urbanisation, a democratisation of politics, it is 
claimed that “ [w]e are in the early stages of a ‘Knowledge Revolution’” (Burton- 
Jones, p. 3). This ‘revolution’, which reshapes our economic lives, takes place 
amid what is imagined as the reshaping the world. We have problems combing 
apart the threads o f  contemporary social description and explanation, among 
which we find the labels; globalisation, post-industrialism, post-Modernity, post- 
Fordism, the network society, and, indeed, the knowledge economy. To 
understand these threads it helps to arrive at some sense of priority. It does not 
require one to be a M arxist for one to accept the Marxian axiom that the 
arrangement o f our economic affairs is the pre-requisite for all other forms of 
organisation. Understanding the most basic form of our economic affairs, the 
way that we work, is therefore a task suited to a sociology that meets the 
challenges posed by the much trumpeted, apparently dramatic changes in the 
world39.
In a ‘weightless’ economy, Schumpterian creative destruction is destruction 
without real consequences. The failures o f a weightless knowledge economy will 
produce no equivalent to the post-industrial towns of northern England, merely 
abandoned software platforms and redundant domain names. But economies are 
not weightless, regardless o f the fact that a narrow band o f privileged workers 
deal in the symbolic rather than the material. Further, as described in this thesis, 
the Institute is a mass organisation that bears the marks that characterise
39 Narratives o f  dramatic change can them selves change the world, even if  they are inaccurate 
descriptions. There appears to be a keenness to justify government policies, whether on work and 
welfare or terrorism and security, by suggesting that the ‘rules o f  the game have changed’. That 
the vast majority o f  these po lic ies are regressive, and rely on the dragooning o f  a rhetoric o f  
drastic, d iscontinuous change from a past historical period to the present in order to defend these 
policies, ought to tell us to take narratives o f  such shifts in the arrangement o f  the world with two 
fistfuls o f  salt.
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Modernity. A key workplace o f contemporary biological science is therefore an 
expression o f Modernity. Yet, it is also imagined as the seed of the knowledge 
economy, which, its prophets predict, will sweep these forms of social 
organisation away.
The propaganda for the knowledge economy as a revolution is curious. As a 
second extract from the Potter speech shows, despite its presentation as an 
inexorable, irresistible change in our economies, we must act in order for the 
revolution to be completed.
The effect o f the virtual machine is so profound that it is 
changing the entire econom ic structure. It is therefore critical 
that we do identify it as the revolution it is so that we can 
facilitate and accept change in our society.
(Potter, 1999 [2003])
The knowledge economy is both human-made and beyond the control of human 
beings. The actions o f humans are only accepted into the narrative where they are 
designed to carry the revolution o f the knowledge economy forward. Society 
must be made to conform.
One way in which society will be made to conform to the demands of the 
knowledge economy is through education. In these visions o f a knowledge 
economy, education becomes economic and social policy (Brown and Hesketh, 
2004). Through education, and as a result, the increase in the skills and talents of 
the population, the trend towards increasing inequality that is seen in post- 
industrial technologically advanced economies will be reversed. As with the 
immaterial economy, social justice is a good that can be produced without 
reference to structures o f society, only to the ideas within people.
The bolder rhetoric o f the knowledge economy suggests that we are entering a 
new, distinct period o f history. This thesis suggests that such periodisation of 
history is a problem atic simplification. The example of the Institute demonstrates 
that a workplace that is held to be one of the foundation stones of our coming 
knowledge economy incorporates features that are characteristically Modem.
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These features remind those both inside and outside the Institute of the forms of 
Industrial Age economic life. This, it should be noted, is not a case of the work of 
the Institute, and as a corollary, work in science, simply lagging behind the trend. 
The kind o f  work being done in the Institute was not described as being 
‘industrial’ because it had been left behind. Rather, the industrialisation of 
science seen at the Institute was a development that takes this particular instance 
of scientific practice away from the traditional form of work in science. This 
form o f work can be seen as the ideal o f ‘knowledge work’. In other words, the 
example o f the Institute shows that, however smoothly history appears to run 
‘forwards’ when viewed from a suitable distance, when considered at close 
quarters the path from the Industrial Age to the Knowledge Age is a path with 
many forks and turnings. This thesis does not suggest there are not changes in the 
way in which we organise our economic life, but rather than these changes are 
marked by continuity as much as by discontinuity, and by the reappearance, and 
reinvention, o f  forms o f economic life that have gone before. Given this, the task 
of studying the knowledge economy does not require a whole new sociology to be 
rebuilt from first foundations; the world has not become something so radically 
different we need abandon our tools and theories in the face o f an intractable post- 
Modem world. In the face o f these problems, the question is not whether we are 
living in Modernity, late-Modernity, post-Modernity, or whether we have perhaps 
never been M odem (Latour, 1993), but that the forms of life described by these 
labels are marked by threads o f continuity strong and distinct enough to render all 
these worlds intelligible to existing forms o f sociological study.
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J3 K n o w l e d g e  W o r k  a n d  K n o w l e d g e  W o r k e r s
We have heard rhetoric like that o f the knowledge economy before. This thesis 
argues that the knowledge economy is not a transformation on the scale of the 
Industrial Revolution. Such a revolution reorders the entire world, geographically, 
economically, socially, and culturally. It overturns the class relationships of 
existing society. Instead, the development of the knowledge economy it is a 
change, profound though it is, o f a kind with the automation of manufacturing in 
the mid-twentieth century. Then, as now, we were capable of looking into the 
near future and seeing a reordered world on the basis of these changes in our 
connection to the economy.
This was met not only with pessimism, but with political optimism. The 
enthusiasm o f contemporary governments for the development of knowledge 
economies mirrors that excitement found attitude of the British government 
towards the ‘white heat’ o f technology in the 1960s. The embrace of high 
technology, it was imagined, would achieve both economic growth and social 
progress (Edgerton, 1996). The rationale behind the increasing focus on high 
technology in the 1960s was built on a belief in a Bush-like (1945 [2007]) linear 
model o f economic growth resulting from research spending. This is strongly tied 
to notions o f the industrialism, not the dream of unshackling economies from their 
connection with labour and material resources. Nevertheless, a turn to science 
and technology, with all its promise o f Modernity, was seen as a path to 
prosperity and a better society. In the 1960s, this took the shape of sweeping 
away o f the anti-science Establishment that was holding back the potential of the 
masses.
And, in the 1960s, as now, there are suggestions that a knowledge economy, like 
the hi-tech economy expected during the 1960s, would do away with the drudgery 
of work. Senker (1992) recounts a strain of research in the mid to late 1960s, 
such as that by Lilley and by Fyrth and Goldsmith, which suggested that, rather 
than deskilling workplaces, increasing automation created a greater demand for 
skilled workers. Rather than producing armies of routine and low skilled workers,
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as might be feared, automation would eliminate the need for this kind of work. In 
that, these researchers argued that the education system would have to be 
strengthened and aligned in the pursuit of producing a nation of workers capable 
of filling these positions. This kind o f argument reminds us very much of the 
propaganda for the knowledge economy; greater amounts education is required to 
realise economic and social improvements. In the 1960s, the working classes 
were to become Blauner’s (1964) un-alienated process workers, in the twentieth 
century, when the working classes are admitted to the narrative at all, they are to 
become knowledge workers, committed, engaged and autonomous.
While we did not see a comprehensive revolution o f this sort, a liberation through 
technology, neither did we see the emergence of the dystopic automated world as 
described in Player Piano  (Vonnegut, 1952 [1980]). Unlike during the Industrial 
Revolution, there was not a turning over of the relationships of class and the 
developments o f new ones. Some descriptions of the knowledge economy 
suggest that highly-educated knowledge workers will form a new class in a post­
industrial economy. But Brown and Hesketh (2004), examining the question of 
employability, find little evidence to support the claim that, in the supposed 
knowledge economies o f  the US and UK, there is a constantly growing demand 
for graduates as knowledge workers. Indeed, they suggest that, if anything, there 
is an over-supply o f graduates40. This thesis argues that it does us no favours to 
see in the adjustments o f contemporary society the kinds of changes we could call 
a revolution41.
Who are knowledge workers and what is knowledge work? Are knowledge 
workers those who, as suggested by Charles Leadbetter (cited in Brown and 
Hesketh, 2004), those whose work produces nothing that can be weighed? This 
would accord with the bolder claims for the knowledge economy. But this 
definition would include a great deal o f routine, uncreative and low-status work, 
and excludes some whose work in transforming the physical world demands the 
continuous and highly-skilled application of knowledge and judgement. Others
40 If universities are considered the sites o f  the production o f  workers, rather than citizens.
41 U nless w e have a book or a policy to sell.
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seek to limit knowledge workers to those who have a high degree of education, 
use IT and have some degree o f autonomy. In definitions of knowledge work that 
revolve around the use o f IT, working with, or even creation of, knowledge by 
workers who do not use IT is not classed as knowledge work.
Benson and Brown (2007) provide a more useful definition of knowledge work. 
“Knowledge work is identified by the emphasis on information processing, 
problem solving and the production of knowledge” (p. 122) “The term 
knowledge work is often used to characterize the shift from routine operational 
tasks to more varied and complex work” (p. 124). Does this include or exclude 
the work o f the people who sequenced the human genome? The ‘work of the 
Institute’ is not the work o f any particular individual or job at the Institute. 
Collectively, the Institute is engaged in knowledge work. But this does not mean 
that all, or even any, o f the people working there should be described as 
knowledge workers. O f course, there is the problem that the notion of 
‘knowledge w ork’ may itself be unhelpful. If we describe an IT technician as 
being involved in knowledge work, do we also describe a plumber or electrician 
as also being so? Consistency would suggest that we do, unless we are to rig the 
categorisation o f knowledge work in such a way that it means little more that 
contemporarily culturally middle-class employment. Benson and Brown quote an 
unpublished paper by Sewell when addressing this problem. Such an approach, 
concentrating on occupations rather that the practices of work “’belies a 
degradation in the nature o f some “knowledge work” while simultaneously 
ignoring the increasing cognitive demands placed on many employees in 
traditional em ploym ent’” (p. 124). If it is the case that, as Benson and Brown 
write, quoting Horibe (1999), “[i]n short, knowledge workers add value to the 
enterprise through ‘their ideas, their analyses, their judgement, their syntheses, 
and their design’ (p. 125) then what do we have but a relabelling of what we used 
to describe as the professions into the language of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century. The division between routine and non-routine work does not 
capture the sense o f the knowledge economy, of the sectoral changes in work, 
rather it reiterates the divisions o f manual and mental labour.
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Benson and Brown (2007) expand and dissect their definition of a knowledge 
worker by suggesting that categorisation involves the consideration o f three axes; 
variety in the work, interdependence o f the work, and autonomy in the pursuit of 
the tasks at hand. Benson and Brown recommend a definition such as this as it 
avoids categorisation on occupational or sectoral grounds. But, in the context of a 
discussion o f a knowledge economy, sectoral classifications are both important 
and useful. If  we have knowledge work being conducted within the economy, in 
collectives such as the Institute, it is important that the fact that the individual 
workers employment in ‘routine’ work does not exclude them from consideration 
as a part o f the knowledge economy.
In actually existing knowledge economies, the proportion of workers classed as 
knowledge workers varies from analyst to analyst. Hesketh and Brown (2004) 
cite Reich to describe one o f the more restrictive definitions of the knowledge 
worker; the ‘symbolic analyst’. Reich’s definition excludes the majority of the 
workforce in technologically advanced economies. In a knowledge economy, the 
majority o f workers remain ‘routine production workers’, which includes even 
low- and middle-managers and routine IT workers, or work in ‘in-person 
services’, in which value is extracted by the exploitation of emotional labour. 
This reads as a pessimistic vision o f the knowledge economy, one that promises 
little capability to reverse trends towards inequality. Instead, it produces a 
minority o f knowledge workers, perhaps twenty percent, who occupy the role of 
an aristocracy o f  labour. The majority will be production workers or service 
workers in a culture that lauds knowledge work and denigrates other forms of 
necessary labour. Knowledge work is, as Brown and Hesketh (2004) title a 
section of their book, ‘nice work, if you can get it’.
Other analysts are much more optimistic. Brown and Hesketh (2004) suggest that 
writers such as Drucker (1992) put the proportion of knowledge workers at 
seventy per cent. This is optimistic, but problematic. Such a large number of 
people engaged in knowledge work is not a claim that is in accord with what 
Brown and H esketh find in their study of the economies o f the US and the UK. 
Many people might be employed in knowledge intensive industries, in the sectors 
of economic activity that characterise knowledge work. This does not mean that
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the work that they do is knowledge work, or that the knowledge economy has 
transformed their experience o f work. The proportion of the workforce that an 
analysts sees as knowledge workers appears to determine, or be determined by, 
the degree o f  optimism, that the analyst has for the knowledge economy to benefit 
society as a whole.
Thompson and W arhurst (1998) have argued that the labelling of an increasingly 
wide range o f jobs as knowledge work presents a misleading picture of society. 
Such descriptions make it appear that there has been a growth in knowledgeable 
workers, that the nature o f  work has changed. However, a great number of jobs in 
the knowledge intensive sectors o f the economy involve the performance of 
routine tasks. This theme is echoed by Alvesson (2004) who claimed that much 
work in many knowledge intensive firms is routine, and Fleming et al. (2004) 
who found that by ‘going below the surface’ the growth in occupations that were 
deemed to be knowledge work revealed a growth in many of the more routine 
aspects o f work” (p. 124). Even the claim that post-industrialism has involved a 
discontinuous shift from manufacturing work to service work has been challenged. 
Callinicos (1989) argues that the UK labour market at the turn of the twentieth 
century contained a substantial services ‘sector’, largely in the form of domestic 
servants42. Brown and Hesketh (2004) update the critique offered by Nichols and 
Beynon (1977) that it would be automation that would liberate us at work by 
reminding the reader o f the millions of cleaners, production workers, service 
industry workers, packers and so on, who are required even in the technological 
advanced economies o f the US and the UK. As Brown and Hesketh put it, labour 
is always required to ‘activate’ the value of ideas.
Continuities connect the knowledge economy to the manufacturing economies of 
the twentieth century. With regard to the development of the workplaces of the 
knowledge economy, this can be seen in Kleinman and Valias (2001). Kleinman 
and Valias describe the way in which the forms of work in knowledge intensive 
industrial sectors and academia are coming to resemble each other. They describe 
the relationship between the bureaucracy o f industrial corporations and the
42 The return o f  w hich  are lauded in the Sunday supplements as a sign o f  prosperity.
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collegiality o f academia as being in tension. These developments are a “shift 
away from  the hierarchical constraints that capitalism has historically imposed, 
toward  a newer, more flexible, and egalitarian organizational pattern” (p. 460). 
Though the forms o f work are new, they are built from the model of already 
existing forms o f work. Grint (1998) advises us to think of “the post-industrial 
future not simply as an inversion o f the industrial present but as embodying 
shadows o f the pre-industrial past” (p. 320).
These ‘new ’ forms o f  work promise autonomy and egalitarianism. Kleinman and 
Valias (2001) describe the process that Barley (1996) has called the ‘technization’ 
of work; that is, as work becomes more complex, those in work come to use ever 
more esoteric bodies o f knowledge, and work is resistant to the imposition of 
bureaucratic controls. A knowledge economy therefore, should be characterised 
by forms o f work that, in their essence, are resistant to existing forms of capitalist 
control. But, as Hesketh and Brown (2004) argue, this ‘nice work’ is not 
available to all. The knowledge economy is still characterised by routine work 
(Thompson and Warhurst, 1998).
Moreover, a counter-trend should be expected. If ideas are the engines of wealth 
creation, then we can expect to see the codification, routinisation, and even 
automation o f the work processes o f knowledge work. Not only to make the 
process more efficient, and not only to allow the deskilling o f workers. In a 
knowledge economy, where knowledge itself becomes a commodity, it would be 
unwise to leave this important commodity in the ownership o f employees, of 
labour, rather than under the control o f the organisation, of capital. This would 
mirror the development o f CNC machine tools, (Noble, 1984). Codification, 
routinisation and automation all transfer the knowledge from the minds and 
bodies o f the workers, who can walk out of the factory or laboratory, and into 
physical objects. These could be as simple as instruction manuals. Through these, 
ideas and knowledge can be treated as commodities, as objects.
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J4 T h e  D e -M o n  s t r a t io n  o f  t h e  In s t it u t e
The de-monstration o f the Institute forces us to consider our position between 
several sets o f oppositional relationships. Just as people approach the Institute 
from hinterlands o f work dominated by imagery of the factory or the university, 
now that we have had a chance to reflect on the Institute as a workplace in the 
context o f a technologically advanced economy with a claim to becoming a 
knowledge economy, how do we see its de-monstration? Are we optimists or 
pessimists? Are we a version o f what Mirowski and Van Horn (2005) have called 
the Economic Whigs, seeing in these new forms of work in science the room for 
an unleashing o f  econom ic potential? Or are we Mertonian Tories, who see in the 
rationalisation and industrialisation o f science a threat to knowledge production? 
When science is routinised and automated, as it must be when it is industrialised, 
are we ‘black box optim ists’ or ‘black box pessimists’ (McNally, 2008)? Do we 
see the black boxes as limiting or enabling? Which Weber do we read? The one 
who sees rationalisation as infinitely  superior to all traditional forms of social 
organization” (Mommsen, 1989, p. 111), or the one who sees bureaucratic rule as 
producing “conditions which will eventually precipitate its failure, or more often 
its petrification” (p. 116)? And, more widely, do we look forward to a knowledge 
economy o f rewarding creative work, in which ‘high road’ practices predominate, 
or do we see a future in which the workforce has been divided into a small, stable 
core o f knowledge workers, with the rest a disposable periphery, fractured and 
divided in an age o f post-Fordism, post-industrialism, and post-Modemism, 
vulnerable and unable to resist exploitation? Or even, are we ‘high road’ 
optimists or pessimists? Do we see in these new organisational forms a ‘hyper- 
Fordism’, in which responsibility is shifted from supervisors to workers, in which 
the internalisation o f the values and goals o f the organisation leads to self­
rationalisation, co-opting workers into increases in the intensity of work (Powell 
and Snellman, 2004)?
To what extent is the work o f the Institute ‘knowledge work’? As we argue, it 
would be counter intuitive to suggest that the Institute itself was not involved in 
knowledge work. The work of science is surely the archetype, the ideal even, of
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knowledge work. Though some have argued that the work of the Institute falls 
outside the definition o f science (Hood and Smith, 1987), based on the argument 
that genome sequencing asks no questions and tests no hypotheses43, it is tightly 
bound within the orbit o f science, and, patently, is involved the production of 
knowledge. The work o f the Institute, science or not, is sectorally part of the 
knowledge economy.
A great amount o f  the work o f sequencing genomes at the Institute did not require 
the recruitment o f  graduates or already trained workers. As Brown and Hesketh 
(2004) put it; “Knowledge worked, then, does not necessarily require certificated 
knowledge workers” (p. 55). Training was found at work, on-the-job, and did not 
require formal further or higher education. By conventional definitions, this 
would place the work at the Institute as outside the category of highly skilled 
work (Brown and Hesketh, 2004). This questions the assumption that an effective 
knowledge economy requires the expanding production of workers with formal 
further or higher education. In so much as the a key sector of the knowledge 
economy is biotechnology, and given that the sequence of the human genome is a 
key part o f the infrastructure that allows biotechnology to realise its possibilities, 
we can say that the knowledge economy is built on a foundation of jobs that do 
not require higher education. Brown and Hesketh’s (2004) study of employability 
would suggest that, in its existing form, knowledge economies do not require 
great masses o f  graduates. Brown and Hesketh describe actually existing 
knowledge economies as 80/20 economies, in which eighty per cent of the 
workforce is not engaged in knowledge work.
So are we pessimists or optimists with regard to the promise o f the knowledge 
economy? The fact that something as quintessentially ‘knowledge economy’ as 
the Human Genome Project was accomplished without the need for the 
recruitment o f  a great mass o f scientists, o f graduates, instead relying on the
43 This definition w ould exclude other scientific work from their definition o f  science. At least 
large parts o f  the work o f  naturalists, paleontologists, and astromonmers could all be described in 
this way. O f course, H ood and Smith (1987) were not writing as philosophers or sociologists o f  
science. They w ere acting as politicians, seeking to secure resources for a project to sequence the 
human genom e in the face o f  criticism s that such a project would be bad science. I f it is not 
science at all, such criticism s are neutralised. And i f  it is not science but akin to construction, 
there is no uncertainty over su ccess.
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recruitment o f untrained people leaves us in a state of ambivalence. This 
recruitment suggests that Brown and Hesketh’s (2004) 80/20 economy is the 
correct description, not the optimistic vision of Drucker (1992). Even in a 
knowledge economy, even in knowledge intensive firms, a great deal of work will 
involve routine work. There will be no new mass class o f university educated 
knowledge workers ready to revolutionise society. However, neither will people 
necessarily be left behind. Some will be, as the vision of full employment which 
was set out in the Lisbon meeting appears not to have met capitalist reality. But 
the Institute demonstrates that tremendous accomplishments in high technology, 
scientifically advanced work can be achieved by people who do not arrive at work 
equipped with a degree.
What o f new organisational forms, o f the ‘high road’? There is a tension here, 
which can be read through Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, and Chapter 
H, The High R oad to the Human Genome. In order for a worker to become 
affectively, attitudinally and normatively committed to their work, and to their 
workplace, their sentiments need to be recruited. They need to be engaged. If 
workers are to be engaged, the tasks that they do cannot be meaningless and they 
cannot be alienated from the values o f the organisation in which they work. This 
engagement is expressed as intrinsic satisfaction; the new forms of organising 
work that seem to accompany the emergence o f a knowledge economy produce 
work that is satisfying and engaging even as it is routine.
As we see in Chapter G, The Recruitment o f  Sentiment, when the Institute was in 
the process o f sequencing the human gerome it was led by the contingent 
charisma o f the founding director. Brown and Hesketh (2004) describe the move 
from bureaucratic management to charismatic leadership as part of the changes 
that are taken to characterise the emergence of knowledge economies. “The 
charismatic personality represents changing forms of symbolic control in the 
knowledge intensive organizations. It celebrates those managers who seek to 
undermine the structures o f routine action and rule-following behaviour” (p. 33). 
But the charismatic leadership o f the Institute was not a product of post­
industrialism, but a product o f the emergence of the Institute from a form of work
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that had much in common with pre-Fordist entrepreneurial firms. As much as the 
knowledge economy changes work, it reincarnates past forms.
Yet, as discussed in Chapter H, The High Road to the Human Genome, the kind 
of loyalty and engagement engendered by new forms of work and charismatic 
leadership hides the nature o f  the relationship between employee and employer, 
demands that the worker becomes their own supervisor, and leaves them without 
the resources by which to resist the intensification of their labour. Indeed, as 
engaged workers, this intensification is gladly accepted. The Institute, though, is 
exceptional. The recruitment o f sentiment involved factors that cannot be 
replicated in ‘ordinary’ workplaces of a knowledge economy. Without such 
exceptional factors as the narrative o f science as a benefit to all humankind, the 
special nature o f the hum an genome, and the moral dimension of the race, a more 
tempered degree o f engagement is the product.
What o f the perils and pathologies o f big, industrialised biological science? 
Watson (2003) identifies writers such as Blackburn et al. (1985) as arguing that 
ICT would allow the severing o f “ ‘the Fordist link between mass-production and 
economies o f scale’ by allowing ‘the production at lower costs of smaller but still 
economic batches’” (p. 67). Thus, workers would no longer need to be physically 
concentrated in large collectives. Yet the Institute was just this kind of 
concentration.
Nevertheless, this is another way in which the Institute can appear as a decade and 
a half cartoon recapitulation o f the history of industrialisation. We start with the 
craft workshop, the highly skilled, highly green-fingered work of molecular 
biologists, at a time when sequencing a gene was worthy of acclaim. This work 
was made more routine with the birth of the Institute, in which a number of 
craftspeople were brought together, the work was divided into rough chunks, but 
the atmosphere was still one of a family firm. This process was then 
industrialised, a development that was seen as one of the successes of the 
sequencing centres involved in sequencing the human genome (Hodgson, 2000). 
Post-Fordist diversification comes in two forms. First, the development of a 
number o f innovative small teams; the post-genomic smaller science faculty.
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Second, the development o f IT and the process of automation leads to a history of 
big science that might look something like the vision described by Peter.
So they’re going through that kind of parabolic curve, so at the 
moment the processes are more manual, so it’s upping physical 
bodies to do the task. But at the same time they’re looking at, 
you know, there must be a way to do this process better than just 
throwing people at it. So, again, it’s driving technologies to be 
developed saying, we don’t want to do that step manually, we’ve 
reached the level where it’s robust enough that it could be 
potentially automated, and therefore we need to look at how 
you’re going to automate it.
[Peter]
So, in the case o f  big biology, where the scaling up of science does not involve 
the construction o f massive pieces o f apparatus, as is the case in big physics, but 
rather does involve the multiplication o f labour- intensive bench-top processes, big 
science contains the seeds o f the logic that lead to its own withering away. At 
least, in so much as the science is big organisationally. The development of IT 
and automation allows biology to be a big informational science while being 
conducted in the labs o f  small(er) teams. Biology, in the case of genomics, has 
moved from craft work, through Fordist industrialisation, to post-Fordism, 
complete with, as we see in Chapter I, Interlude: Dis-Engagement and Dis­
integration, its own small-scale, localised version of the demoralisation of the 
working class, in the space of a decade and a half. The perils and pathologies of 
big biological science are increasingly irrelevant as the industrialised form of 
biology has produced its own redundancy.
What o f the cognitive community o f science, o f the generation of black boxes? 
Are we black box pessimists or black box optimists? McNally (2008), in her 
report from a multidisciplinary workshop on ‘the transformation of knowledge 
production in the biosciences’, describes the two positions.
On the black box ‘pessimist’ side was concern that black boxes 
are having a deskilling effect on the threshold for entry to the 
field, with adverse consequences on the quality of proteomics 
research. [...] the way forward is for researchers to be equipped 
with the skills to understand the workings of the various black 
boxes they deploy; and for black boxes themselves to be less
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black [ ...]  black box "optimists’ argued that instances of bad 
practice are not an argument against black boxes per se; that 
over time black boxes improve, becoming not only faster, more 
accurate and more sensitive, but also blacker and less amenable 
to tinkering, and that this is a sign of progress; and that black 
boxes are a good thing precisely because they empower 
individuals to perform tasks which would otherwise be beyond 
their ken. (McNally, 2008, p. 223-224)
It was the black boxing o f  knowledge that allowed the human genome to be 
sequenced. It was black boxing that enabled hundred upon hundreds of 
uncredentialed workers to take part in the accomplishment of sequencing the 
human genome. In this, it deskilled the job o f genome sequencing, but ‘upskilled’ 
those recruited to a knowledge intensive workplace that would otherwise not exist. 
Indeed, it is black boxes, not a creation of a new mass class of knowledge workers 
equipped with the higher degrees necessary to understand the work task from first 
principles, which makes the knowledge economy possible.
This study does not exhaust the kinds o f labour essential to the sequencing of the 
human genome, where are, for example, the cleaners, the caterers, the security 
guards? Nevertheless, in this study we enter the ‘hidden abode’ of production, get 
behind the mythic presentation o f the heroic men of science, and explore the 
experiences o f the day-to-day workers of large-scale genome sequencing which 
are most often absent from view in the ways that we ‘consume’ the genome. As 
we are reminded by Brown and Hesketh (2004), ju s t as we were reminded by 
Nichols and Beynon (1977), the lionisation o f the transformation of work ignores 
the continuities that connect these futures o f work to the work o f the past.
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